Jumat, 31 Desember 2010

On BBQ Sauce and Rhizomes


Two weeks ago I posted about “Neoliberalism and the Spirit of the Sixties.” A few readers took issue with my argument in the comments section. At Ph.D. Octupus, Nemo, while agreeing with my argument to a point, writes that I risk “downplaying the period’s genuine radicalism… [which] explains why the United States government saw the period’s activists, particularly the Panthers, as a major threat, and did everything in its power to destroy them (often breaking the law in the process).” Nemo lands his best punch in an embedded image of Black Panthers Huey Newton and Bobby Seale, dressed in leather, rifles brandished, with a sub-heading that asks the ironic question: “Harbingers of Neo-Liberalism?”

If I were into scoring cheap shots, I would point out that Bobby Seale might be the quintessential sixties-radical-cum-neoliberal, now that he trades on his fame as a Black Panther to sell BBQ Sauce recipe books. I paste the preamble to Seale’s Barbeque Bill of Rights for your reading pleasure:

WHEN IN THE COURSE OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT it becomes necessary for us, the citizens of the earth, to creatively improve the culinary art of barbe-que'n in our opposition to the overly commercialized bondage of “cue-be-rab” (barbecuing backwards); and to assume, within the realm of palatable biological reactions to which the laws of nature and nature's God entitle us, a decent respect for all the billions of human taste buds and savory barbeque desires; we the people declare a basic barbeque bill of rights which impels us to help halt, eradicate, and ultimately stamp out “cue-be-rab!”

Not only would this be a cheap shot, but following the biographies of individual sixties radicals would allow arguments that swing both ways. For instance, Angela Davis remains incredibly active, especially in the anti-prison movement, which, as Nemo implicitly points out in a satirical piece on the prison-industrial complex, “A Modest Proposal: Job Creation through Incarceration” (his audition to write for The Onion), is taking neoliberalism on at its source.

Rather, I would like to rephrase my argument, which is theoretical and historical, not moral or accusatory. I do not blame sixties radicalism for neoliberalism. Quite the opposite. Their activism inarguably helped make the nation a better place. It is less racist, less sexist, and less homophobic than it used to be, reflected in laws and in attitudes. But nonetheless, the spirit of sixties radicalism was sopped up by and incorporated into U.S. corporate capitalism, in the ways that I alluded to in my previous post, and as pointed out by Walter Benn Michaels and others. But I would argue this process is nothing new. It is a recapitulation of Adorno and Horkheimer’s theory from Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944) that, in modernity, new constraints take the form of resistance to older constraints.

The neoliberal dialectic is best exemplified by two pieces of legislation passed by the current lame-duck Congress. On the one hand, Don’t Ask Don’t Tell, discriminatory to the core, was thankfully repealed. I should recognize that prohibition on serving in the military discriminated against gays economically as well, as pointed out by George Chauncey, since the postwar road to the middle class has often been traveled through the military and the benefits accrued veterans, such as the GI Bill. But on the other hand, Congress also extended all of Bush’s tax cuts, including for the wealthiest Americans, thus ensuring that inequality will continue to rise. So gays have been given a route to the middle class as the door to the middle class shrinks in the never-ending race to the bottom that is neoliberalism.

In my previous post on this topic, I also briefly addressed the ways in which another side of the spirit of sixties radicalism—the ethos typified by the antinomian protest slogan omnipresent during the late 1960s, “It is forbidden to forbid!”—wormed its way into the mainstream. A recent London Review essay by Adam Shatz on one of the strangest philosophical collaborations ever—that between Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari—illustrates this point. My introduction to Deleuze and Guattari was via Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri's tome, Empire, heavily reliant on Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of rhizomatic resistance, a way to think about resistance as a network, as opposed to a structure. Going off of Deleuze and Guattari, Hardt and Negri argued that any resistance anywhere, whether the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 or the anti-WTO protests in Seattle in 1999, plugged into the global network of capital (what they termed “empire,” not your grandfather’s empire), thus altering it, at least somewhat. Shatz writes:

The warmest welcome Deleuze and Guattari received outside Italy’s Red Belt was in underground America. In 1975, Guattari’s friend Sylvère Lotringer, a professor at Columbia, organised a conference on “schizoculture” in their honour and put them up at the Chelsea Hotel. They were beginning work on A Thousand Plateaus, the sequel to Anti-Oedipus, an alluring, enigmatic essay on the “rhizome”, a non-hierarchical, hyper-connective open system in a state of constant flux and transformation, without origin or destination; they contrasted it with the root-obsessed “arborescent” or tree model. (“We’re tired of trees,” they wrote. “They’ve made us suffer too much.”) Radical New York – Black Panthers and gay activists, Marxist professors and anti-psychiatrists – turned out en masse for the symposium; John Cage and William Burroughs came along; and Foucault flew in from Paris. It quickly became a circus.

Is it any wonder they were embraced in the prototypical land of neoliberalism? More from Shatz:

Their names are invoked more often today than they were when they were alive. D&G have a rhizomatic afterlife online, cited in articles on art and film, anthropology, avant-garde jazz, colonialism, disability and military strategy; WikiLeaks has been described as an exemplary “rhizomatic, deterritorialised, itinerant war machine”. Politically, their “tool kit”, as they liked to call their work, has proved useful to everyone from Hardt and Negri, the authors of the alternative globalisation manifesto Empire, to the counterinsurgency theorist Shimon Naveh, a retired general who teaches at an Israeli military academy and speaks in fluent Deleuzo-Guattarese, describing his effort to “smooth out” spaces that are “striated” in Palestinian towns.

What would Deleuze and Guattari have made of this domestication – this perversion – of their arguments? It seems that the further their ideas have traveled from their roots on the far left, the more they have been incorporated by the system they opposed. Indeed, the language of desire, multiplicity and all the rest is no longer the language of revolution. It is the language of cyberspace, and of neoliberal capitalism. Deleuze and Guattari’s desiring machines, constantly seeking out new sensations, look a lot like today’s permanently distracted consumers and websurfers. François Dosse is keen to portray his subjects as visionaries, but they anticipated a future neither of them would have wanted to live in.


This last bit—“they anticipated a future neither of them would have wanted to live in”—should be the motto of the neoliberal dialectic.

On BBQ Sauce and Rhizomes


Two weeks ago I posted about “Neoliberalism and the Spirit of the Sixties.” A few readers took issue with my argument in the comments section. At Ph.D. Octupus, Nemo, while agreeing with my argument to a point, writes that I risk “downplaying the period’s genuine radicalism… [which] explains why the United States government saw the period’s activists, particularly the Panthers, as a major threat, and did everything in its power to destroy them (often breaking the law in the process).” Nemo lands his best punch in an embedded image of Black Panthers Huey Newton and Bobby Seale, dressed in leather, rifles brandished, with a sub-heading that asks the ironic question: “Harbingers of Neo-Liberalism?”

