The forthcoming September 2009 issue of Historically Speaking features a forum on the current state of intellectual history. Articles in the forum touch on U.S. topics, and the authors cite some of the work done via the USIH weblog and conference (well, last year's anyway). Here is the relevant portion of the issue's table of contents:
------------------------------
A Forum on the Current State of Intellectual History
Is Intellectual History a Neglected Field of Study?
Daniel Wickberg
Thinking is as American as Apple Pie
David A. Hollinger
Reply to Daniel Wickberg
Sarah E. Igo
Response to Daniel Wickberg
Wilfred M. McClay
Rejoinder to Hollinger, Igo, and McClay
Daniel Wickberg
------------------------------
I previewed Daniel Wickberg's lead piece and one reply, from Professor McClay, about a month ago. I haven't seen the final version of any of the articles, but was impressed with Wickberg's assertion of a paradoxical trade-off between a decreased field identity (and job openings, subsequently) and the ubiquitous nature of intellectual history's methods, approaches, and theoretical concerns (via prize-winning and attention-grabbing books like Louis Menand's Metaphysical Club, Michael O'Brien's Conjectures of Order, Sarah Igo's Averaged American, and Howard Brick's Transcending Capitalism).
I look forward to reading the forum as a whole. Perhaps we should have a forum on the forum, maybe in October or November? - TL
Jumat, 28 Agustus 2009
New Historically Speaking Covers Intellectual History
The forthcoming September 2009 issue of Historically Speaking features a forum on the current state of intellectual history. Articles in the forum touch on U.S. topics, and the authors cite some of the work done via the USIH weblog and conference (well, last year's anyway). Here is the relevant portion of the issue's table of contents:
------------------------------
A Forum on the Current State of Intellectual History
Is Intellectual History a Neglected Field of Study?
Daniel Wickberg
Thinking is as American as Apple Pie
David A. Hollinger
Reply to Daniel Wickberg
Sarah E. Igo
Response to Daniel Wickberg
Wilfred M. McClay
Rejoinder to Hollinger, Igo, and McClay
Daniel Wickberg
------------------------------
I previewed Daniel Wickberg's lead piece and one reply, from Professor McClay, about a month ago. I haven't seen the final version of any of the articles, but was impressed with Wickberg's assertion of a paradoxical trade-off between a decreased field identity (and job openings, subsequently) and the ubiquitous nature of intellectual history's methods, approaches, and theoretical concerns (via prize-winning and attention-grabbing books like Louis Menand's Metaphysical Club, Michael O'Brien's Conjectures of Order, Sarah Igo's Averaged American, and Howard Brick's Transcending Capitalism).
I look forward to reading the forum as a whole. Perhaps we should have a forum on the forum, maybe in October or November? - TL
------------------------------
A Forum on the Current State of Intellectual History
Is Intellectual History a Neglected Field of Study?
Daniel Wickberg
Thinking is as American as Apple Pie
David A. Hollinger
Reply to Daniel Wickberg
Sarah E. Igo
Response to Daniel Wickberg
Wilfred M. McClay
Rejoinder to Hollinger, Igo, and McClay
Daniel Wickberg
------------------------------
I previewed Daniel Wickberg's lead piece and one reply, from Professor McClay, about a month ago. I haven't seen the final version of any of the articles, but was impressed with Wickberg's assertion of a paradoxical trade-off between a decreased field identity (and job openings, subsequently) and the ubiquitous nature of intellectual history's methods, approaches, and theoretical concerns (via prize-winning and attention-grabbing books like Louis Menand's Metaphysical Club, Michael O'Brien's Conjectures of Order, Sarah Igo's Averaged American, and Howard Brick's Transcending Capitalism).
I look forward to reading the forum as a whole. Perhaps we should have a forum on the forum, maybe in October or November? - TL
Rabu, 26 Agustus 2009
Debate opening: Progressive Change
Last Sunday in the New York Times Magazine, Nicholas Kristoff and Sheryl WuDunn suggested that "The world is awakening to a powerful truth: Women and girls aren’t the problem; they’re the solution." Improving the economic situation for women in the world, through micro-loans and increased education, will directly result in the lessening of global poverty particularly because women spend differently than men. They argue that women's issues tend to be seen as "soft" issues and put on the back burner by journalists and politicians to more "serious" issues like Tienanmen Square or wars. Yet, more women have been lost in the "gendercide" of the 20th century, through preferential abortion, less health care, bride burnings, etc, than men were lost in the wars of the same century. Read the article for the rest of their argument.
What struck me was the consistent use of Progressive Era discourse throughout the text. First of all, consider the two titles. The particular essay referenced above is "The Woman's Crusade." The title of the whole magazine is "Saving the World's Women." The thesis of the piece seemed to be that wealthy Westerners have a burden to bring the rest of the women up to middle class standards of living through middle class morality. Despite Kristoff having sensitivity towards other cultures in his other pieces, he seems here to utterly disregard any strength in the world's cultures, and sees only the ways in which they do not measure up.
So what I would like to discuss here is--How should we, as historians, consider modern efforts for ameliorative programs? I would imagine most of us abhor world poverty, and yet, for me at least, Kristoff's piece utterly lacked a sense of the historical failures of the Progressive Era, coupled as it was with imperialism. What do you think such a sense would have added to his arguments?
And at the same time, how do we talk about the complex ways in which imperialism functions? I always think about the way the Americans sashshayed into the Philippines with a full sense of the "White Man's Burden" and smashed the local resistance movement that had started the war with Spain in the first place. And yet, why are there Filipino nurses spread all over the globe, filling a global nursing shortage? Because those Americans set up hospitals. While it seems to me that imperialism is wrong, it does not seem like simple condemnation adequately addresses the full range of possibilities here. In his piece, Kristoff takes the problem of seeming to dictate Western morality by using illustrations centered on Africans and Asians, with their goals in the forefront.
Is it right for historians to judge (for a slightly different, yet similar question, read this post)? Or, given that we are human, when we judge, what should be our parameters? I suppose this is linked to my previous post about ethics, but here I ask about our own personal ethics as historians.
What struck me was the consistent use of Progressive Era discourse throughout the text. First of all, consider the two titles. The particular essay referenced above is "The Woman's Crusade." The title of the whole magazine is "Saving the World's Women." The thesis of the piece seemed to be that wealthy Westerners have a burden to bring the rest of the women up to middle class standards of living through middle class morality. Despite Kristoff having sensitivity towards other cultures in his other pieces, he seems here to utterly disregard any strength in the world's cultures, and sees only the ways in which they do not measure up.
So what I would like to discuss here is--How should we, as historians, consider modern efforts for ameliorative programs? I would imagine most of us abhor world poverty, and yet, for me at least, Kristoff's piece utterly lacked a sense of the historical failures of the Progressive Era, coupled as it was with imperialism. What do you think such a sense would have added to his arguments?
And at the same time, how do we talk about the complex ways in which imperialism functions? I always think about the way the Americans sashshayed into the Philippines with a full sense of the "White Man's Burden" and smashed the local resistance movement that had started the war with Spain in the first place. And yet, why are there Filipino nurses spread all over the globe, filling a global nursing shortage? Because those Americans set up hospitals. While it seems to me that imperialism is wrong, it does not seem like simple condemnation adequately addresses the full range of possibilities here. In his piece, Kristoff takes the problem of seeming to dictate Western morality by using illustrations centered on Africans and Asians, with their goals in the forefront.
Is it right for historians to judge (for a slightly different, yet similar question, read this post)? Or, given that we are human, when we judge, what should be our parameters? I suppose this is linked to my previous post about ethics, but here I ask about our own personal ethics as historians.
Debate opening: Progressive Change
Last Sunday in the New York Times Magazine, Nicholas Kristoff and Sheryl WuDunn suggested that "The world is awakening to a powerful truth: Women and girls aren’t the problem; they’re the solution." Improving the economic situation for women in the world, through micro-loans and increased education, will directly result in the lessening of global poverty particularly because women spend differently than men. They argue that women's issues tend to be seen as "soft" issues and put on the back burner by journalists and politicians to more "serious" issues like Tienanmen Square or wars. Yet, more women have been lost in the "gendercide" of the 20th century, through preferential abortion, less health care, bride burnings, etc, than men were lost in the wars of the same century. Read the article for the rest of their argument.
What struck me was the consistent use of Progressive Era discourse throughout the text. First of all, consider the two titles. The particular essay referenced above is "The Woman's Crusade." The title of the whole magazine is "Saving the World's Women." The thesis of the piece seemed to be that wealthy Westerners have a burden to bring the rest of the women up to middle class standards of living through middle class morality. Despite Kristoff having sensitivity towards other cultures in his other pieces, he seems here to utterly disregard any strength in the world's cultures, and sees only the ways in which they do not measure up.
So what I would like to discuss here is--How should we, as historians, consider modern efforts for ameliorative programs? I would imagine most of us abhor world poverty, and yet, for me at least, Kristoff's piece utterly lacked a sense of the historical failures of the Progressive Era, coupled as it was with imperialism. What do you think such a sense would have added to his arguments?
