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Jumat, 09 November 2012

S-USIH Member News and Notes - Fall 2012

The conference newsletter we were going to distribute in New York earlier this month (you can view/download a .pdf here) included a column of "Member News and Notes" (page 8). At my request Ray Haberski, S-USIH Secretary, had sent out an email to our membership, and I had also posted a notice on this blog, asking for professional news and publication notices from our members.  Below are the news items I received by our newsletter print deadline. 

 I would be glad to post "Member News and Notes" here on the blog in between our newsletter issues. If you are a member of the S-USIH, and you have a brief notice to share with our readers, please send me an email using the subject line "news and notes." - L.D. Burnett
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S-USIH Member News and Notes - Fall 2012




Angus Burgin's book, The Great Persuasion: Reinventing Free Markets Since the Depression, was published in October by Harvard University Press.  From the HUP website:  "Just as today’s observers struggle to justify the workings of the free market in the wake of a global economic crisis, an earlier generation of economists revisited their worldviews following the Great Depression. The Great Persuasion is an intellectual history of that project. Angus Burgin traces the evolution of postwar economic thought in order to reconsider many of the most basic assumptions of our market-centered world."

George Cotkin's newest book, Dive Deeper: Journeys With Moby Dick, was published in July by Oxford University Press. From the OUP website:  "George Cotkin's Dive Deeper provides both a guide to the novel and a record of its dazzling cultural train. It supplies easy-to-follow plot points for each of the novel's 135 sections before taking up a salient phrase, image, or idea in each for further exploration. Through these forays, Cotkin traces the astonishing reach of the novel, sighting the White Whale in mainstream and obscure subcultures alike, from impressionist painting circles to political terrorist cells. In a lively and engaging style, Dive Deeper immerses us into the depths of Melville's influence on the literature, film, and art of our modern world."

Louise (Lucy) W. Knight, Visiting Scholar, Gender Studies Program, Northwestern University, gave a plenary talk on re-interpreting Jane Addams's ideas using a rhetorical analysis at a conference at the University of Dayton titled, "Feminist Pragmatism in Place," October 19-20, 2012.

Drew Maciag's book, Edmund Burke in America: The Contested Career of the Father of Modern Conservatism, will be published by Cornell University Press next spring.

Mike O'Connor's article "Liberals in Space: The 1960s Politics of Star Trek" will be published this December in the journal The Sixties. In March of next year, Mike will be appearing as a talking head on the television series The Real Story (aired in the U.S. on the Smithsonian Channel) on the episode featuring Star Trek. Since last year's newsletter, he has signed a contract for his book A Commercial Republic: Democratic Capitalism in American Thought. It will be published by the University Press of Kansas in early 2014.

Mark Pittinger's book Class Unknown:  Undercover Investigations of American Work and Poverty from the Progressive Era to the Present was published in August by New York University press.   From the website of the Department of History at the University of Colorado: "The book explains how social scientists, middle-class reformers, and writers have left the comforts of their offices to 'pass' as steel workers, coal miners, assembly-line laborers, waitresses, hoboes, and other working and poor people in an attempt to gain a fuller and more authentic understanding of the lives of the working class and the poor."

Selasa, 18 September 2012

The “New Political History” and U.S. Intellectual History

(Today's guest post is from Mike O'Connor. It's weird for me to call Mike a guest since he helped found this blog and S-USIH. I'm glad he came out of retirement for this one.)

The introduction to Governing America: The Revival of Political History, the most recent book from Julian Zelizer, raises some really interesting issues that both highlight and challenge what we have been doing here at S-USIH. In his short introductory piece, Zelizer argues convincingly that political history is enjoying a resurgence. This might not seem controversial to anyone who has noted, for example, the outsize influence of Robert Caro’s LBJ biographies, or the many interesting and important studies of postwar conservatism that have come out in the last several years. But Zelizer is saying something more than that the subject of American politics is enjoying a cyclical resurgence, or that some talented writers have captured the attention of the historical profession and general public. Instead, he is arguing that political history has regained its relevance because it has actually changed.
The implication here is, of course, that in decades past, the field “as it had been practiced by legendary figures such as Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. and Richard Hofstadter” had itself to blame for its decline in importance and prestige. Beginning in the sixties, attacks on political history came from every direction: New Left scholars challenged the presumption of consensus that it had explicitly or implicitly advanced, social and cultural historians focused on conceptions of politics—race, gender, class and identity—that were not captured by treatments of the actions of elected officials, and French scholarship, in the form of the Annales school, shifted historical attention away from “the specific actions of political leaders at given points in time” and toward major shifts in “ideational and institutional structures.” Political history, still wedded to its traditional “great man” narratives, sunk into irrelevance.