If I were into scoring cheap shots, I would point out that Bobby Seale might be the quintessential sixties-radical-cum-neoliberal, now that he trades on his fame as a Black Panther to sell BBQ Sauce recipe books. I paste the preamble to Seale’s Barbeque Bill of Rights for your reading pleasure:

WHEN IN THE COURSE OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT it becomes necessary for us, the citizens of the earth, to creatively improve the culinary art of barbe-que'n in our opposition to the overly commercialized bondage of “cue-be-rab” (barbecuing backwards); and to assume, within the realm of palatable biological reactions to which the laws of nature and nature's God entitle us, a decent respect for all the billions of human taste buds and savory barbeque desires; we the people declare a basic barbeque bill of rights which impels us to help halt, eradicate, and ultimately stamp out “cue-be-rab!”

Not only would this be a cheap shot, but following the biographies of individual sixties radicals would allow arguments that swing both ways. For instance, Angela Davis remains incredibly active, especially in the anti-prison movement, which, as Nemo implicitly points out in a satirical piece on the prison-industrial complex, “A Modest Proposal: Job Creation through Incarceration” (his audition to write for The Onion), is taking neoliberalism on at its source.

Rather, I would like to rephrase my argument, which is theoretical and historical, not moral or accusatory. I do not blame sixties radicalism for neoliberalism. Quite the opposite. Their activism inarguably helped make the nation a better place. It is less racist, less sexist, and less homophobic than it used to be, reflected in laws and in attitudes. But nonetheless, the spirit of sixties radicalism was sopped up by and incorporated into U.S. corporate capitalism, in the ways that I alluded to in my previous post, and as pointed out by Walter Benn Michaels and others. But I would argue this process is nothing new. It is a recapitulation of Adorno and Horkheimer’s theory from Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944) that, in modernity, new constraints take the form of resistance to older constraints.

The neoliberal dialectic is best exemplified by two pieces of legislation passed by the current lame-duck Congress. On the one hand, Don’t Ask Don’t Tell, discriminatory to the core, was thankfully repealed. I should recognize that prohibition on serving in the military discriminated against gays economically as well, as pointed out by George Chauncey, since the postwar road to the middle class has often been traveled through the military and the benefits accrued veterans, such as the GI Bill. But on the other hand, Congress also extended all of Bush’s tax cuts, including for the wealthiest Americans, thus ensuring that inequality will continue to rise. So gays have been given a route to the middle class as the door to the middle class shrinks in the never-ending race to the bottom that is neoliberalism.

In my previous post on this topic, I also briefly addressed the ways in which another side of the spirit of sixties radicalism—the ethos typified by the antinomian protest slogan omnipresent during the late 1960s, “It is forbidden to forbid!”—wormed its way into the mainstream. A recent London Review essay by Adam Shatz on one of the strangest philosophical collaborations ever—that between Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari—illustrates this point. My introduction to Deleuze and Guattari was via Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri's tome, Empire, heavily reliant on Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of rhizomatic resistance, a way to think about resistance as a network, as opposed to a structure. Going off of Deleuze and Guattari, Hardt and Negri argued that any resistance anywhere, whether the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 or the anti-WTO protests in Seattle in 1999, plugged into the global network of capital (what they termed “empire,” not your grandfather’s empire), thus altering it, at least somewhat. Shatz writes:

The warmest welcome Deleuze and Guattari received outside Italy’s Red Belt was in underground America. In 1975, Guattari’s friend Sylvère Lotringer, a professor at Columbia, organised a conference on “schizoculture” in their honour and put them up at the Chelsea Hotel. They were beginning work on A Thousand Plateaus, the sequel to Anti-Oedipus, an alluring, enigmatic essay on the “rhizome”, a non-hierarchical, hyper-connective open system in a state of constant flux and transformation, without origin or destination; they contrasted it with the root-obsessed “arborescent” or tree model. (“We’re tired of trees,” they wrote. “They’ve made us suffer too much.”) Radical New York – Black Panthers and gay activists, Marxist professors and anti-psychiatrists – turned out en masse for the symposium; John Cage and William Burroughs came along; and Foucault flew in from Paris. It quickly became a circus.

Is it any wonder they were embraced in the prototypical land of neoliberalism? More from Shatz:

Their names are invoked more often today than they were when they were alive. D&G have a rhizomatic afterlife online, cited in articles on art and film, anthropology, avant-garde jazz, colonialism, disability and military strategy; WikiLeaks has been described as an exemplary “rhizomatic, deterritorialised, itinerant war machine”. Politically, their “tool kit”, as they liked to call their work, has proved useful to everyone from Hardt and Negri, the authors of the alternative globalisation manifesto Empire, to the counterinsurgency theorist Shimon Naveh, a retired general who teaches at an Israeli military academy and speaks in fluent Deleuzo-Guattarese, describing his effort to “smooth out” spaces that are “striated” in Palestinian towns.

What would Deleuze and Guattari have made of this domestication – this perversion – of their arguments? It seems that the further their ideas have traveled from their roots on the far left, the more they have been incorporated by the system they opposed. Indeed, the language of desire, multiplicity and all the rest is no longer the language of revolution. It is the language of cyberspace, and of neoliberal capitalism. Deleuze and Guattari’s desiring machines, constantly seeking out new sensations, look a lot like today’s permanently distracted consumers and websurfers. François Dosse is keen to portray his subjects as visionaries, but they anticipated a future neither of them would have wanted to live in.


This last bit—“they anticipated a future neither of them would have wanted to live in”—should be the motto of the neoliberal dialectic.

Kamis, 30 Desember 2010

The Problem Of American Liberalism: Post-Christmas Redux

I'm sorry to be persistent, but can we continue this discussion?

