Senin, 24 Mei 2010

Patience and Change

In my new outlook of the dissertation as only the beginning of a whole new journey of understanding, I'm going to try to read much more broadly this summer (beyond my own "Derrida," as the movie below points out, with much amusement).

I'm just rereading "Letter from a Birmingham Jail" by Martin Luther King, Jr. The last time I read it, I completely understood his frustration with the "Patience" and "Wait" lines he had been fed growing up. Now that I've written a dissertation on the generation before King, on blacks and whites who alternatively decried "Patience" and advocated it, I'm seeing the "Letter" with new eyes.

We know through painful experience that freedom is never voluntarily given by the oppressor; it must be demanded by the oppressed. Frankly, I have yet to engage in a direct action campaign that was "well timed" in the view of those who have not suffered unduly from the disease of segregation. For years now I have heard the word "Wait!" It rings in the ear of every Negro with piercing familiarity. This "Wait" has almost always meant "Never." We must come to see, with one of our distinguished jurists, that "justice too long delayed is justice denied."

We have waited for more than 340 years for our constitutional and God given rights. The nations of Asia and Africa are moving with jetlike speed toward gaining political independence, but we still creep at horse and buggy pace toward gaining a cup of coffee at a lunch counter. Perhaps it is easy for those who have never felt the stinging darts of segregation to say, "Wait." But when you have seen vicious mobs lynch your mothers and fathers at will and drown your sisters and brothers at whim; when you have seen hate filled policemen curse, kick and even kill your black brothers and sisters; when you see the vast majority of your twenty million Negro brothers smothering in an airtight cage of poverty in the midst of an affluent society; when you suddenly find your tongue twisted and your speech stammering as you seek to explain to your six year old daughter why she can't go to the public amusement park that has just been advertised on television, and see tears welling up in her eyes when she is told that Funtown is closed to colored children, and see ominous clouds of inferiority beginning to form in her little mental sky, and see her beginning to distort her personality by developing an unconscious bitterness toward white people;
Isn't it interesting that King moves from horrifying violence and poverty to a more middle class exclusion from a theme park? Perhaps this seems particularly noteworthy in the light of subsequent events, where the black middle class can now participate in most things it can afford, but violence and poverty are still realities. There is a side historiographical conversation about how King's legacy has been tamed by "the media" (Singh and Hall are two I can think of)--an idea I intuitively agree with, but that needs more step-by-step analysis.

But what about King's claim that "Wait" means "Never"? There are so many elements in that statement. One is youth. Anna Arnold Hedgeman, in her autobiography, remembered a similar fierceness in her early years with the YWCA in the 1920s. She got so frustrated with white board members controlling the finances of black "neighborhood" (read segregated) branches and then telling her and her cohort to be patient, to wait for change. And yet, it was the years that Arnold Hedgeman worked in the YWCA, in the New York Mayor's first Equal Employment office, and with A. Philip Randolph to produce the March on Washington that did produce change.

There is a passion among the young to change the world right now. By placing his demands for rights and for change within waiting for 340 years, King glosses over the changes that had occurred since the constitution. He needed to--his essay was one of the most masterful and powerful pieces of persuasion in the twentieth century. I can't imagine it not being read for many more centuries.

I'm starting to realize that one of the contributions of my dissertation is witnessing slow change by people who advocated patience (while working) and by people who criticized the patient. Perhaps that is one of the major differences between the interwar generation of black leaders and the Civil Rights Movement generation. Even as I write that, I do not want to make it seem that African Americans ever just accepted Jim Crow in the way that King tears apart. But they did live with it, while working against it. And that living and working make for fascinating study.

Did the group I study lay the foundations for the Civil Rights Movement or turn into the "complacent" that King found himself fighting?

I began thinking about the fact that I stand in the middle of two opposing forces in the Negro community. One is a force of complacency, made up in part of Negroes who, as a result of long years of oppression, are so drained of self respect and a sense of "somebodiness" that they have adjusted to segregation; and in part of a few middle-class Negroes who, because of a degree of academic and economic security and because in some ways they profit by segregation, have become insensitive to the problems of the masses.



Yes and yes. It is too simple a question. Many black leaders in the 1930s criticized the black middle class for their distance from the "masses," but it was a self-critique. It was difficult to be both an intellectual and know for certain what motivated impoverished black people. Abram Harris, in particular, went through frequent self-analysis about his own role as an intellectual and also frequently critiqued middle class African Americans for not caring enough about economic injustice. Yet, but the time of King's writing, he might be considered one of those who "had academic and economic security"--not because he accepted segregation, but because he was one of the few who broke through it into a position at the University of Chicago (albeit a lesser position as only in the undergraduate college.).

One of the members of my committee asked a perceptive question during my defense--did I think that change happens in academics? Or does the academic system necessarily limit and order radical thought? Can we substitute the "academic system" for "white moderate" in the following King quote?

I must make two honest confessions to you, my Christian and Jewish brothers. First, I must confess that over the past few years I have been gravely disappointed with the white moderate. I have almost reached the regrettable conclusion that the Negro's great stumbling block in his stride toward freedom is not the White Citizen's Counciler or the Ku Klux Klanner, but the white moderate, who is more devoted to "order" than to justice; who prefers a negative peace which is the absence of tension to a positive peace which is the presence of justice; who constantly says: "I agree with you in the goal you seek, but I cannot agree with your methods of direct action"; who paternalistically believes he can set the timetable for another man's freedom; who lives by a mythical concept of time and who constantly advises the Negro to wait for a "more convenient season." Shallow understanding from people of good will is more frustrating than absolute misunderstanding from people of ill will. Lukewarm acceptance is much more bewildering than outright rejection.
I think my dissertation offers a complicated answer--yes, oftentimes academics chops off the most demanding calls for the ends of injustice. At the same time, the academy can also support those demands through careful thought and teaching positions. It is a difficult position--one that is frequently discussed among theorists and analysts of the current state of Black Studies.