But, Zelizer argues, political history “slowly, almost imperceptibly” adapted to the new intellectual terrain. Political scientists working in the field of American Political Development emphasized how the growth of institutions posed “structural constraints” on elected officials. Social scientists also emphasized the power of institutions to retard political change. Many social and cultural historians, “feeing that the field of American history had become too specialized and fragmented,” returned to political history in search of an intellectual center of gravity for American history itself.
Zelizer argues that the field has been enjoying a resurgence “since the early 1990s.” The American political history that has “returned to the forefront of the profession,” however, is “not the same political history of the past.” These practitioners have “punctured the myth” of consensus “in any period,” while emphasizing the importance of social movements. Those who have continued to study political leaders have done so from a new perspective, “situating them within particular institutional contexts,” emphasizing what they were and were not able to do within those structures, and “broaden[ing] the range” of those who might be considered worthy of study in the first place.
The arguments I have summarized here take up only half of the short introduction to the book, which is a collection of essays. Though occupying only four pages, the ideas introduced there made a huge impression on me, for two reasons. The first relates to political history itself: though I had never really thought about, or perhaps even been aware of, a resurgence in American political history, once Zelizer spelled it out I could immediately confirm this development from my own reading and experience. The second reason concerned S-USIH, for I could see a parallel between what we are doing here and the new political history.
As Zelizer describes it, the new political history specifically takes into account the advances and criticisms offered by social history in the last several decades. What is also apparent on my reading, however, is that historians working in that vein also tacitly and respectfully decided that this particular intervention has gone as far as it should. We can turn to a particularly important work of recent political history for a succinct statement of this point. In the introduction to The Rise of American Democracy (tellingly subtitled “Jefferson to Lincoln”), Sean Wilentz defends his decision to focus on political elites. Arguing that previous studies have “generally submerged the history of politics in the history of social change,” Wilentz characterized his book as one that would “reaffirm the importance of political events.” He went farther, I suspect, than Zelizer might, in “insisting on what ought to be a truism: that some people have more influence on history than others.” Of course, this statement is a truism, and suggesting otherwise invokes the boogeyman of a social historian who will not assent to the obvious. Yet readers of Wilentz’s somewhat snarky dismissal of social history might be surprised that the rest of his book contains treatments of social movements—such as the Democratic-Republican societies, the Working Men’s movement and abolitionism—in what is certainly a political history. Moreover, Wilentz’s first book, Chants Democratic, itself works in the tradition of social history. Thus I see Wilentz’s cantankerousness as belied by his actual work: even a somewhat hostile critic of social history recognizes its necessity in a political narrative. This would confirm Zelizer’s point.
A less churlish example comes from Meg Jacobs’ Pocketbook Politics. In her introduction, Jacobs positions her political history less as a rejection of social history than as an incorporation of it into a larger narrative. She notes that policymakers in large administrative states are dependent upon citizens to legitimate their authority; at the same time, however, “popular movements have succeeded in effecting [sic] change only to the extent that they win support at elite levels.” Thus it would seem that neither the history of elected officials nor that of social movements tells a complete story. Jacobs carefully limits her observations to her own project, saying that the “book encourages a new way of studying state power by integrating popular politics and elite policymaking.” Yet one might fairly generalize all of these observations to conclude that the more recent political history turns on the assumption that a complete account of political developments must incorporate both social and policy history.
Having said all that, then, the question for us is, “What about intellectual history? Does it have a place in the new political history?” Put another way, does the new political history represent only the incorporation of social history, or is the latter simply a placeholder, representing the need to expand political history beyond its traditional boundaries? I must admit that for the historians I have cited, the former answer appears to be the case. Additionally, while many of my favorite recent works of political history, for example, Nixonland or Stayin’ Alive, clearly operate within the paradigm of the new political history, I would not say that they are particularly concerned with intellectual history.
But I would argue that the spirit of Zelizer’s characterization (independently of what Zelizer himself might happen to think) would in fact require that effective political history would sometimes be required to take note of intellectual history. I take the initial point of departure not to be that social history is necessary to an account of American politics, but that the actions of politicians do not exhaust the narrative. If the latter is the case, then, depending on the nature of a given project, any kind of history might be necessary in order to fully explain the political history of a given period, issue, figure or movement. As an obvious example, making sense of the Revolutionary Era and founding period seems difficult without acknowledging the importance of ideas to the overall narrative.
Indeed, the desire to incorporate intellectual history into political history has been a motivating force in the past and future projects of many who have been active in the founding and leadership of the Society for U.S. Intellectual History, such as Andrew Hartman, Ray Haberski, Lisa Szefel, Ben Alpers, David Sehat, and, well, me. And many more who have actively commented or guest-posted on the blog, or participated in the conference, are working in a similar vein. There appears to be a strong overlap between the new political history and the intellectual space being carved out here at S-USIH.
But because of Julian Zelizer’s short introduction, I see this common interest much differently than I have in the past. Because so many people at S-USIH share this focus on political history, I had assumed for years that there was something inherently political about the current moment in intellectual history. I could see no reason why that might be true, but all of my experience seemed to confirm it. Now I believe it to be far more likely that S-USIH was being carried by a tide that was sweeping the profession more broadly. And, more importantly, I believe that interested intellectual historians will find a receptive audience within the new political history.