Perhaps, as a starting point, we might construct a bibliography of the best books to tackle each of the questions I posed in relation to the history of American Liberalism. To catalyze your memories, here is the question list from my prior post (somewhat modified):

- When did American liberalism begin? The Progressive Era?
- What was the apex of American liberalism? The early 1960s?
- Is the "liberal project" in America dead? As of when? Perhaps it's still in its death throes?
- What is peculiar about American liberalism in terms of what Max Lerner called the "battlefields of liberalism"?
- Why is liberalism both loved and loathed?
- What is liberalism's relationship to the academy?
- What is liberalism's relationship with American modernity? Are they chronologically the same? Are they two sides of the same coin?
- What is philosophy's relationship with liberalism?
- Who are the most articulate proponents of liberalism in philosophy? Rawls? Dewey? Habermas? Walzer?
- Why is liberalism---in a very weird turn of events---sometimes confused with socialism/communism?
- What is liberalism's relationship with the Left? When are they not the same?
- What is liberalism's relationship with the Arts?
- Who are exemplars of U.S. political liberalism? Franklin Delano Roosevelt? LBJ?
- How does liberalism cross party lines? Or rather, is there such a category as "Republican Liberalism"?
- What is liberalism's relationship to the common terms of liberal and conservative?
- Could Ronald Reagan be classified as an exemplar of Republican liberalism? Eisenhower?
- What is liberalism in American economic terms?
- What is the relationship between class (economic) and liberalism?
- If liberalism has been instrumental in the construction of something of a "welfare state" in America, why is liberalism reviled by those on the far Left?
- Why is religion's relationship---whether Christian or otherwise---with liberalism troubled?
- Are secularism and liberalism basically synonymous?
- What is liberalism's relationship with multiculturalism? What of pluralism?
- What is postmodernism's relationship with liberalism?
- Why is liberalism prone to the anarchy of license, "absolute liberty," and laissez-faire?
- Can equality exist without liberalism?
- With all this potential confusion about the term, who are "liberals"?

The Problem Of American Liberalism: Post-Christmas Redux

I'm sorry to be persistent, but can we continue this discussion?

Perhaps, as a starting point, we might construct a bibliography of the best books to tackle each of the questions I posed in relation to the history of American Liberalism. To catalyze your memories, here is the question list from my prior post (somewhat modified):

- When did American liberalism begin? The Progressive Era?
- What was the apex of American liberalism? The early 1960s?
- Is the "liberal project" in America dead? As of when? Perhaps it's still in its death throes?
- What is peculiar about American liberalism in terms of what Max Lerner called the "battlefields of liberalism"?
- Why is liberalism both loved and loathed?
- What is liberalism's relationship to the academy?
- What is liberalism's relationship with American modernity? Are they chronologically the same? Are they two sides of the same coin?
- What is philosophy's relationship with liberalism?
- Who are the most articulate proponents of liberalism in philosophy? Rawls? Dewey? Habermas? Walzer?
- Why is liberalism---in a very weird turn of events---sometimes confused with socialism/communism?
- What is liberalism's relationship with the Left? When are they not the same?
- What is liberalism's relationship with the Arts?
- Who are exemplars of U.S. political liberalism? Franklin Delano Roosevelt? LBJ?
- How does liberalism cross party lines? Or rather, is there such a category as "Republican Liberalism"?
- What is liberalism's relationship to the common terms of liberal and conservative?
- Could Ronald Reagan be classified as an exemplar of Republican liberalism? Eisenhower?
- What is liberalism in American economic terms?
- What is the relationship between class (economic) and liberalism?
- If liberalism has been instrumental in the construction of something of a "welfare state" in America, why is liberalism reviled by those on the far Left?
- Why is religion's relationship---whether Christian or otherwise---with liberalism troubled?
- Are secularism and liberalism basically synonymous?
- What is liberalism's relationship with multiculturalism? What of pluralism?
- What is postmodernism's relationship with liberalism?
- Why is liberalism prone to the anarchy of license, "absolute liberty," and laissez-faire?
- Can equality exist without liberalism?
- With all this potential confusion about the term, who are "liberals"?

Rabu, 29 Desember 2010

A great book of 2010: John Dower's "Cultures of War"

As we are still in a week of relative rest (and my kid is out of school), I will keep this post quite brief. I am happy Ben asked us to suggest great books of 2010. Like him, I strongly recommend George Cotkin's Morality's Muddy Waters and our own David Sehat's The Myth of American Religious Freedom. Both books deserve greater attention that I can give them in this post. So I will offer another book with a link to a great discussion by its author. John Dower's The Cultures of War has impressed me in large part because it asks questions that are difficult to answer but fascinating to investigate. You can find Dower's conversation about the book at After Words.

This is a big, bold book that takes as its general theme a comparison between the cultures of war that surrounded the American war with Japan and the American wars following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. But this is comparative history with a twist: rather than comparing American and Japanese visions of the same war, as Dower did in War without Mercy, Dower uses comparative history within the same country, between many different countries, and as a way to critique to use of historical analogy. For example, he discusses the strange use of Ground Zero to describe both the point of detonation of the atomic bombs over Japan in 1945 and the destruction of the Twin Towers in lower Manhattan. The fact that such a term can be used in such different and seemingly contradictory ways frames one of Dower's most interesting insights: that "the reasons we humans embrace violence and mass destruction are more convoluted than the war planners or most policy analysts acknowledge, and we ignore this complexity at our peril--however forbidding what this says about us as individuals and societies may be."

Because I am wrestling with the ways in which wars since 1945 have influenced the construction and uses of American civil religion, I find Dower's willingness to wade into difficult subjects such as evil, holy wars, terrorism and terror bombing, just war, the elegance of science and the science of destruction, and myth-making to be nothing short of brave. Moreover, Dower once again puts to use his keen critical eye for war photography by including a remarkable 122 illustrations in his book. Somewhat like Susan Sontag (whom I also admire), Dower doesn't merely critique the social significance of iconic photographs but has the audacity to question our relationships to images of real suffering--there is a moral imperative to his reading.

I will close for now and promise a fuller discussion of Dower's important work soon.

Happy New Year!

A great book of 2010: John Dower's "Cultures of War"

As we are still in a week of relative rest (and my kid is out of school), I will keep this post quite brief. I am happy Ben asked us to suggest great books of 2010. Like him, I strongly recommend George Cotkin's Morality's Muddy Waters and our own David Sehat's The Myth of American Religious Freedom. Both books deserve greater attention that I can give them in this post. So I will offer another book with a link to a great discussion by its author. John Dower's The Cultures of War has impressed me in large part because it asks questions that are difficult to answer but fascinating to investigate. You can find Dower's conversation about the book at After Words.

This is a big, bold book that takes as its general theme a comparison between the cultures of war that surrounded the American war with Japan and the American wars following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. But this is comparative history with a twist: rather than comparing American and Japanese visions of the same war, as Dower did in War without Mercy, Dower uses comparative history within the same country, between many different countries, and as a way to critique to use of historical analogy. For example, he discusses the strange use of Ground Zero to describe both the point of detonation of the atomic bombs over Japan in 1945 and the destruction of the Twin Towers in lower Manhattan. The fact that such a term can be used in such different and seemingly contradictory ways frames one of Dower's most interesting insights: that "the reasons we humans embrace violence and mass destruction are more convoluted than the war planners or most policy analysts acknowledge, and we ignore this complexity at our peril--however forbidding what this says about us as individuals and societies may be."