(This is also a driving personal question for me--are we all extremists? "So the question is not whether we will be extremists, but what kind of extremists we will be. Will we be extremists for hate or for love? Will we be extremists for the preservation of injustice or for the extension of justice?" (King). Or is moderation possible? Post 9-11, it seems to me that moderation was hailed and extremism deplored by a certain liberal and vocal subset of society. Is that the more moral choice? If extremism is the better path, is it possible as an academic? Can moderates be moral standard bearers, or are they necessarily moral cowards? Do any of these questions even make sense outside of the particular moral question being asked?)

Patience and Change

In my new outlook of the dissertation as only the beginning of a whole new journey of understanding, I'm going to try to read much more broadly this summer (beyond my own "Derrida," as the movie below points out, with much amusement).

I'm just rereading "Letter from a Birmingham Jail" by Martin Luther King, Jr. The last time I read it, I completely understood his frustration with the "Patience" and "Wait" lines he had been fed growing up. Now that I've written a dissertation on the generation before King, on blacks and whites who alternatively decried "Patience" and advocated it, I'm seeing the "Letter" with new eyes.

We know through painful experience that freedom is never voluntarily given by the oppressor; it must be demanded by the oppressed. Frankly, I have yet to engage in a direct action campaign that was "well timed" in the view of those who have not suffered unduly from the disease of segregation. For years now I have heard the word "Wait!" It rings in the ear of every Negro with piercing familiarity. This "Wait" has almost always meant "Never." We must come to see, with one of our distinguished jurists, that "justice too long delayed is justice denied."

We have waited for more than 340 years for our constitutional and God given rights. The nations of Asia and Africa are moving with jetlike speed toward gaining political independence, but we still creep at horse and buggy pace toward gaining a cup of coffee at a lunch counter. Perhaps it is easy for those who have never felt the stinging darts of segregation to say, "Wait." But when you have seen vicious mobs lynch your mothers and fathers at will and drown your sisters and brothers at whim; when you have seen hate filled policemen curse, kick and even kill your black brothers and sisters; when you see the vast majority of your twenty million Negro brothers smothering in an airtight cage of poverty in the midst of an affluent society; when you suddenly find your tongue twisted and your speech stammering as you seek to explain to your six year old daughter why she can't go to the public amusement park that has just been advertised on television, and see tears welling up in her eyes when she is told that Funtown is closed to colored children, and see ominous clouds of inferiority beginning to form in her little mental sky, and see her beginning to distort her personality by developing an unconscious bitterness toward white people;
Isn't it interesting that King moves from horrifying violence and poverty to a more middle class exclusion from a theme park? Perhaps this seems particularly noteworthy in the light of subsequent events, where the black middle class can now participate in most things it can afford, but violence and poverty are still realities. There is a side historiographical conversation about how King's legacy has been tamed by "the media" (Singh and Hall are two I can think of)--an idea I intuitively agree with, but that needs more step-by-step analysis.

But what about King's claim that "Wait" means "Never"? There are so many elements in that statement. One is youth. Anna Arnold Hedgeman, in her autobiography, remembered a similar fierceness in her early years with the YWCA in the 1920s. She got so frustrated with white board members controlling the finances of black "neighborhood" (read segregated) branches and then telling her and her cohort to be patient, to wait for change. And yet, it was the years that Arnold Hedgeman worked in the YWCA, in the New York Mayor's first Equal Employment office, and with A. Philip Randolph to produce the March on Washington that did produce change.

There is a passion among the young to change the world right now. By placing his demands for rights and for change within waiting for 340 years, King glosses over the changes that had occurred since the constitution. He needed to--his essay was one of the most masterful and powerful pieces of persuasion in the twentieth century. I can't imagine it not being read for many more centuries.

I'm starting to realize that one of the contributions of my dissertation is witnessing slow change by people who advocated patience (while working) and by people who criticized the patient. Perhaps that is one of the major differences between the interwar generation of black leaders and the Civil Rights Movement generation. Even as I write that, I do not want to make it seem that African Americans ever just accepted Jim Crow in the way that King tears apart. But they did live with it, while working against it. And that living and working make for fascinating study.

Did the group I study lay the foundations for the Civil Rights Movement or turn into the "complacent" that King found himself fighting?

I began thinking about the fact that I stand in the middle of two opposing forces in the Negro community. One is a force of complacency, made up in part of Negroes who, as a result of long years of oppression, are so drained of self respect and a sense of "somebodiness" that they have adjusted to segregation; and in part of a few middle-class Negroes who, because of a degree of academic and economic security and because in some ways they profit by segregation, have become insensitive to the problems of the masses.



Yes and yes. It is too simple a question. Many black leaders in the 1930s criticized the black middle class for their distance from the "masses," but it was a self-critique. It was difficult to be both an intellectual and know for certain what motivated impoverished black people. Abram Harris, in particular, went through frequent self-analysis about his own role as an intellectual and also frequently critiqued middle class African Americans for not caring enough about economic injustice. Yet, but the time of King's writing, he might be considered one of those who "had academic and economic security"--not because he accepted segregation, but because he was one of the few who broke through it into a position at the University of Chicago (albeit a lesser position as only in the undergraduate college.).

One of the members of my committee asked a perceptive question during my defense--did I think that change happens in academics? Or does the academic system necessarily limit and order radical thought? Can we substitute the "academic system" for "white moderate" in the following King quote?

I must make two honest confessions to you, my Christian and Jewish brothers. First, I must confess that over the past few years I have been gravely disappointed with the white moderate. I have almost reached the regrettable conclusion that the Negro's great stumbling block in his stride toward freedom is not the White Citizen's Counciler or the Ku Klux Klanner, but the white moderate, who is more devoted to "order" than to justice; who prefers a negative peace which is the absence of tension to a positive peace which is the presence of justice; who constantly says: "I agree with you in the goal you seek, but I cannot agree with your methods of direct action"; who paternalistically believes he can set the timetable for another man's freedom; who lives by a mythical concept of time and who constantly advises the Negro to wait for a "more convenient season." Shallow understanding from people of good will is more frustrating than absolute misunderstanding from people of ill will. Lukewarm acceptance is much more bewildering than outright rejection.
I think my dissertation offers a complicated answer--yes, oftentimes academics chops off the most demanding calls for the ends of injustice. At the same time, the academy can also support those demands through careful thought and teaching positions. It is a difficult position--one that is frequently discussed among theorists and analysts of the current state of Black Studies.