Sabtu, 14 April 2012

In the Lists: Reading for Exams

Though the time of trial is still a year away, I have begun to prepare in earnest for my (in)glorious combat in the lists:  the ordeal of qualifying exams.

At this point, my preparations involve hammering out the reading lists for my fields:  American intellectual and cultural history (soup to nuts), American literature (Early Republic to the day before yesterday), and Transatlantic history in the long 19th century (1776-1924).

At my institution, the process begins manageably enough:  I provide the profs supervising my fields with a preliminary list of texts I think I need to read, and then we make additions and changes from there.  One value of having us students come up with the first list ourselves is that it gives our profs a benchmark for assessing our initial understanding (or lack thereof) of our fields.  Do we have a sense of the basic boundaries, the major landmarks, or are we wandering lost in a trackless epistemic wasteland?  That would be problematic.

Fortunately, those who have traveled this ground before me have left some trail markers to guide me and other grad students along the way.  Indeed, some of the most helpful navigation aids for putting together a preliminary list are embedded in others' posts and comments on this very blog.

For those of you putting together exam lists (or syllabi), I want to call your attention to several past posts on USIH that have featured discussions of "must-read" texts in U.S. intellectual history, U.S. history in general, the "long 19th century," and so forth:

Secondary sources in U.S. intellectual history

A Canon of U.S. Intellectual History

A Reading List for the Long Nineteenth Century

The U.S. History Canon

A truly canonical U.S. history list

Perhaps putting these links together in one blog post will be helpful to those who come after me on this pilgrim pathway.  But as you can see from the posts and their dates, I'm certainly not the one blazing this trail.  Thanks to Mike O'Connor and David Sehat for taking up these questions, and thanks to the other commenters on their posts for participating in the discussion and adding their suggestions.  Most helpful.

I am sure to end up with a reading list for U.S. intellectual history that is somewhat different from the (combined) suggestions of these posts.  But this isn't a bad place to start.

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Addendum, June 3, 2012 1:10 AM:

I have since finalized my reading list for U.S. Intellectual and Cultural history; I have posted it here.

Rabu, 04 April 2012

CFP: postwar political economy

(Note: I post this on behalf of Mike O'Connor, the current S-USIH treasurer.)

I am soliciting papers and a potential chair for a panel at the annual conference of the Society for U.S. Intellectual History, to be held November 1-2, 2012 in New York City. The subject of the panel is "postwar political economy." I am seeking any papers that deal with the intellectual history of the relationship between government and the economy in the United States in the latter half of the twentieth century. Both the disciplinary methodology and the subject may be considered broadly: please submit anything that you might consider relevant.

To apply, send a CV and an abstract of less than one page to Mike O'Connor at oconnor [at] gsu [dot] edu. Those who wish to be considered as the chair of the panel should send a CV to the same address, with a short note explaining their interest. Please submit all documents in MS Word or .pdf format no later than May 1, 2012. The conference organizers will not allow conference attendees to participate in more than one panel. All participants in the conference must be members of the Society for U.S. Intellectual history, and pay the conference registration fee.

Selasa, 31 Januari 2012

Socialism is the Name of Our Desire

Last week I presented to about 60 secondary history teachers, alongside two of my colleagues at our lab school, University High, on the topic: “Teaching Socialism in American History.” I argued that including the history of socialism in the secondary U.S. history survey was important because, in the all important quest to make history more interesting for young students—since polls regularly show that high school students consider history the most boring subject—the history of socialism would give students space to imagine a different world. Counterfactual thinking is important to the development of historical imagination. It helps students think about the differences between history, in its constructedness, and the past, in its finiteness. Counterfactuals highlight historical contingency in ways that make the study of history more compelling than the Whiggish, even teleological narratives spun by textbooks. Werner Sombert’s crucial question—“Why no socialism in America?”— which has helped shaped a century of American historiography, is just the type of counterfactual question that we should ask our young history students.

