Communities of Discourse
Fifth Annual Conference and Annual Meeting of the Society for U.S. Intellectual History
Co-sponsored and hosted by the Center for the Humanities,
The Graduate Center of the City University of New York
New York City
November 1-2, 2012
Submission deadline: June 1, 2012
The Society for U.S. Intellectual History (S-USIH) invites panel proposals for its fifth annual conference to be held at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York on November 1-2, 2012. S-USIH is very pleased to announce that the keynote address will be delivered by David A. Hollinger, Preston Hotchkis Professor of American History at the University of California-Berkeley.
This year’s conference theme is “Communities of Discourse.” The theme highlights the fact that communities are essential to intellectual life. Intellectual historians often focus on individual figures, yet individuals are always embedded in wider communities of intellectual exchange. In addition, intellectual historians are themselves situated in communities of exchange that include not only other historians, but also academics from a broad range of fields (including literature, political science, communications, religion, sociology, anthropology, art history) and the wider public as well. The conference committee invites participants to reflect on all aspects of communities of discourse and the study of intellectual history. Although proposals that relate to the theme are particularly welcome, the committee will accept submissions that are relevant to any aspect of the study of American thought.
Given the growing popularity of the conference, the committee is introducing a number of new submission rules in order to ensure fairness. Please read carefully. We will only accept submission of complete panels and will no longer accept individual paper submissions. Panel submissions must include an abstract of each presentation, a separate description of the panel itself, and one-page CVs including the relevant means of contact for all participants. Abstracts for individual presentations should be no longer than 250 words; panel abstracts should be no longer than 500 words.
Please observe the following:
1. The number of participants in each session will vary with the format but each panel should have a chair. We will accept the following formats:
a. Traditional panels: Sessions featuring three academic papers and one commentator, who will also serve as the panel chair.
b. Roundtables: A series of ten-minute extemporaneous presentations on a topic followed by discussion among the panel and audience.
c. Discussion panels: Sessions in which the papers are circulated online prior to the conference. The entire session is devoted to discussions of the papers.
d. Brownbags: One-hour long presentations during the lunch period.
2. Each panel submission must indicate a panel organizer, who will serve as the point of contact for the conference committee.
3. The committee is especially eager to ensure a diverse representation of participants at the conference. All academic considerations being equal, panels will be selected whose participants contribute to that goal.
4. Participation will be limited to once on the program, so a person should only join one panel submission.
5. The committee assumes that submission to the conference is an indication that participants will be attending the entire conference. We are unable to accommodate scheduling requests.
6. All persons appearing on the program must become members of S-USIH and register for the conference in advance.
7. Deadline for submissions is June 1, 2012. All submissions must be emailed as attachments in MS Word or .pdf format.
Send all submissions to:
2012 Conference Committee
usih2012@gmail.com
Other queries may be directed to:
David Sehat, 2012 Conference Committee Chair
dsehat@gsu.edu
Selasa, 31 Januari 2012
Socialism is the Name of Our Desire
Last week I presented to about 60 secondary history teachers, alongside two of my colleagues at our lab school, University High, on the topic: “Teaching Socialism in American History.” I argued that including the history of socialism in the secondary U.S. history survey was important because, in the all important quest to make history more interesting for young students—since polls regularly show that high school students consider history the most boring subject—the history of socialism would give students space to imagine a different world. Counterfactual thinking is important to the development of historical imagination. It helps students think about the differences between history, in its constructedness, and the past, in its finiteness. Counterfactuals highlight historical contingency in ways that make the study of history more compelling than the Whiggish, even teleological narratives spun by textbooks. Werner Sombert’s crucial question—“Why no socialism in America?”— which has helped shaped a century of American historiography, is just the type of counterfactual question that we should ask our young history students.
Lest you dyed-in-the-wool empiricists out there object, I should point out that I also argued that including socialism as part of the U.S. history curriculum paints a more accurate picture of U.S. history. In making this case, I relied heavily on Michael Kazin’s indispensable new book, American Dreamers: How the Left Changed a Nation (which Mike O’Connor reviewed for USIH here.) Kazin contends that the left, defined as “that social movement, or congeries of mutually sympathetic movements, that are dedicated to a radically egalitarian transformation of society”—has transformed the moral culture, or "common sense” of the nation, even though it has never been a serious threat to the concentrations of political and economic power. He writes: “Leftists who articulated big dreams of a different future did much to initiate what became common, if still controversial, features of American life. These included the advocacy of equal opportunity and equal treatment for women, ethnic and racial minorities, and homosexuals; the celebration of sexual pleasure unconnected to reproduction, media and educational system sensitive to racial and gender oppression and which celebrates what we now call multiculturalism, and the popularity of novels and films with a strongly altruistic and anti-authoritarian point of view.” In short, Kazin argues that the cultural left, from Harriet Beecher Stowe, to Max Eastman, to Toni Morrison, to Matt Groening, “articulated outrage about the state of the world and the longing for a different one in ways the political left was unable to do.”
Kazin’s thesis is exciting for intellectual historians because, insofar as the left has been influential in American life, such influence is best assessed by taking stock of how its ideas have been incorporated into mainstream cultural frameworks. This is not to say that American Dreamers is a work of intellectual history. Kazin takes ideas seriously, and intellectuals seriously, but usually as tangential to the larger social history of political movements. That is to say, he rarely pauses to analyze intellectual sources with any rigor. Which is fine. Like I said, the book is indispensable as a synthetic historical overview of the American left. I definitely plan to assign it to undergraduate students.
American Dreamers is also a good place for intellectual historians to begin rethinking the paradoxes of radical thought. For instance, in an obscure footnote Kazin quotes a stunning passage from Richard Hofstadter’s Age of Reform: “The dialectic of history is full of odd and cunningly contrived ironies, and among these are rebellion waged only that the rebels might in the end be converted into their opposites.” Kazin relates Hofstadter’s point about the populists in order to make his case that many New Left dissidents, those who staged dramatic sit-ins at universities across the country, ended up controlling the reigns of cultural power as represented by humanities departments. Although this paradoxical development sends shivers down the spines of conservatives such as Pat Buchanan—whose pithy quote, “Culture is the Ho Chi Minh Trail of power; you surrender that province and you lose America,” became a rallying cry for conservative culture warriors—Kazin qualifies the effect of tenured radicals.
On the one hand, Kazin recognizes, along with Richard Rorty, that New Leftists have reshaped American culture to be far less sadistic. Concomitantly, they changed the way millions of young Americans have learned about their nation. Kazin writes: “Gradually, their ideas about history, literature, and a just society percolated down to secondary schools across the land. Black studies, Chicano studies, women’s studies, queer studies, and cultural studies; history which examined America as a nation dominated by white people bent on empire, the so-called ‘holy trinity’ of ‘race-class-and-gender’ and the virtues of multicultural identity—all were norms of pedagogy and scholarship by the end of the twentieth century.” Although this is more than a touch overstated—more secondary students continue to learn from traditional curriculums than from those inflected with New Left ideas, and even most college surveys avoid using the “E word” (Empire) when describing the role of America in the world, apart from the era of the Spanish-American War—Kazin is basically correct about this remarkable cultural transformation.
But on the other hand, Kazin’s analysis of the cultural left is tempered by his pessimism that such success matters little in the face of conservative economic and political power. “The cultural influence of the post-1960s left thus became a background melody to a political narrative written largely by conservatives. It softened the tone and created some striking ironies”—such that Fox broadcast sixties radical Matt Groening’s satirically subversive The Simpsons for over two decades at the same time its news station became an effective mouthpiece of the Republican Party’s right-wing—“but it did not rewrite the script.” The trajectory of this analysis is similar to a line of thought I’ve been exploring: to what degree has New Left thought been sopped up by neoliberalism (cultural liberalism mixed with economic conservatism)? Kazin’s analysis that, “as respect for the individual rights of everyone advanced, the advocacy of collective uplift and economic equality receded further,” begs the following question: was the advance of the former the precondition for the recession of the latter? The answers to this question might determine whether the left has a future.
Kazin is a careful and fair scholar. But he gets caught up in his own brand of polemics when analyzing contemporary left public intellectuals such as Noam Chomsky, Naomi Klein, Michael Moore, and Howard Zinn. Although he is quick to point out that such intellectuals are handicapped by the fact that their ideas are disconnected from a movement—since a left political movement is mostly non-existent—he is even quicker to dismiss their ideas as grim and unrealistic. Kazin is especially harsh in rehashing his dour assessment of the late historian and activist Howard Zinn. Me thinks he doth protest too much.
Kazin begrudgingly recognizes that Zinn’s A People’s History of the United States, which has sold over two million copies, has “became the most popular work of history an American leftist has ever written.” “Unfortunately,” Kazin writes, “Zinn’s big book was stronger on polemical passion than historical insight. For all his virtuous intentions, he essentially reduced the past to a Manichean fable and made no serious attempt to address the biggest question a leftist should ask about U.S. history: why have most Americans accepted the legitimacy of the capitalist republic in which they live?” This is a weird point of criticism given that a few paragraphs prior Kazin addresses the ways in which Zinn sought to answer “the biggest question.” “The American elite,” Kazin paraphrases Zinn, “used its wealth to pit ‘the 99 percent’ of the people ‘against one another’ and employed war, patriotism, and the military to ‘absorb and divert’ the occasional rebellion.” So the real problem is not that Zinn fails to address “the biggest question,” but rather that Kazin dislikes Zinn’s answers.
For Kazin, the American people cannot be reduced to either heroes or dupes. Fair enough. A professional historian should recognize nuance, complexity, irony, blah, blah, blah. But should A People’s History of the United States be judged by these standards? Or should it be assessed as a primary document of the left, similarly to how Kazin analyzes the Port Huron Statement? In other words, is accuracy or effect the barometer? Kazin assesses most of his primary sources according to the latter. What good did it do? Did it help the left? Did it make America better? I would argue Zinn’s book, and his legacy, should be analyzed as such. Kazin’s glib assessment of Zinn the lousy scholar—he didn’t even cite his sources!—is really beside the point.
Kazin has always been open about recognizing his personal position relative to his subject matter. He was the son of anti-Stalinist leftists. He was a New Leftist. He was a Maoist who cut sugarcane in Cuba. He was also, as the reader of American Dreamers discovers, a hippie communard who sought to get closer to nature while living in a group house and growing his own food in Oregon in the early 70s. Kazin has since gone out of his way to renounce some of his earlier positions as flawed. But, unlike someone like David Horowitz, he remains a man of the left, evident in that he’s the current editor of Dissent. I could compare his trajectory to Todd Gitlin’s. Gitlin was a renowned SDS member who has since worked hard to convince leftists that loving America—the flag!—is necessary and good. Similarly, Kazin was the only panelist on the American Exceptionalism plenary (that concluded last year’s USIH conference) who seemed to think American Exceptionalism something the left could embrace.
Given Kazin’s reflective self-positioning, I find it strange that he fails to see the ironies that plague his analysis of Zinn. For example, Kazin charges Zinn with, essentially, being a lumper, or, gasp, an uber-lumper. In contrast, Kazin carefully splits the left throughout his book. For example, one of my favorite chapters is titled, “The Tale of Three Socialism”: the prairie socialism from Wisconsin to Milwaukee, the secular-Jewish socialism of the needle unions, and the radical modernism of bohemian New York. Kazin also expertly delineates the differences between Old and New Lefts. And yet, in writing a book about the American left, from the 1830s to the present, he can’t help but also do some lumping of his own. Mike O’Connor expertly clarifies this problem in his review of American Dreamers:
It is difficult to know how Kazin might have addressed this problem short of writing an entirely different book. A deeper issue raised by American Dreamers, however, is whether “the left” qualifies as a tradition in the sense that Kazin intends. Without a core tenet, text or history, do the disparate struggles for justice in the name of race, gender and labor constitute a single movement? Moreover, to what extent does the work of later radical activists derive from that of earlier ones? To cite Kazin’s earliest examples, can we draw direct lines from David Walker to Malcolm X, Frances Wright to Robin Morgan, or Thomas Skidmore to Occupy Wall Street? Kazin suggests that all of these figures and groups are committed to the ideal of equality and therefore such connections are justified. But have these leftists seen themselves as unified in a common project? Is such self-conscious identification necessary to be designated a tradition in this sense?
Ironically, again, Zinn is perhaps the most influential chronicler of those radicals in American history whom Kazin would deem worthy of lumping together. Most contemporary radicals understand the history of the American left through Zinn. David Walker, Big Bill Haywood, Jane Addams, Eugene Debs, Tom Hayden, and many more, continue to be imagined as part of an unbroken chain of leftists. Such an imagination is thanks due in no small part to Zinn. Had a public intellectual from an earlier era achieved something of this magnitude, Kazin would not have heaped so much scorn. Zinn certainly did more than Dissent to keep Kazin’s beloved left—my beloved left—alive during its nadir! (Kazin is only recently the editor of Dissent!)
Nitpicking aside, read American Dreamers. Learning about the history of those Americans who dreamed of a better world is a good antidote to cynics who decry the Occupy Movement’s lack of achievable goals. As Kazin writes in his conclusion: “the utopian impulse should not be smothered under a patchwork quilt of policy prescriptions.” For Kazin, and for me, socialism is the name of this utopia. Or, as Lewis Coser and Irving Howe wrote in a 1954 Dissent essay: “Socialism is the name of our desire.” “Socialism,” Kazin writes, “has never been the name most Americans would choose for their dream society; today, many doubt such a society is either feasible or desirable. Without such an ideal, however, whatever we name it, the real world will be ever harder to change.”