(This is also a driving personal question for me--are we all extremists? "So the question is not whether we will be extremists, but what kind of extremists we will be. Will we be extremists for hate or for love? Will we be extremists for the preservation of injustice or for the extension of justice?" (King). Or is moderation possible? Post 9-11, it seems to me that moderation was hailed and extremism deplored by a certain liberal and vocal subset of society. Is that the more moral choice? If extremism is the better path, is it possible as an academic? Can moderates be moral standard bearers, or are they necessarily moral cowards? Do any of these questions even make sense outside of the particular moral question being asked?)

Jumat, 21 Mei 2010

Noteworthy Quote From U.S. Intellectual History

"There is no philosopher in the world so great but that he believes a million things on the faith of other people and accepts a great many more truths than he demonstrates." --- Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Volume 2, Chapter 2

Noteworthy Quote From U.S. Intellectual History

"There is no philosopher in the world so great but that he believes a million things on the faith of other people and accepts a great many more truths than he demonstrates." --- Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Volume 2, Chapter 2

CFP Of Interest: Essays in Philosophy

This upcoming issue of Essays in Philosophy looks like it's begging for a contribution from an intellectual historian. I mean, the best predictor of the future is past performance, right? That's what the investment adds tell us. Anyway, I've put passages of interest in bold. - TL

---------------------------------------------------------

Call for papers: Special issue of Essays in Philosophy

Philosophy's Future: Science or Something Else?

It has been well over two centuries since Kant asked, essentially, whether philosophy is possible as a science. What is the answer? Analytic philosophers today talk as if our discipline is a branch of science: We aspire to the rigor of mathematics, the objectivity of physics, the explanatory power of biology, and so forth. But if philosophy is like a science, then it is a science like no other. Philosophical proposals that are hundreds or even thousands of years old are taken seriously in the present, even as it is widely believed that those ideas don't solve their respective problems. No philosophical idea ever dies, and no philosophical idea ever gains full acceptance, either. No other solution-based, intellectual discipline has this property. Philosophers hypothesize answers like scientists, structure arguments like mathematicians, and end up with theories as inscrutable as art. It is time to ask again where philosophy stands as a problem solving discipline-to ask again, have we advanced even one step? Can we?

Essays in Philosophy, Volume 12, Number 2
Issue date: July 2011
Submission deadline: December 31, 2010
Editors: Eric Dietrich (SUNY Binghamton) and Zach Weber (University of
Melbourne)

All submissions should be sent to the general editor via email:
boersema@pacificu.edu.

CFP Of Interest: Essays in Philosophy

This upcoming issue of Essays in Philosophy looks like it's begging for a contribution from an intellectual historian. I mean, the best predictor of the future is past performance, right? That's what the investment adds tell us. Anyway, I've put passages of interest in bold. - TL

---------------------------------------------------------

Call for papers: Special issue of Essays in Philosophy

Philosophy's Future: Science or Something Else?

It has been well over two centuries since Kant asked, essentially, whether philosophy is possible as a science. What is the answer? Analytic philosophers today talk as if our discipline is a branch of science: We aspire to the rigor of mathematics, the objectivity of physics, the explanatory power of biology, and so forth. But if philosophy is like a science, then it is a science like no other. Philosophical proposals that are hundreds or even thousands of years old are taken seriously in the present, even as it is widely believed that those ideas don't solve their respective problems. No philosophical idea ever dies, and no philosophical idea ever gains full acceptance, either. No other solution-based, intellectual discipline has this property. Philosophers hypothesize answers like scientists, structure arguments like mathematicians, and end up with theories as inscrutable as art. It is time to ask again where philosophy stands as a problem solving discipline-to ask again, have we advanced even one step? Can we?

Essays in Philosophy, Volume 12, Number 2
Issue date: July 2011
Submission deadline: December 31, 2010
Editors: Eric Dietrich (SUNY Binghamton) and Zach Weber (University of
Melbourne)

All submissions should be sent to the general editor via email:
boersema@pacificu.edu.

Selasa, 18 Mei 2010

The Revenge of the Eustonians; or Benda It Like Berman

This Sunday, the New York Times Book Review featured a glowing assessment by Anthony Julius of Paul Berman's new book, The Flight of the Intellectuals, which angrily accuses Western left-wing intellectuals of embracing the Oxford University Muslim scholar Tariq Ramadan while failing to come to the defense of the Somali-Dutch refugee and American Enterprise Institute Resident Fellow Ayaan Hirsi Ali. Ramadan, according to Berman, is a slippery character whose opposition to Islamic radicalism is more ambivalent than is often said; while Hirsi Ali is a brave secularist who has devoted her career to truly opposing Islamic extremism in the name of Enlightenment values. But Berman and Julius seem more interested in their opponents on the Western intellectual left, who, they argue, have betrayed their vocation and their intellectual heritage through (in Julius's words):

the false identification of liberal values with an oppressive West, and of political Islamism with an oppressed third world; an unreflective, unqualified opposition to every exercise of American power; a certain blindness regarding, or even tenderness toward, contemporary expressions of anti-Semitism.


For Julius, Berman's book is an impressive entry in a genre that includes Richard Wolin's Seduction of Unreason: the Intellectual Romance with Fascism from Nietzsche to Postmodernism and the many books devoted to Martin Heidegger's Nazism, works which call intellectuals to account for monstrous political failings. As Julius notes, the urtext of this genre is Julien Benda's La Trahison des Clerc (The Betrayal of the Intellectuals) (1927), which attacked intellectuals who abandoned dispassionate reason in favor of nationalism, racism, and militarism.