Lest you dyed-in-the-wool empiricists out there object, I should point out that I also argued that including socialism as part of the U.S. history curriculum paints a more accurate picture of U.S. history. In making this case, I relied heavily on Michael Kazin’s indispensable new book, American Dreamers: How the Left Changed a Nation (which Mike O’Connor reviewed for USIH here.) Kazin contends that the left, defined as “that social movement, or congeries of mutually sympathetic movements, that are dedicated to a radically egalitarian transformation of society”—has transformed the moral culture, or "common sense” of the nation, even though it has never been a serious threat to the concentrations of political and economic power. He writes: “Leftists who articulated big dreams of a different future did much to initiate what became common, if still controversial, features of American life. These included the advocacy of equal opportunity and equal treatment for women, ethnic and racial minorities, and homosexuals; the celebration of sexual pleasure unconnected to reproduction, media and educational system sensitive to racial and gender oppression and which celebrates what we now call multiculturalism, and the popularity of novels and films with a strongly altruistic and anti-authoritarian point of view.” In short, Kazin argues that the cultural left, from Harriet Beecher Stowe, to Max Eastman, to Toni Morrison, to Matt Groening, “articulated outrage about the state of the world and the longing for a different one in ways the political left was unable to do.”

Kazin’s thesis is exciting for intellectual historians because, insofar as the left has been influential in American life, such influence is best assessed by taking stock of how its ideas have been incorporated into mainstream cultural frameworks. This is not to say that American Dreamers is a work of intellectual history. Kazin takes ideas seriously, and intellectuals seriously, but usually as tangential to the larger social history of political movements. That is to say, he rarely pauses to analyze intellectual sources with any rigor. Which is fine. Like I said, the book is indispensable as a synthetic historical overview of the American left. I definitely plan to assign it to undergraduate students.

American Dreamers is also a good place for intellectual historians to begin rethinking the paradoxes of radical thought. For instance, in an obscure footnote Kazin quotes a stunning passage from Richard Hofstadter’s Age of Reform: “The dialectic of history is full of odd and cunningly contrived ironies, and among these are rebellion waged only that the rebels might in the end be converted into their opposites.” Kazin relates Hofstadter’s point about the populists in order to make his case that many New Left dissidents, those who staged dramatic sit-ins at universities across the country, ended up controlling the reigns of cultural power as represented by humanities departments. Although this paradoxical development sends shivers down the spines of conservatives such as Pat Buchanan—whose pithy quote, “Culture is the Ho Chi Minh Trail of power; you surrender that province and you lose America,” became a rallying cry for conservative culture warriors—Kazin qualifies the effect of tenured radicals.

On the one hand, Kazin recognizes, along with Richard Rorty, that New Leftists have reshaped American culture to be far less sadistic. Concomitantly, they changed the way millions of young Americans have learned about their nation. Kazin writes: “Gradually, their ideas about history, literature, and a just society percolated down to secondary schools across the land. Black studies, Chicano studies, women’s studies, queer studies, and cultural studies; history which examined America as a nation dominated by white people bent on empire, the so-called ‘holy trinity’ of ‘race-class-and-gender’ and the virtues of multicultural identity—all were norms of pedagogy and scholarship by the end of the twentieth century.” Although this is more than a touch overstated—more secondary students continue to learn from traditional curriculums than from those inflected with New Left ideas, and even most college surveys avoid using the “E word” (Empire) when describing the role of America in the world, apart from the era of the Spanish-American War—Kazin is basically correct about this remarkable cultural transformation.

But on the other hand, Kazin’s analysis of the cultural left is tempered by his pessimism that such success matters little in the face of conservative economic and political power. “The cultural influence of the post-1960s left thus became a background melody to a political narrative written largely by conservatives. It softened the tone and created some striking ironies”—such that Fox broadcast sixties radical Matt Groening’s satirically subversive The Simpsons for over two decades at the same time its news station became an effective mouthpiece of the Republican Party’s right-wing—“but it did not rewrite the script.” The trajectory of this analysis is similar to a line of thought I’ve been exploring: to what degree has New Left thought been sopped up by neoliberalism (cultural liberalism mixed with economic conservatism)? Kazin’s analysis that, “as respect for the individual rights of everyone advanced, the advocacy of collective uplift and economic equality receded further,” begs the following question: was the advance of the former the precondition for the recession of the latter? The answers to this question might determine whether the left has a future.

Kazin is a careful and fair scholar. But he gets caught up in his own brand of polemics when analyzing contemporary left public intellectuals such as Noam Chomsky, Naomi Klein, Michael Moore, and Howard Zinn. Although he is quick to point out that such intellectuals are handicapped by the fact that their ideas are disconnected from a movement—since a left political movement is mostly non-existent—he is even quicker to dismiss their ideas as grim and unrealistic. Kazin is especially harsh in rehashing his dour assessment of the late historian and activist Howard Zinn. Me thinks he doth protest too much.