Because I am wrestling with the ways in which wars since 1945 have influenced the construction and uses of American civil religion, I find Dower's willingness to wade into difficult subjects such as evil, holy wars, terrorism and terror bombing, just war, the elegance of science and the science of destruction, and myth-making to be nothing short of brave. Moreover, Dower once again puts to use his keen critical eye for war photography by including a remarkable 122 illustrations in his book. Somewhat like Susan Sontag (whom I also admire), Dower doesn't merely critique the social significance of iconic photographs but has the audacity to question our relationships to images of real suffering--there is a moral imperative to his reading.

I will close for now and promise a fuller discussion of Dower's important work soon.

Happy New Year!

Selasa, 28 Desember 2010

A Quote for Tuesday

"The temporal structure of everyday life confronts me as a facticity with which I must reckon, that is, with which I must try to synchronize my own projects. I encounter time in everyday reality as continuous and finite. All my existence in this world is continuously ordered by its time, is indeed enveloped by it. My own life is an episode in the externally facticious stream of time. It was there before I was born and it will be there after I die. The knowledge of my inevitable death makes this time finite for me. I have only a certain amount of time available for the realization of my projects, and the knowledge of this affects my attitude to these projects. Also, since I do not want to die, this knowledge injects an underlying anxiety into my projects."

Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality (New York: Anchor, 1966), 27.

My Choice for the Book of 2010

When the editors at the OUP blog asked me to write a piece about my choice for the book of 2010, I knew immediately and without question what book that was: Eric Hill's intellectually deep and endlessly rewarding Where's Spot?, which I have read probably 400 times over the past year with my son (those readers with children know what I'm talking about). But more considered reflection made me think that the editors probably had something else in mind, so after a bit more thought I chose Tony Judt's collection of short memoirs, The Memory Chalet.

Here's the first paragraph from my post:
"Prior to this year, I was familiar with Tony Judt as the director of the Remarque Institute at New York University and as a controversial public intellectual: his stands against the politics of Israel and the current state of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process made him an object of scorn or celebration, depending on one’s politics. Judt’s presence in the public sphere as both an engaged intellectual and a deeply serious historian was comforting if rare proof that some in the United States still take seriously the life of the mind. But earlier this year, with the announcement that he had amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (also known as Lou Gehrig’s disease), his work took a profound new direction that extended and deepened his intellectual example."

Read the rest here.

A Quote for Tuesday

"The temporal structure of everyday life confronts me as a facticity with which I must reckon, that is, with which I must try to synchronize my own projects. I encounter time in everyday reality as continuous and finite. All my existence in this world is continuously ordered by its time, is indeed enveloped by it. My own life is an episode in the externally facticious stream of time. It was there before I was born and it will be there after I die. The knowledge of my inevitable death makes this time finite for me. I have only a certain amount of time available for the realization of my projects, and the knowledge of this affects my attitude to these projects. Also, since I do not want to die, this knowledge injects an underlying anxiety into my projects."

Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality (New York: Anchor, 1966), 27.

My Choice for the Book of 2010

When the editors at the OUP blog asked me to write a piece about my choice for the book of 2010, I knew immediately and without question what book that was: Eric Hill's intellectually deep and endlessly rewarding Where's Spot?, which I have read probably 400 times over the past year with my son (those readers with children know what I'm talking about). But more considered reflection made me think that the editors probably had something else in mind, so after a bit more thought I chose Tony Judt's collection of short memoirs, The Memory Chalet.

Here's the first paragraph from my post:
"Prior to this year, I was familiar with Tony Judt as the director of the Remarque Institute at New York University and as a controversial public intellectual: his stands against the politics of Israel and the current state of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process made him an object of scorn or celebration, depending on one’s politics. Judt’s presence in the public sphere as both an engaged intellectual and a deeply serious historian was comforting if rare proof that some in the United States still take seriously the life of the mind. But earlier this year, with the announcement that he had amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (also known as Lou Gehrig’s disease), his work took a profound new direction that extended and deepened his intellectual example."

Read the rest here.

Senin, 27 Desember 2010

2010 in US Intellectual History

Historically, we don't amount to much apparently!
This being the last week of the year, I figured it would be a good time to have a conversation about 2010 in U.S. intellectual history....which of course means at least two things*:

1. The most significant works in U.S. intellectual history.

2. The most significant developments in U.S. thought.




That second meaning, I think, will likely be somewhat elusive at this point. After all, one of the reasons we do intellectual history is that ideas take a while to work their significance out (if that's not dreadfully old-fashioned to say).  Though some very important things have been thought in 2010, we're likely not to know what they are at this point. I took a glance at both Scientific American's list of World Changing Ideas 2010 (behind a paywall, unfortunately) and the New York Times' Year in Ideas and they are both heavily dominated by technological innovations rather than ideas per se.

(There are, however, some technological innovations of direct interest to intellectual historians, like crowd-sourced manuscript transcription and Google's Ngram, which generated the little chart at the top of this post. The latter, in particular, is worthy of further discussion, I think)

As for the first meaning, a lot of interesting and significant works of intellectual history have been published this year, including one by USIH's own David Sehat: The Myth of American Religious Freedom.

The New York Times list of 100 Notable Books of 2010 includes at least six works that might qualify as U.S. intellectual history (you might count even more among them): Lewis Hyde's Common as Air: Revolution, Art, and Ownership; Eric Foner's The Fiery Trial: Abraham Lincoln and American Slavery; Oren Harman's The Price of Altruism: George Price and the Search for the Origins of Kindness; Alan Brinkley's The Publisher: Henry Luce and His American Century; Pauline Maier's Ratification: The People Debate the Constitution, 1787-1788 (which David Sehat reviewed for this blog); and Justin Spring's Secret Historian: The Life and Times of Samuel Steward, Professor, Tattoo Artist, and Sexual Renegade.

Though a number of these books are on my to-read list, I haven't read any of them yet.  Among the works of US intellectual history published this year that I have read, George Cotkin's Morality's Muddy Waters stands out as one of the year's best.

What do you think has defined--and will define--2010 in US intellectual history?
___________________________
* A third possible meaning would involve the year for USIH (i.e. this blog/organization).  It's been a good year, but I don't think that's necessarily worth a post.