Lest you dyed-in-the-wool empiricists out there object, I should point out that I also argued that including socialism as part of the U.S. history curriculum paints a more accurate picture of U.S. history. In making this case, I relied heavily on Michael Kazin’s indispensable new book, American Dreamers: How the Left Changed a Nation (which Mike O’Connor reviewed for USIH here.) Kazin contends that the left, defined as “that social movement, or congeries of mutually sympathetic movements, that are dedicated to a radically egalitarian transformation of society”—has transformed the moral culture, or "common sense” of the nation, even though it has never been a serious threat to the concentrations of political and economic power. He writes: “Leftists who articulated big dreams of a different future did much to initiate what became common, if still controversial, features of American life. These included the advocacy of equal opportunity and equal treatment for women, ethnic and racial minorities, and homosexuals; the celebration of sexual pleasure unconnected to reproduction, media and educational system sensitive to racial and gender oppression and which celebrates what we now call multiculturalism, and the popularity of novels and films with a strongly altruistic and anti-authoritarian point of view.” In short, Kazin argues that the cultural left, from Harriet Beecher Stowe, to Max Eastman, to Toni Morrison, to Matt Groening, “articulated outrage about the state of the world and the longing for a different one in ways the political left was unable to do.”
Kazin’s thesis is exciting for intellectual historians because, insofar as the left has been influential in American life, such influence is best assessed by taking stock of how its ideas have been incorporated into mainstream cultural frameworks. This is not to say that American Dreamers is a work of intellectual history. Kazin takes ideas seriously, and intellectuals seriously, but usually as tangential to the larger social history of political movements. That is to say, he rarely pauses to analyze intellectual sources with any rigor. Which is fine. Like I said, the book is indispensable as a synthetic historical overview of the American left. I definitely plan to assign it to undergraduate students.
American Dreamers is also a good place for intellectual historians to begin rethinking the paradoxes of radical thought. For instance, in an obscure footnote Kazin quotes a stunning passage from Richard Hofstadter’s Age of Reform: “The dialectic of history is full of odd and cunningly contrived ironies, and among these are rebellion waged only that the rebels might in the end be converted into their opposites.” Kazin relates Hofstadter’s point about the populists in order to make his case that many New Left dissidents, those who staged dramatic sit-ins at universities across the country, ended up controlling the reigns of cultural power as represented by humanities departments. Although this paradoxical development sends shivers down the spines of conservatives such as Pat Buchanan—whose pithy quote, “Culture is the Ho Chi Minh Trail of power; you surrender that province and you lose America,” became a rallying cry for conservative culture warriors—Kazin qualifies the effect of tenured radicals.
On the one hand, Kazin recognizes, along with Richard Rorty, that New Leftists have reshaped American culture to be far less sadistic. Concomitantly, they changed the way millions of young Americans have learned about their nation. Kazin writes: “Gradually, their ideas about history, literature, and a just society percolated down to secondary schools across the land. Black studies, Chicano studies, women’s studies, queer studies, and cultural studies; history which examined America as a nation dominated by white people bent on empire, the so-called ‘holy trinity’ of ‘race-class-and-gender’ and the virtues of multicultural identity—all were norms of pedagogy and scholarship by the end of the twentieth century.” Although this is more than a touch overstated—more secondary students continue to learn from traditional curriculums than from those inflected with New Left ideas, and even most college surveys avoid using the “E word” (Empire) when describing the role of America in the world, apart from the era of the Spanish-American War—Kazin is basically correct about this remarkable cultural transformation.
But on the other hand, Kazin’s analysis of the cultural left is tempered by his pessimism that such success matters little in the face of conservative economic and political power. “The cultural influence of the post-1960s left thus became a background melody to a political narrative written largely by conservatives. It softened the tone and created some striking ironies”—such that Fox broadcast sixties radical Matt Groening’s satirically subversive The Simpsons for over two decades at the same time its news station became an effective mouthpiece of the Republican Party’s right-wing—“but it did not rewrite the script.” The trajectory of this analysis is similar to a line of thought I’ve been exploring: to what degree has New Left thought been sopped up by neoliberalism (cultural liberalism mixed with economic conservatism)? Kazin’s analysis that, “as respect for the individual rights of everyone advanced, the advocacy of collective uplift and economic equality receded further,” begs the following question: was the advance of the former the precondition for the recession of the latter? The answers to this question might determine whether the left has a future.
Kazin is a careful and fair scholar. But he gets caught up in his own brand of polemics when analyzing contemporary left public intellectuals such as Noam Chomsky, Naomi Klein, Michael Moore, and Howard Zinn. Although he is quick to point out that such intellectuals are handicapped by the fact that their ideas are disconnected from a movement—since a left political movement is mostly non-existent—he is even quicker to dismiss their ideas as grim and unrealistic. Kazin is especially harsh in rehashing his dour assessment of the late historian and activist Howard Zinn. Me thinks he doth protest too much.
Kazin begrudgingly recognizes that Zinn’s A People’s History of the United States, which has sold over two million copies, has “became the most popular work of history an American leftist has ever written.” “Unfortunately,” Kazin writes, “Zinn’s big book was stronger on polemical passion than historical insight. For all his virtuous intentions, he essentially reduced the past to a Manichean fable and made no serious attempt to address the biggest question a leftist should ask about U.S. history: why have most Americans accepted the legitimacy of the capitalist republic in which they live?” This is a weird point of criticism given that a few paragraphs prior Kazin addresses the ways in which Zinn sought to answer “the biggest question.” “The American elite,” Kazin paraphrases Zinn, “used its wealth to pit ‘the 99 percent’ of the people ‘against one another’ and employed war, patriotism, and the military to ‘absorb and divert’ the occasional rebellion.” So the real problem is not that Zinn fails to address “the biggest question,” but rather that Kazin dislikes Zinn’s answers.
For Kazin, the American people cannot be reduced to either heroes or dupes. Fair enough. A professional historian should recognize nuance, complexity, irony, blah, blah, blah. But should A People’s History of the United States be judged by these standards? Or should it be assessed as a primary document of the left, similarly to how Kazin analyzes the Port Huron Statement? In other words, is accuracy or effect the barometer? Kazin assesses most of his primary sources according to the latter. What good did it do? Did it help the left? Did it make America better? I would argue Zinn’s book, and his legacy, should be analyzed as such. Kazin’s glib assessment of Zinn the lousy scholar—he didn’t even cite his sources!—is really beside the point.
Kazin has always been open about recognizing his personal position relative to his subject matter. He was the son of anti-Stalinist leftists. He was a New Leftist. He was a Maoist who cut sugarcane in Cuba. He was also, as the reader of American Dreamers discovers, a hippie communard who sought to get closer to nature while living in a group house and growing his own food in Oregon in the early 70s. Kazin has since gone out of his way to renounce some of his earlier positions as flawed. But, unlike someone like David Horowitz, he remains a man of the left, evident in that he’s the current editor of Dissent. I could compare his trajectory to Todd Gitlin’s. Gitlin was a renowned SDS member who has since worked hard to convince leftists that loving America—the flag!—is necessary and good. Similarly, Kazin was the only panelist on the American Exceptionalism plenary (that concluded last year’s USIH conference) who seemed to think American Exceptionalism something the left could embrace.
Given Kazin’s reflective self-positioning, I find it strange that he fails to see the ironies that plague his analysis of Zinn. For example, Kazin charges Zinn with, essentially, being a lumper, or, gasp, an uber-lumper. In contrast, Kazin carefully splits the left throughout his book. For example, one of my favorite chapters is titled, “The Tale of Three Socialism”: the prairie socialism from Wisconsin to Milwaukee, the secular-Jewish socialism of the needle unions, and the radical modernism of bohemian New York. Kazin also expertly delineates the differences between Old and New Lefts. And yet, in writing a book about the American left, from the 1830s to the present, he can’t help but also do some lumping of his own. Mike O’Connor expertly clarifies this problem in his review of American Dreamers:
It is difficult to know how Kazin might have addressed this problem short of writing an entirely different book. A deeper issue raised by American Dreamers, however, is whether “the left” qualifies as a tradition in the sense that Kazin intends. Without a core tenet, text or history, do the disparate struggles for justice in the name of race, gender and labor constitute a single movement? Moreover, to what extent does the work of later radical activists derive from that of earlier ones? To cite Kazin’s earliest examples, can we draw direct lines from David Walker to Malcolm X, Frances Wright to Robin Morgan, or Thomas Skidmore to Occupy Wall Street? Kazin suggests that all of these figures and groups are committed to the ideal of equality and therefore such connections are justified. But have these leftists seen themselves as unified in a common project? Is such self-conscious identification necessary to be designated a tradition in this sense?
Ironically, again, Zinn is perhaps the most influential chronicler of those radicals in American history whom Kazin would deem worthy of lumping together. Most contemporary radicals understand the history of the American left through Zinn. David Walker, Big Bill Haywood, Jane Addams, Eugene Debs, Tom Hayden, and many more, continue to be imagined as part of an unbroken chain of leftists. Such an imagination is thanks due in no small part to Zinn. Had a public intellectual from an earlier era achieved something of this magnitude, Kazin would not have heaped so much scorn. Zinn certainly did more than Dissent to keep Kazin’s beloved left—my beloved left—alive during its nadir! (Kazin is only recently the editor of Dissent!)
Nitpicking aside, read American Dreamers. Learning about the history of those Americans who dreamed of a better world is a good antidote to cynics who decry the Occupy Movement’s lack of achievable goals. As Kazin writes in his conclusion: “the utopian impulse should not be smothered under a patchwork quilt of policy prescriptions.” For Kazin, and for me, socialism is the name of this utopia. Or, as Lewis Coser and Irving Howe wrote in a 1954 Dissent essay: “Socialism is the name of our desire.” “Socialism,” Kazin writes, “has never been the name most Americans would choose for their dream society; today, many doubt such a society is either feasible or desirable. Without such an ideal, however, whatever we name it, the real world will be ever harder to change.”
Sabtu, 28 Januari 2012
Novel and Old School
Since the popular literature of the Early Republic, and especially the early American novel, is a crucial source for my work on the idea of home, I can't avoid the scholarship of Cathy N. Davidson. Nor do I want to.
Davidson's work on the novel as a democratic genre, her explorations of how novels were read, and by whom, and to what purpose and effect -- all of her painstaking research, rendered into brilliant prose, has cut a path through the wilderness, along which I will gladly and gratefully walk for as far as it will take me in pursuit of my quarry.
At the same time, Davidson's work on learning and pedagogy -- especially writing pedagogy and the new literacy -- is likewise unavoidable for me. I teach rhetoric (a.k.a. "freshman comp") at my university, and our standardized syllabus requires a blog project as part of our students' portfolio of work. This requirement is due in no small part to the influence of Davidson and other scholars who are championing the blog as a tool for teaching writing -- perhaps even as a substitute for the research paper or term paper.
A recent article in the New York Times describes Davidson's take on "Blogs vs. Term Papers," and situates her as holding "a more extreme position" among professors and writing teachers who are all alike concerned with finding the best way to teach the best practices that make for the best writing both within and beyond the academy. The concern to teach writing practices that have some practical application beyond the ivied walls of the Ivory Tower is made explicit in Davidson's pedagogy, but, as I will argue below, I believe a concern for practicality is implicit in the commitments of those of us who continue to see pedagogical value in the research essay.
Now, as the reader may have gathered, I am fond of blogging. It is a fantastic medium for exploring ideas and establishing connections with fellow explorers working at other institutions. (Oh mercy -- what is it with all these metaphors of hunting, exploring, wandering in the wilderness? Clearly, I have been spending too much time with Catharine Sedgwick and James Fennimore Cooper.) Indeed, I think blogging can at least help create the conditions for establishing a vibrant intellectual community, a virtual post-modern Republic of Letters.
There's no doubt that blogging emphasizes the sense of writing for an audience and highlights the potential for interaction with one's readers in a way that writing a traditional term paper may not. The (in)formal conventions of blogging may help students better recognize that scholarship is not about building little (or big) monumental plinths that just stand there and gather dust -- it's not about writing essays, term papers, theses, dissertations as finished objects and final words. Rather, scholarship is about participating in and contributing to a larger conversation. So to the extent that blogging foregrounds this crucial aspect of scholarly work, I think it can be a valuable use of students' time and energy.
But I worry that a near-exclusive emphasis on blogging is not a very good use of students' money -- especially working-class students, first-generation students, students who are going into debt to attain that which an education confers. As Davidson has made clear in her own research on the early American novel and its readership, education confers empowerment -- often in ways that the educators never intended and that the educated never expected. And maybe that democratic and democratizing empowerment will be (already is?) the lasting legacy of blogging, the internet, the new literacy. In the meantime, though, I believe that championing the blog as the primary form of scholarly writing puts students at a profound disadvantage, not merely in the job market but, more crucially, in the public square.
In an era when most of the paths to erudition were closed to women, when a university education was not merely impermissible but also impossible because most women were not trained to read Latin or Greek, the novel democratized education and became a means by which disempowered women and men could not only gain knowledge but also produce knowledge and shape public discourse. As a result, the doors of educational opportunity that had been closed to women, to the working-class, to minorities, have been and are being opened. And I can see the similarities between the novel and the blog as genres that open up access to knowledge.
In some ways, though, championing the blog over the research paper as a cornerstone of a university education seems to be turning back the clock, taking back part of what has been gained. Knowledge is power, and the knowledge of how knowledge is constructed and deployed as a tool of empowerment and disempowerment -- not just how to recognize the process, but how to do it -- is the most powerful knowledge of all.
Judging from the Times' description of how Davidson uses blogging in her pedagogy, it is clear to me that she doesn't teach blogging as a substitute for careful research, but as a means of exploring new avenues for students to articulate what they have learned in ways that excite and ignite the interest of others. I'm sure that her students leave her class well-equipped to pursue and present a savvy, sophisticated argument across a full range of knowledge platforms. More power to them.
Nevertheless, despite the broad democratic potential of the blogosphere, there is still enormous privilege, power and prestige in traditional academic prose. Nobody -- not even the English department at Stanford -- is going to throw that baby out with the bathwater. So no matter the potential of blogging as a means of (re)producing knowledge, the best educated, the most privileged and empowered among us, will continue to learn the long-form, old-school research essay.