"Berman," writes Julius, "has a fair claim to being regarded as the Benda of our time. In The Flight of the Intellectuals he continues his work of redeeming the good name of intellectuals by exposing the corrupt among them."

Berman's book has also been lavishly praised by Ron Rosenbaum in Slate, who had personally encouraged Berman to expand an already extensive 2007 New Republic piece attacking Tariq Ramadan.

What links Berman, Julius, and Rosenbaum, is that each is strongly connected to the self-described Decent Left that emerged following 9/11. And the elephant in the room of their discussion of left intellectuals and Tariq Ramadan is the Decent Left's signal project, the War on Iraq.

Paul Berman, in particular, has been an unusually committed and dogged proponent of that war, seeing it as the first necessary step in a long war against "Muslim totalitarianism."* Along with Berman, Anthony Julius was an early signatory to the Euston Manifesto, a 2006 British document that excoriated the anti-war left and has been the chief institutional manifestation of the pro-war left in the UK.

Ron Rosenbaum, for his part, was ambivalent about the upcoming Iraq War in October 2002, but he knew what he didn't like--the anti-war movement. How dare leftist academics attack George W. Bush and John Ashcroft, Rosenbaum wrote, when they had yet to atone for the crimes of Josef Stalin and Pol Pot:

Goodbye to the brilliant thinkers of the Left who believe it’s the very height of wit to make fun of George W. Bush’s intelligence—thereby establishing, of course, how very, very smart they are. Mr. Bush may not be the sharpest knife in the drawer (I think he’s more ill-informed and lazy than dumb). But they are guilty of a historical stupidity on a far greater scale, in their blind spot about Marxist genocides. It’s a failure of self-knowledge and intellectual responsibility that far outweighs Bush’s, because they’re supposed to be so very smart.


"I guess today," Rosenbaum concluded dramatically, "Left means never having to say you're sorry."

Say what you will about the Eustonian "leftists," they certainly seem to have adopted Rosenbaum's accusatory credo as their own when it comes to the Iraq War.

There have been many more appalling crimes in the last bloody century of the world's history, but in this young millennium, the War on Iraq stands as one of the greatest wastes of human life and national treasure. It helped destabilize a region. It ushered in new threats to civil liberties in two of the world's great democracies. It placed the United States in the company of the world's open torturers. And unlike Stalin's and Pol Pot's genocides, this one is our responsibility as Americans and Brits. And special responsibility lies with the war's unrepentant cheerleaders.

So while I don't have a studied opinion about Tariq Ramadan, I do know that Paul Berman, Anthony Julius, and Ron Rosenbaum are pretty much the last people who ought to be lecturing us about the trahison des clercs.**
________________________________________
* Berman's view of the war is on fine display in the Slate forum entitled "Liberal Hawks Reconsider the Iraq War" (in Berman's case, not very much).

** For an alternate view on Tariq Ramadan, see this recent Andrew March piece from The American Prospect.

The Revenge of the Eustonians; or Benda It Like Berman

This Sunday, the New York Times Book Review featured a glowing assessment by Anthony Julius of Paul Berman's new book, The Flight of the Intellectuals, which angrily accuses Western left-wing intellectuals of embracing the Oxford University Muslim scholar Tariq Ramadan while failing to come to the defense of the Somali-Dutch refugee and American Enterprise Institute Resident Fellow Ayaan Hirsi Ali. Ramadan, according to Berman, is a slippery character whose opposition to Islamic radicalism is more ambivalent than is often said; while Hirsi Ali is a brave secularist who has devoted her career to truly opposing Islamic extremism in the name of Enlightenment values. But Berman and Julius seem more interested in their opponents on the Western intellectual left, who, they argue, have betrayed their vocation and their intellectual heritage through (in Julius's words):

the false identification of liberal values with an oppressive West, and of political Islamism with an oppressed third world; an unreflective, unqualified opposition to every exercise of American power; a certain blindness regarding, or even tenderness toward, contemporary expressions of anti-Semitism.


For Julius, Berman's book is an impressive entry in a genre that includes Richard Wolin's Seduction of Unreason: the Intellectual Romance with Fascism from Nietzsche to Postmodernism and the many books devoted to Martin Heidegger's Nazism, works which call intellectuals to account for monstrous political failings. As Julius notes, the urtext of this genre is Julien Benda's La Trahison des Clerc (The Betrayal of the Intellectuals) (1927), which attacked intellectuals who abandoned dispassionate reason in favor of nationalism, racism, and militarism.

"Berman," writes Julius, "has a fair claim to being regarded as the Benda of our time. In The Flight of the Intellectuals he continues his work of redeeming the good name of intellectuals by exposing the corrupt among them."

Berman's book has also been lavishly praised by Ron Rosenbaum in Slate, who had personally encouraged Berman to expand an already extensive 2007 New Republic piece attacking Tariq Ramadan.

What links Berman, Julius, and Rosenbaum, is that each is strongly connected to the self-described Decent Left that emerged following 9/11. And the elephant in the room of their discussion of left intellectuals and Tariq Ramadan is the Decent Left's signal project, the War on Iraq.

Paul Berman, in particular, has been an unusually committed and dogged proponent of that war, seeing it as the first necessary step in a long war against "Muslim totalitarianism."* Along with Berman, Anthony Julius was an early signatory to the Euston Manifesto, a 2006 British document that excoriated the anti-war left and has been the chief institutional manifestation of the pro-war left in the UK.

Ron Rosenbaum, for his part, was ambivalent about the upcoming Iraq War in October 2002, but he knew what he didn't like--the anti-war movement. How dare leftist academics attack George W. Bush and John Ashcroft, Rosenbaum wrote, when they had yet to atone for the crimes of Josef Stalin and Pol Pot:

Goodbye to the brilliant thinkers of the Left who believe it’s the very height of wit to make fun of George W. Bush’s intelligence—thereby establishing, of course, how very, very smart they are. Mr. Bush may not be the sharpest knife in the drawer (I think he’s more ill-informed and lazy than dumb). But they are guilty of a historical stupidity on a far greater scale, in their blind spot about Marxist genocides. It’s a failure of self-knowledge and intellectual responsibility that far outweighs Bush’s, because they’re supposed to be so very smart.


