Tampilkan postingan dengan label Randolph Bourne. Tampilkan semua postingan
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Rabu, 08 Desember 2010

Iconic Irony

We often wonder how best to capture our moment, the temper of the time. In the classroom, we use a document, a novel, a photograph, a person, a film—some kind of iconic representation that can reduce immeasurably complex eras to something more manageable. We assign terms such as the “acids of modernity,” “the age of fracture,” “the era of broken dreams” to these iconic symbols in the hope that the combination will evoke further thought. Recently, I asked students taking my course on movies and American culture to tell me what movie, actor, genre, production trend, etc., best represented our contemporary moment. We had gone through the history of movies and so could speak about Birth of a Nation, The Bicycle Thief, Bonnie and Clyde and other films as iconic and representative of thought that was bubbling up at the time. We read about production trends and the corporate imperatives of the movie industry; the rise of moguls and the creation of stars; the patrol of censorship boards and control exerted by Catholics.

What I wanted for the final assignment was a reflection on something that moved them and I wanted to be moved by the passion of their convictions. What follows was my attempt to illustrate that kind of exercise.

For me, the touchstone for this sort of assignment has been, not surprisingly, Pauline Kael’s emphatic acclaim for Bonnie and Clyde. Kael has long been my uber-critic—the one who gets why movies matter but who was self-aware enough to understand that movies ultimately didn’t matter that much. She famously opened her review with a statement that rang like a gun shot: “How do you make a good movie in this country without getting jumped on?” What made her review of Bonnie and Clyde worthy of landmark status was her ability to understand the scathing critiques of the film and dispatch them with forcefulness required. Movie culture had changed, and she identified that change before it became a cliché.

Her moxie was more than mere bravado, though; it connected to an intellectual tradition that had genuine gravity. She was an ironist—she operated within an American intellectual tradition that has claim to the soul of the nation. The whole American project can be seen as ironic—an almost chosen nation; a place of grace and chance; a nation born of virtue and baptized by blood; a champion of freedom despite its history of slavery, inequality, and imperialism.

I don’t contend that Kael’s movie criticism is in league with the thought of Oliver Wendell Holmes or William James; but she might be in the same ballpark as Randolph Bourne and even Walter Lippmann. She exemplified the ironist of Bourne’s description, one who was “keenly alert, keenly sensitive, reacting promptly with feeling of liking or dislike to each bit of experience, letting none of it pass without interpretation and assimilation, a life full and satisfying—indeed, a rival of the religious life.” Kael was the ironic critic that changed the way I saw movies, she made manifest in popular culture that which the great American thinkers from James to Niebuhr had made essential to political life. She made visceral the cerebral. Kael’s criticism was not systematic, programmatic, or ideological—but it was incisive, historical, and categorical.

My debt to Pauline Kael is threefold: she showed how movies could be both popular and private and how out of that combination they possessed power as an art; she illustrated how to write about popular culture with verve and precision; and she gave all of us license to make declarations about what we as people get from our art, while at the same time reminding us that the point of making such declarations was to have them contested.

Kael is my iconic ironist. But I have two other ironic icons that define my era of popular culture. One appeared in 1991, the other in 2007, the former in music, the latter in film.

In the fall of 1991, I was midway through an MA program in history, the first Gulf War was barely over, and I was reading Reinhold Niebuhr. My thesis topic was the diplomat and historian George F. Kennan and his rather conservative, even tragic, views of life in America. Kennan claimed that he owed an intellectual debt to Niebuhr and the Christian theologian’s views of original sin and irony in politics. Reading Niebuhr and Kennan was a bracing experience for me, especially because I came late to an appreciation of what it meant to wrestle with ideas through writing. And like many students, while I was struggling with ideas that I didn’t completely understand, I was also plugged into a popular culture that was as vacuous as Niebuhr’s thought was rigorous. Nonetheless, it was around this time that I had an experience that in retrospect (and in the context of the other experience) created a signpost for how I viewed my time. In a moment of repose from reading Niebuhr’s Moral Man and Immoral Society, I turned on my pathetically small, utterly un-digital television to one of the many music video programs that littered the airwaves. Then I heard the opening chords of a song that blew me away—I had met Nirvana.