And at the same time, how do we talk about the complex ways in which imperialism functions? I always think about the way the Americans sashshayed into the Philippines with a full sense of the "White Man's Burden" and smashed the local resistance movement that had started the war with Spain in the first place. And yet, why are there Filipino nurses spread all over the globe, filling a global nursing shortage? Because those Americans set up hospitals. While it seems to me that imperialism is wrong, it does not seem like simple condemnation adequately addresses the full range of possibilities here. In his piece, Kristoff takes the problem of seeming to dictate Western morality by using illustrations centered on Africans and Asians, with their goals in the forefront.
Is it right for historians to judge (for a slightly different, yet similar question, read this post)? Or, given that we are human, when we judge, what should be our parameters? I suppose this is linked to my previous post about ethics, but here I ask about our own personal ethics as historians.
What struck me was the consistent use of Progressive Era discourse throughout the text. First of all, consider the two titles. The particular essay referenced above is "The Woman's Crusade." The title of the whole magazine is "Saving the World's Women." The thesis of the piece seemed to be that wealthy Westerners have a burden to bring the rest of the women up to middle class standards of living through middle class morality. Despite Kristoff having sensitivity towards other cultures in his other pieces, he seems here to utterly disregard any strength in the world's cultures, and sees only the ways in which they do not measure up.
So what I would like to discuss here is--How should we, as historians, consider modern efforts for ameliorative programs? I would imagine most of us abhor world poverty, and yet, for me at least, Kristoff's piece utterly lacked a sense of the historical failures of the Progressive Era, coupled as it was with imperialism. What do you think such a sense would have added to his arguments?
And at the same time, how do we talk about the complex ways in which imperialism functions? I always think about the way the Americans sashshayed into the Philippines with a full sense of the "White Man's Burden" and smashed the local resistance movement that had started the war with Spain in the first place. And yet, why are there Filipino nurses spread all over the globe, filling a global nursing shortage? Because those Americans set up hospitals. While it seems to me that imperialism is wrong, it does not seem like simple condemnation adequately addresses the full range of possibilities here. In his piece, Kristoff takes the problem of seeming to dictate Western morality by using illustrations centered on Africans and Asians, with their goals in the forefront.
Is it right for historians to judge (for a slightly different, yet similar question, read this post)? Or, given that we are human, when we judge, what should be our parameters? I suppose this is linked to my previous post about ethics, but here I ask about our own personal ethics as historians.
Debate opening: Personal and Public Morality
All the Ted Kennedy talk has sent me pondering a perennial question of mine--just how much does personal morality or ethics have to do with public morality or effectiveness? In the United States media in recent years, politicians' morality is often linked to their behavior in the home (or in Argentina). But the issue goes back much further, at least to King David and Bathsheba.
How do you think about this relation, through the intellectuals you have studied? Part of the question is how you would define what is good in the private and the public. It seems to me that as much as this is linked to the American Protestant heritage, it has also not been a constant in American politics (see Ted's brother in the Oval Office, and the media's silence). Is a "good" person in the home the same as a "good" person in office? Or rather, how would you complicate this question, based on your research?
How do you think about this relation, through the intellectuals you have studied? Part of the question is how you would define what is good in the private and the public. It seems to me that as much as this is linked to the American Protestant heritage, it has also not been a constant in American politics (see Ted's brother in the Oval Office, and the media's silence). Is a "good" person in the home the same as a "good" person in office? Or rather, how would you complicate this question, based on your research?
Debate opening: Personal and Public Morality
All the Ted Kennedy talk has sent me pondering a perennial question of mine--just how much does personal morality or ethics have to do with public morality or effectiveness? In the United States media in recent years, politicians' morality is often linked to their behavior in the home (or in Argentina). But the issue goes back much further, at least to King David and Bathsheba.
How do you think about this relation, through the intellectuals you have studied? Part of the question is how you would define what is good in the private and the public. It seems to me that as much as this is linked to the American Protestant heritage, it has also not been a constant in American politics (see Ted's brother in the Oval Office, and the media's silence). Is a "good" person in the home the same as a "good" person in office? Or rather, how would you complicate this question, based on your research?
How do you think about this relation, through the intellectuals you have studied? Part of the question is how you would define what is good in the private and the public. It seems to me that as much as this is linked to the American Protestant heritage, it has also not been a constant in American politics (see Ted's brother in the Oval Office, and the media's silence). Is a "good" person in the home the same as a "good" person in office? Or rather, how would you complicate this question, based on your research?
Selasa, 25 Agustus 2009
Ontology, Jesus, And U.S. Intellectual History
I first encountered the term "ontology" back in the mid-1990s while debating a friend about Catholic theological issues. I had asked him about the femininity of God and the corresponding limits, or possibilities, of Catholic discussion about the subject. He had classified my question as an ontological one---meaning that a principle of ontology limited the ability to talk about God in feminine terms. Sadly our brief conversation never progressed beyond the introduction of the term and the categorization of my question.
Although I was unfamiliar the term, I recall looking up ontology in the dictionary. I don't remember what version of the dictionary I had at the time, but the one on my desk currently defines it as follows: "The branch of metaphysics that deals with the nature of being" (The American Heritage College dictionary, third edition, Houghton Mifflin, 1997, p. 955). I think the definition I ran into in the mid-1990s was similar. But since I was less familiar with metaphysical terminology, I think I brushed this off as a kind of restatement of the definition of metaphysics. It was the "nature of" distinction that was lost on me back then.
My ignorance of a more precise meaning persisted for nearly fifteen years. Since philosophy had little to do with my full-time or part-time work (environmental field, social services agency, sales, dean's office gopher/go-fer/go-for, adjunct history faculty) or education (graduate studies in history), opportunities to think more about the term were scarce. Even my doctoral exam reading lists on intellectual history were of no help. Few American philosophers delve deeply into metaphysics. Indeed, it seems to be the nature of pragmatism and instrumentalism to avoid metaphysics. And transcendentalism does not force one to think about traditional metaphysical questions. Even my dalliances with Thomistic/Aristotelian philosophy in connection with Mortimer J. Adler and his community of discourse never caused me to encounter ontology as a term again. It is amazing to me how long we can let unresolved questions linger.
The happy ending to this story involves another thing put-off: reading Frederick Copleston’s multi-volume A History of Philosophy series. I had started volume I ("Greece and Rome: From the Pre-Socratics to Plotinus") several years ago, probably during my doctoral exams, but put it down because of other obligations. I finally picked it up again about two weeks ago with a stronger resolve than ever to get into the series. Since then I've gone from page 16 or so to page 186. Aside from his humbling insertions of Greek and Latin phrases, and even one long passage in French, Copleston moves the narrative along. As an Americanist it is easier, of course, for me to read the ancients quickly, even if I am reading it for professional reasons, because of the remoteness of the terminology and actors. Even so, it's useful to see the roots of Kantian and Hegelian idealism in Plato---to understand the longue durée of a unit idea.
Copleston has helped me understand my friend's classification of my question. For starters, it is probably no coincidence that I did not understand ontology until I had obtained some understanding of Plato's Forms/Ideas/Essences/In-common terms. Our awareness, or discovery, of forms---those stable, immaterial essences that provide the template for everything true and eternal---by the process of dialectic determines the level of our knowledge. Copleston reports that this constitutes the epistemology of Plato's system. And conversely, according to Copleston, ontology refers to the corresponding objects of forms. [Aside: You could argue that if Forms really exist, they are also ontological and not just epistemological. Indeed, to complicate these classifications Allan Silverman writes, in the Stanford Ency. of Philosophy article on forms above, that Plato’s ontology is also his metaphysics. Silverman asserts that although "students of Plato…divide philosophy into three parts: Ethics, Epistemology and Metaphysics," and that is "generally accurate and certainly useful for pedagogical purposes," in fact "no rigid boundary separates the parts." And let's not even get into the apparently backwards use of the term ontology in relation to ontological arguments for God's existence.]
Back to my Catholic friend, in reference to God’s masculinity or femininity, he was asserting that the limits of the discussion were dictated by the ontological fact---the object of reference with regard to God considered as an ultimate Platonic form---that Jesus was a male. Consequently, Jesus' really existing maleness limited the Church's ability to speculate about, or conceive of, God's feminine characteristics. Right or wrong, that was my friend's assessment.
In relation to U.S. intellectual history, what intrigues me about the notion of ontology is that what it represents about the prominent strains of American philosophical thought. If Kantian and Hegelian idealism do indeed correspond with the general metaphysics (or epistemology) of many nineteenth-century U.S. philosophers, as is argued by Bruce Kuklick in A History of Philosophy in America, then one could say that American pragmatism, realism, and instrumentalism were American contributions to the ongoing debate about the meaning of ontology in relation to idealism. In other words, what are the objects of reference for high thinking? Rather than worrying primarily about what is stable, essential, and immaterial, American thinkers of the late nineteenth century began to work a posteriori, or from experience backwards. And their commitments to the stability of truth determined the depth of their exploration of metaphysics, whether ancient or modern.
As an aside, I also now understand more thoroughly Mortimer J. Adler’s apparent fixation on dialectic and the notion of ideas as objects of knowledge (e.g. 102 Great Ideas). While Adler consistently adhered to Thomistic and Aristotelian philosophies, he apparently also sought a synthesis with the Platonic ideals, as well as admired the process of obtaining knowledge---the dialectic---outlined by Plato in the dialogues, Socratic and otherwise. This tension, or hoped for synthesis, dominated Adler’s philosophical thinking until at least the 1960s. It was then that he gave himself over, fully, to Aristotelian philosophy.