"I guess today," Rosenbaum concluded dramatically, "Left means never having to say you're sorry."

Say what you will about the Eustonian "leftists," they certainly seem to have adopted Rosenbaum's accusatory credo as their own when it comes to the Iraq War.

There have been many more appalling crimes in the last bloody century of the world's history, but in this young millennium, the War on Iraq stands as one of the greatest wastes of human life and national treasure. It helped destabilize a region. It ushered in new threats to civil liberties in two of the world's great democracies. It placed the United States in the company of the world's open torturers. And unlike Stalin's and Pol Pot's genocides, this one is our responsibility as Americans and Brits. And special responsibility lies with the war's unrepentant cheerleaders.

So while I don't have a studied opinion about Tariq Ramadan, I do know that Paul Berman, Anthony Julius, and Ron Rosenbaum are pretty much the last people who ought to be lecturing us about the trahison des clercs.**
________________________________________
* Berman's view of the war is on fine display in the Slate forum entitled "Liberal Hawks Reconsider the Iraq War" (in Berman's case, not very much).

** For an alternate view on Tariq Ramadan, see this recent Andrew March piece from The American Prospect.

Jumat, 14 Mei 2010

CFP: “Intellectuals and Their Publics”

Third Annual U.S. Intellectual History Conference
Sponsored by USIH and the Center for the Humanities
The Graduate Center, CUNY
New York City
October 21-22, 2010

Paper and panel proposals are welcome for the Third Annual U.S. Intellectual History Conference to be held on October 21-22, 2010 in New York City. The Conference is being organized by the editors of the U.S. Intellectual History (USIH) blog in coordination with the City University of New York's Center for the Humanities (The Graduate Center). Founded in 2007, USIH promotes discussion of American intellectual history and fosters connections between scholars from any discipline sharing this interest. Visit our site: http://us-intellectual-history.blogspot.com/

This year’s theme is “Intellectuals and Their Publics.” We seek papers and panels reflecting upon the social, political, and cultural impact of intellectuals and their varied relationships to a diversity of publics, such as ethnic or racial groups, professionals, scholars, artists, politicians, or civil rights organizations. Intellectuals have always worked in relationship to their audience. In what ways have intellectuals defined, or been defined by, their audiences? In the pluralistic public culture of the United States, have audience divisions shaped distinctive intellectual traditions or supplemented a common public culture? In general, how have intellectuals—whether scientists or theologians, philosophers or authors, artists or policymakers—sought broader public relevance, as social critics, “public intellectuals,” or in other ways? In what ways have academic intellectuals breached disciplinary boundaries and/or reached non-academic audiences? Have the responsibilities pressed upon, and accepted by, Black, Latino/a, Native American, and Asian-American intellectuals been different from those expected of Euro-Americans? While we solicit papers on these and related issues, we welcome papers and panels on other aspects of U.S. intellectual history as well.

In addition to individual papers, we also encourage submissions of full panels and applications from those who would be interested in moderating a session. Please submit electronic abstracts for papers, panels, or both by Tuesday, June 15, 2010. Proposals should be approximately 200 words and include a concise curriculum vitae for each participant. Be sure to include your postal and e-mail addresses, as well as a phone number. Those interested in chairing a session or commenting should send a CV indicating areas of expertise and interests. Panels will feature three papers, no longer than 20 minutes each. Sessions will last 120 minutes.

Please address all inquiries and abstracts to:

Andrew Hartman
ahartma@ilstu.edu

CFP: “Intellectuals and Their Publics”

Third Annual U.S. Intellectual History Conference
Sponsored by USIH and the Center for the Humanities
The Graduate Center, CUNY
New York City
October 21-22, 2010

Paper and panel proposals are welcome for the Third Annual U.S. Intellectual History Conference to be held on October 21-22, 2010 in New York City. The Conference is being organized by the editors of the U.S. Intellectual History (USIH) blog in coordination with the City University of New York's Center for the Humanities (The Graduate Center). Founded in 2007, USIH promotes discussion of American intellectual history and fosters connections between scholars from any discipline sharing this interest. Visit our site: http://us-intellectual-history.blogspot.com/

This year’s theme is “Intellectuals and Their Publics.” We seek papers and panels reflecting upon the social, political, and cultural impact of intellectuals and their varied relationships to a diversity of publics, such as ethnic or racial groups, professionals, scholars, artists, politicians, or civil rights organizations. Intellectuals have always worked in relationship to their audience. In what ways have intellectuals defined, or been defined by, their audiences? In the pluralistic public culture of the United States, have audience divisions shaped distinctive intellectual traditions or supplemented a common public culture? In general, how have intellectuals—whether scientists or theologians, philosophers or authors, artists or policymakers—sought broader public relevance, as social critics, “public intellectuals,” or in other ways? In what ways have academic intellectuals breached disciplinary boundaries and/or reached non-academic audiences? Have the responsibilities pressed upon, and accepted by, Black, Latino/a, Native American, and Asian-American intellectuals been different from those expected of Euro-Americans? While we solicit papers on these and related issues, we welcome papers and panels on other aspects of U.S. intellectual history as well.

In addition to individual papers, we also encourage submissions of full panels and applications from those who would be interested in moderating a session. Please submit electronic abstracts for papers, panels, or both by Tuesday, June 15, 2010. Proposals should be approximately 200 words and include a concise curriculum vitae for each participant. Be sure to include your postal and e-mail addresses, as well as a phone number. Those interested in chairing a session or commenting should send a CV indicating areas of expertise and interests. Panels will feature three papers, no longer than 20 minutes each. Sessions will last 120 minutes.

Please address all inquiries and abstracts to:

Andrew Hartman
ahartma@ilstu.edu

USIH 3.0: Keynote and Plenary Sessions

[Updated: 5/14/2010]

The program for the third annual U.S. Intellectual History Conference (USIH3) will be highlighted by the following keynote speaker and plenary sessions:

------------------------------------------------------------------

Keynote: James Kloppenberg, the Charles Warren Professor of American History at Harvard University.
Friday, Oct. 22, 1:30-3:00 p.m.