2010 in US Intellectual History

Historically, we don't amount to much apparently!
This being the last week of the year, I figured it would be a good time to have a conversation about 2010 in U.S. intellectual history....which of course means at least two things*:

1. The most significant works in U.S. intellectual history.

2. The most significant developments in U.S. thought.




That second meaning, I think, will likely be somewhat elusive at this point. After all, one of the reasons we do intellectual history is that ideas take a while to work their significance out (if that's not dreadfully old-fashioned to say).  Though some very important things have been thought in 2010, we're likely not to know what they are at this point. I took a glance at both Scientific American's list of World Changing Ideas 2010 (behind a paywall, unfortunately) and the New York Times' Year in Ideas and they are both heavily dominated by technological innovations rather than ideas per se.

(There are, however, some technological innovations of direct interest to intellectual historians, like crowd-sourced manuscript transcription and Google's Ngram, which generated the little chart at the top of this post. The latter, in particular, is worthy of further discussion, I think)

As for the first meaning, a lot of interesting and significant works of intellectual history have been published this year, including one by USIH's own David Sehat: The Myth of American Religious Freedom.

The New York Times list of 100 Notable Books of 2010 includes at least six works that might qualify as U.S. intellectual history (you might count even more among them): Lewis Hyde's Common as Air: Revolution, Art, and Ownership; Eric Foner's The Fiery Trial: Abraham Lincoln and American Slavery; Oren Harman's The Price of Altruism: George Price and the Search for the Origins of Kindness; Alan Brinkley's The Publisher: Henry Luce and His American Century; Pauline Maier's Ratification: The People Debate the Constitution, 1787-1788 (which David Sehat reviewed for this blog); and Justin Spring's Secret Historian: The Life and Times of Samuel Steward, Professor, Tattoo Artist, and Sexual Renegade.

Though a number of these books are on my to-read list, I haven't read any of them yet.  Among the works of US intellectual history published this year that I have read, George Cotkin's Morality's Muddy Waters stands out as one of the year's best.

What do you think has defined--and will define--2010 in US intellectual history?
___________________________
* A third possible meaning would involve the year for USIH (i.e. this blog/organization).  It's been a good year, but I don't think that's necessarily worth a post.

Jumat, 24 Desember 2010

Happy Happy, Merry Merry


Given that, over the next few days, it is unlikely anyone will be in the mood for reading one of my more serious posts about capitalism, neoliberalism, conservatism, postmodernism, or the culture wars, today's Friday post is my attempt at brevity, and levity. It's a joke (see below). But first, I highly recommend that you check out Nemo's response to my post from last week, on Neoliberalism and the Spirit of the 60s, at the smart little blog, PhD Octopus. Expect my longish reply to Nemo next week.

If anyone is in the mood for more serious reading, contrary to my expectations, check out all of the great USIH posts by my colleagues this week.

Read Ben's Monday reflections on the end of the excellent historical blog, Edge of the American West.

Check out David's smart Tuesday post on whether or not he thinks evangelicals are on the verge of fracture.

Read Ray's excellent Wednesday post on how US actions abroad during the 90s lacked moral or national clarity.

And finally, check out Tim's provocative Thursday piece on liberalism, an explicit call for a debate.

Now for the joke, which I am stealing from a recent London Review of Books letter to the editor, and which resonates with the season:

Q: What do you call Santa’s little helpers?

A: Subordinate clauses.

Happy Happy, Merry Merry


Given that, over the next few days, it is unlikely anyone will be in the mood for reading one of my more serious posts about capitalism, neoliberalism, conservatism, postmodernism, or the culture wars, today's Friday post is my attempt at brevity, and levity. It's a joke (see below). But first, I highly recommend that you check out Nemo's response to my post from last week, on Neoliberalism and the Spirit of the 60s, at the smart little blog, PhD Octopus. Expect my longish reply to Nemo next week.

If anyone is in the mood for more serious reading, contrary to my expectations, check out all of the great USIH posts by my colleagues this week.

Read Ben's Monday reflections on the end of the excellent historical blog, Edge of the American West.

Check out David's smart Tuesday post on whether or not he thinks evangelicals are on the verge of fracture.

Read Ray's excellent Wednesday post on how US actions abroad during the 90s lacked moral or national clarity.

And finally, check out Tim's provocative Thursday piece on liberalism, an explicit call for a debate.

Now for the joke, which I am stealing from a recent London Review of Books letter to the editor, and which resonates with the season:

Q: What do you call Santa’s little helpers?

A: Subordinate clauses.

Kamis, 23 Desember 2010

The Problem Of American Liberalism

With apologies to H.J. McCloskey, who in 1965 had an article published in The Review of Metaphysics (Vol. 19, no. 2) titled "The Problem of Liberalism," I propose we renew discussion of liberalism for historians today.

McCloskey wrote in what we might view as the height of the era, and in relation to philosophy. It's the 'might' in my prior sentence, however, that has stimulated me to propose the issue for debate here. I want to discuss the problem of liberalism in relation to historians---intellectual historians in particular---studying twentieth-century America.

My proposition is this: Understanding American liberalism in the twentieth century is the single most important issue facing U.S. intellectual historians today.

Why?

Liberalism touches on a daunting array of issues and topics important to studying thought in the century: politics, economics, religion, war, civil rights, individualism, communitarianism, the Progressive Era, the Cold War, the Culture Wars, the New Deal, Reaganism, and the list goes on and on.

Liberalism has also been a side---and sometimes direct---topic of many USIH posts (see here and here and here for recent examples). The topic has of course been covered in all three conferences. But we've never tackled it head on at USIH (until today) as an historiographical problem.

Despite this web of reference, citation, and relevance, I find only cobwebs surrounding the issue both in popular discussion and in the profession. I propose the following questions for debate:

- When did American liberalism begin? What was its apex? Is it over--is the "liberal project" in America dead?
- What is peculiar about American liberalism in terms of what Max Lerner called the "battlefields of liberalism"?
- Why is liberalism both loved and loathed?
- What is liberalism's relationship to the academy?
- What is liberalism's relationship with American modernity?
- What is philosophy's relationship with liberalism?
- Who are the most articulate proponents of liberalism in philosophy? Rawls? Dewey? Habermas? Walzer?
- Why is liberalism, in a very confusing turn of events, sometimes confused with socialism/communism?
- What is liberalism's relationship with the Left?
- What is liberalism's relationship with the Arts?
- Who are exemplars of U.S. political liberalism? Franklin Delano Roosevelt?
- Could Ronald Reagan be classified as an exemplar of Republican liberalism? Or is Eisenhower a better example?
- How does liberalism cross party lines?
- What is liberalism's relationship to the common terms of liberal and conservative?
- What is liberalism in American economic terms?
- What is the relationship between class (economic) and liberalism?
- If liberalism has been instrumental in the construction of something of a "welfare state" in America, why is liberalism reviled by those on the far Left?
- Why is religion's relationship---whether Christian or otherwise---with liberalism troubled?
- Are secularism and liberalism basically synonymous?
- What is liberalism's relationship with multiculturalism? What of pluralism?
- What is postmodernism's relationship with liberalism?
- With all this potential confusion, who are "liberals"?
- Why is liberalism prone to the anarchy of license, "absolute liberty," and laissez-faire?
- Can equality exist without liberalism?