In this age of the soundbite, this era of intentional and celebratory ephemerality, this epoch of the quick and the slick and the flickering flash of momentary thoughts twittering across the collective mindscape, whose knowledge will carry the day? Whose perspective will endure to shape the present and open or close the future? In the country of the blind, the one-eyed man is king. In the country of those who don't learn to value, much less know how to construct, a sustained, logical argument based upon careful research and a judicious treatment of evidence, David Barton and Newt Gingrich will be our greatest historians, our most influential public intellectuals.
Davidson's work on the novel as a democratic genre, her explorations of how novels were read, and by whom, and to what purpose and effect -- all of her painstaking research, rendered into brilliant prose, has cut a path through the wilderness, along which I will gladly and gratefully walk for as far as it will take me in pursuit of my quarry.
At the same time, Davidson's work on learning and pedagogy -- especially writing pedagogy and the new literacy -- is likewise unavoidable for me. I teach rhetoric (a.k.a. "freshman comp") at my university, and our standardized syllabus requires a blog project as part of our students' portfolio of work. This requirement is due in no small part to the influence of Davidson and other scholars who are championing the blog as a tool for teaching writing -- perhaps even as a substitute for the research paper or term paper.
A recent article in the New York Times describes Davidson's take on "Blogs vs. Term Papers," and situates her as holding "a more extreme position" among professors and writing teachers who are all alike concerned with finding the best way to teach the best practices that make for the best writing both within and beyond the academy. The concern to teach writing practices that have some practical application beyond the ivied walls of the Ivory Tower is made explicit in Davidson's pedagogy, but, as I will argue below, I believe a concern for practicality is implicit in the commitments of those of us who continue to see pedagogical value in the research essay.
Now, as the reader may have gathered, I am fond of blogging. It is a fantastic medium for exploring ideas and establishing connections with fellow explorers working at other institutions. (Oh mercy -- what is it with all these metaphors of hunting, exploring, wandering in the wilderness? Clearly, I have been spending too much time with Catharine Sedgwick and James Fennimore Cooper.) Indeed, I think blogging can at least help create the conditions for establishing a vibrant intellectual community, a virtual post-modern Republic of Letters.
There's no doubt that blogging emphasizes the sense of writing for an audience and highlights the potential for interaction with one's readers in a way that writing a traditional term paper may not. The (in)formal conventions of blogging may help students better recognize that scholarship is not about building little (or big) monumental plinths that just stand there and gather dust -- it's not about writing essays, term papers, theses, dissertations as finished objects and final words. Rather, scholarship is about participating in and contributing to a larger conversation. So to the extent that blogging foregrounds this crucial aspect of scholarly work, I think it can be a valuable use of students' time and energy.
But I worry that a near-exclusive emphasis on blogging is not a very good use of students' money -- especially working-class students, first-generation students, students who are going into debt to attain that which an education confers. As Davidson has made clear in her own research on the early American novel and its readership, education confers empowerment -- often in ways that the educators never intended and that the educated never expected. And maybe that democratic and democratizing empowerment will be (already is?) the lasting legacy of blogging, the internet, the new literacy. In the meantime, though, I believe that championing the blog as the primary form of scholarly writing puts students at a profound disadvantage, not merely in the job market but, more crucially, in the public square.
In an era when most of the paths to erudition were closed to women, when a university education was not merely impermissible but also impossible because most women were not trained to read Latin or Greek, the novel democratized education and became a means by which disempowered women and men could not only gain knowledge but also produce knowledge and shape public discourse. As a result, the doors of educational opportunity that had been closed to women, to the working-class, to minorities, have been and are being opened. And I can see the similarities between the novel and the blog as genres that open up access to knowledge.
In some ways, though, championing the blog over the research paper as a cornerstone of a university education seems to be turning back the clock, taking back part of what has been gained. Knowledge is power, and the knowledge of how knowledge is constructed and deployed as a tool of empowerment and disempowerment -- not just how to recognize the process, but how to do it -- is the most powerful knowledge of all.
Judging from the Times' description of how Davidson uses blogging in her pedagogy, it is clear to me that she doesn't teach blogging as a substitute for careful research, but as a means of exploring new avenues for students to articulate what they have learned in ways that excite and ignite the interest of others. I'm sure that her students leave her class well-equipped to pursue and present a savvy, sophisticated argument across a full range of knowledge platforms. More power to them.
Nevertheless, despite the broad democratic potential of the blogosphere, there is still enormous privilege, power and prestige in traditional academic prose. Nobody -- not even the English department at Stanford -- is going to throw that baby out with the bathwater. So no matter the potential of blogging as a means of (re)producing knowledge, the best educated, the most privileged and empowered among us, will continue to learn the long-form, old-school research essay.
In this age of the soundbite, this era of intentional and celebratory ephemerality, this epoch of the quick and the slick and the flickering flash of momentary thoughts twittering across the collective mindscape, whose knowledge will carry the day? Whose perspective will endure to shape the present and open or close the future? In the country of the blind, the one-eyed man is king. In the country of those who don't learn to value, much less know how to construct, a sustained, logical argument based upon careful research and a judicious treatment of evidence, David Barton and Newt Gingrich will be our greatest historians, our most influential public intellectuals.
Jumat, 27 Januari 2012
Don't Trust Your Weakness
I get to teach my favorite course this semester, historiography. My colleagues and I offer the course to our undergraduate majors as a way to get them oriented in the idea of history; in other words, we do not dedicate most of the class to studying historians but to thinking about what history is.
Obviously, such an approach can be translated in many different ways. So, for example, in the first few weeks I choose to dwell on movies, memory, and morality. I use the films including Christopher Nolan's Memento which came out almost twelve years ago.
I explained my admiration for this film in my review to David Sehat's extraordinary first book, The Myth of American Religious Freedom. The film strikes me as powerful because it demonstrates an idea I found endlessly interesting: the willful and ostensibly innocent construction of myth. I imagine that most folks know the film but to make explicit my use of it, let me give a brief synopsis.
The film opens with a man named Leonard killing another man, named Teddy. They seem to know each other, even be friends, but Leonard believes that Teddy bears responsibility for raping and killing Leonard's wife. But there is a wrinkle in what might otherwise be a straight-forward morality tale--Leonard has no short-term memory. Leonard has a condition--he never tires of explaining--that causes his memories to fade as soon as he makes them. The cause of this problem, though, also serves as his will to live. We come to learn that the fate of Leonard's wife motivates him to search for and consequently kill many people. So here is our dilemma: we know Leonard is physically responsible for killing people, but is he morally responsible? He can't remember what he does and, moreover, when he does kill he often seems to us, the viewer, either justified (in that film noir way), or manipulated.
I ask students two basic questions about this: how does Leonard create his mythical past? And why does Leonard create his mythical past?
We see that Leonard has a system of noting taking that is at once ridiculous and somewhat familiar. He takes Polaroid photos of his immediate surroundings to get a situated; he takes notes on everything from people he meets to directions to a hotel; and he tattoos things he wants to be considered as "facts" in order to create a "permanent memory." Out of this system, Leonard crafts narratives that help have agency. And out of this aspect of the film, I get to discuss the idea of narrative with my students.
I use an essay about Hayden White and an excerpt from an essay by White entitled, "The Fictions of Factual Representation," to play with the idea that we fool ourselves into believing that narrative is an adequate structure for representing reality. The reality we create in our narratives leads to new realities that we then represent in new narratives, thus perpetuating two kinds of myths--the one we live by and the myth that we can demolish a myth through a narrative of truth.
The device in Memento that represents this ironic relationship to narrative is pictured above. Leonard has a tattoo telling him to "remember sammy jankis." We come to learn that sammy jankis was either a person with the same condition as Leonard but without a system for living with it, or a con-man that Leonard has deliberately misremembered to give his system credibility. In one review of the movie, the writer smartly observed that Leonard might not be able to create new short memories, but the more serious problem is that he deliberately manipulates long-term memories as well. And so, sammy jankis is one very consequential manipulation.
In the end, I want students to figure out ways to understand what Leonard is doing to his past--and "the past" as an abstract, historical concept--and to imagine that their critique of Leonard's system of remembering, documenting, and acting has moral consequences. Not only does Leonard's misremembering get people killed, but his deception (by himself and others) illustrates the need for some vigilance when trying to think historically. In short, I want the students to consider what kind of historical method works?
I'm interested in what other people use to illustrate historical methods.
Obviously, such an approach can be translated in many different ways. So, for example, in the first few weeks I choose to dwell on movies, memory, and morality. I use the films including Christopher Nolan's Memento which came out almost twelve years ago.
I explained my admiration for this film in my review to David Sehat's extraordinary first book, The Myth of American Religious Freedom. The film strikes me as powerful because it demonstrates an idea I found endlessly interesting: the willful and ostensibly innocent construction of myth. I imagine that most folks know the film but to make explicit my use of it, let me give a brief synopsis.
The film opens with a man named Leonard killing another man, named Teddy. They seem to know each other, even be friends, but Leonard believes that Teddy bears responsibility for raping and killing Leonard's wife. But there is a wrinkle in what might otherwise be a straight-forward morality tale--Leonard has no short-term memory. Leonard has a condition--he never tires of explaining--that causes his memories to fade as soon as he makes them. The cause of this problem, though, also serves as his will to live. We come to learn that the fate of Leonard's wife motivates him to search for and consequently kill many people. So here is our dilemma: we know Leonard is physically responsible for killing people, but is he morally responsible? He can't remember what he does and, moreover, when he does kill he often seems to us, the viewer, either justified (in that film noir way), or manipulated.
I ask students two basic questions about this: how does Leonard create his mythical past? And why does Leonard create his mythical past?
We see that Leonard has a system of noting taking that is at once ridiculous and somewhat familiar. He takes Polaroid photos of his immediate surroundings to get a situated; he takes notes on everything from people he meets to directions to a hotel; and he tattoos things he wants to be considered as "facts" in order to create a "permanent memory." Out of this system, Leonard crafts narratives that help have agency. And out of this aspect of the film, I get to discuss the idea of narrative with my students.
I use an essay about Hayden White and an excerpt from an essay by White entitled, "The Fictions of Factual Representation," to play with the idea that we fool ourselves into believing that narrative is an adequate structure for representing reality. The reality we create in our narratives leads to new realities that we then represent in new narratives, thus perpetuating two kinds of myths--the one we live by and the myth that we can demolish a myth through a narrative of truth.
The device in Memento that represents this ironic relationship to narrative is pictured above. Leonard has a tattoo telling him to "remember sammy jankis." We come to learn that sammy jankis was either a person with the same condition as Leonard but without a system for living with it, or a con-man that Leonard has deliberately misremembered to give his system credibility. In one review of the movie, the writer smartly observed that Leonard might not be able to create new short memories, but the more serious problem is that he deliberately manipulates long-term memories as well. And so, sammy jankis is one very consequential manipulation.
In the end, I want students to figure out ways to understand what Leonard is doing to his past--and "the past" as an abstract, historical concept--and to imagine that their critique of Leonard's system of remembering, documenting, and acting has moral consequences. Not only does Leonard's misremembering get people killed, but his deception (by himself and others) illustrates the need for some vigilance when trying to think historically. In short, I want the students to consider what kind of historical method works?
I'm interested in what other people use to illustrate historical methods.
Kamis, 26 Januari 2012
Saul Alinsky, Newt Gingrich, And The Culture Wars---Conducted Transtemporally
A couple of years ago, in a "Tim's Light Reading" entry, I mentioned Saul Alinsky. At the time I expressed some surprise upon learning that Alinsky maintained a thirty-year correspondence with the French Catholic neo-Thomist philosopher Jacques Maritain. I have three subsequent observations: (1) Have I really been putting up "light reading" posts that long? Wow. Then again, yesterday was this blog's fifth birthday. (2) I'm _still_ amazed that Alinsky and Maritain kept in touch that long. (3) That post is the _only_ mention before today of Alinsky here at USIH. Today I am going to blow out (3) in a big way.
Why? Newt Gingrich, of course! He's our recent bete noire, between the weblog and our USIH Facebook page. I can give you three guesses, but you'll see Gingrich-Alinsky link in the following passages from this story (bolds mine):
------------------------------------------------------
Nearly 40 years after his death, Saul Alinsky's name is back in the news, peppered throughout presidential hopeful Newt Gingrich's speeches.
A native Chicagoan, Alinsky was "the father of community organizing," said Sanford D. Horwitt, author of Let Them Call Me Rebel: A Biography of Saul Alinsky."
"He invented community organizing … this very unique form of political action," Horwitt said, adding that Alinsky believed the goal of organizing people was to give them power.
It's that "community organizer" moniker that Gingrich is attempting to use in comparing Alinsky to President Barack Obama, who first came to Chicago as a community organizer practicing Alinsky's model, according to historians.
After winning the South Carolina Republican primary Saturday, Gingrich referenced Obama's "Saul Alinsky radicalism," painting it in a negative light. ...
"Newt realizes this is just an act, saying Alinsky is a dangerous radical. Gingrich is enough of a historian to know what Alinsky was about," Horwitt said. "This is something that he is feeding to a part of the conservative right."
------------------------------------------------------
And the article goes on to recount the parallel between this and Tea Party enthusiasts continually reminding us of the links between Obama and another piece of radical living history, Bill Ayers. Politicians really are good at the guilt-by-association game.
But who IS Saul Alinsky? Here's your introduction to him from the rest of the article above (links that follow are mine):
------------------------------------------------------
Born in January 1909, Alinsky grew up on [Chicago's] West Side, studied criminology at the University of Chicago and worked in state prisons before deciding he could make a bigger difference at the community level, said former Washington Post reporter Nicholas von Hoffman, who wrote Radical: A Portrait of Saul Alinsky.