Smells Like Teen Spirit is a great song—we now duly recognize it as such. But at the time those opening chords, the lyrics, and the irony of it all hit my intellectual ground like a lightening bolt. How did a song with a title referring to a teen body spray come to define an age? For me, Nirvana did two things: they were better than anything else that was hard and they were smarter than anything else in rock. I went to high school in Woodstock, New York, a place that trafficked in music and the arts. But like the world of ideas, I came to the world of art and music late—I didn’t learn the lyrics to a Doors album, or see Pink Floyd in concert, or own a Jimi Hendrix import. I saw Kiss in concert; I liked heavy metal and pop music. In short, I just didn’t have IT. But Nirvana made me think that I didn’t need to find IT.

“I found it hard, it’s hard to find. Oh well, whatever, nevermind…” Damn right. I didn’t want rehashed ideas from the 1960s. I was unimpressed with what passed for grand ideas after the end of the cold war. But I wasn’t cynical nor optimistic about idealism. What I wanted was a little irony. Pop music was beside the point—it really was the noise of the “whatever.” Politics offered something, but not “it,” because “it” is hard to find—as it should be. Three guys from Seattle—rather than LA or New York or London— offered what seemed like a genuine alternative, looking like they didn’t care, when, in fact, it was clear they did. “The ironist,” Randolph Bourne wrote, “is ironical not because he does not care, but because he cares too much. He is feeling the profoundest depths of the world’s great beating, laboring heart, and his playful attitude towards the grim and sordid is a necessary relief from the tension of too much caring.”[1]

And then things fell apart. The Bosnian war reminded us how close we still were to the tragic nature of man and how ill-prepared we were to deal with it; Bill Clinton denigrated politics (for me, at least) by channeling the “whatever” of our Pop! lives through his political compromises and comprising situations; and September 11, 2001 became our new historical landmark. George W. Bush thought he rose to the occasion by telling us that “our responsibility to history is already clear: to answer these attacks and rid the world of evil.” The president counseled us to accept the fact that God’s “purposes are not always our own.” And that the “world He created is of moral design.” And such rhetoric left us where, ruminating about the nature of evil, the will of God, the course of a nation? Not really. Susan Sontag put it best a few days after the attacks in a brief essay in the New Yorker that made her perhaps the most hated American of the moment: “The unanimity of the sanctimonious, reality-concealing rhetoric spouted by American officials and media commentators in recent days seems, well, unworthy of a mature democracy.” Indeed, I read Sontag and mourned the loss of hope that was not destroyed by the events of 9/11 but by the response to it. Irony wouldn’t serve as a counterweight to a collective passion for worn-out dogmas of righteous indignation. We had been wronged, no doubt, but as Sontag seemed to sigh: “Let’s by all means grieve together. But let’s not be stupid together.” Oh, well, whatever, nevermind.

Rather unremarkably, we drifted from these tragic, frantic days into two wars that defied logical explanations. And an era that began with Nirvana’s ironic riffs about a world that needed more authenticity had grown increasingly abstract and existential. Niebuhr appeared again, this time as the prophet of our ironic disposition. My interest in Niebuhr had shifted from his relationship to Kennan’s conservatism, to his abiding admiration for Abraham Lincoln. While Niebuhr was being used by both sides of the war on Iraq, I sat with Lincoln’s “Meditation on the Divine Will.” In this short reflection, Lincoln illustrated his acceptance that the Civil War was neither a mistake nor a noble cause but an act of God’s will that was wholly unintelligible to men carrying it out in His name. What was George W. Bush fighting? Who was he fighting for? A movie provided solace for such depressing questions.