Perhaps one could make the argument that all that is distinctive about American philosophy from 1850 to 1950, after which the analytic movement became prominent, was the attempt to understand ontology in relation to Platonic/Kantian/Hegelian idealism? – TL
Although I was unfamiliar the term, I recall looking up ontology in the dictionary. I don't remember what version of the dictionary I had at the time, but the one on my desk currently defines it as follows: "The branch of metaphysics that deals with the nature of being" (The American Heritage College dictionary, third edition, Houghton Mifflin, 1997, p. 955). I think the definition I ran into in the mid-1990s was similar. But since I was less familiar with metaphysical terminology, I think I brushed this off as a kind of restatement of the definition of metaphysics. It was the "nature of" distinction that was lost on me back then.
My ignorance of a more precise meaning persisted for nearly fifteen years. Since philosophy had little to do with my full-time or part-time work (environmental field, social services agency, sales, dean's office gopher/go-fer/go-for, adjunct history faculty) or education (graduate studies in history), opportunities to think more about the term were scarce. Even my doctoral exam reading lists on intellectual history were of no help. Few American philosophers delve deeply into metaphysics. Indeed, it seems to be the nature of pragmatism and instrumentalism to avoid metaphysics. And transcendentalism does not force one to think about traditional metaphysical questions. Even my dalliances with Thomistic/Aristotelian philosophy in connection with Mortimer J. Adler and his community of discourse never caused me to encounter ontology as a term again. It is amazing to me how long we can let unresolved questions linger.
The happy ending to this story involves another thing put-off: reading Frederick Copleston’s multi-volume A History of Philosophy series. I had started volume I ("Greece and Rome: From the Pre-Socratics to Plotinus") several years ago, probably during my doctoral exams, but put it down because of other obligations. I finally picked it up again about two weeks ago with a stronger resolve than ever to get into the series. Since then I've gone from page 16 or so to page 186. Aside from his humbling insertions of Greek and Latin phrases, and even one long passage in French, Copleston moves the narrative along. As an Americanist it is easier, of course, for me to read the ancients quickly, even if I am reading it for professional reasons, because of the remoteness of the terminology and actors. Even so, it's useful to see the roots of Kantian and Hegelian idealism in Plato---to understand the longue durée of a unit idea.
Copleston has helped me understand my friend's classification of my question. For starters, it is probably no coincidence that I did not understand ontology until I had obtained some understanding of Plato's Forms/Ideas/Essences/In-common terms. Our awareness, or discovery, of forms---those stable, immaterial essences that provide the template for everything true and eternal---by the process of dialectic determines the level of our knowledge. Copleston reports that this constitutes the epistemology of Plato's system. And conversely, according to Copleston, ontology refers to the corresponding objects of forms. [Aside: You could argue that if Forms really exist, they are also ontological and not just epistemological. Indeed, to complicate these classifications Allan Silverman writes, in the Stanford Ency. of Philosophy article on forms above, that Plato’s ontology is also his metaphysics. Silverman asserts that although "students of Plato…divide philosophy into three parts: Ethics, Epistemology and Metaphysics," and that is "generally accurate and certainly useful for pedagogical purposes," in fact "no rigid boundary separates the parts." And let's not even get into the apparently backwards use of the term ontology in relation to ontological arguments for God's existence.]
Back to my Catholic friend, in reference to God’s masculinity or femininity, he was asserting that the limits of the discussion were dictated by the ontological fact---the object of reference with regard to God considered as an ultimate Platonic form---that Jesus was a male. Consequently, Jesus' really existing maleness limited the Church's ability to speculate about, or conceive of, God's feminine characteristics. Right or wrong, that was my friend's assessment.
In relation to U.S. intellectual history, what intrigues me about the notion of ontology is that what it represents about the prominent strains of American philosophical thought. If Kantian and Hegelian idealism do indeed correspond with the general metaphysics (or epistemology) of many nineteenth-century U.S. philosophers, as is argued by Bruce Kuklick in A History of Philosophy in America, then one could say that American pragmatism, realism, and instrumentalism were American contributions to the ongoing debate about the meaning of ontology in relation to idealism. In other words, what are the objects of reference for high thinking? Rather than worrying primarily about what is stable, essential, and immaterial, American thinkers of the late nineteenth century began to work a posteriori, or from experience backwards. And their commitments to the stability of truth determined the depth of their exploration of metaphysics, whether ancient or modern.
As an aside, I also now understand more thoroughly Mortimer J. Adler’s apparent fixation on dialectic and the notion of ideas as objects of knowledge (e.g. 102 Great Ideas). While Adler consistently adhered to Thomistic and Aristotelian philosophies, he apparently also sought a synthesis with the Platonic ideals, as well as admired the process of obtaining knowledge---the dialectic---outlined by Plato in the dialogues, Socratic and otherwise. This tension, or hoped for synthesis, dominated Adler’s philosophical thinking until at least the 1960s. It was then that he gave himself over, fully, to Aristotelian philosophy.
Perhaps one could make the argument that all that is distinctive about American philosophy from 1850 to 1950, after which the analytic movement became prominent, was the attempt to understand ontology in relation to Platonic/Kantian/Hegelian idealism? – TL
Label:
Catholicism,
Frederick Copleston SJ,
general U.S. intellectual history,
history of ideas,
history of philosophy,
idealism,
Jesus,
Mortimer J. Adler,
ontology
Ontology, Jesus, And U.S. Intellectual History
I first encountered the term "ontology" back in the mid-1990s while debating a friend about Catholic theological issues. I had asked him about the femininity of God and the corresponding limits, or possibilities, of Catholic discussion about the subject. He had classified my question as an ontological one---meaning that a principle of ontology limited the ability to talk about God in feminine terms. Sadly our brief conversation never progressed beyond the introduction of the term and the categorization of my question.
Although I was unfamiliar the term, I recall looking up ontology in the dictionary. I don't remember what version of the dictionary I had at the time, but the one on my desk currently defines it as follows: "The branch of metaphysics that deals with the nature of being" (The American Heritage College dictionary, third edition, Houghton Mifflin, 1997, p. 955). I think the definition I ran into in the mid-1990s was similar. But since I was less familiar with metaphysical terminology, I think I brushed this off as a kind of restatement of the definition of metaphysics. It was the "nature of" distinction that was lost on me back then.
My ignorance of a more precise meaning persisted for nearly fifteen years. Since philosophy had little to do with my full-time or part-time work (environmental field, social services agency, sales, dean's office gopher/go-fer/go-for, adjunct history faculty) or education (graduate studies in history), opportunities to think more about the term were scarce. Even my doctoral exam reading lists on intellectual history were of no help. Few American philosophers delve deeply into metaphysics. Indeed, it seems to be the nature of pragmatism and instrumentalism to avoid metaphysics. And transcendentalism does not force one to think about traditional metaphysical questions. Even my dalliances with Thomistic/Aristotelian philosophy in connection with Mortimer J. Adler and his community of discourse never caused me to encounter ontology as a term again. It is amazing to me how long we can let unresolved questions linger.
The happy ending to this story involves another thing put-off: reading Frederick Copleston’s multi-volume A History of Philosophy series. I had started volume I ("Greece and Rome: From the Pre-Socratics to Plotinus") several years ago, probably during my doctoral exams, but put it down because of other obligations. I finally picked it up again about two weeks ago with a stronger resolve than ever to get into the series. Since then I've gone from page 16 or so to page 186. Aside from his humbling insertions of Greek and Latin phrases, and even one long passage in French, Copleston moves the narrative along. As an Americanist it is easier, of course, for me to read the ancients quickly, even if I am reading it for professional reasons, because of the remoteness of the terminology and actors. Even so, it's useful to see the roots of Kantian and Hegelian idealism in Plato---to understand the longue durée of a unit idea.
Copleston has helped me understand my friend's classification of my question. For starters, it is probably no coincidence that I did not understand ontology until I had obtained some understanding of Plato's Forms/Ideas/Essences/In-common terms. Our awareness, or discovery, of forms---those stable, immaterial essences that provide the template for everything true and eternal---by the process of dialectic determines the level of our knowledge. Copleston reports that this constitutes the epistemology of Plato's system. And conversely, according to Copleston, ontology refers to the corresponding objects of forms. [Aside: You could argue that if Forms really exist, they are also ontological and not just epistemological. Indeed, to complicate these classifications Allan Silverman writes, in the Stanford Ency. of Philosophy article on forms above, that Plato’s ontology is also his metaphysics. Silverman asserts that although "students of Plato…divide philosophy into three parts: Ethics, Epistemology and Metaphysics," and that is "generally accurate and certainly useful for pedagogical purposes," in fact "no rigid boundary separates the parts." And let's not even get into the apparently backwards use of the term ontology in relation to ontological arguments for God's existence.]
Back to my Catholic friend, in reference to God’s masculinity or femininity, he was asserting that the limits of the discussion were dictated by the ontological fact---the object of reference with regard to God considered as an ultimate Platonic form---that Jesus was a male. Consequently, Jesus' really existing maleness limited the Church's ability to speculate about, or conceive of, God's feminine characteristics. Right or wrong, that was my friend's assessment.