Kazin begrudgingly recognizes that Zinn’s A People’s History of the United States, which has sold over two million copies, has “became the most popular work of history an American leftist has ever written.” “Unfortunately,” Kazin writes, “Zinn’s big book was stronger on polemical passion than historical insight. For all his virtuous intentions, he essentially reduced the past to a Manichean fable and made no serious attempt to address the biggest question a leftist should ask about U.S. history: why have most Americans accepted the legitimacy of the capitalist republic in which they live?” This is a weird point of criticism given that a few paragraphs prior Kazin addresses the ways in which Zinn sought to answer “the biggest question.” “The American elite,” Kazin paraphrases Zinn, “used its wealth to pit ‘the 99 percent’ of the people ‘against one another’ and employed war, patriotism, and the military to ‘absorb and divert’ the occasional rebellion.” So the real problem is not that Zinn fails to address “the biggest question,” but rather that Kazin dislikes Zinn’s answers.

For Kazin, the American people cannot be reduced to either heroes or dupes. Fair enough. A professional historian should recognize nuance, complexity, irony, blah, blah, blah. But should A People’s History of the United States be judged by these standards? Or should it be assessed as a primary document of the left, similarly to how Kazin analyzes the Port Huron Statement? In other words, is accuracy or effect the barometer? Kazin assesses most of his primary sources according to the latter. What good did it do? Did it help the left? Did it make America better? I would argue Zinn’s book, and his legacy, should be analyzed as such. Kazin’s glib assessment of Zinn the lousy scholar—he didn’t even cite his sources!—is really beside the point.

Kazin has always been open about recognizing his personal position relative to his subject matter. He was the son of anti-Stalinist leftists. He was a New Leftist. He was a Maoist who cut sugarcane in Cuba. He was also, as the reader of American Dreamers discovers, a hippie communard who sought to get closer to nature while living in a group house and growing his own food in Oregon in the early 70s. Kazin has since gone out of his way to renounce some of his earlier positions as flawed. But, unlike someone like David Horowitz, he remains a man of the left, evident in that he’s the current editor of Dissent. I could compare his trajectory to Todd Gitlin’s. Gitlin was a renowned SDS member who has since worked hard to convince leftists that loving America—the flag!—is necessary and good. Similarly, Kazin was the only panelist on the American Exceptionalism plenary (that concluded last year’s USIH conference) who seemed to think American Exceptionalism something the left could embrace.

Given Kazin’s reflective self-positioning, I find it strange that he fails to see the ironies that plague his analysis of Zinn. For example, Kazin charges Zinn with, essentially, being a lumper, or, gasp, an uber-lumper. In contrast, Kazin carefully splits the left throughout his book. For example, one of my favorite chapters is titled, “The Tale of Three Socialism”: the prairie socialism from Wisconsin to Milwaukee, the secular-Jewish socialism of the needle unions, and the radical modernism of bohemian New York. Kazin also expertly delineates the differences between Old and New Lefts. And yet, in writing a book about the American left, from the 1830s to the present, he can’t help but also do some lumping of his own. Mike O’Connor expertly clarifies this problem in his review of American Dreamers:

It is difficult to know how Kazin might have addressed this problem short of writing an entirely different book. A deeper issue raised by American Dreamers, however, is whether “the left” qualifies as a tradition in the sense that Kazin intends. Without a core tenet, text or history, do the disparate struggles for justice in the name of race, gender and labor constitute a single movement? Moreover, to what extent does the work of later radical activists derive from that of earlier ones? To cite Kazin’s earliest examples, can we draw direct lines from David Walker to Malcolm X, Frances Wright to Robin Morgan, or Thomas Skidmore to Occupy Wall Street? Kazin suggests that all of these figures and groups are committed to the ideal of equality and therefore such connections are justified. But have these leftists seen themselves as unified in a common project? Is such self-conscious identification necessary to be designated a tradition in this sense?

Ironically, again, Zinn is perhaps the most influential chronicler of those radicals in American history whom Kazin would deem worthy of lumping together. Most contemporary radicals understand the history of the American left through Zinn. David Walker, Big Bill Haywood, Jane Addams, Eugene Debs, Tom Hayden, and many more, continue to be imagined as part of an unbroken chain of leftists. Such an imagination is thanks due in no small part to Zinn. Had a public intellectual from an earlier era achieved something of this magnitude, Kazin would not have heaped so much scorn. Zinn certainly did more than Dissent to keep Kazin’s beloved left—my beloved left—alive during its nadir! (Kazin is only recently the editor of Dissent!)

Nitpicking aside, read American Dreamers. Learning about the history of those Americans who dreamed of a better world is a good antidote to cynics who decry the Occupy Movement’s lack of achievable goals. As Kazin writes in his conclusion: “the utopian impulse should not be smothered under a patchwork quilt of policy prescriptions.” For Kazin, and for me, socialism is the name of this utopia. Or, as Lewis Coser and Irving Howe wrote in a 1954 Dissent essay: “Socialism is the name of our desire.” “Socialism,” Kazin writes, “has never been the name most Americans would choose for their dream society; today, many doubt such a society is either feasible or desirable. Without such an ideal, however, whatever we name it, the real world will be ever harder to change.”