In 2007, my favorite team of filmmaking brothers Joel and Ethan Coen offered their masterpiece, No Country for Old Men. It’s a contemporary western based on a book from Cormac McCarthy, our latter-day Melville. The film is quiet and violent—and that combination alone would make it a worthy representative of the age of irony. But of course, there's more. It has the character of Sheriff Ed Tom Bell, a narrator for our time. He comes from a long line of lawmen who patrolled the violent border region of west Texas. He confronts far too often scenes that don’t make sense, or, in his vernacular, “I don’t know what to make of that,” Bells says of one story. “I sure don’t.” Bell wants guidance in the world he patrols. He looks to the past, to his father and grandfather as lawmen that he thinks had to be exemplary—at least more so than he is. They don’t help, though, the world’s changed. He hopes that perhaps God will enter his dreams—He doesn’t. Bell laments his pathos to his grandfather’s former deputy, and old man named Ellis. Ellis offers the guidance required—for his moment and ours. As political scientist Mary Nichols notes: “Ellis offers support not by pointing to any unnoticed achievements, but by offering the opinion that we do not know what God thinks. God is as unintelligible as Chigurh [the villain of the story]. This film is not about the world’s injustice, but its unintelligibility.” Ellis provides the wisdom echoed by the story’s title: “This country is hard on people,” he says to Bell. “You can’t stop what’s coming…It ain’t all waiting on you. That’s vanity.”

That’s about right. And by 2007 I was ready to consider the inability of the United States to discern the patterns of history so that it could better meet the responsibilities as the world’s sole superpower. That’s vanity, and hubris. Yet, that doesn’t mean the world is determined by chance, by Chigurh’s flip of a coin. Nor does it mean that we are at fatalists like Llewelyn Moss, knowing we’re going to die. The Coens gave us what all great movies provide, the ability to experience something vicariously that is indelibly of the moment. Kael knew Bonnie and Clyde had to use violence to make its point, not because violence was essential to contemporary society, but so that we in the audience might wonder why that was the case. The Coens didn’t have to say the world is brutal and given up to chance—rather they let us wonder why that seemed to describe our world. I don’t know quite what to make of that, I sure don't.



[1] My Bourne quotes come courtesy of Kevin Mattson, “Irony’s Irony,” Social Policy, 31 (Summer 2001), 56-60.

Iconic Irony

We often wonder how best to capture our moment, the temper of the time. In the classroom, we use a document, a novel, a photograph, a person, a film—some kind of iconic representation that can reduce immeasurably complex eras to something more manageable. We assign terms such as the “acids of modernity,” “the age of fracture,” “the era of broken dreams” to these iconic symbols in the hope that the combination will evoke further thought. Recently, I asked students taking my course on movies and American culture to tell me what movie, actor, genre, production trend, etc., best represented our contemporary moment. We had gone through the history of movies and so could speak about Birth of a Nation, The Bicycle Thief, Bonnie and Clyde and other films as iconic and representative of thought that was bubbling up at the time. We read about production trends and the corporate imperatives of the movie industry; the rise of moguls and the creation of stars; the patrol of censorship boards and control exerted by Catholics.

What I wanted for the final assignment was a reflection on something that moved them and I wanted to be moved by the passion of their convictions. What follows was my attempt to illustrate that kind of exercise.

For me, the touchstone for this sort of assignment has been, not surprisingly, Pauline Kael’s emphatic acclaim for Bonnie and Clyde. Kael has long been my uber-critic—the one who gets why movies matter but who was self-aware enough to understand that movies ultimately didn’t matter that much. She famously opened her review with a statement that rang like a gun shot: “How do you make a good movie in this country without getting jumped on?” What made her review of Bonnie and Clyde worthy of landmark status was her ability to understand the scathing critiques of the film and dispatch them with forcefulness required. Movie culture had changed, and she identified that change before it became a cliché.

Her moxie was more than mere bravado, though; it connected to an intellectual tradition that had genuine gravity. She was an ironist—she operated within an American intellectual tradition that has claim to the soul of the nation. The whole American project can be seen as ironic—an almost chosen nation; a place of grace and chance; a nation born of virtue and baptized by blood; a champion of freedom despite its history of slavery, inequality, and imperialism.