In relation to U.S. intellectual history, what intrigues me about the notion of ontology is that what it represents about the prominent strains of American philosophical thought. If Kantian and Hegelian idealism do indeed correspond with the general metaphysics (or epistemology) of many nineteenth-century U.S. philosophers, as is argued by Bruce Kuklick in A History of Philosophy in America, then one could say that American pragmatism, realism, and instrumentalism were American contributions to the ongoing debate about the meaning of ontology in relation to idealism. In other words, what are the objects of reference for high thinking? Rather than worrying primarily about what is stable, essential, and immaterial, American thinkers of the late nineteenth century began to work a posteriori, or from experience backwards. And their commitments to the stability of truth determined the depth of their exploration of metaphysics, whether ancient or modern.
As an aside, I also now understand more thoroughly Mortimer J. Adler’s apparent fixation on dialectic and the notion of ideas as objects of knowledge (e.g. 102 Great Ideas). While Adler consistently adhered to Thomistic and Aristotelian philosophies, he apparently also sought a synthesis with the Platonic ideals, as well as admired the process of obtaining knowledge---the dialectic---outlined by Plato in the dialogues, Socratic and otherwise. This tension, or hoped for synthesis, dominated Adler’s philosophical thinking until at least the 1960s. It was then that he gave himself over, fully, to Aristotelian philosophy.
Perhaps one could make the argument that all that is distinctive about American philosophy from 1850 to 1950, after which the analytic movement became prominent, was the attempt to understand ontology in relation to Platonic/Kantian/Hegelian idealism? – TL
Although I was unfamiliar the term, I recall looking up ontology in the dictionary. I don't remember what version of the dictionary I had at the time, but the one on my desk currently defines it as follows: "The branch of metaphysics that deals with the nature of being" (The American Heritage College dictionary, third edition, Houghton Mifflin, 1997, p. 955). I think the definition I ran into in the mid-1990s was similar. But since I was less familiar with metaphysical terminology, I think I brushed this off as a kind of restatement of the definition of metaphysics. It was the "nature of" distinction that was lost on me back then.
My ignorance of a more precise meaning persisted for nearly fifteen years. Since philosophy had little to do with my full-time or part-time work (environmental field, social services agency, sales, dean's office gopher/go-fer/go-for, adjunct history faculty) or education (graduate studies in history), opportunities to think more about the term were scarce. Even my doctoral exam reading lists on intellectual history were of no help. Few American philosophers delve deeply into metaphysics. Indeed, it seems to be the nature of pragmatism and instrumentalism to avoid metaphysics. And transcendentalism does not force one to think about traditional metaphysical questions. Even my dalliances with Thomistic/Aristotelian philosophy in connection with Mortimer J. Adler and his community of discourse never caused me to encounter ontology as a term again. It is amazing to me how long we can let unresolved questions linger.
The happy ending to this story involves another thing put-off: reading Frederick Copleston’s multi-volume A History of Philosophy series. I had started volume I ("Greece and Rome: From the Pre-Socratics to Plotinus") several years ago, probably during my doctoral exams, but put it down because of other obligations. I finally picked it up again about two weeks ago with a stronger resolve than ever to get into the series. Since then I've gone from page 16 or so to page 186. Aside from his humbling insertions of Greek and Latin phrases, and even one long passage in French, Copleston moves the narrative along. As an Americanist it is easier, of course, for me to read the ancients quickly, even if I am reading it for professional reasons, because of the remoteness of the terminology and actors. Even so, it's useful to see the roots of Kantian and Hegelian idealism in Plato---to understand the longue durée of a unit idea.
Copleston has helped me understand my friend's classification of my question. For starters, it is probably no coincidence that I did not understand ontology until I had obtained some understanding of Plato's Forms/Ideas/Essences/In-common terms. Our awareness, or discovery, of forms---those stable, immaterial essences that provide the template for everything true and eternal---by the process of dialectic determines the level of our knowledge. Copleston reports that this constitutes the epistemology of Plato's system. And conversely, according to Copleston, ontology refers to the corresponding objects of forms. [Aside: You could argue that if Forms really exist, they are also ontological and not just epistemological. Indeed, to complicate these classifications Allan Silverman writes, in the Stanford Ency. of Philosophy article on forms above, that Plato’s ontology is also his metaphysics. Silverman asserts that although "students of Plato…divide philosophy into three parts: Ethics, Epistemology and Metaphysics," and that is "generally accurate and certainly useful for pedagogical purposes," in fact "no rigid boundary separates the parts." And let's not even get into the apparently backwards use of the term ontology in relation to ontological arguments for God's existence.]
Back to my Catholic friend, in reference to God’s masculinity or femininity, he was asserting that the limits of the discussion were dictated by the ontological fact---the object of reference with regard to God considered as an ultimate Platonic form---that Jesus was a male. Consequently, Jesus' really existing maleness limited the Church's ability to speculate about, or conceive of, God's feminine characteristics. Right or wrong, that was my friend's assessment.
In relation to U.S. intellectual history, what intrigues me about the notion of ontology is that what it represents about the prominent strains of American philosophical thought. If Kantian and Hegelian idealism do indeed correspond with the general metaphysics (or epistemology) of many nineteenth-century U.S. philosophers, as is argued by Bruce Kuklick in A History of Philosophy in America, then one could say that American pragmatism, realism, and instrumentalism were American contributions to the ongoing debate about the meaning of ontology in relation to idealism. In other words, what are the objects of reference for high thinking? Rather than worrying primarily about what is stable, essential, and immaterial, American thinkers of the late nineteenth century began to work a posteriori, or from experience backwards. And their commitments to the stability of truth determined the depth of their exploration of metaphysics, whether ancient or modern.
As an aside, I also now understand more thoroughly Mortimer J. Adler’s apparent fixation on dialectic and the notion of ideas as objects of knowledge (e.g. 102 Great Ideas). While Adler consistently adhered to Thomistic and Aristotelian philosophies, he apparently also sought a synthesis with the Platonic ideals, as well as admired the process of obtaining knowledge---the dialectic---outlined by Plato in the dialogues, Socratic and otherwise. This tension, or hoped for synthesis, dominated Adler’s philosophical thinking until at least the 1960s. It was then that he gave himself over, fully, to Aristotelian philosophy.
Perhaps one could make the argument that all that is distinctive about American philosophy from 1850 to 1950, after which the analytic movement became prominent, was the attempt to understand ontology in relation to Platonic/Kantian/Hegelian idealism? – TL
Label:
Catholicism,
Frederick Copleston SJ,
general U.S. intellectual history,
history of ideas,
history of philosophy,
idealism,
Jesus,
Mortimer J. Adler,
ontology
Rabu, 19 Agustus 2009
Proposition For Debate: Change In The Objects Of Study For Intellectual Historians
[Updated: 8/20/09, 9:35 CST]
Intellectual historians have traditionally been concerned with high and complex thought---traditional philosophical topics (Deweyan instrumentalism, Jamesian pragmatism, etc.) or practical applications thereof (Deweyites in education, Jamesians in psychology, etc.). These concerns might involve iterations of larger, more evident ideas or topics (e.g. freedom, democracy, knowledge, truth), or it might involve history books that make explicit subtle points of method (e.g. language theory, logic, arguments). The point is that a kind of top-down movement pervades this tradition---from complex ideas and/or prominent thinkers, to historical evidence.
But because higher thought exists and is on record, this does not necessitate that intellectual historians should neglect “lower thought.” By lower thought I mean that which is not recognized or always respected by philosophers or intellectual historians. This includes non-Western thought processes, the varieties of emotion, the appearance of unreasonableness (e.g. popular culture frivolity, ideologues), and less articulate attempts to rise above everyday circumstances. Of course this may involve occasional speculation on the part of historians to fill the gap inevitably left by the less articulate.
I do not mean to assert that a move toward the broad study of less complex thought should necessitate the neglect of higher modes of thought. A move toward more popular expressions of the intellect is meant only to (a) show the appeal of intellectual history to more readers and citizens, and (b) serve as a bulwark against the charge of elitism in intellectual history (e.g. concern only for those who express themselves well or in a complex fashion in the archives).
Be it resolved, then, that some significant portion of intellectual historians should, if not already doing so, concern themselves with classes of people traditionally considered less or in-articulate, irrational, emotional, or whose apparent actions would formerly indicate irrationality or radical differences in reasoning method.
-------------------------------------------
What am I forgetting? Is this proposition so obvious as to be irrelevant? Per the 1977 Wingspread Conference, has the history of culture, or cultural history, fulfilled this obligation? If so, has it done it satisfactorily? Is forwarding this proposition just another case of one forgetting about the “hidden intellectual history” of the past 30 years or so—--the kind of intellectual history that is now scattered over many other subfields? An example that might prove this point could be Michael Denning’s much-discussed and admired study, The Cultural Front. Are there not enough of those kinds of books? But have books on immigration history and the history of emotions, for instance, made an effort from the bottom up to connect historical actors to traditional streams of intellectual history? - TL
Intellectual historians have traditionally been concerned with high and complex thought---traditional philosophical topics (Deweyan instrumentalism, Jamesian pragmatism, etc.) or practical applications thereof (Deweyites in education, Jamesians in psychology, etc.). These concerns might involve iterations of larger, more evident ideas or topics (e.g. freedom, democracy, knowledge, truth), or it might involve history books that make explicit subtle points of method (e.g. language theory, logic, arguments). The point is that a kind of top-down movement pervades this tradition---from complex ideas and/or prominent thinkers, to historical evidence.