Von Hoffman, who before becoming a journalist worked alongside Alinsky from 1953 to 1962, said Alinsky fought for fair working conditions, affordable housing and any cause that "boiled down to one thing: organizing people so they have a decent shake."
Alinsky's tactics included tying up bank teller lines with volunteers repeatedly exchanging a $100 bill for pennies and vice versa as a way to protest banking institutions, said John Kretzmann, professor at Northwestern University's School of Education and Social Policy. Another involved Alinsky's followers threatening to occupy all the bathrooms atO'Hare International Airportfor an entire day. The threat alone granted Alinsky a meeting with then-Mayor Richard J. Daley, Kretzmann said.
------------------------------------------------------
And here's more from "Professor Wikipedia." A significant portion of the entry derives from a 1972 Playboy magazine article (24, 403 words!), conducted a few months before Alinsky's death and reproduced here. Here are a few nuggets from the Wikipedia entry, mostly from that interview*, with brief commentary, both humorous and serious:
1. Time magazine once wrote that "American democracy is being altered by Alinsky's ideas," and conservative author William F. Buckley said he was "very close to being an organizational genius."
You'd think that Gingrich would appreciate Alinsky's focus on ideas. Then again, as Ben Alpers reminded us via two funny quotes from Frank and Krugman, the rigor behind Newt's ideas are often suspect. [BTW: Check out this post by long-time USIH blog friend and S-USIH founding member, Julian Nemeth, on Buckley, Gingrich, and Republican victimhood.]
2. Because of his strict Jewish upbringing, he was asked whether he ever encountered antisemitism while growing up in Chicago. He replied, "it was so pervasive you didn't really even think about it; you just accepted it as a fact of life." He considered himself to be a devout Jew until the age of 12, after which time he began to fear that his parents would force him to become a rabbi. "I went through some pretty rapid withdrawal symptoms and kicked the habit ... But I'll tell you one thing about religious identity," he added. "Whenever anyone asks me my religion, I always say—and always will say—Jewish."
It appears Alinksy had a Tony Judt-ish-type relationship with his religious/ethnic identity. [BTW #2 related to PhD Octopus: Check out this post by David Weinfeld on Judt.]
3. Contrary to the Chicago Tribune article above, Alinsky was an undergraduate major in archaeology. But then there's this confusing passage from Wikipedia, apparently derived from the Playboy interview: After attending two years of graduate school he dropped out to accept work as a community organizer for the state of Illinois as a criminologist. Hmm...
4. Alinsky's work as a community organizer attracted the attention of Adlai Stevenson: His early efforts to "turn scattered, voiceless discontent into a united protest aroused the admiration of Illinois governor Adlai Stevenson, who said Alinsky's aims 'most faithfully reflect our ideals of brotherhood, tolerance, charity and dignity of the individual.'"
Getting praised by Stevenson in the Forties probably wasn't the kiss of death in relation to anti-intellectual/anti-Egghead associations. That wouldn't occur until the 1950s, I believe.
5. When asked during an interview whether he ever considered becoming a Communist party member, he replied: "Not at any time. I've never joined any organization—not even the ones I've organized myself. I prize my own independence too much. And philosophically, I could never accept any rigid dogma or ideology, whether it's Christianity or Marxism. One of the most important things in life is what Judge Learned Hand described as 'that ever-gnawing inner doubt as to whether you're right.' If you don't have that, if you think you've got an inside track to absolute truth, you become doctrinaire, humorless and intellectually constipated. The greatest crimes in history have been perpetrated by such religious and political and racial fanatics, from the persecutions of the Inquisition on down to Communist purges and Nazi genocide."
So isn't it ironic that Gingrich, whom Alinsky would've no doubt called "intellectually constipated," is holding up Obama as a president that follows the ideology of a figure who despised ideology to the point of avoiding organizations he himself organized? Isn't it interesting to see the Culture Wars conducted transtemporally, or is this Gingrich living history in ideas? Consult with LD's recent post on "Big Ideas," particularly the parts on David Armitage, to make whatever sense you want of my last question.
6. And this: Alinsky described his plans in 1972 to begin to organize the white middle class across America, and the necessity of that project. He believed that what President Richard Nixon and Vice-President Spiro Agnew called "The Silent Majority" was living in frustration and despair, worried about their future, and ripe for a turn to radical social change, to become politically-active citizens. He feared the middle class could be driven to a right-wing viewpoint, "making them ripe for the plucking by some guy on horseback promising a return to the vanished verities of yesterday." His stated motive: "I love this goddamn country, and we're going to take it back."
Was Alinsky unknowingly forecasting the arrival, on the wings of the New Right, of that famous presidential hero of American Western films, Ronald Reagan? - TL
------------------------------------------------------
*I don't have the time, right now, to read the wholebook interview
Why? Newt Gingrich, of course! He's our recent bete noire, between the weblog and our USIH Facebook page. I can give you three guesses, but you'll see Gingrich-Alinsky link in the following passages from this story (bolds mine):
------------------------------------------------------
Nearly 40 years after his death, Saul Alinsky's name is back in the news, peppered throughout presidential hopeful Newt Gingrich's speeches.
A native Chicagoan, Alinsky was "the father of community organizing," said Sanford D. Horwitt, author of Let Them Call Me Rebel: A Biography of Saul Alinsky."
"He invented community organizing … this very unique form of political action," Horwitt said, adding that Alinsky believed the goal of organizing people was to give them power.
It's that "community organizer" moniker that Gingrich is attempting to use in comparing Alinsky to President Barack Obama, who first came to Chicago as a community organizer practicing Alinsky's model, according to historians.
After winning the South Carolina Republican primary Saturday, Gingrich referenced Obama's "Saul Alinsky radicalism," painting it in a negative light. ...
"Newt realizes this is just an act, saying Alinsky is a dangerous radical. Gingrich is enough of a historian to know what Alinsky was about," Horwitt said. "This is something that he is feeding to a part of the conservative right."
------------------------------------------------------
And the article goes on to recount the parallel between this and Tea Party enthusiasts continually reminding us of the links between Obama and another piece of radical living history, Bill Ayers. Politicians really are good at the guilt-by-association game.
But who IS Saul Alinsky? Here's your introduction to him from the rest of the article above (links that follow are mine):
------------------------------------------------------
Born in January 1909, Alinsky grew up on [Chicago's] West Side, studied criminology at the University of Chicago and worked in state prisons before deciding he could make a bigger difference at the community level, said former Washington Post reporter Nicholas von Hoffman, who wrote Radical: A Portrait of Saul Alinsky.
Von Hoffman, who before becoming a journalist worked alongside Alinsky from 1953 to 1962, said Alinsky fought for fair working conditions, affordable housing and any cause that "boiled down to one thing: organizing people so they have a decent shake."
Alinsky's tactics included tying up bank teller lines with volunteers repeatedly exchanging a $100 bill for pennies and vice versa as a way to protest banking institutions, said John Kretzmann, professor at Northwestern University's School of Education and Social Policy. Another involved Alinsky's followers threatening to occupy all the bathrooms atO'Hare International Airportfor an entire day. The threat alone granted Alinsky a meeting with then-Mayor Richard J. Daley, Kretzmann said.
------------------------------------------------------
And here's more from "Professor Wikipedia." A significant portion of the entry derives from a 1972 Playboy magazine article (24, 403 words!), conducted a few months before Alinsky's death and reproduced here. Here are a few nuggets from the Wikipedia entry, mostly from that interview*, with brief commentary, both humorous and serious:
1. Time magazine once wrote that "American democracy is being altered by Alinsky's ideas," and conservative author William F. Buckley said he was "very close to being an organizational genius."
You'd think that Gingrich would appreciate Alinsky's focus on ideas. Then again, as Ben Alpers reminded us via two funny quotes from Frank and Krugman, the rigor behind Newt's ideas are often suspect. [BTW: Check out this post by long-time USIH blog friend and S-USIH founding member, Julian Nemeth, on Buckley, Gingrich, and Republican victimhood.]
2. Because of his strict Jewish upbringing, he was asked whether he ever encountered antisemitism while growing up in Chicago. He replied, "it was so pervasive you didn't really even think about it; you just accepted it as a fact of life." He considered himself to be a devout Jew until the age of 12, after which time he began to fear that his parents would force him to become a rabbi. "I went through some pretty rapid withdrawal symptoms and kicked the habit ... But I'll tell you one thing about religious identity," he added. "Whenever anyone asks me my religion, I always say—and always will say—Jewish."
It appears Alinksy had a Tony Judt-ish-type relationship with his religious/ethnic identity. [BTW #2 related to PhD Octopus: Check out this post by David Weinfeld on Judt.]
3. Contrary to the Chicago Tribune article above, Alinsky was an undergraduate major in archaeology. But then there's this confusing passage from Wikipedia, apparently derived from the Playboy interview: After attending two years of graduate school he dropped out to accept work as a community organizer for the state of Illinois as a criminologist. Hmm...
4. Alinsky's work as a community organizer attracted the attention of Adlai Stevenson: His early efforts to "turn scattered, voiceless discontent into a united protest aroused the admiration of Illinois governor Adlai Stevenson, who said Alinsky's aims 'most faithfully reflect our ideals of brotherhood, tolerance, charity and dignity of the individual.'"
Getting praised by Stevenson in the Forties probably wasn't the kiss of death in relation to anti-intellectual/anti-Egghead associations. That wouldn't occur until the 1950s, I believe.
5. When asked during an interview whether he ever considered becoming a Communist party member, he replied: "Not at any time. I've never joined any organization—not even the ones I've organized myself. I prize my own independence too much. And philosophically, I could never accept any rigid dogma or ideology, whether it's Christianity or Marxism. One of the most important things in life is what Judge Learned Hand described as 'that ever-gnawing inner doubt as to whether you're right.' If you don't have that, if you think you've got an inside track to absolute truth, you become doctrinaire, humorless and intellectually constipated. The greatest crimes in history have been perpetrated by such religious and political and racial fanatics, from the persecutions of the Inquisition on down to Communist purges and Nazi genocide."
So isn't it ironic that Gingrich, whom Alinsky would've no doubt called "intellectually constipated," is holding up Obama as a president that follows the ideology of a figure who despised ideology to the point of avoiding organizations he himself organized? Isn't it interesting to see the Culture Wars conducted transtemporally, or is this Gingrich living history in ideas? Consult with LD's recent post on "Big Ideas," particularly the parts on David Armitage, to make whatever sense you want of my last question.
6. And this: Alinsky described his plans in 1972 to begin to organize the white middle class across America, and the necessity of that project. He believed that what President Richard Nixon and Vice-President Spiro Agnew called "The Silent Majority" was living in frustration and despair, worried about their future, and ripe for a turn to radical social change, to become politically-active citizens. He feared the middle class could be driven to a right-wing viewpoint, "making them ripe for the plucking by some guy on horseback promising a return to the vanished verities of yesterday." His stated motive: "I love this goddamn country, and we're going to take it back."
Was Alinsky unknowingly forecasting the arrival, on the wings of the New Right, of that famous presidential hero of American Western films, Ronald Reagan? - TL
------------------------------------------------------
*I don't have the time, right now, to read the whole
Rabu, 25 Januari 2012
Reconsidering my reconsideration of "the racial protocol"
You might remember my prior meditations on the "racial protocol" here and more recently here. Today I'm writing a stream-of-consciousness meditation on both the "racial protocol" and black internationalism.
My inspiration for reconsidering the "racial protocol" came from Anastasia Curwood's book Stormy Weather:
I removed the above quote from my talk and instead focused on this quote from Claudia Tate herself (in her book l, Psychoanalysis and Black Novels: Desire and the Protocols of Race, 1998):
As I mentioned in my previous blog post, this is in contradistinction to Michael West's and William Martin's argument that the black international “has a single defining characteristic: struggle." This struggle is born of consciousness and the dream of a “circle of universal emancipation, unbroken in space and time” (From Toussaint to Tupac: The Black International Since the Age of Revolution, 2009).
By analyzing the three-dimension subjectivity of individuals, I can understand how Eslanda Robeson's and Emma Goldman's relationship was primarily social, but through the click of their personalities, the aging Goldman persuaded the young Robeson toward a more radical stance on economic issues. West and Martin's formulation makes it seem predetermined that a black person would choose struggle, when in fact that choice was born of dark nights of the soul and wrenching decisions to put oneself and one's loved ones at risk.
At the same time, I've been pondering what makes black internationalism distinct when compared to Pan-Asian or Wilsonian inspired anti-colonial movements (I'm relying upon Erez Manela's Wilsonian Moment there). West and Martin offer a very succinct explanation of difference.
Reading some Social Darwinists for my USIH class, though, makes struggle as a defining characteristic unattractive. William Graham Sumner argues that "life on earth must be maintained by a struggle against nature, and also by a competition with other forms of life." (American Intellectual Tradition, p28).
Perhaps, then, it is not the fact of struggle that is defining so much as what is being struggled towards--the dream of "a circle of universal emancipation, unbroken in space and time." The meaning of that emancipation for a Christian missionary returning to Africa to civilize it, or Marcus Garvey's desire to also return to Africa to impose his own kind of civilization, is not so uni-dimensional or clear-cut.
One of the essays in West and Martin's collection offers a more nuanced alternative. Lara Putnam, in "Nothing Matters but Color: Transnational Circuits, the Interwar Caribbean, and the Black International" argues
I'm so compelled by that statement, because some of the people that I study reached the opposite conclusion. Juliette Derricotte decided that fellowship could only be achieved, not by ignoring race, but by concentrating on similar religious convictions (she was among a diverse body of Christians, all trying to find a way to overcome racial and national animosities in 1928). Ralph Bunche, on the other hand, decided that the only way to overcome racism was by finding and attacking its economic root.