To catalyze debate in relation to answering some of these questions, I offer the following:

A. A definition of liberalism (from The American Heritage College Dictionary, Third Edition, 1997):

-----------------------------------------
1. The state or quality of being liberal.
2.a. A political theory favoring civil and political liberties, government by law with the consent of the governed, and protection from arbitrary authority.
2.b. The tenets or policies of a Liberal party.
3. An economic theory in favor of laissez-faire, the free market, and the gold standard.
4.a. A 19th-century Protestant movement that favored free intellectual inquiry, stressed the ethical and humanitarian content of Christianity, and de-emphasized dogmatic theology.
4.b. A 19th-century Roman Catholic movement that favored political democracy and ecclesiastical reform.
-----------------------------------------

B. Liberalism as denoted in my thesaurus (Webster's New World/Roget's A-Z Thesaurus, Wiley, 1999):
-----------------------------------------
Synonyms: broad-mindedness, liberality, free-thinking, freedom, radicalism, humanitarianism, humanism, free thought, progressivism, universality, forward view, breadth of mind, latitudinarianism
-----------------------------------------

C. Liberalism according to Wikipedia.

I don't like this article, in part because it uses the term "liberals" loosely in the second line of the piece. I realize that liberals can be used broadly as supporters of "liberalism," but the term has too many present-day negative connotations to be read fairly by non-specialist readers of the entry. ...Then again, a fair reader (rare) would see that "liberals" could apply to wide parts of both currently dominant American political parties. It is probably the case that Wikipedia's entry for "social liberalism" best encapsulates twentieth-century American liberalism as discussed by historians. But that entry is long, and this post is getting too long.

D. Liberalism according to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (circa 1996, authored by Gerald Gaus and Shane Courtland.

I love the opening closing paragraphs (bolds mine):

As soon as one examines it, ‘liberalism’ fractures into a variety of types and competing visions. In this entry we focus on debates within the liberal tradition. We begin by (1) examining different interpretations of liberalism's core commitment — liberty. We then consider (2) the longstanding debate between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ liberalism. In section (3) we turn to the more recent controversy about whether liberalism is a ‘comprehensive’ or a ‘political’ doctrine. We close in (4) by considering disagreements as to ‘the reach’ of liberalism — does it apply to all humankind, and must all political communities be liberal? ...

Given that liberalism fractures on so many issues — the nature of liberty, the place of property and democracy in a just society, the comprehensiveness and the reach of the liberal ideal — one might wonder whether there is any point in talking of ‘liberalism’ at all. It is not, though, an unimportant or trivial thing that all these theories take liberty to be the grounding political value. Radical democrats assert the overriding value of equality, communitarians maintain that the demands of belongingness trump freedom, and conservatives complain that the liberal devotion to freedom undermines traditional values and virtues and so social order itself. Intramural disputes aside, liberals join in rejecting these conceptions of political right.*

*I have no idea what this last line means.

E. Liberalism according to the Encyclopedia Britannica (circa 1960 as defined by Max Lerner).

Here are the opening lines of that essay:
-----------------------------------------
.Liberalism is the creed, philosophy and movement which is committed to freedom as a method and policy in government, as an organizing principle in society and as a way of life for the individual and community. As a term it took its origins from the "Liberales," a Spanish political party in the early 19th century, but received its widest currency in the English language. As an idea and philosophy it predates its use as a term, and can be traced back to the Judaeo-Christian-Greek intellectual world, along with the idea of liberty itself with which it is closely linked.

Confusion of Terms.--Some of the confusions about liberalism arise from the various stages of meaning through which the term passed during a history of several centuries, and from the wide diversity of uses to which it has been put. There were in the second half of the 20th century a number of political parties, in Great Britain, Italy, Germany and elsewhere, called by the name of the "Liberal party" or some variant of it; there was a party of the same name active in the politics of New York state; and even a Liberal International which served as a clearinghouse for liberal political movements throughout the world. But while these parties expressed the liberal outlook, that outlook was not limited to them.

-----------------------------------------

There is much to recommend in this essay, particularly it's last section ("Liberalism in the Second Half of the 20th Century"), but notice how "Confusion of Terms" opens the second paragraph---not surprisingly.

I think we can see here how liberalism, as used in discussions about twentieth-century America, could be confusing. That said, in terms of a dictionary definition, I believe that 2.a. gets closest to the core of what I want to discuss in relation to every other topic outlined in the questions above.

With this breadth of associations and terminology, how are we---as writers and readers of history---to discuss "liberalism" with any clarity? Indeed, what is "liberalism" in twentieth-century America? It should be clear with this post that, at the very least, any historical narrative using this term without careful definition exposes itself to equivocation.

To be continued...- TL

PS (11:30 CST, 12/23): If possible, in discussion I would ask that we not use the term 'liberalism' to designate the political, social, and culture desires of 'liberals' (i.e the perceived 'Left' in America). In other words, I want to go against the common usage of the term liberalism in relation to the world of pundits and social commentators. I want to use liberalism in its most philosophical sense.

The Problem Of American Liberalism

With apologies to H.J. McCloskey, who in 1965 had an article published in The Review of Metaphysics (Vol. 19, no. 2) titled "The Problem of Liberalism," I propose we renew discussion of liberalism for historians today.

McCloskey wrote in what we might view as the height of the era, and in relation to philosophy. It's the 'might' in my prior sentence, however, that has stimulated me to propose the issue for debate here. I want to discuss the problem of liberalism in relation to historians---intellectual historians in particular---studying twentieth-century America.

My proposition is this: Understanding American liberalism in the twentieth century is the single most important issue facing U.S. intellectual historians today.

Why?

Liberalism touches on a daunting array of issues and topics important to studying thought in the century: politics, economics, religion, war, civil rights, individualism, communitarianism, the Progressive Era, the Cold War, the Culture Wars, the New Deal, Reaganism, and the list goes on and on.

Liberalism has also been a side---and sometimes direct---topic of many USIH posts (see here and here and here for recent examples). The topic has of course been covered in all three conferences. But we've never tackled it head on at USIH (until today) as an historiographical problem.