Professor Kloppenberg specializes in American and European intellectual history. For his keynote, Kloppenberg will be presenting from his book on the thought of Barack Obama, forthcoming from Princeton University Press.He has written about the rise and fall of social democracy in Europe and America; eighteenth-century American politics and ideas; the career of the American philosophy of pragmatism from the late nineteenth to the twenty-first century; European interpretations of American culture from Tocqueville through Weber; and the relation between contemporary critical theory and historical writing.

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Plenary: Intellectual History for What?
Friday, Oct. 22, 7-9 p.m.

George Cotkin
Rochelle Gurstein
Elisabeth Lasch-Quinn
Wilfred McClay
David Steigerwald
Casey Nelson Blake

This plenary session will raise a number of questions involving the relationship between intellectual history and less specialized audiences and genres of expression, including: intellectual history and social/cultural criticism; intellectual history as a resource for moral reflection and edification; writing for, teaching, and speaking to generalist audiences; and the ambiguous position of intellectual history within the research university.

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Plenary: Renewing Black Intellectual History
Thursday, Oct 21, 6-8 p.m.

The following four speakers are confirmed:

Adolph Reed, Jr.
Kenneth W. Warren
Dean E. Robinson
Touré F. Reed

This plenary that will consist of several contributors to an exciting new anthology, Renewing Black Intellectual History: The Ideological and Material Foundations of African American Thought. "This book maps the changing conditions of black political practice and experience from Emancipation to Obama with excursions into the Jim Crow era, Black Power radicalism, and the Reagan revolt. Here are essays, classic and new, that define historically and conceptually discrete problems affecting black Americans as these problems have been shaped by both politics and scholarly fashion. A key goal of the book is to come to terms with the changing terrain of American life in view of major Civil Rights court decisions and legislation."

USIH 3.0: Keynote and Plenary Sessions

[Updated: 5/14/2010]

The program for the third annual U.S. Intellectual History Conference (USIH3) will be highlighted by the following keynote speaker and plenary sessions:

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Keynote: James Kloppenberg, the Charles Warren Professor of American History at Harvard University.
Friday, Oct. 22, 1:30-3:00 p.m.

Professor Kloppenberg specializes in American and European intellectual history. For his keynote, Kloppenberg will be presenting from his book on the thought of Barack Obama, forthcoming from Princeton University Press.He has written about the rise and fall of social democracy in Europe and America; eighteenth-century American politics and ideas; the career of the American philosophy of pragmatism from the late nineteenth to the twenty-first century; European interpretations of American culture from Tocqueville through Weber; and the relation between contemporary critical theory and historical writing.

------------------------------------------------------------------

Plenary: Intellectual History for What?
Friday, Oct. 22, 7-9 p.m.

George Cotkin
Rochelle Gurstein
Elisabeth Lasch-Quinn
Wilfred McClay
David Steigerwald
Casey Nelson Blake

This plenary session will raise a number of questions involving the relationship between intellectual history and less specialized audiences and genres of expression, including: intellectual history and social/cultural criticism; intellectual history as a resource for moral reflection and edification; writing for, teaching, and speaking to generalist audiences; and the ambiguous position of intellectual history within the research university.

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Plenary: Renewing Black Intellectual History
Thursday, Oct 21, 6-8 p.m.

The following four speakers are confirmed:

Adolph Reed, Jr.
Kenneth W. Warren
Dean E. Robinson
Touré F. Reed

This plenary that will consist of several contributors to an exciting new anthology, Renewing Black Intellectual History: The Ideological and Material Foundations of African American Thought. "This book maps the changing conditions of black political practice and experience from Emancipation to Obama with excursions into the Jim Crow era, Black Power radicalism, and the Reagan revolt. Here are essays, classic and new, that define historically and conceptually discrete problems affecting black Americans as these problems have been shaped by both politics and scholarly fashion. A key goal of the book is to come to terms with the changing terrain of American life in view of major Civil Rights court decisions and legislation."

Rabu, 12 Mei 2010

Doing the backwards Kuhn

Interesting thoughts about historical methodology and theory from Adolph Reed in 1997 (I highlighted the Kuhn reference I mention in my title):

9: It is natural enough--given the primacy of racial subordination and oppression--that Afro-American thinking has been so thoroughly dominated by issues of racial strategy. What Myrdal overlooked, however, is that even the narrowest, most 'provincial' lines of debate derive from and are structured by a normatively significant language of politics, a discourse bound by shared 'values, beliefs, perceptions, and concepts.' In their various critiques Fontaine, Reddick, Thorpe, and Frazier in effect were calling for black intellectuals to adopt a more critically reflective stance vis-a-vis the foundations of prevailing patterns of black social and political discourse."

10: "Under these influences, Afro-Americanist scholarship congealed around an intellectual core characterized by naivete concerning both the historical autonomy of political thought and the theoretical and epistemic foundations of its own enterprise. As a consequence, research has been largely blind to the regions of deeper normative meanings that are tacit within expressly pragmatic black political debates; for penetrating those regions requires reconstructing the historically specific intellectuals conventions that set the terms of episodic controversy. Not having access to the conventional groundings of black discourse, furthermore, undermines the project of commenting other than trivially on the durable features and self-driving characteristics of Afro-American thought. Instead, such commentary has tended to depict either a perennial chase after platitudinous symbols--'freedom,' 'equality,' even 'struggle'--or a Whiggish saga of the linear unfolding of a grand idea.

11: For students of Afro-American thought the call for critical reflectiveness is therefore most importantly a call for making the normative underpinnings of black thought accessible. Thus we must examine texts as historical artifacts of specific discursive communities. This is in turn entails a need for greater theoretical self-consciousness about two discrete aspects of our approach to our subject matter; one bearing on the relation between the Afro-Americanist and Americanist fields, and the other more generally on the history of ideas. First, to the extent that black thought takes shape within a broader American language of politics, credible recovery of the normative principles tacit in black discourse requires accounting for that constitutive grammar of political debate. ... The study of Afro-American thought can be enriched by rigorous study of American thought and should be so informed.