One of the things that most intrigues me about West and Martin's edited collection is the way that internationalism actually solidifies nationalism (is this the same as the thesis that Italian nationalism was created in America by Italian migrants? It is by being in a place where you are different that you search for someone who is similar). I think Erez Manela makes a similar argument in The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism. Manela argues that the emergence of the circumstances for decolonization was due "to the establishment, for the first time, of international institutions and norms that allowed, indeed invited anticolonial nationalists to challenge colonial powers in an external arena, circumventing and thereby weakening the imperial relationship." Manela is looking particularly at internationalist organizations like the League of Nations, while Putnam is considering more the experiences of individual British West Indian migrants, but both express the vibrancy of the international dialogue during the interwar era.
Putnam writes, "The black internationalism articulated by British West Indian migrants in the interwar years was not a revival of tradition, but a particular vision of the future, developed in dialogue and in step with the other nationalisms that defined North Atlantic modernity."
She and Manela certainly aid my argument that the interwar era represents a distinct moment in black American and black international history, rather than the culmination of the nadir or the beginnings of the Long Civil Rights Movement.
Another interesting consideration around the question of the black international is when does someone become a nationalist, when does someone become a Pan-Africanist (with or without becoming a nationalist) and when does someone become what Nico Slate terms a "colored cosmopolitan" (someone who felt common cause with other people of color in an anticolonial struggle)? I think that question of motivations and decisions will become a central one for my book.
My inspiration for reconsidering the "racial protocol" came from Anastasia Curwood's book Stormy Weather:
The literary theorist Claudia Tate developed the term 'racial protocol' for the assumption that African Americans' experiences can be reduced to racial politics and that individual subjectivity carries little importance. As a result of the racial protocol, much writing about African Americans focuses entirely on racial struggle and not on the human experiences that would move the analysis beyond a two-dimensional representation of African Americans' lives.I was discussing this idea over dinner with a friend and colleague. He suggested that I border, if not tip over into, the offensive by attacking the "racial protocol," because it sounds like I am neglecting (if not negating) the oppression, in which, as a white person, I am implicated.
I removed the above quote from my talk and instead focused on this quote from Claudia Tate herself (in her book l, Psychoanalysis and Black Novels: Desire and the Protocols of Race, 1998):
The black text mediates two broad categories of experience: one is historically racialized and regulated by African American cultural performance; the other is the individual and subjective experience of personal desire signified in language.This makes my analysis both/and rather than either/or. Both oppression/struggle and three dimensional subjective individuals are important. Both race and other identities are involved in the identity formation of my research subjects. I believe that this both/and emphasis is more reflective of what I do in my work, in which race/oppression/struggle matters as one primary category of analysis, but in which they are not the only categories.
As I mentioned in my previous blog post, this is in contradistinction to Michael West's and William Martin's argument that the black international “has a single defining characteristic: struggle." This struggle is born of consciousness and the dream of a “circle of universal emancipation, unbroken in space and time” (From Toussaint to Tupac: The Black International Since the Age of Revolution, 2009).
By analyzing the three-dimension subjectivity of individuals, I can understand how Eslanda Robeson's and Emma Goldman's relationship was primarily social, but through the click of their personalities, the aging Goldman persuaded the young Robeson toward a more radical stance on economic issues. West and Martin's formulation makes it seem predetermined that a black person would choose struggle, when in fact that choice was born of dark nights of the soul and wrenching decisions to put oneself and one's loved ones at risk.
At the same time, I've been pondering what makes black internationalism distinct when compared to Pan-Asian or Wilsonian inspired anti-colonial movements (I'm relying upon Erez Manela's Wilsonian Moment there). West and Martin offer a very succinct explanation of difference.
Reading some Social Darwinists for my USIH class, though, makes struggle as a defining characteristic unattractive. William Graham Sumner argues that "life on earth must be maintained by a struggle against nature, and also by a competition with other forms of life." (American Intellectual Tradition, p28).
Perhaps, then, it is not the fact of struggle that is defining so much as what is being struggled towards--the dream of "a circle of universal emancipation, unbroken in space and time." The meaning of that emancipation for a Christian missionary returning to Africa to civilize it, or Marcus Garvey's desire to also return to Africa to impose his own kind of civilization, is not so uni-dimensional or clear-cut.
One of the essays in West and Martin's collection offers a more nuanced alternative. Lara Putnam, in "Nothing Matters but Color: Transnational Circuits, the Interwar Caribbean, and the Black International" argues
First, that migration and migrants' activities created a West Indian-centered black internationalist world in the first decades of the twentieth century; second, that this world came under attack as a result of the rise of narrow, racially defined nationalism and imperial closures in the interwar years; and third, that the attacks reinforced 'race consciousness' among migrants, spurring increasingly explicit black internationalist critiques of imperial and neocolonial power.She follows this with the conclusion that "In the interwar years, West Indian community leaders of diverse class positions and ideologies came to a common conclusion: only by putting race first could people of African descent attain collective uplift in a modern, racist world." [I wonder about the contrast between this quote and her title, in which she foregrounds color. It does not seem to me that color and race were the same thing in the Caribbean; indeed intraracial discrimination often occurred along color lines]
I'm so compelled by that statement, because some of the people that I study reached the opposite conclusion. Juliette Derricotte decided that fellowship could only be achieved, not by ignoring race, but by concentrating on similar religious convictions (she was among a diverse body of Christians, all trying to find a way to overcome racial and national animosities in 1928). Ralph Bunche, on the other hand, decided that the only way to overcome racism was by finding and attacking its economic root.
One of the things that most intrigues me about West and Martin's edited collection is the way that internationalism actually solidifies nationalism (is this the same as the thesis that Italian nationalism was created in America by Italian migrants? It is by being in a place where you are different that you search for someone who is similar). I think Erez Manela makes a similar argument in The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism. Manela argues that the emergence of the circumstances for decolonization was due "to the establishment, for the first time, of international institutions and norms that allowed, indeed invited anticolonial nationalists to challenge colonial powers in an external arena, circumventing and thereby weakening the imperial relationship." Manela is looking particularly at internationalist organizations like the League of Nations, while Putnam is considering more the experiences of individual British West Indian migrants, but both express the vibrancy of the international dialogue during the interwar era.
Putnam writes, "The black internationalism articulated by British West Indian migrants in the interwar years was not a revival of tradition, but a particular vision of the future, developed in dialogue and in step with the other nationalisms that defined North Atlantic modernity."
She and Manela certainly aid my argument that the interwar era represents a distinct moment in black American and black international history, rather than the culmination of the nadir or the beginnings of the Long Civil Rights Movement.
Another interesting consideration around the question of the black international is when does someone become a nationalist, when does someone become a Pan-Africanist (with or without becoming a nationalist) and when does someone become what Nico Slate terms a "colored cosmopolitan" (someone who felt common cause with other people of color in an anticolonial struggle)? I think that question of motivations and decisions will become a central one for my book.
Selasa, 24 Januari 2012
Did Paul Goodman Change Your Life?
After my recently published article, “Teach for America: The Hidden Curriculum of Liberal Do-Gooders,” went semi-viral, thanks in no small part to Valerie Strauss, who republished it in its entirety at her Washington Post education blog, I received quite a bit of interesting feedback from readers. Some of it was negative (coming mostly from TFA alums), but most of it was positive. The most interesting correspondence I had, however, was with filmmaker Jonathan Lee, who created the new documentary Paul Goodman Changed My Life. My article was forwarded on to him, and he got in touch with me, because I conclude my piece with a reflection on Paul Goodman’s writings on education, which included his most famous book, Growing Up Absurd, and his less famous but I would argue equally important book, Compulsory Mis-Education. My concluding paragraph:
“Goodman was not against education in the strict sense of the word. For him, the question of education was always of kind. In Goodman’s world, which I imagine as a sort of utopia, those who seek to institutionalize the poor are the enemies of the good. And teachers—real teachers, those who commit their lives (not two years) to expanding their students’ imaginative universes—they are the heroes. I can hardly imagine a better inoculation against the hidden curriculum of liberal do-gooders.”
Lee got in touch with me because he hopes to promote his film among those historians and educators who might eventually consider screening it for students. So he sent me a DVD, which is awesome because I was regretfully unable to attend the brown bag session at our last conference when Lee was present to show clips of his film, and, alongside Casey Nelson Blake and Michael Waltzer, engage the audience in discussion of Goodman. I promised to watch the film, which was a pleasure, and to blog about it. So here I am.
Three things struck me about the film (other than watching it, which was, for me, a truly enjoyable intellectual and aesthetic experience; Lee is a masterful filmmaker.) 1) Goodman was the most unique of the New York Intellectuals, highlighted by his anarchism. 2) Goodman’s non-normative sexuality perplexingly mixed with his hyper-normative misogyny. 3) A case might be made that Goodman was one of the most underrated American intellectuals of the twentieth century, or, as the film’s promotional materials phrase it, “the most influential man you’ve never heard of.”
1) One of the film’s interviewees discusses Goodman’s position among his more famous New York Intellectual brethren. He was definitely in that world. He went to CCNY, he attended the same parties, and he wrote for the same little magazines. Yet he was different. This mostly had to do with his politics. Unlike the other precociously smart CCNY Jews of the 1930s and 1940s, Goodman never joined the Communist Party or one of its Trotskyist offshoots. The interviewee is asked why not, and he flips the question on its head: Why did everyone else join the communists?
Goodman’s anarchism was not doctrinaire, of the syndicalist or primitivist kind. It was more a way of feeling politics. Dick Flacks nicely describes this in his contribution to an excellent if short Dissent forum on Paul Goodman Changed My Life, highlighted by an essay by Rochester graduate student and intellectual historian Michael J. Brown (winner of Dissent’s essay-writing contest “in which people under thirty were asked to name the most pressing social and political issue of our times and write a utopian essay that included practical proposals”—a seemingly paradoxical combination that Goodman often mixed with subtle deftness). A long passage from Flacks (which also speaks to my third point, regarding Goodman’s influence):
SDS, THE Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, and other expressions of the New Left were anarchist without at first even knowing anything about the anarchist tradition. Paul Goodman’s use of anarchism was very instructive. To make change you join up with friends and neighbors and try to create alternatives that meet needs blocked by the big institutions. Or you demand new rules that can make life more livable directly—these modes of action are more practical and effective than appealing to authorities and institutions to bring the change.
Rather than spend primary energy to get the university to become a community of scholars, create your own—and by so doing you may affect the institution as well as making a practical difference. To oppose war, refuse to fight it. Goodman’s fusion of the utopian and the practical, in a series of essays during the sixties, provided substance for the impulses of resistance and the visions of a decentralization and community that defined the youth counterculture and the early New Left.
2) I won’t spend much time on Goodman’s non-normative bi-sexuality, which mixed too easily with his sexism, except to say that his marriage reflected this seeming paradox. He had an arrangement with his wife that allowed him to have sex with as many people as he desired, which seemed to be a lot, since his daily schedule was to wake up in the morning and write, then cruise the bars for men in the afternoon, before returning home to his family for dinner. Such an arrangement was not mutual, as his wife made clear in an interview. To Lee’s credit, he doesn’t gloss over Goodman’s large and complex faults.
3) My third point is the most interesting to me. How influential was Goodman? To what degree did his ideas shape a generation, or perhaps better framed, to what degree did Goodman’s ideas reflect the spirit of the Sixties? The film includes audio footage of Susan Sontag reflecting on Goodman. She claims he is perhaps the only person in the twentieth century who came close to Emerson as an American renaissance man of letters. Although this is probably overstated, it is irrefutable that Growing Up Absurd was perhaps the most-read book on college campuses during the high Sixties. In the film, educator Deborah Meier reminisces about the huge impact it made on her and her friends (even though, in her more recent reading, it came across as dated and sexist in its honest lack of interest in women and girls). I would argue that Goodman indeed is perhaps the quintessential Sixties intellectual. His antinomian disdain for the borders constructed by institutions, including both corporations and government bureaucracies, and by cultural norms, sexual and otherwise, speak to the larger countercultural ethos that did so much to reshape the mainstream cultural ethos.
I have long thought Goodman the quintessential voice of the 60s. Which is why I included an analysis of his educational thought in the last chapter of my book, Education and Cold War, a chapter that explored the explosion of new ways of thinking about education in the 1960s. Below is a chunk of that chapter. Read it and then be the judge. Is Paul Goodman “the most influential man you’ve never heard of”? (I realize that if you’re reading this blog, you’ve likely heard of Paul Goodman, but you are not representative.)
------
Growing Up Absurd, assigned in college classes across the country, was a synthesis of a large body of work published in the 1950s that critiqued what Goodman termed the “Organized System,” the bureaucratic and corporate straitjacket analyzed by William Whyte, David Riesman, Vance Packard, and C. Wright Mills. But in opposition to these previous commentators, Goodman, in the words of historian Kevin Mattson, joined his fellow leftist Mills in making “clear that what often appeared as cultural problems – conformity and alienation – had political roots and demanded serious social reform.” Goodman argued that it was “curious” that the two most analyzed phenomena of the time – the “disgrace of the Organized System” and the problem of disaffected youth – were treated as separate entities except by youth rebels themselves. Goodman combined these two popular strands of social commentary – a critique of the bureaucratic society with an analysis of juvenile delinquency – and argued that the former caused the latter.
Goodman’s disdain for the corporate-organized society tied together his various intellectual interests. For example, his Gestalt theory of psychology posited that, in order for people to overcome their sense of alienation, they must reject the social structures that impeded self-awareness or self-actualization. In other words, the pursuit of an authentic self was not merely narcissistic: it required political transformation. This commitment to political reform also grounded his writings on youth culture and education. Goodman said he was motivated to write on the topic of education after one particularly sad conversation with a group of teenage boys. When he asked the boys what they wanted to do when they grew up, they shrugged their shoulders and unanimously answered, “nothing,” a response that brought to his eyes “tears of frank dismay for the waste of our humanity.” Goodman believed that “the simple plight of these adolescents could not be remedied without a social revolution.”