Sabtu, 26 November 2011

Book Review: O'Connor on Kazin's *American Dreamers*

Review of Michael Kazin’s American Dreamers: How the Left Changed a Nation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2011). ISBN: 978-0-307-26628-6. 352 pages.

Reviewed by Mike O’Connor
Georgia State University


The U.S. history survey course is typically a rather liberal affair. It frequently offers a Whiggish narrative in which the evils of the American past—British imperialism, slavery, robber baronism, U.S. imperialism, the Red Scare(s), economic depression, Jim Crow, gender inequality, Cold War paranoia—are consistently, if often belatedly, overcome by the words and actions of those who are dedicated to an expanding vision of freedom. Despite Gordon Wood’s attempt to highlight the radical nature of the American Revolution, or Eric Foner’s insistence that freedom hasn't always meant what it does today, the typical introduction to U.S. history seems an object lesson in Hartzianism. To the longstanding consternation of conservatives, it is very difficult to fit into this story the ideals of those who “[stand] athwart history, yelling Stop.”[1] Yet, as Michael Kazin points out in his new book, American Dreamers: How the Left Changed a Nation, the left resists, just as strongly, assimilation into this version of the national narrative.

Perhaps this is because radicals (a word Kazin uses interchangeably with “leftists”) are not merely liberals with greater dedication or purity, but a different beast altogether. In Kazin’s “classical” formulation, the left is “that social movement…that [is] dedicated to a radically egalitarian transformation of society” (xiv n.). While radicals who are dedicated to equality will find much in common with liberals who prioritize their own specific conception of freedom, the two groups will also differ on many key issues. When these philosophies have come into conflict, the much smaller left has typically found itself marginalized. On the other hand, when the two movements have found common cause, it is the liberal groups that have gotten the credit. To the extent that radicals have affected policy at all, Kazin writes, “they generally did so as decidedly junior partners in a coalition driven by establishment reformers” (xiv). Whatever victories that the left has managed to achieve, then, “never occurred under its own name” (xv). This pattern has resulted in an underappreciation of the contributions of the left, one that is perpetuated in many classroom narratives.

American Dreamers provides a welcome corrective to this tendency. Perfect for use with undergrads, it is a compact, readable overview of the history of the American left. Perhaps the book’s greatest achievement lies in imposing order on an otherwise unruly subject. Its seven chapters do not merely move forward in time, but instead concentrate on the movements that most clearly embodied leftist aspirations at a given moment. In successive chapters, Kazin explains, analyzes and criticizes abolitionism, suffragism, the trade union movement, Populism, socialism, communism and the New Left, concluding with the fragments of a contemporary left represented by such disparate figures as Naomi Klein, Michael Moore and Noam Chomsky.

Some of these movements are more easily summarized than are others. The Communist Party of the USA, for example, is comprehensible within an institutional framework, and much ink has already been spilled interpreting the New Left. (Kazin himself is one who has extensively covered the latter ground.) For the general reader, however, the most helpful features of American Dreamers will be its author’s interpretive frameworks, which corral otherwise sprawling subjects into comprehensible stories. The initial chapter, for example, uses three significant primary documents from U.S. intellectual history to situate the origin of the American left. The three pamphlets—Frances Wright’s Course of Popular Lectures, Thomas Skidmore’s The Rights of Man to Property, and David Walker’s Appeal…to the Colored Citizens of the World—each appeared in the fall of 1829, and together they defined the central issues for future generations of American radicals: gender, labor and race, respectively. From this rather narrow focus, Kazin is able to generalize outward about the role of religion in antebellum protest movements. “Radicals made no apologies for using language that drew a sharp line between the sinful and the righteous…Their approach was proudly illiberal” (10). This point allows him to segue to the abolitionism’s religious roots, a subject that sets up the two following chapters, which cover that movement before and after, respectively, the Civil War. In less certain hands this barrage of topics could be quite disorienting, but Kazin’s structure imposes a discipline on them that renders the shifts quite manageable.

Another example of this successful scaffolding is the treatment of American socialism. This subject can range from the Shakers to Robert Owen to hippie communes, but Kazin reasonably focuses on the period of the movement’s greatest influence: 1890-1920. He frames his treatment around the notion that “three different kinds of socialisms existed, somewhat uneasily, during the Progressive Era, and they suffered different fates” (113). The first of these groups were the Midwestern laborers and farmers, perhaps best exemplified by the Milwaukee “sewer socialists” who elected the nation’s first socialist mayor and Congressperson. The secular Jews who worked in New York City’s garment district and published the Daily Forward make up the second group, while avant garde cultural modernists comprised the third. Such a taxonomy allows Kazin to explain how socialism could cast such a long shadow during this period while leaving a legacy that boasts of few tangible accomplishments.