I don’t contend that Kael’s movie criticism is in league with the thought of Oliver Wendell Holmes or William James; but she might be in the same ballpark as Randolph Bourne and even Walter Lippmann. She exemplified the ironist of Bourne’s description, one who was “keenly alert, keenly sensitive, reacting promptly with feeling of liking or dislike to each bit of experience, letting none of it pass without interpretation and assimilation, a life full and satisfying—indeed, a rival of the religious life.” Kael was the ironic critic that changed the way I saw movies, she made manifest in popular culture that which the great American thinkers from James to Niebuhr had made essential to political life. She made visceral the cerebral. Kael’s criticism was not systematic, programmatic, or ideological—but it was incisive, historical, and categorical.

My debt to Pauline Kael is threefold: she showed how movies could be both popular and private and how out of that combination they possessed power as an art; she illustrated how to write about popular culture with verve and precision; and she gave all of us license to make declarations about what we as people get from our art, while at the same time reminding us that the point of making such declarations was to have them contested.

Kael is my iconic ironist. But I have two other ironic icons that define my era of popular culture. One appeared in 1991, the other in 2007, the former in music, the latter in film.

In the fall of 1991, I was midway through an MA program in history, the first Gulf War was barely over, and I was reading Reinhold Niebuhr. My thesis topic was the diplomat and historian George F. Kennan and his rather conservative, even tragic, views of life in America. Kennan claimed that he owed an intellectual debt to Niebuhr and the Christian theologian’s views of original sin and irony in politics. Reading Niebuhr and Kennan was a bracing experience for me, especially because I came late to an appreciation of what it meant to wrestle with ideas through writing. And like many students, while I was struggling with ideas that I didn’t completely understand, I was also plugged into a popular culture that was as vacuous as Niebuhr’s thought was rigorous. Nonetheless, it was around this time that I had an experience that in retrospect (and in the context of the other experience) created a signpost for how I viewed my time. In a moment of repose from reading Niebuhr’s Moral Man and Immoral Society, I turned on my pathetically small, utterly un-digital television to one of the many music video programs that littered the airwaves. Then I heard the opening chords of a song that blew me away—I had met Nirvana.

Smells Like Teen Spirit is a great song—we now duly recognize it as such. But at the time those opening chords, the lyrics, and the irony of it all hit my intellectual ground like a lightening bolt. How did a song with a title referring to a teen body spray come to define an age? For me, Nirvana did two things: they were better than anything else that was hard and they were smarter than anything else in rock. I went to high school in Woodstock, New York, a place that trafficked in music and the arts. But like the world of ideas, I came to the world of art and music late—I didn’t learn the lyrics to a Doors album, or see Pink Floyd in concert, or own a Jimi Hendrix import. I saw Kiss in concert; I liked heavy metal and pop music. In short, I just didn’t have IT. But Nirvana made me think that I didn’t need to find IT.

“I found it hard, it’s hard to find. Oh well, whatever, nevermind…” Damn right. I didn’t want rehashed ideas from the 1960s. I was unimpressed with what passed for grand ideas after the end of the cold war. But I wasn’t cynical nor optimistic about idealism. What I wanted was a little irony. Pop music was beside the point—it really was the noise of the “whatever.” Politics offered something, but not “it,” because “it” is hard to find—as it should be. Three guys from Seattle—rather than LA or New York or London— offered what seemed like a genuine alternative, looking like they didn’t care, when, in fact, it was clear they did. “The ironist,” Randolph Bourne wrote, “is ironical not because he does not care, but because he cares too much. He is feeling the profoundest depths of the world’s great beating, laboring heart, and his playful attitude towards the grim and sordid is a necessary relief from the tension of too much caring.”[1]

