Tampilkan postingan dengan label political history. Tampilkan semua postingan
Tampilkan postingan dengan label political history. Tampilkan semua postingan

Senin, 22 Oktober 2012

McGovern and American History

This will be a particularly dashed-off post, as I am leaving town tomorrow and simultaneously packing and finishing my USIH Conference Paper.  But I wanted to say a quick word about George McGovern, whose passing yesterday has already been marked (more movingly and coherently than in this post, I fear) on this blog by Ray Haberski yesterday.

In reading many obituaries for and memories of George McGovern, two things have stood out for me. 

First, for a Senator from a small state, who ran for President but lost in a landslide, McGovern is unusually interesting and significant.  Beyond his 1972 Presidential campaign, McGovern is almost certainly most famous for leading the Senate opposition to the Vietnam War (and justly so). But he should also be remembered as one of the prime movers in the effort to reform the Democratic Party in the wake of the 1968 convention that so dramatically tore it apart.  McGovern was the first chair of the Democratic Party's Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection (more usually known as the McGovern-Fraser Commission, after its first two chairs), which essentially created the primary-driven, modern presidential nomination process that we know today.  In doing so, McGovern essentially made possible his own nomination in '72. But he also created the structural conditions for the modern, Democratic coalition.  And McGovern was a crucial figure in the creation of the so-called "New Politics," which began, in a sense, with Bobby Kennedy's presidential campaign, and eventually achieved presidential electoral success, albeit in much less liberal form, with the assent of Jimmy Carter.  Despite the fact that his party seems to have spent four decades trying to pretend his presidential candidacy never happened, the McGovern campaign launched the political careers of many significant party leaders of the future, including both Gary Hart and Bill Clinton.


And yet, the second thing that I've noticed, reflected in many of the remembrances, is how little McGovern is incorporated into our standard narratives about America's last half century.  Corey Robin has blogged about how short and pro-forma President Obama's official statement regarding McGovern's passing was.  When I linked to Robin's piece on Facebook, a friend pointed out that, in the midst of a Presidential election, Obama dare not say anything too nice about McGovern.  Unfortunately, my friend may be right.  To the extent that McGovern has been remembered at all in our political life, it's as a politically disreputable failure. For years "McGovernite" was a pejorative term, used not only by conservative critics of the Democratic Party, but by Democrats engaged in periodic circular firing squads.  In recent years, I think it's usage has declined; to a certain extent, it's been replaced (at least in its intra-"left" uses) by "Naderite."  But just tonight, Chris Matthews was accusing Mitt Romney of "sounding like McGovern" during the third presidential debate for expressing a desire for world peace. 

In this regard, it's worth contrasting McGovern's legacy with that of Barry Goldwater, another candidate from his party's "extreme" wing who got crushed in a landslide victory by an incumbent president of the other party.  Goldwater's campaign is today remembered by Republicans as the vanguard of modern conservatism. Goldwater is seen as having helped paved the way for conservative success, first within the GOP and then in the country at large.  Even Democrats came to see Goldwater as representing an older, somehow better, conservatism. When Goldwater died in 1998, President Clinton ordered that all flags on federal property fly at half mast on the day of his funeral. 

I hope that George McGovern's death will spur us to think more concretely about the differences McGovern made in American politics. He played a crucial, and complicated, role in the transformations that the Democratic Party went through between 1968 and 1992.  Though McGovern's vision lost out to a much more centrist and militarist one, McGovern represents more than simply a path not taken.

One final thing to note about George McGovern. Though other presidents and presidential candidates have fancied themselves to be historians (with two presidents even serving as President of the AHA), George McGovern is the only major party presidential nominee to hold a PhD in American history.  Completed at Northwestern in 1953, McGovern's dissertation concerned the 1913-14 Colorado mining strike.  Among the professors he worked closely with were Ray Allen Billington, Richard W. Leopold, and Arthur S. Link.  A couple weeks ago, I blogged about some of the roles that the study of history plays in our politics.  George McGovern was that rare professional historian who left the academy to pursue a political life.  History blogs, at least, should make a point of remembering this about him.

Selasa, 18 September 2012

The “New Political History” and U.S. Intellectual History

(Today's guest post is from Mike O'Connor. It's weird for me to call Mike a guest since he helped found this blog and S-USIH. I'm glad he came out of retirement for this one.)

The introduction to Governing America: The Revival of Political History, the most recent book from Julian Zelizer, raises some really interesting issues that both highlight and challenge what we have been doing here at S-USIH. In his short introductory piece, Zelizer argues convincingly that political history is enjoying a resurgence. This might not seem controversial to anyone who has noted, for example, the outsize influence of Robert Caro’s LBJ biographies, or the many interesting and important studies of postwar conservatism that have come out in the last several years. But Zelizer is saying something more than that the subject of American politics is enjoying a cyclical resurgence, or that some talented writers have captured the attention of the historical profession and general public. Instead, he is arguing that political history has regained its relevance because it has actually changed.
The implication here is, of course, that in decades past, the field “as it had been practiced by legendary figures such as Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. and Richard Hofstadter” had itself to blame for its decline in importance and prestige. Beginning in the sixties, attacks on political history came from every direction: New Left scholars challenged the presumption of consensus that it had explicitly or implicitly advanced, social and cultural historians focused on conceptions of politics—race, gender, class and identity—that were not captured by treatments of the actions of elected officials, and French scholarship, in the form of the Annales school, shifted historical attention away from “the specific actions of political leaders at given points in time” and toward major shifts in “ideational and institutional structures.” Political history, still wedded to its traditional “great man” narratives, sunk into irrelevance.