But because higher thought exists and is on record, this does not necessitate that intellectual historians should neglect “lower thought.” By lower thought I mean that which is not recognized or always respected by philosophers or intellectual historians. This includes non-Western thought processes, the varieties of emotion, the appearance of unreasonableness (e.g. popular culture frivolity, ideologues), and less articulate attempts to rise above everyday circumstances. Of course this may involve occasional speculation on the part of historians to fill the gap inevitably left by the less articulate.
I do not mean to assert that a move toward the broad study of less complex thought should necessitate the neglect of higher modes of thought. A move toward more popular expressions of the intellect is meant only to (a) show the appeal of intellectual history to more readers and citizens, and (b) serve as a bulwark against the charge of elitism in intellectual history (e.g. concern only for those who express themselves well or in a complex fashion in the archives).
Be it resolved, then, that some significant portion of intellectual historians should, if not already doing so, concern themselves with classes of people traditionally considered less or in-articulate, irrational, emotional, or whose apparent actions would formerly indicate irrationality or radical differences in reasoning method.
-------------------------------------------
What am I forgetting? Is this proposition so obvious as to be irrelevant? Per the 1977 Wingspread Conference, has the history of culture, or cultural history, fulfilled this obligation? If so, has it done it satisfactorily? Is forwarding this proposition just another case of one forgetting about the “hidden intellectual history” of the past 30 years or so—--the kind of intellectual history that is now scattered over many other subfields? An example that might prove this point could be Michael Denning’s much-discussed and admired study, The Cultural Front. Are there not enough of those kinds of books? But have books on immigration history and the history of emotions, for instance, made an effort from the bottom up to connect historical actors to traditional streams of intellectual history? - TL
Proposition For Debate: Change In The Objects Of Study For Intellectual Historians
[Updated: 8/20/09, 9:35 CST]
Intellectual historians have traditionally been concerned with high and complex thought---traditional philosophical topics (Deweyan instrumentalism, Jamesian pragmatism, etc.) or practical applications thereof (Deweyites in education, Jamesians in psychology, etc.). These concerns might involve iterations of larger, more evident ideas or topics (e.g. freedom, democracy, knowledge, truth), or it might involve history books that make explicit subtle points of method (e.g. language theory, logic, arguments). The point is that a kind of top-down movement pervades this tradition---from complex ideas and/or prominent thinkers, to historical evidence.
But because higher thought exists and is on record, this does not necessitate that intellectual historians should neglect “lower thought.” By lower thought I mean that which is not recognized or always respected by philosophers or intellectual historians. This includes non-Western thought processes, the varieties of emotion, the appearance of unreasonableness (e.g. popular culture frivolity, ideologues), and less articulate attempts to rise above everyday circumstances. Of course this may involve occasional speculation on the part of historians to fill the gap inevitably left by the less articulate.
I do not mean to assert that a move toward the broad study of less complex thought should necessitate the neglect of higher modes of thought. A move toward more popular expressions of the intellect is meant only to (a) show the appeal of intellectual history to more readers and citizens, and (b) serve as a bulwark against the charge of elitism in intellectual history (e.g. concern only for those who express themselves well or in a complex fashion in the archives).
Be it resolved, then, that some significant portion of intellectual historians should, if not already doing so, concern themselves with classes of people traditionally considered less or in-articulate, irrational, emotional, or whose apparent actions would formerly indicate irrationality or radical differences in reasoning method.
-------------------------------------------
What am I forgetting? Is this proposition so obvious as to be irrelevant? Per the 1977 Wingspread Conference, has the history of culture, or cultural history, fulfilled this obligation? If so, has it done it satisfactorily? Is forwarding this proposition just another case of one forgetting about the “hidden intellectual history” of the past 30 years or so—--the kind of intellectual history that is now scattered over many other subfields? An example that might prove this point could be Michael Denning’s much-discussed and admired study, The Cultural Front. Are there not enough of those kinds of books? But have books on immigration history and the history of emotions, for instance, made an effort from the bottom up to connect historical actors to traditional streams of intellectual history? - TL
Intellectual historians have traditionally been concerned with high and complex thought---traditional philosophical topics (Deweyan instrumentalism, Jamesian pragmatism, etc.) or practical applications thereof (Deweyites in education, Jamesians in psychology, etc.). These concerns might involve iterations of larger, more evident ideas or topics (e.g. freedom, democracy, knowledge, truth), or it might involve history books that make explicit subtle points of method (e.g. language theory, logic, arguments). The point is that a kind of top-down movement pervades this tradition---from complex ideas and/or prominent thinkers, to historical evidence.
But because higher thought exists and is on record, this does not necessitate that intellectual historians should neglect “lower thought.” By lower thought I mean that which is not recognized or always respected by philosophers or intellectual historians. This includes non-Western thought processes, the varieties of emotion, the appearance of unreasonableness (e.g. popular culture frivolity, ideologues), and less articulate attempts to rise above everyday circumstances. Of course this may involve occasional speculation on the part of historians to fill the gap inevitably left by the less articulate.
I do not mean to assert that a move toward the broad study of less complex thought should necessitate the neglect of higher modes of thought. A move toward more popular expressions of the intellect is meant only to (a) show the appeal of intellectual history to more readers and citizens, and (b) serve as a bulwark against the charge of elitism in intellectual history (e.g. concern only for those who express themselves well or in a complex fashion in the archives).
Be it resolved, then, that some significant portion of intellectual historians should, if not already doing so, concern themselves with classes of people traditionally considered less or in-articulate, irrational, emotional, or whose apparent actions would formerly indicate irrationality or radical differences in reasoning method.
-------------------------------------------
What am I forgetting? Is this proposition so obvious as to be irrelevant? Per the 1977 Wingspread Conference, has the history of culture, or cultural history, fulfilled this obligation? If so, has it done it satisfactorily? Is forwarding this proposition just another case of one forgetting about the “hidden intellectual history” of the past 30 years or so—--the kind of intellectual history that is now scattered over many other subfields? An example that might prove this point could be Michael Denning’s much-discussed and admired study, The Cultural Front. Are there not enough of those kinds of books? But have books on immigration history and the history of emotions, for instance, made an effort from the bottom up to connect historical actors to traditional streams of intellectual history? - TL
Selasa, 18 Agustus 2009
Announcement: Available Entries From The Forthcoming Encyclopedia of American Reform Movements
A few days ago one of our readers forwarded a list of open entries for the Encyclopedia of American Reform Movements. Many may be of interest to you. Encyclopedia articles can be a lot of work, but they do add to your publications list and can be great for testing the waters on a new subject. If you are interested in any from the list below, contact editors Jack McKivigan and Heather Kaufman at americanreform-at-gmail-dot-com. Here's another link containing contributor information. The publisher is Facts on File.