And then things fell apart. The Bosnian war reminded us how close we still were to the tragic nature of man and how ill-prepared we were to deal with it; Bill Clinton denigrated politics (for me, at least) by channeling the “whatever” of our Pop! lives through his political compromises and comprising situations; and September 11, 2001 became our new historical landmark. George W. Bush thought he rose to the occasion by telling us that “our responsibility to history is already clear: to answer these attacks and rid the world of evil.” The president counseled us to accept the fact that God’s “purposes are not always our own.” And that the “world He created is of moral design.” And such rhetoric left us where, ruminating about the nature of evil, the will of God, the course of a nation? Not really. Susan Sontag put it best a few days after the attacks in a brief essay in the New Yorker that made her perhaps the most hated American of the moment: “The unanimity of the sanctimonious, reality-concealing rhetoric spouted by American officials and media commentators in recent days seems, well, unworthy of a mature democracy.” Indeed, I read Sontag and mourned the loss of hope that was not destroyed by the events of 9/11 but by the response to it. Irony wouldn’t serve as a counterweight to a collective passion for worn-out dogmas of righteous indignation. We had been wronged, no doubt, but as Sontag seemed to sigh: “Let’s by all means grieve together. But let’s not be stupid together.” Oh, well, whatever, nevermind.

Rather unremarkably, we drifted from these tragic, frantic days into two wars that defied logical explanations. And an era that began with Nirvana’s ironic riffs about a world that needed more authenticity had grown increasingly abstract and existential. Niebuhr appeared again, this time as the prophet of our ironic disposition. My interest in Niebuhr had shifted from his relationship to Kennan’s conservatism, to his abiding admiration for Abraham Lincoln. While Niebuhr was being used by both sides of the war on Iraq, I sat with Lincoln’s “Meditation on the Divine Will.” In this short reflection, Lincoln illustrated his acceptance that the Civil War was neither a mistake nor a noble cause but an act of God’s will that was wholly unintelligible to men carrying it out in His name. What was George W. Bush fighting? Who was he fighting for? A movie provided solace for such depressing questions.

In 2007, my favorite team of filmmaking brothers Joel and Ethan Coen offered their masterpiece, No Country for Old Men. It’s a contemporary western based on a book from Cormac McCarthy, our latter-day Melville. The film is quiet and violent—and that combination alone would make it a worthy representative of the age of irony. But of course, there's more. It has the character of Sheriff Ed Tom Bell, a narrator for our time. He comes from a long line of lawmen who patrolled the violent border region of west Texas. He confronts far too often scenes that don’t make sense, or, in his vernacular, “I don’t know what to make of that,” Bells says of one story. “I sure don’t.” Bell wants guidance in the world he patrols. He looks to the past, to his father and grandfather as lawmen that he thinks had to be exemplary—at least more so than he is. They don’t help, though, the world’s changed. He hopes that perhaps God will enter his dreams—He doesn’t. Bell laments his pathos to his grandfather’s former deputy, and old man named Ellis. Ellis offers the guidance required—for his moment and ours. As political scientist Mary Nichols notes: “Ellis offers support not by pointing to any unnoticed achievements, but by offering the opinion that we do not know what God thinks. God is as unintelligible as Chigurh [the villain of the story]. This film is not about the world’s injustice, but its unintelligibility.” Ellis provides the wisdom echoed by the story’s title: “This country is hard on people,” he says to Bell. “You can’t stop what’s coming…It ain’t all waiting on you. That’s vanity.”

That’s about right. And by 2007 I was ready to consider the inability of the United States to discern the patterns of history so that it could better meet the responsibilities as the world’s sole superpower. That’s vanity, and hubris. Yet, that doesn’t mean the world is determined by chance, by Chigurh’s flip of a coin. Nor does it mean that we are at fatalists like Llewelyn Moss, knowing we’re going to die. The Coens gave us what all great movies provide, the ability to experience something vicariously that is indelibly of the moment. Kael knew Bonnie and Clyde had to use violence to make its point, not because violence was essential to contemporary society, but so that we in the audience might wonder why that was the case. The Coens didn’t have to say the world is brutal and given up to chance—rather they let us wonder why that seemed to describe our world. I don’t know quite what to make of that, I sure don't.



[1] My Bourne quotes come courtesy of Kevin Mattson, “Irony’s Irony,” Social Policy, 31 (Summer 2001), 56-60.