This methodological innocence--a function of the prevailing naivete about historical contextuality--has left Afro-Americanists without a basis for discussing either interpretive standards or purposive orientations to research. This point should not be taken to suggest a call for a research 'paradigm.' Such an effort hints of solipsism and would deploy scholarly resources most inefficiently. Besides, exercises in paradigm building very likely invert their Kuhnian inspiration anyway. By forgetting that paradigms--when and where they exist--are born, not made, efforts to call them into existence commit a version of the well-known error of confounding the history of science and its summary reconstruction as a sequential logic in the philosophy of science. In this area Hegel's dictum holds: 'The way is the long way around'; one might add, 'if there is any way at all.' Rather, what I am suggesting is simply that we inform our work with the insights--and the ambiguities--generated by hermeneutical and otherwise procedural discussions throughout the broader history of ideas (and, for that matter, literary criticism).

Proper attentiveness to historical contextuality requires breaking the thrall of presentism and similar forms of interpretive naivete, which in turn requires cultivating an attitude of humility and cautious self-doubt in approach to texts. These qualities can be enhanced by making the field's reigning assumptions and procedures objects of scrutiny and by considering Afro-American thought to be a 'relatively autonomous' subset of American thought in general and the history of ideas writ large.

Doing the backwards Kuhn

Interesting thoughts about historical methodology and theory from Adolph Reed in 1997 (I highlighted the Kuhn reference I mention in my title):

9: It is natural enough--given the primacy of racial subordination and oppression--that Afro-American thinking has been so thoroughly dominated by issues of racial strategy. What Myrdal overlooked, however, is that even the narrowest, most 'provincial' lines of debate derive from and are structured by a normatively significant language of politics, a discourse bound by shared 'values, beliefs, perceptions, and concepts.' In their various critiques Fontaine, Reddick, Thorpe, and Frazier in effect were calling for black intellectuals to adopt a more critically reflective stance vis-a-vis the foundations of prevailing patterns of black social and political discourse."

10: "Under these influences, Afro-Americanist scholarship congealed around an intellectual core characterized by naivete concerning both the historical autonomy of political thought and the theoretical and epistemic foundations of its own enterprise. As a consequence, research has been largely blind to the regions of deeper normative meanings that are tacit within expressly pragmatic black political debates; for penetrating those regions requires reconstructing the historically specific intellectuals conventions that set the terms of episodic controversy. Not having access to the conventional groundings of black discourse, furthermore, undermines the project of commenting other than trivially on the durable features and self-driving characteristics of Afro-American thought. Instead, such commentary has tended to depict either a perennial chase after platitudinous symbols--'freedom,' 'equality,' even 'struggle'--or a Whiggish saga of the linear unfolding of a grand idea.

11: For students of Afro-American thought the call for critical reflectiveness is therefore most importantly a call for making the normative underpinnings of black thought accessible. Thus we must examine texts as historical artifacts of specific discursive communities. This is in turn entails a need for greater theoretical self-consciousness about two discrete aspects of our approach to our subject matter; one bearing on the relation between the Afro-Americanist and Americanist fields, and the other more generally on the history of ideas. First, to the extent that black thought takes shape within a broader American language of politics, credible recovery of the normative principles tacit in black discourse requires accounting for that constitutive grammar of political debate. ... The study of Afro-American thought can be enriched by rigorous study of American thought and should be so informed.

This methodological innocence--a function of the prevailing naivete about historical contextuality--has left Afro-Americanists without a basis for discussing either interpretive standards or purposive orientations to research. This point should not be taken to suggest a call for a research 'paradigm.' Such an effort hints of solipsism and would deploy scholarly resources most inefficiently. Besides, exercises in paradigm building very likely invert their Kuhnian inspiration anyway. By forgetting that paradigms--when and where they exist--are born, not made, efforts to call them into existence commit a version of the well-known error of confounding the history of science and its summary reconstruction as a sequential logic in the philosophy of science. In this area Hegel's dictum holds: 'The way is the long way around'; one might add, 'if there is any way at all.' Rather, what I am suggesting is simply that we inform our work with the insights--and the ambiguities--generated by hermeneutical and otherwise procedural discussions throughout the broader history of ideas (and, for that matter, literary criticism).

Proper attentiveness to historical contextuality requires breaking the thrall of presentism and similar forms of interpretive naivete, which in turn requires cultivating an attitude of humility and cautious self-doubt in approach to texts. These qualities can be enhanced by making the field's reigning assumptions and procedures objects of scrutiny and by considering Afro-American thought to be a 'relatively autonomous' subset of American thought in general and the history of ideas writ large.

Senin, 10 Mei 2010

History "Reading" In Graduate School: A Follow-Up

Although I wrote that I agreed with many points in Larry Cebula's "How to Read a Book in One Hour" post, I must admit that I did so with some regret. I truly do enjoy good history writing when I find it. And graduate school would be a waste if one only took books apart rather than relishing, at times, in an author's prose. Indeed, maybe graduate programs are turning out substandard writers, in part, because seminar reading programs are too heavy with 15-books-in-15-weeks type syllabi? Perhaps it is less that programs are not teaching historians how to write, and more that programs are not letting students learn to appreciate good prose?

I am in this reflective mood about slow reading courtesy of Christopher Shea at the Boston Globe's Brainiac blog. There I ran across the reflections of Columbia University literature professor Jenny Davidson. Davidson recently won Columbia University's Mark Van Doren Award for undergraduate teaching excellence, and she posted the remarks she planned to give at the award ceremony. Here's a passage that struck me (bolds mine):

It is tempting to rush to broad thematic generalizations about a work or an author, but how can you answer a big question about what something means if you can’t parse the meanings of the words in one enigmatic sentence? It takes a willingness to puzzle over small things – and often to admit that one doesn’t understand some particular turn of phrase or twist of argument – to earn the right to answer the bigger and more glamorous questions.