----------------------------------------
Encyclopedia of American Reform Movements
Open entries as of August 2009
Chapter 3: Civil Rights Movement
1. Theory Entry: Religious Roots of Civil Rights Activism
2. Theory Entry: Civil Rights Agitation as Product of Economic Change
3. Theory Entry: Inter-Movement Conflicts
4. Historical Development: Reconstruction Era Civil Rights Efforts
5. Historical Development: Spread of Jim Crow in Early 20th Century
6. Intersections: Civil Rights and Socialism/Political Radicalism, and the Labor Movement
7. Future of Civil Rights as Reform Movement: Revitalization of Poor People’s Movements
Chapter 4: Communitarianism
1. Theory of Reform Movement: Competing Theories of Communitarianism
2. Historical Developments: Industrial Experimentation
3. Historical Developments: Life Style Experimentation
Chapter 5: Environmentalism
1. Historical Developments: Earth Day Celebrations (1970--)
Chapter 6: Healthcare Reform
1. Introductory Essay
2. Theory of Health Care Reform Movement: Reforming for Socioeconomic Equality in Health Care
3. Historical Developments: Early Healthcare Reform
4. Historical Developments: Reform of Mental Healthcare and Addiction Treatment
5. Historical Developments: Occupational Safety Movement
6. Historical Developments: Disability Rights Movement
7. Key Moments: Albert Kinsey Publishes First Report on Sexual Behavior (1948)
8. Key Moments: AIDS Was Recognized As Distinct Human Health Problem (1981)
9. Key Moments: Passage of Americans with Disabilities Act (1990)
10. Intersection with Other Reform Movements: Health Care Reform and Environmental Movement, LGBT Rights Movement, Public Education Reform, and Women’s Rights
11. Future of Heath Care Reform Movement: Debate over Access to Healthcare, the Privatization of Healthcare, and a National Healthcare System
Chapter 7: Human Rights
1. Theory of Human Rights as Reform
Consequences of the Global Market, War, and Armed Conflict for Human Rights
2. Intersection of Human Rights with Other Reform Movements: Human Rights and Women’s Rights, Civil Rights, LGBT Rights, Animal Rights, Environmentalism, and Pacifism/Anti-War
Chapter 8: Labor Movement
1. Theory of Labor Movement as Reform: Roots of Labor Movement Reform
2. Theory of Labor Movement as Reform: The Impact of Industrialization and Globalization
Chapter 9: LGBT Rights
1. Theory of Gay Rights as Reform Movement: Intersections of Class, Race, Gender and Sexual Identity
2. Historical Development of LGBT Movement: Gay Rights in the Era of the Closet
3. Historical Development of LGBT Movement: Gays Challenge Discrimination in the Professions
4. Key Moments: ACT-UP Launched To Protest Official Indifference to AIDS Epidemic (1987)
5. Intersection with Other Reform Movements: LGBT Rights and Health Reform, Human Rights, and Public Education
6. Future of LGBT Campaign as Reform Movement: Efforts to Gain Equal Rights and Transgender Inclusion
Chapter 10: Media Reform
1. Introductory Essay
2. Historical Developments:
3. Historical Developments: Evolution of Early Broadcasting
4. Historical Developments: Consequences of the Rightwing Backlash to the New Left
5. Historical Developments: Media Watchdog Groups
6. Historical Developments: Special Interest Groups and the Media
7. Intersection with Other Reform Movements: Media Reform and Christian Patriotism, Pacifism/Anti-War Movement, and Women’s Rights Movement
Chapter 11: Pacifism/Anti-War
1. Intersection of Pacifism/Anti-War with Other Reform Movements: Pacifism/Anti-War and Environmentalism, Human Rights, Labor Movement, Socialism/Political Radicalism, and Women's Rights
2. Future of Pacifism/Anti-War as Reform Movement: Progressive Coalition Views Militarism as Obstacle to Movements for Social Justice
Chapter 12: Populism
1. Theory of Populist Movement as Reform: Populism as a Political Protest Against the Status Quo v. Elite Branding of
2. Theory of Populist Movement as Reform: Populism as Demagoguery, an “Excess of Democracy”
3. 1. Theory of Populist Movement as Reform: Populism as a Model of “Movement Culture and Mass Recruitment,”
4. Historical Development of Reform Movement: 18th and 19th Century Farmer Protests and “Rebellions”
5. Historical Development of Reform Movement: Twentieth Century “Populist” Reincarnations
6. Historical Development of Reform Movement: White Populist Dixiecrats and Jim Crow
7. Intersection with Other Reform Movements: Populism and Civil Rights and Labor Movement
Chapter 13: Progressivism
1. Theory of Progressivism as Reform Movement: Motivation for Progressive Reformism
Chapter 14: Public Education Reform
1. Theory of Reform Movement: Intersections between Government and Business in Public Education
2. Historical Developments: Gender and American Education Policy
3. Future of Public Education Reform: Privatization and Attack on Secularism in Public Education
Chapter 15: Radical Right
1. Theory of Reform: Understanding the Motivation of the Radical Right
2. Historical Developments: Anti-Semitic Groups
3 Historical Developments:. Christian Identity Movement
4. Intersections with Other Reforms: Christian Patriotism and Populism
5. Future of the Reform: Groups who Adhere to Armed Resistance Continue to Recruit, Organize, and Challenge the Federal Government
Chapter 16: Religious Benevolence
1. Introductory Overview Essay
2. Theory of Reform Movement: Benevolence Viewed as Women’s Work
Chapter 17: Socialism/Political Radicalism
1. Theory of Reform: Political, Socio-Economic, and Structural Obstacles to Third-Party Activism
2. Theory of Reform: Cultural Bohemianism as an Expression of Political Radicalism
3. Historical Developments: Antebellum Critique of Capitalism
4. Historical Developments: Utopian Socialism (Edward Bellamy, Henry George, etc.)
5. Intersection with Other Reform Movements: Socialism/Political Radicalism and Civil Rights Movement, Communitarianism, Labor Movement, Pacifism/Anti-War, Religious Benevolence, and Women’s Rights Movement
6. Future of the Reform: Future Opposition to Globalization and Declining Economic Opportunities
Chapter 18: Temperance
1. Theory of Temperance Movement: Alcohol/Drug Abuse Gain Legitimacy as a Social Problem
2. Theory of Temperance Movement :Temperance as Form of Social Control
3. Historical Developments: Unintended Consequences of War on Drugs (1969-Present)
4. Intersections with Other Reform Moments: Temperance and Health Reform, Public Education Reform, Progressivism, and Religious Benevolence
5. Future of Temperance Reform: State Authority v. Personal Autonomy Debate in Continuing Debate over "Drug" Decriminalization
Chapter 19: Women’s Rights Movement
1. Theory of the Reform Movement: Sources of Mobilization for Women's Rights Across the Three Waves of Feminism
2. Theory of the Reform Movement: Sources of Tension within Women's Rights Movement
Chapter 20: Ethnic Identity Movements
1. Introductory Overview Essay
2. Historical Development of Reform: Chinese Equal Rights League Founded in 1884 to Battle Exclusion Policies
3. Historical Development of Reform: Anti-Defamation League Founded in 1913 to Combat Anti-Semitism
4. Historical Development of Reform: Japanese American Citizens League (JACL) Founded in 1929 to Promote Greater Understanding and Awareness of Asian American Pacific Islanders
----------------------------------------
Encyclopedia of American Reform Movements
Open entries as of August 2009
Chapter 3: Civil Rights Movement
1. Theory Entry: Religious Roots of Civil Rights Activism
2. Theory Entry: Civil Rights Agitation as Product of Economic Change
3. Theory Entry: Inter-Movement Conflicts
4. Historical Development: Reconstruction Era Civil Rights Efforts
5. Historical Development: Spread of Jim Crow in Early 20th Century
6. Intersections: Civil Rights and Socialism/Political Radicalism, and the Labor Movement
7. Future of Civil Rights as Reform Movement: Revitalization of Poor People’s Movements
Chapter 4: Communitarianism
1. Theory of Reform Movement: Competing Theories of Communitarianism
2. Historical Developments: Industrial Experimentation
3. Historical Developments: Life Style Experimentation
Chapter 5: Environmentalism
1. Historical Developments: Earth Day Celebrations (1970--)
Chapter 6: Healthcare Reform
1. Introductory Essay
2. Theory of Health Care Reform Movement: Reforming for Socioeconomic Equality in Health Care
3. Historical Developments: Early Healthcare Reform
4. Historical Developments: Reform of Mental Healthcare and Addiction Treatment
5. Historical Developments: Occupational Safety Movement
6. Historical Developments: Disability Rights Movement
7. Key Moments: Albert Kinsey Publishes First Report on Sexual Behavior (1948)
8. Key Moments: AIDS Was Recognized As Distinct Human Health Problem (1981)
9. Key Moments: Passage of Americans with Disabilities Act (1990)
10. Intersection with Other Reform Movements: Health Care Reform and Environmental Movement, LGBT Rights Movement, Public Education Reform, and Women’s Rights
11. Future of Heath Care Reform Movement: Debate over Access to Healthcare, the Privatization of Healthcare, and a National Healthcare System
Chapter 7: Human Rights
1. Theory of Human Rights as Reform
Consequences of the Global Market, War, and Armed Conflict for Human Rights
2. Intersection of Human Rights with Other Reform Movements: Human Rights and Women’s Rights, Civil Rights, LGBT Rights, Animal Rights, Environmentalism, and Pacifism/Anti-War
Chapter 8: Labor Movement
1. Theory of Labor Movement as Reform: Roots of Labor Movement Reform
2. Theory of Labor Movement as Reform: The Impact of Industrialization and Globalization
Chapter 9: LGBT Rights
1. Theory of Gay Rights as Reform Movement: Intersections of Class, Race, Gender and Sexual Identity
2. Historical Development of LGBT Movement: Gay Rights in the Era of the Closet
3. Historical Development of LGBT Movement: Gays Challenge Discrimination in the Professions
4. Key Moments: ACT-UP Launched To Protest Official Indifference to AIDS Epidemic (1987)
5. Intersection with Other Reform Movements: LGBT Rights and Health Reform, Human Rights, and Public Education
6. Future of LGBT Campaign as Reform Movement: Efforts to Gain Equal Rights and Transgender Inclusion
Chapter 10: Media Reform
1. Introductory Essay
2. Historical Developments:
3. Historical Developments: Evolution of Early Broadcasting
4. Historical Developments: Consequences of the Rightwing Backlash to the New Left
5. Historical Developments: Media Watchdog Groups
6. Historical Developments: Special Interest Groups and the Media
7. Intersection with Other Reform Movements: Media Reform and Christian Patriotism, Pacifism/Anti-War Movement, and Women’s Rights Movement
Chapter 11: Pacifism/Anti-War
1. Intersection of Pacifism/Anti-War with Other Reform Movements: Pacifism/Anti-War and Environmentalism, Human Rights, Labor Movement, Socialism/Political Radicalism, and Women's Rights
2. Future of Pacifism/Anti-War as Reform Movement: Progressive Coalition Views Militarism as Obstacle to Movements for Social Justice
Chapter 12: Populism
1. Theory of Populist Movement as Reform: Populism as a Political Protest Against the Status Quo v. Elite Branding of
2. Theory of Populist Movement as Reform: Populism as Demagoguery, an “Excess of Democracy”
3. 1. Theory of Populist Movement as Reform: Populism as a Model of “Movement Culture and Mass Recruitment,”
4. Historical Development of Reform Movement: 18th and 19th Century Farmer Protests and “Rebellions”
5. Historical Development of Reform Movement: Twentieth Century “Populist” Reincarnations
6. Historical Development of Reform Movement: White Populist Dixiecrats and Jim Crow
7. Intersection with Other Reform Movements: Populism and Civil Rights and Labor Movement
Chapter 13: Progressivism
1. Theory of Progressivism as Reform Movement: Motivation for Progressive Reformism
Chapter 14: Public Education Reform
1. Theory of Reform Movement: Intersections between Government and Business in Public Education
2. Historical Developments: Gender and American Education Policy
3. Future of Public Education Reform: Privatization and Attack on Secularism in Public Education
Chapter 15: Radical Right
1. Theory of Reform: Understanding the Motivation of the Radical Right
2. Historical Developments: Anti-Semitic Groups
3 Historical Developments:. Christian Identity Movement
4. Intersections with Other Reforms: Christian Patriotism and Populism
5. Future of the Reform: Groups who Adhere to Armed Resistance Continue to Recruit, Organize, and Challenge the Federal Government