Rabu, 03 November 2010

Brokaw and Bourne

While watching the reports about the mid-term elections, there was one person I looked forward to seeing. Not Jim Lehrer, or Chris Matthews, or even John Stewart; no, I looked forward to Tom Brokaw. Why? Because I thought he might bring up one issue that seemed forgotten—war! In an op-ed in the New York Times on October 17, Brokaw thumped his point: “The United States is now in its ninth year of fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq, the longest wars in American history. Almost 5,000 men and women have been killed. More than 30,000 have been wounded, some so gravely they’re returning home to become, effectively, wards of their families and communities.” On Tuesday night, while the likes of Michelle Bachmann chanted about taxes and…taxes, Brokaw took a moment to remind his colleagues of the “blood and treasure” squandered by the wars on terror. But in the midst of a yet another round of the culture wars, real war got lost.

By calling attention to war, we might hope to have a vigorous debate about its costs, too. In the question and answer period that followed James Kloppenberg’s talk on Barack Obama as a pragmatist, Jackson Lears pointedly critiqued Obama’s handling of the war on terror. While we might find reason to admire or, at least, be sympathetic to Obama’s handling of the economy, health care, and education, his handling of the war on terror has been, Kloppenberg noted, deeply distressful. This exchange suggested that Obama’s failure might indicate a deficiency in his pragmatic thought. Might it also suggest a hole in our intellectual history? In other words, if the battles against Obama in the mid-terms illuminate the cultural wars, what does this failure to contend with real war reveal?

I asked this question knowing that we have intellectual histories of the culture wars, for an incisive treatment of this subject see the work of my USIH colleague Andrew Hartman. The significance of the culture wars, as Andrew writes in a blog posted earlier this year, is the “multiplication of mini-grand narratives.” We are awash in ways to explain the purpose of our age, our nation, and ourselves. The culture wars might not be good for politics but they do raise fundamental questions about the identity of the nation—this fractured, contested identity. Except, it seems, when we go to war. We dismiss each other’s view about art but, according to polls, agree on the heroism of American troops; we war over who gets to interpret the history of the nation but have faith that the nation, even when it is at war, is essentially good; and we wield religious views like weapons but find it entirely appropriate for our political leaders, in a time of war, to lead us in prayer. But in a dangerous twist, where the culture wars force us to recognize differences in ideas, wars tend to blur those differences until we become like Michelle Bachmann—in a trance, mouthing slogans.

Given my configuration above, what we have is an era of “multiplying mini-grand narratives” that has developed and continues to develop alongside and in some cases in relation to a grand narrative of war. The latter has an intellectual history, too. And we might investigate the irony of that history through the concept of civil religion.

The touchstone for thinking about contemporary versions of American civil religion remains Robert Bellah’s 1967 essay, “Civil Religion in America.” Reading Bellah in light of our recent wars, what struck me was not so much his defense of civil religion but the fact that civil religion seemed most relevant and apparent to Bellah in times of war. The heart of his argument relied on the significance of what he called “times of trial.” He concluded that the United States did not fight wars for higher ideals as much as find its ideals in the wars that it fought. In short, American civil religion was forged in war. Sacrifice in the war for independence made apparent a civil religious covenant among Americans. The Civil War incarnated that civil religion through a massive blood sacrifice (to summarize Harry Stout’s recent application of Bellah). World War II certified the promise of civil religion through heroic sacrifice on behalf of ideals embodied by the original American covenant.

The postwar period offered a new twist to the evolution of American civil religion. This was an era in which the notion that America was a force of good in the world went from functioning basically as an abstraction to a historical proof. Because the United States has been in an almost constant of war and because for the first time the abstract notion of the American promise had unprecedented American military power behind it, American civil religion grew exponentially more significant and more dangerous.