Similar fates were met by most, if not all, of the movements chronicled in American Dreamers. This unavoidable observation has led many to conclude that leftism in the United States has been a failed project. The thesis that rests somewhat lightly over the book takes issue with this perception. Kazin is the first to admit that no specific political victories are notched in the left’s column, but that does not mean, he argues, that radicalism has not significantly influenced American history. He claims for the left a much greater effect than success in any political campaign: it has “transform[ed] the moral culture, the ‘common sense’ of society” (xiii). Its willingness to take extreme and unpopular positions has made such stances familiar over time, so that more broad-based liberal movements could, essentially, turn them into actual political changes. Additionally, the expression of leftist views through cultural vehicles such as literature, art, film and music has had the greatest effect in transforming once-radical ideas into mainstream ones. “The cultural left articulated outrage about the state of the world and the longing for a different one in ways that political left was unable to do” (xiv).

Such an argument recalls, of course, Michael Denning’s The Cultural Front, and Kazin’s chapter on twentieth-century communism, with its biographical portraits of Woody Guthrie and Paul Robeson, and treatment of Mr. Smith Goes to Washington, echoes the themes of the earlier book. American Dreamers breaks new ground, however, in applying a similar concept consistently to all periods of American history. The Hutchinson Family Singers, for instance, toured the antebellum nation performing abolitionist songs such as “The Bereaved Slave Mother” and “The Fugitive Slave.” Kazin argues that their great popularity suggests that “[t]he music of abolitionism may have reached as many Americans as turned out to hear anti-slavery speakers” (23). Henry George and Edward Bellamy were instrumental figures in spreading the word about socialism in the late nineteenth century, and the cause of the New Left was communicated most effectively not by “traditional kinds of leaders” (such as union officials or elected politicians), but by “celebrities.” Figures such as Bob Dylan, John Lennon, Abbie Hoffman, Robin Morgan, Eldridge Cleaver and Martin Luther King, Jr. possessed a cultural clout that was as important as their political thinking or activism. While William Lloyd Garrison or Eugene V. Debs might also have been considered earlier leftist celebrities, their relationship with the movement was different: the unstructured nature of the New Left meant that what the celebrities “said and did often steered the activist core, instead of vice versa” (217).

American Dreamers is filled with similarly interesting observations, and the book makes for an easy and compelling read. Yet one of the very trends that Kazin laments—the recurring dynamic by which the left is put in the position of “handing off” its momentum to liberals at crucial moments—must have presented him with a difficult narrative problem. Since American Dreamers concerns leftism rather than liberalism, Kazin repeatedly abandons particular concerns just at the moment in which they finally arrive on the national stage. Without the liberal or mainstream perspective, and the possibility of narrative climax, the book is reminiscent of eavesdropping on one side of a telephone conversation. Early on, for example, one learns much of early abolitionism but comparatively less of the rise of the Republican Party and the Civil War. The pattern continues when the book covers Populism but says little about Progressivism, treats early twentieth century labor radicalism in some detail but glosses over the New Deal, and highlights the campaigns against racism by the Communist Party USA but sends the reader elsewhere for the gains of the Civil Rights Movement.

It is difficult to know how Kazin might have addressed this problem short of writing an entirely different book. A deeper issue raised by American Dreamers, however, is whether “the left” qualifies as a tradition in the sense that Kazin intends. Without a core tenet, text or history, do the disparate struggles for justice in the name of race, gender and labor constitute a single movement? Moreover, to what extent does the work of later radical activists derive from that of earlier ones? To cite Kazin’s earliest examples, can we draw direct lines from David Walker to Malcolm X, Frances Wright to Robin Morgan, or Thomas Skidmore to Occupy Wall Street? Kazin suggests that all of these figures and groups are committed to the ideal of equality and therefore such connections are justified. But have these leftists seen themselves as unified in a common project? Is such self-conscious identification necessary to be designated a tradition in this sense? American Dreamers will likely raise these provocative questions for many readers, though a through consideration of them lies outside of its scope.

The structure and overarching thesis of American Dreamers provide a framework that allows the reader easy entry into the wide-ranging topic of American leftism. At the same time, Michael Kazin’s insight and depth of knowledge continually challenge received notions about the subject. While the book is unlikely to upend the primacy of liberal Whiggery in the nation’s classrooms, placing it in dialogue with this vision could serve to foster new thinking on the subject, for teachers and students alike.

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[1] William F. Buckley, Jr., “Publisher’s Statement,” National Review, November 19, 1955, 5. Available here.

Minggu, 20 November 2011

Final Plenary on American Exceptionalism



















For those who missed the conference or who missed the final plenary, I offer a couple of photos. Above and to the left, Ben Alpers introduces Mike O'Connor who chaired the plenary. Above and to the right, the panel: (L-R) Eric Foner, Beth Bailey, Michael Kazin, and Rogers Smith.