Chapter 16: Religious Benevolence
1. Introductory Overview Essay
2. Theory of Reform Movement: Benevolence Viewed as Women’s Work
Chapter 17: Socialism/Political Radicalism
1. Theory of Reform: Political, Socio-Economic, and Structural Obstacles to Third-Party Activism
2. Theory of Reform: Cultural Bohemianism as an Expression of Political Radicalism
3. Historical Developments: Antebellum Critique of Capitalism
4. Historical Developments: Utopian Socialism (Edward Bellamy, Henry George, etc.)
5. Intersection with Other Reform Movements: Socialism/Political Radicalism and Civil Rights Movement, Communitarianism, Labor Movement, Pacifism/Anti-War, Religious Benevolence, and Women’s Rights Movement
6. Future of the Reform: Future Opposition to Globalization and Declining Economic Opportunities
Chapter 18: Temperance
1. Theory of Temperance Movement: Alcohol/Drug Abuse Gain Legitimacy as a Social Problem
2. Theory of Temperance Movement :Temperance as Form of Social Control
3. Historical Developments: Unintended Consequences of War on Drugs (1969-Present)
4. Intersections with Other Reform Moments: Temperance and Health Reform, Public Education Reform, Progressivism, and Religious Benevolence
5. Future of Temperance Reform: State Authority v. Personal Autonomy Debate in Continuing Debate over "Drug" Decriminalization
Chapter 19: Women’s Rights Movement
1. Theory of the Reform Movement: Sources of Mobilization for Women's Rights Across the Three Waves of Feminism
2. Theory of the Reform Movement: Sources of Tension within Women's Rights Movement
Chapter 20: Ethnic Identity Movements
1. Introductory Overview Essay
2. Historical Development of Reform: Chinese Equal Rights League Founded in 1884 to Battle Exclusion Policies
3. Historical Development of Reform: Anti-Defamation League Founded in 1913 to Combat Anti-Semitism
4. Historical Development of Reform: Japanese American Citizens League (JACL) Founded in 1929 to Promote Greater Understanding and Awareness of Asian American Pacific Islanders
Announcement: Available Entries From The Forthcoming Encyclopedia of American Reform Movements
A few days ago one of our readers forwarded a list of open entries for the Encyclopedia of American Reform Movements. Many may be of interest to you. Encyclopedia articles can be a lot of work, but they do add to your publications list and can be great for testing the waters on a new subject. If you are interested in any from the list below, contact editors Jack McKivigan and Heather Kaufman at americanreform-at-gmail-dot-com. Here's another link containing contributor information. The publisher is Facts on File.
----------------------------------------
Encyclopedia of American Reform Movements
Open entries as of August 2009
Chapter 3: Civil Rights Movement
1. Theory Entry: Religious Roots of Civil Rights Activism
2. Theory Entry: Civil Rights Agitation as Product of Economic Change
3. Theory Entry: Inter-Movement Conflicts
4. Historical Development: Reconstruction Era Civil Rights Efforts
5. Historical Development: Spread of Jim Crow in Early 20th Century
6. Intersections: Civil Rights and Socialism/Political Radicalism, and the Labor Movement
7. Future of Civil Rights as Reform Movement: Revitalization of Poor People’s Movements
Chapter 4: Communitarianism
1. Theory of Reform Movement: Competing Theories of Communitarianism
2. Historical Developments: Industrial Experimentation
3. Historical Developments: Life Style Experimentation
Chapter 5: Environmentalism
1. Historical Developments: Earth Day Celebrations (1970--)
Chapter 6: Healthcare Reform
1. Introductory Essay
2. Theory of Health Care Reform Movement: Reforming for Socioeconomic Equality in Health Care
3. Historical Developments: Early Healthcare Reform
4. Historical Developments: Reform of Mental Healthcare and Addiction Treatment
5. Historical Developments: Occupational Safety Movement
6. Historical Developments: Disability Rights Movement
7. Key Moments: Albert Kinsey Publishes First Report on Sexual Behavior (1948)
8. Key Moments: AIDS Was Recognized As Distinct Human Health Problem (1981)
9. Key Moments: Passage of Americans with Disabilities Act (1990)
10. Intersection with Other Reform Movements: Health Care Reform and Environmental Movement, LGBT Rights Movement, Public Education Reform, and Women’s Rights
11. Future of Heath Care Reform Movement: Debate over Access to Healthcare, the Privatization of Healthcare, and a National Healthcare System
Chapter 7: Human Rights
1. Theory of Human Rights as Reform
Consequences of the Global Market, War, and Armed Conflict for Human Rights
2. Intersection of Human Rights with Other Reform Movements: Human Rights and Women’s Rights, Civil Rights, LGBT Rights, Animal Rights, Environmentalism, and Pacifism/Anti-War
Chapter 8: Labor Movement
1. Theory of Labor Movement as Reform: Roots of Labor Movement Reform
2. Theory of Labor Movement as Reform: The Impact of Industrialization and Globalization
Chapter 9: LGBT Rights
1. Theory of Gay Rights as Reform Movement: Intersections of Class, Race, Gender and Sexual Identity
2. Historical Development of LGBT Movement: Gay Rights in the Era of the Closet
3. Historical Development of LGBT Movement: Gays Challenge Discrimination in the Professions
4. Key Moments: ACT-UP Launched To Protest Official Indifference to AIDS Epidemic (1987)
5. Intersection with Other Reform Movements: LGBT Rights and Health Reform, Human Rights, and Public Education
6. Future of LGBT Campaign as Reform Movement: Efforts to Gain Equal Rights and Transgender Inclusion
Chapter 10: Media Reform
1. Introductory Essay
2. Historical Developments:
3. Historical Developments: Evolution of Early Broadcasting
4. Historical Developments: Consequences of the Rightwing Backlash to the New Left
5. Historical Developments: Media Watchdog Groups
6. Historical Developments: Special Interest Groups and the Media
7. Intersection with Other Reform Movements: Media Reform and Christian Patriotism, Pacifism/Anti-War Movement, and Women’s Rights Movement
Chapter 11: Pacifism/Anti-War
1. Intersection of Pacifism/Anti-War with Other Reform Movements: Pacifism/Anti-War and Environmentalism, Human Rights, Labor Movement, Socialism/Political Radicalism, and Women's Rights
2. Future of Pacifism/Anti-War as Reform Movement: Progressive Coalition Views Militarism as Obstacle to Movements for Social Justice
Chapter 12: Populism
1. Theory of Populist Movement as Reform: Populism as a Political Protest Against the Status Quo v. Elite Branding of
2. Theory of Populist Movement as Reform: Populism as Demagoguery, an “Excess of Democracy”
3. 1. Theory of Populist Movement as Reform: Populism as a Model of “Movement Culture and Mass Recruitment,”
4. Historical Development of Reform Movement: 18th and 19th Century Farmer Protests and “Rebellions”
5. Historical Development of Reform Movement: Twentieth Century “Populist” Reincarnations
6. Historical Development of Reform Movement: White Populist Dixiecrats and Jim Crow
7. Intersection with Other Reform Movements: Populism and Civil Rights and Labor Movement
Chapter 13: Progressivism
1. Theory of Progressivism as Reform Movement: Motivation for Progressive Reformism
Chapter 14: Public Education Reform
1. Theory of Reform Movement: Intersections between Government and Business in Public Education
2. Historical Developments: Gender and American Education Policy
3. Future of Public Education Reform: Privatization and Attack on Secularism in Public Education
Chapter 15: Radical Right
1. Theory of Reform: Understanding the Motivation of the Radical Right
2. Historical Developments: Anti-Semitic Groups
3 Historical Developments:. Christian Identity Movement
4. Intersections with Other Reforms: Christian Patriotism and Populism
5. Future of the Reform: Groups who Adhere to Armed Resistance Continue to Recruit, Organize, and Challenge the Federal Government