Bellah wrote his original essay in light of Vietnam, a war, he argued, that did not disprove the idea that the nation could still be a force for good in the world. Out of the depths of one of the most divisive periods in American history, Bellah offered one of the most attractive versions of American civil religion as a historical proof, arguing that “American civil religion is not the worship of the American nation but an understanding of the American experience in the light of ultimate and universal reality.” In short, Americans not only had a common creed that unified them but they also had a tradition of using that creed to evaluate their nation's actions. In parlance that became popular following World War II, the United States was a nation “under God,” meaning, as Bellah explained, “the will of the people is not itself the criterion of right and wrong. There is a higher criterion in terms of which this will can be judged; it is possible that the people may be wrong. The president’s obligation extends to the higher criterion.”[1]

Bellah suggested a way to claim moral authority in a time of moral tragedy by making adjustments in light of that higher authority. However, Ben Alpers, another colleague of mine at USIH, reminds us in a recent post that Randolph Bourne’s admonition regarding war haunts us. Bourne’s critique of pragmatist support for war included things familiar to us today: the cost of war in treasure and blood; the misguided expectation of a “gallant” war; and the contradictory logic that if a “war is too strong for you to prevent, how is it going to be weak enough for you to control and mould to your liberal purposes?” But perhaps Bourne’s most incisive observation was his lament that pragmatists led by John Dewey believed they could calibrate the techniques of war to the advancement of democratic values. In other words, winning a war made it possible for a philosophy of the good to flourish.

Yet, as Bourne so succinctly put it: “war always undermines values.” Indeed, calibrating values to technique in a time of war invites tragedy. And Bourne’s insight is devastating given our current predicament. Contemporary America is dangerously well-equipped to experiment with technique and tragically uninterested in contending with the psychic damage war has on its values. While our planners fiddle with troop levels, drone attacks, and secret-ops, thousands of soldiers stand to lose their lives for a war of almost no consequence. And while our electorate consumed its politics like so much tea, the wars have consumed at bit more of the national soul. Bourne castigated the young intelligentsia of his day for its infatuation with the technocratic side of war; in organizing for war they had forgotten to give much attention to reasons for fighting it. As our conversation about the role of intellectual history continues, is there a way to theorize war as we have the culture wars? Is there way to answer the call of Randolph Bourne and, of course, Tom Brokaw?


[1] Robert Bellah, http://www.robertbellah.com/articles_5.htm.

Brokaw and Bourne

While watching the reports about the mid-term elections, there was one person I looked forward to seeing. Not Jim Lehrer, or Chris Matthews, or even John Stewart; no, I looked forward to Tom Brokaw. Why? Because I thought he might bring up one issue that seemed forgotten—war! In an op-ed in the New York Times on October 17, Brokaw thumped his point: “The United States is now in its ninth year of fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq, the longest wars in American history. Almost 5,000 men and women have been killed. More than 30,000 have been wounded, some so gravely they’re returning home to become, effectively, wards of their families and communities.” On Tuesday night, while the likes of Michelle Bachmann chanted about taxes and…taxes, Brokaw took a moment to remind his colleagues of the “blood and treasure” squandered by the wars on terror. But in the midst of a yet another round of the culture wars, real war got lost.

By calling attention to war, we might hope to have a vigorous debate about its costs, too. In the question and answer period that followed James Kloppenberg’s talk on Barack Obama as a pragmatist, Jackson Lears pointedly critiqued Obama’s handling of the war on terror. While we might find reason to admire or, at least, be sympathetic to Obama’s handling of the economy, health care, and education, his handling of the war on terror has been, Kloppenberg noted, deeply distressful. This exchange suggested that Obama’s failure might indicate a deficiency in his pragmatic thought. Might it also suggest a hole in our intellectual history? In other words, if the battles against Obama in the mid-terms illuminate the cultural wars, what does this failure to contend with real war reveal?

I asked this question knowing that we have intellectual histories of the culture wars, for an incisive treatment of this subject see the work of my USIH colleague Andrew Hartman. The significance of the culture wars, as Andrew writes in a blog posted earlier this year, is the “multiplication of mini-grand narratives.” We are awash in ways to explain the purpose of our age, our nation, and ourselves. The culture wars might not be good for politics but they do raise fundamental questions about the identity of the nation—this fractured, contested identity. Except, it seems, when we go to war. We dismiss each other’s view about art but, according to polls, agree on the heroism of American troops; we war over who gets to interpret the history of the nation but have faith that the nation, even when it is at war, is essentially good; and we wield religious views like weapons but find it entirely appropriate for our political leaders, in a time of war, to lead us in prayer. But in a dangerous twist, where the culture wars force us to recognize differences in ideas, wars tend to blur those differences until we become like Michelle Bachmann—in a trance, mouthing slogans.