The idea for the plenary sprang from a post of Ben's and took shape under Mike's direction. The turn out was solid for a Friday evening in NYC. A lively question and answer session followed an interesting exchange among the panelists.

Of the many themes addressed over a couple of hours, two stayed with me: all the panelists made note of the need to place whatever might be considered American exceptionalism in an international context. To that end, Eric Foner mentioned Ian Tyrell's work a few times. See Tyrrell's website.

The other theme was the production of usable myths that accord with ideas of American exceptionalism--a point raised most clearly and succinctly by Beth Bailey. I have wondered in posts on this blog what Americans think the American military is doing when it goes overseas, and what the nation's soldiers think they are killing and dying for, if not for a theology of American exceptionalism?

While I have argued that civil religion covers this idea more comprehensively, Beth Bailey made some very serious points regarding the construction and consequences of ideas wrapped up in the exceptionalist narrative.

Senin, 23 November 2009

Is Taylorism Redeemable?


One of my favorite sessions from the second USIH conference was one put together by our own Mike O'Connor. The panel was cleverly titled, "To Market, To Market: American Thinkers Confront Twentieth-Century Capitalism," and was chaired by Jennifer Burns of recent Daily Show fame. Burns is the author of a new biography of Ayn Rand.

All of the papers were excellent. O'Connor convincingly argued that Henry Wallace gave full intellectual expression to the New Deal in his book, Sixty Million Jobs. But the bulk of the post-presentation conversation was spent on Caitlin Rosenthal's paper, "Frederick W. Taylor: The Optimistic Science of Scientific Management." Rosenthal contended that Taylor is misremembered as anti-worker, partly the result of decades of labor historiography, which paints Taylor, through a moral lens, as a tool of the corporate managers seeking to discipline an increasingly unruly industrial workforce. Rosenthal conducted a close reading of "Scientific Management," replete with rhetoric friendly to the cause of the laboring class, to recuperate Taylor. She was somewhat convincing in this, but I took issue during the Q&A session with her conclusion, where she stated that there are plenty of examples in history that point towards capital-labor cooperation. She implied that efficiency is good for everyone, the further implication of which seemed to be that in addition to Taylor, Taylorism is worthy of redemption.

I'm all for overturning conventional wisdom. But in this case, the wisdom of the labor historians, and other assorted left-leaning intellectuals--such as Jill Lepore, who recently wrote an entertaining New Yorker article on Taylor--might be conventional, but it’s still wisdom. Taylorism is not just about efficiency. It's about disciplining a workforce. Perhaps if we think about Taylorism in terms more understandable to our everyday experiences, such as Taylorism in the academy, it would be less redeemable. Sure, shifting the bulk of teaching to on-line courses is more efficient in terms of cost. But it's bad for the academic workforce... not to mention for education. IS Taylorism redeemable?

Is Taylorism Redeemable?


One of my favorite sessions from the second USIH conference was one put together by our own Mike O'Connor. The panel was cleverly titled, "To Market, To Market: American Thinkers Confront Twentieth-Century Capitalism," and was chaired by Jennifer Burns of recent Daily Show fame. Burns is the author of a new biography of Ayn Rand.

All of the papers were excellent. O'Connor convincingly argued that Henry Wallace gave full intellectual expression to the New Deal in his book, Sixty Million Jobs. But the bulk of the post-presentation conversation was spent on Caitlin Rosenthal's paper, "Frederick W. Taylor: The Optimistic Science of Scientific Management." Rosenthal contended that Taylor is misremembered as anti-worker, partly the result of decades of labor historiography, which paints Taylor, through a moral lens, as a tool of the corporate managers seeking to discipline an increasingly unruly industrial workforce. Rosenthal conducted a close reading of "Scientific Management," replete with rhetoric friendly to the cause of the laboring class, to recuperate Taylor. She was somewhat convincing in this, but I took issue during the Q&A session with her conclusion, where she stated that there are plenty of examples in history that point towards capital-labor cooperation. She implied that efficiency is good for everyone, the further implication of which seemed to be that in addition to Taylor, Taylorism is worthy of redemption.

I'm all for overturning conventional wisdom. But in this case, the wisdom of the labor historians, and other assorted left-leaning intellectuals--such as Jill Lepore, who recently wrote an entertaining New Yorker article on Taylor--might be conventional, but it’s still wisdom. Taylorism is not just about efficiency. It's about disciplining a workforce. Perhaps if we think about Taylorism in terms more understandable to our everyday experiences, such as Taylorism in the academy, it would be less redeemable. Sure, shifting the bulk of teaching to on-line courses is more efficient in terms of cost. But it's bad for the academic workforce... not to mention for education. IS Taylorism redeemable?