Goodman’s educational philosophy, as he often made explicit, was not far removed from Dewey’s pragmatism: Dewey’s democratic theory of education was consistent with Goodman’s thoughts on autonomy and decentralization insofar as Dewey believed schools should permit children to be boisterous and physically active in pursuit of meaningful, authentic learning. Goodman agreed with the Deweyan theory that society should adjust to the innate demands of young people rather than vice versa. However, Goodman recognized and was harshly critical of the ways in which Dewey’s thought had been co-opted. “Dewey’s pragmatic and social-minded conceptions,” Goodman lamented, “have ended up as a service university, technocracy, labor bureaucracy, suburban togetherness.” He was sensitive to the fact that those who propagated the despised “Organized System” – those like James Conant who sacrificed the individual to the “cult of efficiency” – were prone to invoke the authority of Dewey in defense of their project. Goodman blamed Conant alongside a multiplicity of educational actors: “timid supervisors,” “bigoted clerics,” “ignorant schools boards,” and, last, but certainly not least, the “school-monks,” his label for “the administrators, professors, academic sociologists, and licensees with diplomas who have proliferated into an invested intellectual class worse than anything since the time of Henry the Eighth.”
The gravest error of the “school monks” was that they wanted to further inflict their methods of socialization upon teenagers because they wrongly attributed the growing number of juvenile delinquents or “beats” to the “failure of socialization.” He wrote:
Growing up is sometimes treated as if it were acculturation, the process of giving up one culture for another, the way a tribe of Indians takes on the culture of whites: so the wild babies give up their ‘individualistic’ mores and ideology, e.g., selfishness or magic thinking or omnipotence, and join the tribe of Society; they are ‘socialized.’ ‘Becoming cultured’ and ‘being adjusted to the social group’ are taken almost as synonymous.”
This socialization process, which he described as “‘vocational guidance’ to fit people wherever they are needed in the productive system,” troubled Goodman in means and ends. He both loathed the practice of adjusting children to society and despised the social regime in which children were being adjusted to – “our highly organized system of machine production and its corresponding social relations.” For Goodman, socialization was the problem, not the solution, and was doomed to failure because it prepared “kids to take some part in a democratic society that does not need them.”
Goodman’s Populist critique of corporate society was powerful but flawed in the way that he romanticized pre-corporate America, a time and place when men supposedly exercised their “capacities in an enterprise useful to society.” The worst evils of the Organized System, in Goodman’s eyes, were its emasculating effects. “The present widespread concern about education is only superficially a part of the Cold War, the need to match the Russian scientists,” he contended. “For in the discussions, pretty soon it becomes clear that people are uneasy about, ashamed of, the world that they have given the children to grow up in. The world is not manly enough.” Goodman explained the rowdiness of adolescent males as a by-product of their need for authentic male behavior:
Positively, the delinquent behavior seems to speak clearly enough. It asks for what we can’t give, but it is in this direction we must go. It asks for manly opportunities to work, make a little money, and have self-esteem; to have some space to bang around in, that is not always somebody’s property; to have better schools to open for them horizons of interest; to have more and better sex without fear or shame; to share somehow in the symbolic goods (like the cars) that are made so much of; to have a community and a country to be loyal to; to claim attention and have a voice.
Goodman limited his analysis to boy culture because their future prospects were dimmer. “A girl does not have to, she is not expected to, ‘make something’ of herself,” Goodman argued. “Her career does not have to be self-justifying, for she will have children, which is absolutely self-justifying, like any other natural or creative act.” The boys, on the other hand, were being asked to run “the rat race of the Organized System.” The timing of his gendered argument was unfortunate, particularly since it was made just a few years before Betty Freidan’s The Feminine Mystique, in which she contended that women were the true victims of middle class conformity. That being said, Goodman’s overall critique of the education system was not limited by his idealized conceptions of male culture, particularly his arguments against compulsory education – what he called the “universal trap” – that he made in a collection of essays published in 1964 by the title, Compulsory Mis-education.
Goodman believed that compulsory education was not only wasteful, but did positive damage to adolescents. It was, in his eyes, partly responsible for an “upsurge of a know-nothing fascism of the right.” “I am profoundly unimpressed,” Goodman wrote, “by our so-called educational system when, as has happened, Governor Wallace comes from the South as a candidate in Northern states and receives his highest number of votes (in some places a majority) in suburbs that have had the most years of schooling.” Goodman’s left-wing critique of the schools mirrored Max Rafferty’s right-wing analysis, not so much because they both asserted that education was helping prepare the way for totalitarianism, but because they attacked what Goodman termed the “fascist vital center” from their opposite flanks. Rafferty might have found much to agree with in Goodman’s argument that the compulsory educational system was a “vast vested interest that goes on for its own sake, keeping millions of people busy, wasting wealth, and pre-empting time and space in which something else could be going on. It is a gigantic market for textbook manufacturers, building contractors, and graduate schools of education.”
For Goodman, if compulsory schooling was democratic, then democracy must have been synonymous with “regimentation.” “The educational role is, by and large,” Goodman intoned “to provide – at public and parents’ expense – apprentice-training for corporations, government, and the teaching profession itself, and also to train the young, as New York’s Commissioner of Education has said, ‘to handle constructively their problems of adjustment to authority.’” It was in school that people learned that life is routine, depersonalized, and “venally graded.” And it was in school that teenagers learned that, in life, it is best to abdicate authority to one’s superiors. This was what Goodman labeled “mis-education” or “socializing to the national norms and regimenting to the national ‘needs.’”
Goodman theorized that literacy was once imperative to democracy because people created their own social existences instead of being asked to adjust to an already-existing social order. “By contrast,” he asked, “what are the citizenly reasons for which we compel everyone to be literate? To keep the economy expanding, to understand the mass-communications, to chose between indistinguishable Democrats and Republicans?” Because a technocratic and managerial elite made all of the life and death decisions – decisions about the economy and war – the only justification for mass literacy was that people could be more efficiently propagandized. From Goodman’s point of view, mass illiteracy was better by comparison.
In opposition to [James] Conant and others who favored staying the nation’s current educational course, Goodman called for a fundamental transformation:
The dangers of a highly technological and automated future are obvious: We might become a brainwashed society of idle and frivolous consumers. We might continue in a rat race of highly competitive, unnecessary busy-work, with a meaningless expanding Gross National Product. In either case, there might still be an outcast group that must be suppressed. To countervail these dangers and make active, competent, and initiating citizens who can produce a community culture and a noble recreation, we need a very different education than the schooling that we have been getting.
In order to be educated, young people had to be de-schooled or de-programmed. This was his call for “real” progressive education, education that would represent human rather than mechanical values.
...
Goodman had no problems with progressive education per se, which he defined as “the attempt to naturalize, to humanize, each new social and technical development that is making traditional education irrelevant.” Rather, he complained that progressive education “was entirely perverted when it began to be applied” because “Americans had no intention of broadening the scientific base and taking technological expertness and control out of the hands of the top managers and their technicians.” Goodman complained that the “democratic community became astoundingly interpreted as conformity, instead of being the matrix of social experiment and political change.” By differentiating between the theoretical intentions of Dewey and the ways in which progressive education had come to be practiced, Goodman set himself apart from his contemporaries who also critiqued the schools:
The recent attacks on Deweyan progressive education, by the Rickovers and Max Raffertys, have really been outrageous – one gets impatient. Historically, the intent of Dewey was the exact opposite of what the critics say. Progressive education appeared in this country in the intellectual, moral, and social crisis of the development of big centralized industrialism after the Civil War. It was the first thoroughgoing analysis of the crucial modern problem of every advanced country in the world: how to cope with high industrialism and scientific technology which are strange to people; how to restore competence to people who are becoming ignorant; how to live in the rapidly growing cities so that they will not be mere urban sprawl; how to have a free society in mass conditions; how to make the high industrial system good for something, rather than a machine running for its own sake… That is, progressive education was the correct solution of a real problem that Rickover is concerned with, the backwardness of people on a scientific world. To put it more accurately, if progressive education had been generally adopted, we would not be so estranged and ignorant today.
For truly progressive education to take hold, education had to become less demarcated, more informal. With his own childhood in mind, Goodman desired that the city itself replace the school building. He also wanted unlicensed adults to have more influence over the lives of children, in order to diminish the separation between childhood and adulthood characteristic of modern life “and to diminish the omnivorous authority of the professional school-people.”
Goodman’s ideal school was Deweyan in the best sense: the curriculum was organized around interests innate to intellectual development; the boundaries between learning and doing were erased. For those like Goodman, progressive education so defined was one plausible means to a less stifling, less technocratic society geared towards Cold War imperatives. However, unlike Goodman, most progressive educators were committed to an American liberalism that suffered from its all-encompassing commitment to waging the Cold War, which rendered secondary those aspects that drew many to it in the first place, namely its humanizing components.
“Goodman was not against education in the strict sense of the word. For him, the question of education was always of kind. In Goodman’s world, which I imagine as a sort of utopia, those who seek to institutionalize the poor are the enemies of the good. And teachers—real teachers, those who commit their lives (not two years) to expanding their students’ imaginative universes—they are the heroes. I can hardly imagine a better inoculation against the hidden curriculum of liberal do-gooders.”
Lee got in touch with me because he hopes to promote his film among those historians and educators who might eventually consider screening it for students. So he sent me a DVD, which is awesome because I was regretfully unable to attend the brown bag session at our last conference when Lee was present to show clips of his film, and, alongside Casey Nelson Blake and Michael Waltzer, engage the audience in discussion of Goodman. I promised to watch the film, which was a pleasure, and to blog about it. So here I am.
Three things struck me about the film (other than watching it, which was, for me, a truly enjoyable intellectual and aesthetic experience; Lee is a masterful filmmaker.) 1) Goodman was the most unique of the New York Intellectuals, highlighted by his anarchism. 2) Goodman’s non-normative sexuality perplexingly mixed with his hyper-normative misogyny. 3) A case might be made that Goodman was one of the most underrated American intellectuals of the twentieth century, or, as the film’s promotional materials phrase it, “the most influential man you’ve never heard of.”
1) One of the film’s interviewees discusses Goodman’s position among his more famous New York Intellectual brethren. He was definitely in that world. He went to CCNY, he attended the same parties, and he wrote for the same little magazines. Yet he was different. This mostly had to do with his politics. Unlike the other precociously smart CCNY Jews of the 1930s and 1940s, Goodman never joined the Communist Party or one of its Trotskyist offshoots. The interviewee is asked why not, and he flips the question on its head: Why did everyone else join the communists?
Goodman’s anarchism was not doctrinaire, of the syndicalist or primitivist kind. It was more a way of feeling politics. Dick Flacks nicely describes this in his contribution to an excellent if short Dissent forum on Paul Goodman Changed My Life, highlighted by an essay by Rochester graduate student and intellectual historian Michael J. Brown (winner of Dissent’s essay-writing contest “in which people under thirty were asked to name the most pressing social and political issue of our times and write a utopian essay that included practical proposals”—a seemingly paradoxical combination that Goodman often mixed with subtle deftness). A long passage from Flacks (which also speaks to my third point, regarding Goodman’s influence):
SDS, THE Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, and other expressions of the New Left were anarchist without at first even knowing anything about the anarchist tradition. Paul Goodman’s use of anarchism was very instructive. To make change you join up with friends and neighbors and try to create alternatives that meet needs blocked by the big institutions. Or you demand new rules that can make life more livable directly—these modes of action are more practical and effective than appealing to authorities and institutions to bring the change.
Rather than spend primary energy to get the university to become a community of scholars, create your own—and by so doing you may affect the institution as well as making a practical difference. To oppose war, refuse to fight it. Goodman’s fusion of the utopian and the practical, in a series of essays during the sixties, provided substance for the impulses of resistance and the visions of a decentralization and community that defined the youth counterculture and the early New Left.
2) I won’t spend much time on Goodman’s non-normative bi-sexuality, which mixed too easily with his sexism, except to say that his marriage reflected this seeming paradox. He had an arrangement with his wife that allowed him to have sex with as many people as he desired, which seemed to be a lot, since his daily schedule was to wake up in the morning and write, then cruise the bars for men in the afternoon, before returning home to his family for dinner. Such an arrangement was not mutual, as his wife made clear in an interview. To Lee’s credit, he doesn’t gloss over Goodman’s large and complex faults.
3) My third point is the most interesting to me. How influential was Goodman? To what degree did his ideas shape a generation, or perhaps better framed, to what degree did Goodman’s ideas reflect the spirit of the Sixties? The film includes audio footage of Susan Sontag reflecting on Goodman. She claims he is perhaps the only person in the twentieth century who came close to Emerson as an American renaissance man of letters. Although this is probably overstated, it is irrefutable that Growing Up Absurd was perhaps the most-read book on college campuses during the high Sixties. In the film, educator Deborah Meier reminisces about the huge impact it made on her and her friends (even though, in her more recent reading, it came across as dated and sexist in its honest lack of interest in women and girls). I would argue that Goodman indeed is perhaps the quintessential Sixties intellectual. His antinomian disdain for the borders constructed by institutions, including both corporations and government bureaucracies, and by cultural norms, sexual and otherwise, speak to the larger countercultural ethos that did so much to reshape the mainstream cultural ethos.
I have long thought Goodman the quintessential voice of the 60s. Which is why I included an analysis of his educational thought in the last chapter of my book, Education and Cold War, a chapter that explored the explosion of new ways of thinking about education in the 1960s. Below is a chunk of that chapter. Read it and then be the judge. Is Paul Goodman “the most influential man you’ve never heard of”? (I realize that if you’re reading this blog, you’ve likely heard of Paul Goodman, but you are not representative.)