Given my configuration above, what we have is an era of “multiplying mini-grand narratives” that has developed and continues to develop alongside and in some cases in relation to a grand narrative of war. The latter has an intellectual history, too. And we might investigate the irony of that history through the concept of civil religion.

The touchstone for thinking about contemporary versions of American civil religion remains Robert Bellah’s 1967 essay, “Civil Religion in America.” Reading Bellah in light of our recent wars, what struck me was not so much his defense of civil religion but the fact that civil religion seemed most relevant and apparent to Bellah in times of war. The heart of his argument relied on the significance of what he called “times of trial.” He concluded that the United States did not fight wars for higher ideals as much as find its ideals in the wars that it fought. In short, American civil religion was forged in war. Sacrifice in the war for independence made apparent a civil religious covenant among Americans. The Civil War incarnated that civil religion through a massive blood sacrifice (to summarize Harry Stout’s recent application of Bellah). World War II certified the promise of civil religion through heroic sacrifice on behalf of ideals embodied by the original American covenant.

The postwar period offered a new twist to the evolution of American civil religion. This was an era in which the notion that America was a force of good in the world went from functioning basically as an abstraction to a historical proof. Because the United States has been in an almost constant of war and because for the first time the abstract notion of the American promise had unprecedented American military power behind it, American civil religion grew exponentially more significant and more dangerous.

Bellah wrote his original essay in light of Vietnam, a war, he argued, that did not disprove the idea that the nation could still be a force for good in the world. Out of the depths of one of the most divisive periods in American history, Bellah offered one of the most attractive versions of American civil religion as a historical proof, arguing that “American civil religion is not the worship of the American nation but an understanding of the American experience in the light of ultimate and universal reality.” In short, Americans not only had a common creed that unified them but they also had a tradition of using that creed to evaluate their nation's actions. In parlance that became popular following World War II, the United States was a nation “under God,” meaning, as Bellah explained, “the will of the people is not itself the criterion of right and wrong. There is a higher criterion in terms of which this will can be judged; it is possible that the people may be wrong. The president’s obligation extends to the higher criterion.”[1]

Bellah suggested a way to claim moral authority in a time of moral tragedy by making adjustments in light of that higher authority. However, Ben Alpers, another colleague of mine at USIH, reminds us in a recent post that Randolph Bourne’s admonition regarding war haunts us. Bourne’s critique of pragmatist support for war included things familiar to us today: the cost of war in treasure and blood; the misguided expectation of a “gallant” war; and the contradictory logic that if a “war is too strong for you to prevent, how is it going to be weak enough for you to control and mould to your liberal purposes?” But perhaps Bourne’s most incisive observation was his lament that pragmatists led by John Dewey believed they could calibrate the techniques of war to the advancement of democratic values. In other words, winning a war made it possible for a philosophy of the good to flourish.

Yet, as Bourne so succinctly put it: “war always undermines values.” Indeed, calibrating values to technique in a time of war invites tragedy. And Bourne’s insight is devastating given our current predicament. Contemporary America is dangerously well-equipped to experiment with technique and tragically uninterested in contending with the psychic damage war has on its values. While our planners fiddle with troop levels, drone attacks, and secret-ops, thousands of soldiers stand to lose their lives for a war of almost no consequence. And while our electorate consumed its politics like so much tea, the wars have consumed at bit more of the national soul. Bourne castigated the young intelligentsia of his day for its infatuation with the technocratic side of war; in organizing for war they had forgotten to give much attention to reasons for fighting it. As our conversation about the role of intellectual history continues, is there a way to theorize war as we have the culture wars? Is there way to answer the call of Randolph Bourne and, of course, Tom Brokaw?


[1] Robert Bellah, http://www.robertbellah.com/articles_5.htm.