Despite this web of reference, citation, and relevance, I find only cobwebs surrounding the issue both in popular discussion and in the profession. I propose the following questions for debate:

- When did American liberalism begin? What was its apex? Is it over--is the "liberal project" in America dead?
- What is peculiar about American liberalism in terms of what Max Lerner called the "battlefields of liberalism"?
- Why is liberalism both loved and loathed?
- What is liberalism's relationship to the academy?
- What is liberalism's relationship with American modernity?
- What is philosophy's relationship with liberalism?
- Who are the most articulate proponents of liberalism in philosophy? Rawls? Dewey? Habermas? Walzer?
- Why is liberalism, in a very confusing turn of events, sometimes confused with socialism/communism?
- What is liberalism's relationship with the Left?
- What is liberalism's relationship with the Arts?
- Who are exemplars of U.S. political liberalism? Franklin Delano Roosevelt?
- Could Ronald Reagan be classified as an exemplar of Republican liberalism? Or is Eisenhower a better example?
- How does liberalism cross party lines?
- What is liberalism's relationship to the common terms of liberal and conservative?
- What is liberalism in American economic terms?
- What is the relationship between class (economic) and liberalism?
- If liberalism has been instrumental in the construction of something of a "welfare state" in America, why is liberalism reviled by those on the far Left?
- Why is religion's relationship---whether Christian or otherwise---with liberalism troubled?
- Are secularism and liberalism basically synonymous?
- What is liberalism's relationship with multiculturalism? What of pluralism?
- What is postmodernism's relationship with liberalism?
- With all this potential confusion, who are "liberals"?
- Why is liberalism prone to the anarchy of license, "absolute liberty," and laissez-faire?
- Can equality exist without liberalism?

To catalyze debate in relation to answering some of these questions, I offer the following:

A. A definition of liberalism (from The American Heritage College Dictionary, Third Edition, 1997):

-----------------------------------------
1. The state or quality of being liberal.
2.a. A political theory favoring civil and political liberties, government by law with the consent of the governed, and protection from arbitrary authority.
2.b. The tenets or policies of a Liberal party.
3. An economic theory in favor of laissez-faire, the free market, and the gold standard.
4.a. A 19th-century Protestant movement that favored free intellectual inquiry, stressed the ethical and humanitarian content of Christianity, and de-emphasized dogmatic theology.
4.b. A 19th-century Roman Catholic movement that favored political democracy and ecclesiastical reform.
-----------------------------------------

B. Liberalism as denoted in my thesaurus (Webster's New World/Roget's A-Z Thesaurus, Wiley, 1999):
-----------------------------------------
Synonyms: broad-mindedness, liberality, free-thinking, freedom, radicalism, humanitarianism, humanism, free thought, progressivism, universality, forward view, breadth of mind, latitudinarianism
-----------------------------------------

C. Liberalism according to Wikipedia.

I don't like this article, in part because it uses the term "liberals" loosely in the second line of the piece. I realize that liberals can be used broadly as supporters of "liberalism," but the term has too many present-day negative connotations to be read fairly by non-specialist readers of the entry. ...Then again, a fair reader (rare) would see that "liberals" could apply to wide parts of both currently dominant American political parties. It is probably the case that Wikipedia's entry for "social liberalism" best encapsulates twentieth-century American liberalism as discussed by historians. But that entry is long, and this post is getting too long.

D. Liberalism according to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (circa 1996, authored by Gerald Gaus and Shane Courtland.

I love the opening closing paragraphs (bolds mine):

As soon as one examines it, ‘liberalism’ fractures into a variety of types and competing visions. In this entry we focus on debates within the liberal tradition. We begin by (1) examining different interpretations of liberalism's core commitment — liberty. We then consider (2) the longstanding debate between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ liberalism. In section (3) we turn to the more recent controversy about whether liberalism is a ‘comprehensive’ or a ‘political’ doctrine. We close in (4) by considering disagreements as to ‘the reach’ of liberalism — does it apply to all humankind, and must all political communities be liberal? ...

Given that liberalism fractures on so many issues — the nature of liberty, the place of property and democracy in a just society, the comprehensiveness and the reach of the liberal ideal — one might wonder whether there is any point in talking of ‘liberalism’ at all. It is not, though, an unimportant or trivial thing that all these theories take liberty to be the grounding political value. Radical democrats assert the overriding value of equality, communitarians maintain that the demands of belongingness trump freedom, and conservatives complain that the liberal devotion to freedom undermines traditional values and virtues and so social order itself. Intramural disputes aside, liberals join in rejecting these conceptions of political right.*

*I have no idea what this last line means.

E. Liberalism according to the Encyclopedia Britannica (circa 1960 as defined by Max Lerner).

Here are the opening lines of that essay:
-----------------------------------------
.Liberalism is the creed, philosophy and movement which is committed to freedom as a method and policy in government, as an organizing principle in society and as a way of life for the individual and community. As a term it took its origins from the "Liberales," a Spanish political party in the early 19th century, but received its widest currency in the English language. As an idea and philosophy it predates its use as a term, and can be traced back to the Judaeo-Christian-Greek intellectual world, along with the idea of liberty itself with which it is closely linked.

Confusion of Terms.--Some of the confusions about liberalism arise from the various stages of meaning through which the term passed during a history of several centuries, and from the wide diversity of uses to which it has been put. There were in the second half of the 20th century a number of political parties, in Great Britain, Italy, Germany and elsewhere, called by the name of the "Liberal party" or some variant of it; there was a party of the same name active in the politics of New York state; and even a Liberal International which served as a clearinghouse for liberal political movements throughout the world. But while these parties expressed the liberal outlook, that outlook was not limited to them.

-----------------------------------------

There is much to recommend in this essay, particularly it's last section ("Liberalism in the Second Half of the 20th Century"), but notice how "Confusion of Terms" opens the second paragraph---not surprisingly.

I think we can see here how liberalism, as used in discussions about twentieth-century America, could be confusing. That said, in terms of a dictionary definition, I believe that 2.a. gets closest to the core of what I want to discuss in relation to every other topic outlined in the questions above.

With this breadth of associations and terminology, how are we---as writers and readers of history---to discuss "liberalism" with any clarity? Indeed, what is "liberalism" in twentieth-century America? It should be clear with this post that, at the very least, any historical narrative using this term without careful definition exposes itself to equivocation.

To be continued...- TL

PS (11:30 CST, 12/23): If possible, in discussion I would ask that we not use the term 'liberalism' to designate the political, social, and culture desires of 'liberals' (i.e the perceived 'Left' in America). In other words, I want to go against the common usage of the term liberalism in relation to the world of pundits and social commentators. I want to use liberalism in its most philosophical sense.