------
Growing Up Absurd, assigned in college classes across the country, was a synthesis of a large body of work published in the 1950s that critiqued what Goodman termed the “Organized System,” the bureaucratic and corporate straitjacket analyzed by William Whyte, David Riesman, Vance Packard, and C. Wright Mills. But in opposition to these previous commentators, Goodman, in the words of historian Kevin Mattson, joined his fellow leftist Mills in making “clear that what often appeared as cultural problems – conformity and alienation – had political roots and demanded serious social reform.” Goodman argued that it was “curious” that the two most analyzed phenomena of the time – the “disgrace of the Organized System” and the problem of disaffected youth – were treated as separate entities except by youth rebels themselves. Goodman combined these two popular strands of social commentary – a critique of the bureaucratic society with an analysis of juvenile delinquency – and argued that the former caused the latter.
Goodman’s disdain for the corporate-organized society tied together his various intellectual interests. For example, his Gestalt theory of psychology posited that, in order for people to overcome their sense of alienation, they must reject the social structures that impeded self-awareness or self-actualization. In other words, the pursuit of an authentic self was not merely narcissistic: it required political transformation. This commitment to political reform also grounded his writings on youth culture and education. Goodman said he was motivated to write on the topic of education after one particularly sad conversation with a group of teenage boys. When he asked the boys what they wanted to do when they grew up, they shrugged their shoulders and unanimously answered, “nothing,” a response that brought to his eyes “tears of frank dismay for the waste of our humanity.” Goodman believed that “the simple plight of these adolescents could not be remedied without a social revolution.”
Goodman’s educational philosophy, as he often made explicit, was not far removed from Dewey’s pragmatism: Dewey’s democratic theory of education was consistent with Goodman’s thoughts on autonomy and decentralization insofar as Dewey believed schools should permit children to be boisterous and physically active in pursuit of meaningful, authentic learning. Goodman agreed with the Deweyan theory that society should adjust to the innate demands of young people rather than vice versa. However, Goodman recognized and was harshly critical of the ways in which Dewey’s thought had been co-opted. “Dewey’s pragmatic and social-minded conceptions,” Goodman lamented, “have ended up as a service university, technocracy, labor bureaucracy, suburban togetherness.” He was sensitive to the fact that those who propagated the despised “Organized System” – those like James Conant who sacrificed the individual to the “cult of efficiency” – were prone to invoke the authority of Dewey in defense of their project. Goodman blamed Conant alongside a multiplicity of educational actors: “timid supervisors,” “bigoted clerics,” “ignorant schools boards,” and, last, but certainly not least, the “school-monks,” his label for “the administrators, professors, academic sociologists, and licensees with diplomas who have proliferated into an invested intellectual class worse than anything since the time of Henry the Eighth.”
The gravest error of the “school monks” was that they wanted to further inflict their methods of socialization upon teenagers because they wrongly attributed the growing number of juvenile delinquents or “beats” to the “failure of socialization.” He wrote:
Growing up is sometimes treated as if it were acculturation, the process of giving up one culture for another, the way a tribe of Indians takes on the culture of whites: so the wild babies give up their ‘individualistic’ mores and ideology, e.g., selfishness or magic thinking or omnipotence, and join the tribe of Society; they are ‘socialized.’ ‘Becoming cultured’ and ‘being adjusted to the social group’ are taken almost as synonymous.”
This socialization process, which he described as “‘vocational guidance’ to fit people wherever they are needed in the productive system,” troubled Goodman in means and ends. He both loathed the practice of adjusting children to society and despised the social regime in which children were being adjusted to – “our highly organized system of machine production and its corresponding social relations.” For Goodman, socialization was the problem, not the solution, and was doomed to failure because it prepared “kids to take some part in a democratic society that does not need them.”
Goodman’s Populist critique of corporate society was powerful but flawed in the way that he romanticized pre-corporate America, a time and place when men supposedly exercised their “capacities in an enterprise useful to society.” The worst evils of the Organized System, in Goodman’s eyes, were its emasculating effects. “The present widespread concern about education is only superficially a part of the Cold War, the need to match the Russian scientists,” he contended. “For in the discussions, pretty soon it becomes clear that people are uneasy about, ashamed of, the world that they have given the children to grow up in. The world is not manly enough.” Goodman explained the rowdiness of adolescent males as a by-product of their need for authentic male behavior:
Positively, the delinquent behavior seems to speak clearly enough. It asks for what we can’t give, but it is in this direction we must go. It asks for manly opportunities to work, make a little money, and have self-esteem; to have some space to bang around in, that is not always somebody’s property; to have better schools to open for them horizons of interest; to have more and better sex without fear or shame; to share somehow in the symbolic goods (like the cars) that are made so much of; to have a community and a country to be loyal to; to claim attention and have a voice.
Goodman limited his analysis to boy culture because their future prospects were dimmer. “A girl does not have to, she is not expected to, ‘make something’ of herself,” Goodman argued. “Her career does not have to be self-justifying, for she will have children, which is absolutely self-justifying, like any other natural or creative act.” The boys, on the other hand, were being asked to run “the rat race of the Organized System.” The timing of his gendered argument was unfortunate, particularly since it was made just a few years before Betty Freidan’s The Feminine Mystique, in which she contended that women were the true victims of middle class conformity. That being said, Goodman’s overall critique of the education system was not limited by his idealized conceptions of male culture, particularly his arguments against compulsory education – what he called the “universal trap” – that he made in a collection of essays published in 1964 by the title, Compulsory Mis-education.
Goodman believed that compulsory education was not only wasteful, but did positive damage to adolescents. It was, in his eyes, partly responsible for an “upsurge of a know-nothing fascism of the right.” “I am profoundly unimpressed,” Goodman wrote, “by our so-called educational system when, as has happened, Governor Wallace comes from the South as a candidate in Northern states and receives his highest number of votes (in some places a majority) in suburbs that have had the most years of schooling.” Goodman’s left-wing critique of the schools mirrored Max Rafferty’s right-wing analysis, not so much because they both asserted that education was helping prepare the way for totalitarianism, but because they attacked what Goodman termed the “fascist vital center” from their opposite flanks. Rafferty might have found much to agree with in Goodman’s argument that the compulsory educational system was a “vast vested interest that goes on for its own sake, keeping millions of people busy, wasting wealth, and pre-empting time and space in which something else could be going on. It is a gigantic market for textbook manufacturers, building contractors, and graduate schools of education.”
For Goodman, if compulsory schooling was democratic, then democracy must have been synonymous with “regimentation.” “The educational role is, by and large,” Goodman intoned “to provide – at public and parents’ expense – apprentice-training for corporations, government, and the teaching profession itself, and also to train the young, as New York’s Commissioner of Education has said, ‘to handle constructively their problems of adjustment to authority.’” It was in school that people learned that life is routine, depersonalized, and “venally graded.” And it was in school that teenagers learned that, in life, it is best to abdicate authority to one’s superiors. This was what Goodman labeled “mis-education” or “socializing to the national norms and regimenting to the national ‘needs.’”
Goodman theorized that literacy was once imperative to democracy because people created their own social existences instead of being asked to adjust to an already-existing social order. “By contrast,” he asked, “what are the citizenly reasons for which we compel everyone to be literate? To keep the economy expanding, to understand the mass-communications, to chose between indistinguishable Democrats and Republicans?” Because a technocratic and managerial elite made all of the life and death decisions – decisions about the economy and war – the only justification for mass literacy was that people could be more efficiently propagandized. From Goodman’s point of view, mass illiteracy was better by comparison.
In opposition to [James] Conant and others who favored staying the nation’s current educational course, Goodman called for a fundamental transformation:
The dangers of a highly technological and automated future are obvious: We might become a brainwashed society of idle and frivolous consumers. We might continue in a rat race of highly competitive, unnecessary busy-work, with a meaningless expanding Gross National Product. In either case, there might still be an outcast group that must be suppressed. To countervail these dangers and make active, competent, and initiating citizens who can produce a community culture and a noble recreation, we need a very different education than the schooling that we have been getting.
In order to be educated, young people had to be de-schooled or de-programmed. This was his call for “real” progressive education, education that would represent human rather than mechanical values.
...
Goodman had no problems with progressive education per se, which he defined as “the attempt to naturalize, to humanize, each new social and technical development that is making traditional education irrelevant.” Rather, he complained that progressive education “was entirely perverted when it began to be applied” because “Americans had no intention of broadening the scientific base and taking technological expertness and control out of the hands of the top managers and their technicians.” Goodman complained that the “democratic community became astoundingly interpreted as conformity, instead of being the matrix of social experiment and political change.” By differentiating between the theoretical intentions of Dewey and the ways in which progressive education had come to be practiced, Goodman set himself apart from his contemporaries who also critiqued the schools:
The recent attacks on Deweyan progressive education, by the Rickovers and Max Raffertys, have really been outrageous – one gets impatient. Historically, the intent of Dewey was the exact opposite of what the critics say. Progressive education appeared in this country in the intellectual, moral, and social crisis of the development of big centralized industrialism after the Civil War. It was the first thoroughgoing analysis of the crucial modern problem of every advanced country in the world: how to cope with high industrialism and scientific technology which are strange to people; how to restore competence to people who are becoming ignorant; how to live in the rapidly growing cities so that they will not be mere urban sprawl; how to have a free society in mass conditions; how to make the high industrial system good for something, rather than a machine running for its own sake… That is, progressive education was the correct solution of a real problem that Rickover is concerned with, the backwardness of people on a scientific world. To put it more accurately, if progressive education had been generally adopted, we would not be so estranged and ignorant today.
For truly progressive education to take hold, education had to become less demarcated, more informal. With his own childhood in mind, Goodman desired that the city itself replace the school building. He also wanted unlicensed adults to have more influence over the lives of children, in order to diminish the separation between childhood and adulthood characteristic of modern life “and to diminish the omnivorous authority of the professional school-people.”
Goodman’s ideal school was Deweyan in the best sense: the curriculum was organized around interests innate to intellectual development; the boundaries between learning and doing were erased. For those like Goodman, progressive education so defined was one plausible means to a less stifling, less technocratic society geared towards Cold War imperatives. However, unlike Goodman, most progressive educators were committed to an American liberalism that suffered from its all-encompassing commitment to waging the Cold War, which rendered secondary those aspects that drew many to it in the first place, namely its humanizing components.
Senin, 23 Januari 2012
Newt Gingrich's Big Ideas
JOHN KING: Speaker Gingrich, I want to start with you. You're at this for months and you're out there. If there's one thing, just one thing in this campaign you could do over, what would it be?
MR. GINGRICH: I would skip the opening three months, where I hired regular consultants and tried to figure out how to be a normal candidate, and I would just to straight at being a big-ideas, big- solutions, Internet-based campaign from day one, because it just didn't work. I mean, it's not who I am. I'm not capable of being a sort of traditional candidate. I'm a very idea-oriented candidate. And I think the Internet makes it possible to create a momentum of ideas that's very, very exciting.Newt does not have ideas, he has ideas about ideas. He keeps saying what a good idea it is to have ideas. . . . He is the least substantive major political figure I’ve ever seen.He's a stupid man's idea of what a smart man sounds like.
Newt Gingrich has apparently always liked "big ideas." And, just as apparently, critics have felt that his attachment to "big ideas" was largely devoid of content. Gingrich's "interest in long-range and broad-range planning for the future...is clearly more appropriate to the orientation of our Department of Geography" noted his then employer, West George College President Ward Pafford, in a 1975 letter announcing Gingrich's removal from the History Department. "Not only is Mr Gingrich not a problem-solver," quipped The Economist's Democracy in American Blog last year, "he is a problem-aggrandiser."
Following Newt's big win in SC over the weekend, skeptical beltway pundits are having trouble identifying the ideas his campaign is supposedly based on. Via Gary Johnson, Ezra Klein unearthed the justly defeated Drug Importer Death Penalty Act of 1996, which would have put to death anyone bringing more than two ounces of marijuana into the U.S.* Ultimately, Klein concludes, when it comes to Newt's ideas, there's no there there: "Can anyone name some actually big, actually workable, actually new ideas that Gingrich has been associated with during his career? What has he brought to the table that wouldn’t have been there in his absence?"
But although Newt Gingrich's vaunted ideas don't amount to much, I think it would be wrong to dismiss their importance to his political success. Newt is hardly alone on the right in valuing the idea of ideas. Indeed, ideas a key part of what one might call the brand identity of modern American conservatism.
One of the founding texts of post-war conservative thought was Richard Weaver's Ideas Have Consequences. Conservative scholars have most often continued to view their own history in terms of ideas; it's no accident that the first major academic narrative of modern American conservatism understood the movement in fundamentally intellectual terms: George Nash's The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America Since 1945.**
Conservatives have made exceedingly long novels of ideas into best-sellers.
The chief organizing strategy of the John Birch Society, the signature organization of the late 1950s and early 1960s far right, involved exceedingly long, detailed and dry seminars by founder Robert Welch:
More recently, we've seen the bizarre infamy of the Frankfurt School among some rightwing groups in the last two decades. Glenn Beck built his fame around weaving complicated conspiratorial histories on his whiteboards.
Whether or not we join Corey Robin in seeing conservatism as fundamentally an "ideas-driven praxis," there's no question that the idea of ideas has great power on the right.
The question is why?
This is, after all, a movement that has also boldly embraced a rhetoric of populist anti-elitism and has often celebrated anti-intellectualism. In 2005, in the midst of praising George W. Bush in the wake of Katrina, David Frum could conclude that the then President was "sometimes glib, even dogmatic, often uncurious, and as a result ill-informed . . . (but) outweighing the faults are his virtues: decency, honesty, rectitude, courage, and tenacity."
And yet, my guess is the fact that Newt Gingrich has a PhD in history probably does him a lot more electoral good than George McGovern's PhD in history ever did him. As Ezra Klein and others have noted, Newt's ideas don't much distinguish him from most of the other GOP presidential candidates. But the place of ideas in Newt's self-presentation is one of the distinguishing characteristics of his campaign and indeed his entire career. That it confounds and infuriates people like Barney Frank, Paul Krugman, and Ezra Klein is, among Gingrich's base, doubtless a feature not a bug.