I repeat: To earn the right to answer the bigger and more glamorous questions. Well said. I wonder how many historians bother to earn that right? And why bother if we're not consistently trained to admire good prose?

One of the reasons I enjoy intellectual history is precisely because it forces a slower reading. The prose isn't always great, but the topics are complex enough that one has to read more deliberately. I think that, by and large, intellectual historians do earn the right to ask bigger questions because, in part, they are forced to read slower. The nature of intellectual history demands it.

So having the practical skill of knowing "how to read a book in one hour" might get you through graduate school---perhaps even with flying colors---but it won't give you the appreciation needed to produce good prose for a profession that will hopefully last one's lifetime. And what is the use of making it through, or what is the use of a program credentialing people, if the apprenticeship does does not provide the master skills? - TL

History "Reading" In Graduate School: A Follow-Up

Although I wrote that I agreed with many points in Larry Cebula's "How to Read a Book in One Hour" post, I must admit that I did so with some regret. I truly do enjoy good history writing when I find it. And graduate school would be a waste if one only took books apart rather than relishing, at times, in an author's prose. Indeed, maybe graduate programs are turning out substandard writers, in part, because seminar reading programs are too heavy with 15-books-in-15-weeks type syllabi? Perhaps it is less that programs are not teaching historians how to write, and more that programs are not letting students learn to appreciate good prose?

I am in this reflective mood about slow reading courtesy of Christopher Shea at the Boston Globe's Brainiac blog. There I ran across the reflections of Columbia University literature professor Jenny Davidson. Davidson recently won Columbia University's Mark Van Doren Award for undergraduate teaching excellence, and she posted the remarks she planned to give at the award ceremony. Here's a passage that struck me (bolds mine):

It is tempting to rush to broad thematic generalizations about a work or an author, but how can you answer a big question about what something means if you can’t parse the meanings of the words in one enigmatic sentence? It takes a willingness to puzzle over small things – and often to admit that one doesn’t understand some particular turn of phrase or twist of argument – to earn the right to answer the bigger and more glamorous questions.

I repeat: To earn the right to answer the bigger and more glamorous questions. Well said. I wonder how many historians bother to earn that right? And why bother if we're not consistently trained to admire good prose?

One of the reasons I enjoy intellectual history is precisely because it forces a slower reading. The prose isn't always great, but the topics are complex enough that one has to read more deliberately. I think that, by and large, intellectual historians do earn the right to ask bigger questions because, in part, they are forced to read slower. The nature of intellectual history demands it.

So having the practical skill of knowing "how to read a book in one hour" might get you through graduate school---perhaps even with flying colors---but it won't give you the appreciation needed to produce good prose for a profession that will hopefully last one's lifetime. And what is the use of making it through, or what is the use of a program credentialing people, if the apprenticeship does does not provide the master skills? - TL

Sabtu, 08 Mei 2010

History "Reading" In Graduate School

Larry Cebula, of Eastern Washington University, breaks down the infamous---and useful---grad school skim at his Northwest History weblog.

I confess that I have used Larry's method on many occasions, and agree with most of his points. Allow me to add a few more tips.

If you own the book and believe you are likely to keep it, follow some advice I obtained years ago from Mortimer Adler: Do not fear writing in the book. It is as easy to enter short notes and page numbers in a book's endpages as it is to use notecards, or enter information into Zotero or some other (useful) program. But write your notes with a pencil. Don't highlight. When you highlight you're simply delaying both your note-taking and thinking. There's something about the writing utensil that touches your deepest habits as a student.

Reinforcing point #6 of Larry's method, one of my professors told me years ago that there's usually one chapter that makes a book. If you cannot ~not~ spend some time reading in the book, work on this chapter. This will cause your reading to exceed one hour, but at least it will both assuage your guilt and give you more confidence heading into your seminar.

Sadly, I think point #8 of Larry's list usually occurs ~after~ class. If your grad school experience was like mine, most of your friends are not in school with you. And if you happen to have a few who are, usually you are in different courses. Sometimes, however, grad students will gather for a drink or food after a class. That's where you might be lucky enough to actually talk about your reading---provided Lost, Glee, Treme, Madmen, or some other TV program does not dominate the conversation.

I would be remiss if I failed to draw your attention to the last three lines of Larry's post. When you see warnings like this, you know you've encountered one of the dirty, essential secrets of the profession.

Thanks to John Fea for the tip. - TL

History "Reading" In Graduate School

Larry Cebula, of Eastern Washington University, breaks down the infamous---and useful---grad school skim at his Northwest History weblog.

I confess that I have used Larry's method on many occasions, and agree with most of his points. Allow me to add a few more tips.

If you own the book and believe you are likely to keep it, follow some advice I obtained years ago from Mortimer Adler: Do not fear writing in the book. It is as easy to enter short notes and page numbers in a book's endpages as it is to use notecards, or enter information into Zotero or some other (useful) program. But write your notes with a pencil. Don't highlight. When you highlight you're simply delaying both your note-taking and thinking. There's something about the writing utensil that touches your deepest habits as a student.

Reinforcing point #6 of Larry's method, one of my professors told me years ago that there's usually one chapter that makes a book. If you cannot ~not~ spend some time reading in the book, work on this chapter. This will cause your reading to exceed one hour, but at least it will both assuage your guilt and give you more confidence heading into your seminar.

Sadly, I think point #8 of Larry's list usually occurs ~after~ class. If your grad school experience was like mine, most of your friends are not in school with you. And if you happen to have a few who are, usually you are in different courses. Sometimes, however, grad students will gather for a drink or food after a class. That's where you might be lucky enough to actually talk about your reading---provided Lost, Glee, Treme, Madmen, or some other TV program does not dominate the conversation.

I would be remiss if I failed to draw your attention to the last three lines of Larry's post. When you see warnings like this, you know you've encountered one of the dirty, essential secrets of the profession.

Thanks to John Fea for the tip. - TL