Rabu, 22 Desember 2010

America in the '90s: Unipolar, Indispensable, Amoral


I am at work on a chapter that looks at war and civil religion in the 1990s. In the process of wading through literature related to this admittedly ambiguous subject, I read Mark Danner's essay from the Fall 1997 issue of World Policy Journal, entitled "Marooned in the Cold War." It is a powerful essay on the congruence of the war in Bosnia and the proposed expansion of NATO--a moment Danner observed acidly that arrived in full irony when he looked skyward and saw America F-16s "tracing their way elegantly through the bright blue sky" over a scene of carnage in a Sarajevo market.

That moment captured for Danner the abdication of American moral authority. Had we not remembered the century that was coming to an end--the world wars, the cold war, the "plunge of civilization into this abyss of blood and darkness." Danner used that line from a letter Henry James wrote in 1914 to reflect on the irony of American impotence at a time when it seemed possible to move beyond "all that." And yet, "We sat in our living rooms and watched all of them...gunners shelling, the children shrieking on the operating table, the battered faces of emaciated men staring dully out from behind barbed wire...as they enacted the drama before our eyes, clearly, undeniably day in and day out. And while we watched, 100,000 people died."

Danner's point in writing the essay was not merely to question such vile spectatorship, or the impotence of NATO, but to ask how American moral authority would be understood and exercised in an age of irony, when American power was undisputed, and yet American idealism was in shambles. The problem Danner pointed out was not the inability of America to act, but an unwillingness to act because of failures of the past. "American leaders have shown themselves fearful of political retribution from a suspicious public. They proved unwilling even to try to make a vigorous case to Americans that their country's interests were involved abroad: not in Haiti, not in Somalia, not even in the former Yugoslavia." During the Cold War, American leaders had persuaded and engaged the public by "blending national security and moral mission," embodied in public declarations such as the Truman Doctrine.

The Truman Doctrine?! What made Danner wistful for that particular bygone era? He observed that when the grand strategy of the early cold war emerged in policies like containment or in documents such as NSC-68, at least there was a touchstone for debate and action existed. In a post-cold war world without the existential threat of communism, the need to live under cold war foreign policies seemed ludicrous. And so, by the 1990s, the United States had indeed achieved its ultimate cold war aim of possessing a preponderance of power (if only because its enemy fell apart) and being utterly indispensable to its allies in Europe (if only because it footed their collective defense bill). But the United States had also demonstrated through its actions--and inaction--to be amoral. The decade of '90s could have been a time of debate over what it meant to exercise moral authority, but instead, according to Danner, American leaders avoided such debate because they were unable to imagine a discussion about war and its consequences outside the outdated cold war tropes. It was easier to calibrate the old national security state to crises of wildly varying degrees than to discuss the responsibility that state had to the world and its own people--whatever that might be.

Did that amoral moment lead to our present state of moral bankruptcy? When I read about pledges to pull troops out of Afghanistan in 2012 or 2014 or whenever, I feel the same sense of frustration that Danner so vividly captured in 1997. Sure, I want the troops out, but as much as that, I want a discussion about when it is right to send troops abroad. After two wars of choice, are we any closer to understanding American responsibility in the world? Or have we just spent another decade drifting in the same philosophical morass that we entered in 1989?

America in the '90s: Unipolar, Indispensable, Amoral


I am at work on a chapter that looks at war and civil religion in the 1990s. In the process of wading through literature related to this admittedly ambiguous subject, I read Mark Danner's essay from the Fall 1997 issue of World Policy Journal, entitled "Marooned in the Cold War." It is a powerful essay on the congruence of the war in Bosnia and the proposed expansion of NATO--a moment Danner observed acidly that arrived in full irony when he looked skyward and saw America F-16s "tracing their way elegantly through the bright blue sky" over a scene of carnage in a Sarajevo market.

That moment captured for Danner the abdication of American moral authority. Had we not remembered the century that was coming to an end--the world wars, the cold war, the "plunge of civilization into this abyss of blood and darkness." Danner used that line from a letter Henry James wrote in 1914 to reflect on the irony of American impotence at a time when it seemed possible to move beyond "all that." And yet, "We sat in our living rooms and watched all of them...gunners shelling, the children shrieking on the operating table, the battered faces of emaciated men staring dully out from behind barbed wire...as they enacted the drama before our eyes, clearly, undeniably day in and day out. And while we watched, 100,000 people died."

Danner's point in writing the essay was not merely to question such vile spectatorship, or the impotence of NATO, but to ask how American moral authority would be understood and exercised in an age of irony, when American power was undisputed, and yet American idealism was in shambles. The problem Danner pointed out was not the inability of America to act, but an unwillingness to act because of failures of the past. "American leaders have shown themselves fearful of political retribution from a suspicious public. They proved unwilling even to try to make a vigorous case to Americans that their country's interests were involved abroad: not in Haiti, not in Somalia, not even in the former Yugoslavia." During the Cold War, American leaders had persuaded and engaged the public by "blending national security and moral mission," embodied in public declarations such as the Truman Doctrine.

The Truman Doctrine?! What made Danner wistful for that particular bygone era? He observed that when the grand strategy of the early cold war emerged in policies like containment or in documents such as NSC-68, at least there was a touchstone for debate and action existed. In a post-cold war world without the existential threat of communism, the need to live under cold war foreign policies seemed ludicrous. And so, by the 1990s, the United States had indeed achieved its ultimate cold war aim of possessing a preponderance of power (if only because its enemy fell apart) and being utterly indispensable to its allies in Europe (if only because it footed their collective defense bill). But the United States had also demonstrated through its actions--and inaction--to be amoral. The decade of '90s could have been a time of debate over what it meant to exercise moral authority, but instead, according to Danner, American leaders avoided such debate because they were unable to imagine a discussion about war and its consequences outside the outdated cold war tropes. It was easier to calibrate the old national security state to crises of wildly varying degrees than to discuss the responsibility that state had to the world and its own people--whatever that might be.

Did that amoral moment lead to our present state of moral bankruptcy? When I read about pledges to pull troops out of Afghanistan in 2012 or 2014 or whenever, I feel the same sense of frustration that Danner so vividly captured in 1997. Sure, I want the troops out, but as much as that, I want a discussion about when it is right to send troops abroad. After two wars of choice, are we any closer to understanding American responsibility in the world? Or have we just spent another decade drifting in the same philosophical morass that we entered in 1989?

Selasa, 21 Desember 2010

A Quote for Tuesday

In the voice of God speaking to Adam: "I have placed you at the very center of the world, so that from that vantage point you may with greater ease glance round about you on all that the world contains. We have made you a creature neither of heaven nor of earth, neither mortal nor immortal, in order that you may, as the free and proud shaper of your own being, fashion yourself in the form you may prefer."

Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Oration on the Dignity of Man, trans. A. Robert Caponigri (1487; Washington D.C.: Gateway, 1956), 7.