Chapter 16: Religious Benevolence
1. Introductory Overview Essay
2. Theory of Reform Movement: Benevolence Viewed as Women’s Work
Chapter 17: Socialism/Political Radicalism
1. Theory of Reform: Political, Socio-Economic, and Structural Obstacles to Third-Party Activism
2. Theory of Reform: Cultural Bohemianism as an Expression of Political Radicalism
3. Historical Developments: Antebellum Critique of Capitalism
4. Historical Developments: Utopian Socialism (Edward Bellamy, Henry George, etc.)
5. Intersection with Other Reform Movements: Socialism/Political Radicalism and Civil Rights Movement, Communitarianism, Labor Movement, Pacifism/Anti-War, Religious Benevolence, and Women’s Rights Movement
6. Future of the Reform: Future Opposition to Globalization and Declining Economic Opportunities
Chapter 18: Temperance
1. Theory of Temperance Movement: Alcohol/Drug Abuse Gain Legitimacy as a Social Problem
2. Theory of Temperance Movement :Temperance as Form of Social Control
3. Historical Developments: Unintended Consequences of War on Drugs (1969-Present)
4. Intersections with Other Reform Moments: Temperance and Health Reform, Public Education Reform, Progressivism, and Religious Benevolence
5. Future of Temperance Reform: State Authority v. Personal Autonomy Debate in Continuing Debate over "Drug" Decriminalization
Chapter 19: Women’s Rights Movement
1. Theory of the Reform Movement: Sources of Mobilization for Women's Rights Across the Three Waves of Feminism
2. Theory of the Reform Movement: Sources of Tension within Women's Rights Movement
Chapter 20: Ethnic Identity Movements
1. Introductory Overview Essay
2. Historical Development of Reform: Chinese Equal Rights League Founded in 1884 to Battle Exclusion Policies
3. Historical Development of Reform: Anti-Defamation League Founded in 1913 to Combat Anti-Semitism
4. Historical Development of Reform: Japanese American Citizens League (JACL) Founded in 1929 to Promote Greater Understanding and Awareness of Asian American Pacific Islanders
----------------------------------------
Encyclopedia of American Reform Movements
Open entries as of August 2009
Chapter 3: Civil Rights Movement
1. Theory Entry: Religious Roots of Civil Rights Activism
2. Theory Entry: Civil Rights Agitation as Product of Economic Change
3. Theory Entry: Inter-Movement Conflicts
4. Historical Development: Reconstruction Era Civil Rights Efforts
5. Historical Development: Spread of Jim Crow in Early 20th Century
6. Intersections: Civil Rights and Socialism/Political Radicalism, and the Labor Movement
7. Future of Civil Rights as Reform Movement: Revitalization of Poor People’s Movements
Chapter 4: Communitarianism
1. Theory of Reform Movement: Competing Theories of Communitarianism
2. Historical Developments: Industrial Experimentation
3. Historical Developments: Life Style Experimentation
Chapter 5: Environmentalism
1. Historical Developments: Earth Day Celebrations (1970--)
Chapter 6: Healthcare Reform
1. Introductory Essay
2. Theory of Health Care Reform Movement: Reforming for Socioeconomic Equality in Health Care
3. Historical Developments: Early Healthcare Reform
4. Historical Developments: Reform of Mental Healthcare and Addiction Treatment
5. Historical Developments: Occupational Safety Movement
6. Historical Developments: Disability Rights Movement
7. Key Moments: Albert Kinsey Publishes First Report on Sexual Behavior (1948)
8. Key Moments: AIDS Was Recognized As Distinct Human Health Problem (1981)
9. Key Moments: Passage of Americans with Disabilities Act (1990)
10. Intersection with Other Reform Movements: Health Care Reform and Environmental Movement, LGBT Rights Movement, Public Education Reform, and Women’s Rights
11. Future of Heath Care Reform Movement: Debate over Access to Healthcare, the Privatization of Healthcare, and a National Healthcare System
Chapter 7: Human Rights
1. Theory of Human Rights as Reform
Consequences of the Global Market, War, and Armed Conflict for Human Rights
2. Intersection of Human Rights with Other Reform Movements: Human Rights and Women’s Rights, Civil Rights, LGBT Rights, Animal Rights, Environmentalism, and Pacifism/Anti-War
Chapter 8: Labor Movement
1. Theory of Labor Movement as Reform: Roots of Labor Movement Reform
2. Theory of Labor Movement as Reform: The Impact of Industrialization and Globalization
Chapter 9: LGBT Rights
1. Theory of Gay Rights as Reform Movement: Intersections of Class, Race, Gender and Sexual Identity
2. Historical Development of LGBT Movement: Gay Rights in the Era of the Closet
3. Historical Development of LGBT Movement: Gays Challenge Discrimination in the Professions
4. Key Moments: ACT-UP Launched To Protest Official Indifference to AIDS Epidemic (1987)
5. Intersection with Other Reform Movements: LGBT Rights and Health Reform, Human Rights, and Public Education
6. Future of LGBT Campaign as Reform Movement: Efforts to Gain Equal Rights and Transgender Inclusion
Chapter 10: Media Reform
1. Introductory Essay
2. Historical Developments:
3. Historical Developments: Evolution of Early Broadcasting
4. Historical Developments: Consequences of the Rightwing Backlash to the New Left
5. Historical Developments: Media Watchdog Groups
6. Historical Developments: Special Interest Groups and the Media
7. Intersection with Other Reform Movements: Media Reform and Christian Patriotism, Pacifism/Anti-War Movement, and Women’s Rights Movement
Chapter 11: Pacifism/Anti-War
1. Intersection of Pacifism/Anti-War with Other Reform Movements: Pacifism/Anti-War and Environmentalism, Human Rights, Labor Movement, Socialism/Political Radicalism, and Women's Rights
2. Future of Pacifism/Anti-War as Reform Movement: Progressive Coalition Views Militarism as Obstacle to Movements for Social Justice
Chapter 12: Populism
1. Theory of Populist Movement as Reform: Populism as a Political Protest Against the Status Quo v. Elite Branding of
2. Theory of Populist Movement as Reform: Populism as Demagoguery, an “Excess of Democracy”
3. 1. Theory of Populist Movement as Reform: Populism as a Model of “Movement Culture and Mass Recruitment,”
4. Historical Development of Reform Movement: 18th and 19th Century Farmer Protests and “Rebellions”
5. Historical Development of Reform Movement: Twentieth Century “Populist” Reincarnations
6. Historical Development of Reform Movement: White Populist Dixiecrats and Jim Crow
7. Intersection with Other Reform Movements: Populism and Civil Rights and Labor Movement
Chapter 13: Progressivism
1. Theory of Progressivism as Reform Movement: Motivation for Progressive Reformism
Chapter 14: Public Education Reform
1. Theory of Reform Movement: Intersections between Government and Business in Public Education
2. Historical Developments: Gender and American Education Policy
3. Future of Public Education Reform: Privatization and Attack on Secularism in Public Education
Chapter 15: Radical Right
1. Theory of Reform: Understanding the Motivation of the Radical Right
2. Historical Developments: Anti-Semitic Groups
3 Historical Developments:. Christian Identity Movement
4. Intersections with Other Reforms: Christian Patriotism and Populism
5. Future of the Reform: Groups who Adhere to Armed Resistance Continue to Recruit, Organize, and Challenge the Federal Government
Chapter 16: Religious Benevolence
1. Introductory Overview Essay
2. Theory of Reform Movement: Benevolence Viewed as Women’s Work
Chapter 17: Socialism/Political Radicalism
1. Theory of Reform: Political, Socio-Economic, and Structural Obstacles to Third-Party Activism
2. Theory of Reform: Cultural Bohemianism as an Expression of Political Radicalism
3. Historical Developments: Antebellum Critique of Capitalism
4. Historical Developments: Utopian Socialism (Edward Bellamy, Henry George, etc.)
5. Intersection with Other Reform Movements: Socialism/Political Radicalism and Civil Rights Movement, Communitarianism, Labor Movement, Pacifism/Anti-War, Religious Benevolence, and Women’s Rights Movement
6. Future of the Reform: Future Opposition to Globalization and Declining Economic Opportunities
Chapter 18: Temperance
1. Theory of Temperance Movement: Alcohol/Drug Abuse Gain Legitimacy as a Social Problem
2. Theory of Temperance Movement :Temperance as Form of Social Control
3. Historical Developments: Unintended Consequences of War on Drugs (1969-Present)
4. Intersections with Other Reform Moments: Temperance and Health Reform, Public Education Reform, Progressivism, and Religious Benevolence
5. Future of Temperance Reform: State Authority v. Personal Autonomy Debate in Continuing Debate over "Drug" Decriminalization
Chapter 19: Women’s Rights Movement
1. Theory of the Reform Movement: Sources of Mobilization for Women's Rights Across the Three Waves of Feminism
2. Theory of the Reform Movement: Sources of Tension within Women's Rights Movement
Chapter 20: Ethnic Identity Movements
1. Introductory Overview Essay
2. Historical Development of Reform: Chinese Equal Rights League Founded in 1884 to Battle Exclusion Policies
3. Historical Development of Reform: Anti-Defamation League Founded in 1913 to Combat Anti-Semitism
4. Historical Development of Reform: Japanese American Citizens League (JACL) Founded in 1929 to Promote Greater Understanding and Awareness of Asian American Pacific Islanders
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