Although I happen to agree with Corey Robin that it's worth spending time to understand the actual ideas of conservatives, I also think that historians ought to spend time understanding the imaginative place of ideas among movement conservatives and its relationship to the equally powerful strains of anti-intellectualism on the right. Rather than opposing tendencies, my sense is that they are actually two sides of the same coin.
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* This is all the more amazing since Newt himself admits to having smoked pot in grad school.
** And not just scholars on the right. Corey Robin, too, argues that conservatism is a movement of ideas and that leftists and liberals have made a terrible mistake not to take those ideas more seriously.
Sabtu, 21 Januari 2012
What's the Big Idea?
This was the catchy title of a critically important session I attended at the AHA this January -- important for me, anyhow. And judging by the fact that every seat was taken, and there were people sitting on the floor along the walls and in the aisle, and there were more people standing in the doorway, it was important for a lot of other folks too. How often do you get to hear David Armitage, James Kloppenberg, Darrin McMahon, and Sophia Rosenfeld in conversation together about their methodological approaches to long-range intellectual history, with Lynn Hunt as the MC? That session was the place to be, and I'm glad I had a seat.
Since most USIH blog readers didn't have a seat in the room, I thought I'd use this blog post to briefly summarize just one highlight of the panel: David Armitage's description of his methodological approach for doing long-range intellectual history.
Armitage described his current work -- a history of the concept of "civil war" -- as a "transtemporal history", governed by a method of "serial contextualism" that is diachronic, not just synchronic, resulting in not a "history of ideas," but a "history in ideas."
That's saying a lot. And, because it was David Armitage talking, it all got said really fast. Happily, he took time to expand upon what he meant by each of these points.
transtemporal history
A "transtemporal" history links discrete moments over large stretches of time. Someone tracing the long-range history of the contestation of an idea should be looking for both "continuities and conceptual ruptures." These moments are "inflection points" in the diffusion, reception, repurposing and transformation of ideas or texts or arguments.
serial contextualism
A "serial contextualism" zooms in on these transtemporal moments to closely examine and illuminate the larger historical context in which a particular instantiation of the "big idea" is embedded, or out of which it emerges.
history in ideas
Doing "history in ideas" (rather than a history of ideas) involves telling a long-range narrative of human experience as expressed in human thought.
This last point of Armitage's, hinging on the seemingly simplest of lexical shifts -- substituting one preposition for another -- was the most conceptually complex. Alas, my brain was working so hard to grasp the implications of "history in ideas" that I faltered in my note-taking.
However, I think what Armitage presented in this compact phrase was a shorthand summation of observations he had made in the introduction to his talk. In the course of giving a rapid-fire historiographical overview of the "history of ideas," Armitage took us from Lovejoy to Braudel to so-called "Big History."
While acknowledging some justice in Skinner's critique of Lovejoy's approach as an exercise in "non-contextualism," Armitage found approaches that treat ideas as epiphenomenal, or as precipitates of presumably deeper forces at work in history, likewise wanting. "Materialism," Armitage said, "reduces reflection to physiological reflect and intellect to interest." A materialist view of history trivializes and ultimately dehumanizes the past. "There is little that is more shallow than what we call 'deep history' because it evacuates the human mind of its purview."
In other words -- and these are my words, not Armitage's -- the purpose of history is to find and understand the meaning that people have made of their lives and their world. We find that meaning, and so make meaning for own time, by telling the stories of the past through the medium of ideas.
Believe me -- it made a lot more sense when David Armitage was saying it.
Since most USIH blog readers didn't have a seat in the room, I thought I'd use this blog post to briefly summarize just one highlight of the panel: David Armitage's description of his methodological approach for doing long-range intellectual history.
Armitage described his current work -- a history of the concept of "civil war" -- as a "transtemporal history", governed by a method of "serial contextualism" that is diachronic, not just synchronic, resulting in not a "history of ideas," but a "history in ideas."
That's saying a lot. And, because it was David Armitage talking, it all got said really fast. Happily, he took time to expand upon what he meant by each of these points.
transtemporal history
A "transtemporal" history links discrete moments over large stretches of time. Someone tracing the long-range history of the contestation of an idea should be looking for both "continuities and conceptual ruptures." These moments are "inflection points" in the diffusion, reception, repurposing and transformation of ideas or texts or arguments.
serial contextualism
A "serial contextualism" zooms in on these transtemporal moments to closely examine and illuminate the larger historical context in which a particular instantiation of the "big idea" is embedded, or out of which it emerges.
history in ideas
Doing "history in ideas" (rather than a history of ideas) involves telling a long-range narrative of human experience as expressed in human thought.
This last point of Armitage's, hinging on the seemingly simplest of lexical shifts -- substituting one preposition for another -- was the most conceptually complex. Alas, my brain was working so hard to grasp the implications of "history in ideas" that I faltered in my note-taking.
However, I think what Armitage presented in this compact phrase was a shorthand summation of observations he had made in the introduction to his talk. In the course of giving a rapid-fire historiographical overview of the "history of ideas," Armitage took us from Lovejoy to Braudel to so-called "Big History."
While acknowledging some justice in Skinner's critique of Lovejoy's approach as an exercise in "non-contextualism," Armitage found approaches that treat ideas as epiphenomenal, or as precipitates of presumably deeper forces at work in history, likewise wanting. "Materialism," Armitage said, "reduces reflection to physiological reflect and intellect to interest." A materialist view of history trivializes and ultimately dehumanizes the past. "There is little that is more shallow than what we call 'deep history' because it evacuates the human mind of its purview."
In other words -- and these are my words, not Armitage's -- the purpose of history is to find and understand the meaning that people have made of their lives and their world. We find that meaning, and so make meaning for own time, by telling the stories of the past through the medium of ideas.
Believe me -- it made a lot more sense when David Armitage was saying it.
Jumat, 20 Januari 2012
Evangelicals and Santorum Together: the Lure of War
A few days ago, former Pennsylvania senator Rick Santorum told Frank Luntz, who moderated a forum hosted by the conservative Faith and Freedom Coalition, that evangelicals need a candidate who "can take the bullets." Santorum's reference to violence was not meant literally--he didn't volunteer to fight in Afghanistan...or Iran (for that matter). However, Santorum wants to remind folks that he understands war--if only rhetorically. In fact, it might be the former senator's bluster on military matters that has increased his appeal among conservative evangelicals. After all, his stance on social issues--the family, homosexuals, and abortion--echoes all other GOP candidates. He has been, though, more forthright--perhaps even reckless--when it comes to thinking out loud about war.
Santorum is Catholic and his endorsement by evangelicals is not as shocking as it once might have been. But among the reasons for this rapprochement between these groups has been the steady development among conservative religious leaders of unified view of war--for more on this see the writing of Catholics George Wiegel and Michael Novak and, yes, Richard John Neuhuas. Of course, liberal religious leaders also found common ground on the issue of war; in the middle of the Vietnam War, groups such as CALCAV spoke out against the dangers of war for the nation. However, for conservatives that war served as an awakening of a different kind, distilling a moral language that would discriminate "patriots" from critics. Conservatives of various religious denominations concluded that the soul of America was worth sacrificing for, even if they would not volunteer to perform that service personally.
Following questions on homosexuals and abortion, the Santorum and his wife answered a question posed by Luntz about military service. The Santorums agreed that they would be proud to have their children enter the military and fight for the United States, though Santorum was quick to correct what he viewed as a prevailing misperception that he hoped for war with Iran. Rather, he clarified, "If Iran is not stopped from developing a nuclear weapon...there will be 'war that we have never seen the likes of in this country, and it is not a matter taking out this regime, it's not a matter of preemptive war, it's a matter of taking out this nuclear ability that would change the face of our country.'" Syntax aside (and perhaps logic as well), why is Santorum speaking about war with Iran changing the face of our country? The face of Iran, the Persian Gulf, perhaps, but our country?
A war, or at least talk of one, can change our country, of course. And speaking to a gathering of conservative evangelicals about such change was probably a sensible idea. As Andrew Bacevich observed in a book on the post-Vietnam romance many evangelicals developed with the military: "In the aftermath of Vietnam, evangelicals came to see the military as an enclave of virtue, a place of refuge where the sacred remnant of patriotic Americans gathered and preserved American principles from extinction." As their neocon allies also cheered in the late 1990s, a martial attitude would correct America's long delusional obsession with the culture wars.
What conservatives of the 1970s rediscovered was the sublime nature of war in the abstract. Corey Robin pointed out on his blog recently that conservatism does not, by principle, tend to avoid war and violence, but, by practical necessity, seeks to channel its emotional power into a philosophical rush. War in the abstract--war in the sense of giving oneself over to something greater or, better, of commanding the ultimate sacrifice for something greater--is the conservative's oversoul. The realities of prosecuting a war, of paying for it, cleaning up after it, of dealing with the grief it causes, can be dismissed to the functions of the state. The nation can command sacrifice, the state only manages the paperwork.
So while Mitt Romney prattles on about his business acumen, and Newt Gingrich bellows about his big ideas for big problems (including, apparently, intergalactic empires), Rick Santorum might be the conservative to speak about the meaning of sacrifice in terms that the faithful will understand. And what about Ron Paul...well, I think more than just the GOP could stand to hear his analysis of war and the nation.
Kamis, 19 Januari 2012
George Kateb's Place In The History Of Political Philosophy
In the course of researching the reviews of Mortimer J. Adler's 1970s books, I ran across one by George Kateb. At the time he was a junior faculty member at Amherst College*, but is now an emeritus professor at Princeton University.
I don't know anything about Kateb's reputation among political philosophers, but his Wikipedia entry (or "Professor Wikipedia," in Bill Fine's words) calls him a "staunch individualist" and relays that "Kateb, along with John Rawls and Isaiah Berlin, is credited with making significant contributions to liberal political theory." Heady company. Suffice it to say that he is a champion for liberalism.
Here are the books authored by him alone:
- Utopia and Its Enemies. New York and London: Free Press, l963. Reprinted with a new Preface, New York: Schocken, l972.
- Political Theory: Its Nature and Uses. New York: St Martin's Press, l968.
- Hannah Arendt: Politics, Conscience, Evil. Totowa, N.J. and London: Rowman and Allanheld, l984.
- The Inner Ocean: Individualism and Democratic Culture. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1992.
- Emerson and Self-Reliance. Sage, 1994. 2d edition, with a new Preface, New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002.
- Patriotism and Other Mistakes. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006.
The topics that are the objects of these books arise in predictable spots when one searches the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy online. This at least affirms something of Kateb's authority, or usefulness.
What do you know about Kateb? Where does he appear in USIH historiography? I haven't found him in any recent intellectual histories. So how can he really be on par with Rawls and Berlin in terms of contributions to political philosophy? What is Kateb's place in the history of American political philosophy? Who _is_ George Kateb?
Not that this answers any of my questions, but Kateb has made an appearance at the NYT philosophy blog, The Stone (the link takes you to a video interview--here's a transcripted excerpt). There Kateb characterizes himself "as an oncologist or pathologist of politics." To that point, his Wikipedia page adds: "More recently Kateb has turned his attention to what he sees as the increasing erosion of individual liberty wrought by the Bush administration and the poisonous influence of religious, ethnic and statist group identity on morality." Most interesting.
My inclination is to put him in the camp of non-analytic political philosophers whose works support a kind of secular libertarianism. But he also appears to have some sense of community responsibility. So perhaps he is simply a paragon of the individualist strain in mid-century liberalism. Thoughts? Let's see if we can build some kind of historiography in relation to his thought in the comments. - TL
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*Kateb was interviewed by Amherst professor William Taubman in 2008.
I don't know anything about Kateb's reputation among political philosophers, but his Wikipedia entry (or "Professor Wikipedia," in Bill Fine's words) calls him a "staunch individualist" and relays that "Kateb, along with John Rawls and Isaiah Berlin, is credited with making significant contributions to liberal political theory." Heady company. Suffice it to say that he is a champion for liberalism.
Here are the books authored by him alone:
- Utopia and Its Enemies. New York and London: Free Press, l963. Reprinted with a new Preface, New York: Schocken, l972.
- Political Theory: Its Nature and Uses. New York: St Martin's Press, l968.
- Hannah Arendt: Politics, Conscience, Evil. Totowa, N.J. and London: Rowman and Allanheld, l984.
- The Inner Ocean: Individualism and Democratic Culture. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1992.
- Emerson and Self-Reliance. Sage, 1994. 2d edition, with a new Preface, New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002.
- Patriotism and Other Mistakes. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006.
The topics that are the objects of these books arise in predictable spots when one searches the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy online. This at least affirms something of Kateb's authority, or usefulness.
What do you know about Kateb? Where does he appear in USIH historiography? I haven't found him in any recent intellectual histories. So how can he really be on par with Rawls and Berlin in terms of contributions to political philosophy? What is Kateb's place in the history of American political philosophy? Who _is_ George Kateb?
Not that this answers any of my questions, but Kateb has made an appearance at the NYT philosophy blog, The Stone (the link takes you to a video interview--here's a transcripted excerpt). There Kateb characterizes himself "as an oncologist or pathologist of politics." To that point, his Wikipedia page adds: "More recently Kateb has turned his attention to what he sees as the increasing erosion of individual liberty wrought by the Bush administration and the poisonous influence of religious, ethnic and statist group identity on morality." Most interesting.
My inclination is to put him in the camp of non-analytic political philosophers whose works support a kind of secular libertarianism. But he also appears to have some sense of community responsibility. So perhaps he is simply a paragon of the individualist strain in mid-century liberalism. Thoughts? Let's see if we can build some kind of historiography in relation to his thought in the comments. - TL
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*Kateb was interviewed by Amherst professor William Taubman in 2008.
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