But, Zelizer argues, political history “slowly, almost imperceptibly” adapted to the new intellectual terrain. Political scientists working in the field of American Political Development emphasized how the growth of institutions posed “structural constraints” on elected officials. Social scientists also emphasized the power of institutions to retard political change. Many social and cultural historians, “feeing that the field of American history had become too specialized and fragmented,” returned to political history in search of an intellectual center of gravity for American history itself.
Zelizer argues that the field has been enjoying a resurgence “since the early 1990s.” The American political history that has “returned to the forefront of the profession,” however, is “not the same political history of the past.” These practitioners have “punctured the myth” of consensus “in any period,” while emphasizing the importance of social movements. Those who have continued to study political leaders have done so from a new perspective, “situating them within particular institutional contexts,” emphasizing what they were and were not able to do within those structures, and “broaden[ing] the range” of those who might be considered worthy of study in the first place.
The arguments I have summarized here take up only half of the short introduction to the book, which is a collection of essays. Though occupying only four pages, the ideas introduced there made a huge impression on me, for two reasons. The first relates to political history itself: though I had never really thought about, or perhaps even been aware of, a resurgence in American political history, once Zelizer spelled it out I could immediately confirm this development from my own reading and experience. The second reason concerned S-USIH, for I could see a parallel between what we are doing here and the new political history.
As Zelizer describes it, the new political history specifically takes into account the advances and criticisms offered by social history in the last several decades. What is also apparent on my reading, however, is that historians working in that vein also tacitly and respectfully decided that this particular intervention has gone as far as it should. We can turn to a particularly important work of recent political history for a succinct statement of this point. In the introduction to The Rise of American Democracy (tellingly subtitled “Jefferson to Lincoln”), Sean Wilentz defends his decision to focus on political elites. Arguing that previous studies have “generally submerged the history of politics in the history of social change,” Wilentz characterized his book as one that would “reaffirm the importance of political events.” He went farther, I suspect, than Zelizer might, in “insisting on what ought to be a truism: that some people have more influence on history than others.” Of course, this statement is a truism, and suggesting otherwise invokes the boogeyman of a social historian who will not assent to the obvious. Yet readers of Wilentz’s somewhat snarky dismissal of social history might be surprised that the rest of his book contains treatments of social movements—such as the Democratic-Republican societies, the Working Men’s movement and abolitionism—in what is certainly a political history. Moreover, Wilentz’s first book, Chants Democratic, itself works in the tradition of social history. Thus I see Wilentz’s cantankerousness as belied by his actual work: even a somewhat hostile critic of social history recognizes its necessity in a political narrative. This would confirm Zelizer’s point.
A less churlish example comes from Meg Jacobs’ Pocketbook Politics. In her introduction, Jacobs positions her political history less as a rejection of social history than as an incorporation of it into a larger narrative. She notes that policymakers in large administrative states are dependent upon citizens to legitimate their authority; at the same time, however, “popular movements have succeeded in effecting [sic] change only to the extent that they win support at elite levels.” Thus it would seem that neither the history of elected officials nor that of social movements tells a complete story. Jacobs carefully limits her observations to her own project, saying that the “book encourages a new way of studying state power by integrating popular politics and elite policymaking.” Yet one might fairly generalize all of these observations to conclude that the more recent political history turns on the assumption that a complete account of political developments must incorporate both social and policy history.
Having said all that, then, the question for us is, “What about intellectual history? Does it have a place in the new political history?” Put another way, does the new political history represent only the incorporation of social history, or is the latter simply a placeholder, representing the need to expand political history beyond its traditional boundaries? I must admit that for the historians I have cited, the former answer appears to be the case. Additionally, while many of my favorite recent works of political history, for example, Nixonland or Stayin’ Alive, clearly operate within the paradigm of the new political history, I would not say that they are particularly concerned with intellectual history.
But I would argue that the spirit of Zelizer’s characterization (independently of what Zelizer himself might happen to think) would in fact require that effective political history would sometimes be required to take note of intellectual history. I take the initial point of departure not to be that social history is necessary to an account of American politics, but that the actions of politicians do not exhaust the narrative. If the latter is the case, then, depending on the nature of a given project, any kind of history might be necessary in order to fully explain the political history of a given period, issue, figure or movement. As an obvious example, making sense of the Revolutionary Era and founding period seems difficult without acknowledging the importance of ideas to the overall narrative.
Indeed, the desire to incorporate intellectual history into political history has been a motivating force in the past and future projects of many who have been active in the founding and leadership of the Society for U.S. Intellectual History, such as Andrew Hartman, Ray Haberski, Lisa Szefel, Ben Alpers, David Sehat, and, well, me. And many more who have actively commented or guest-posted on the blog, or participated in the conference, are working in a similar vein. There appears to be a strong overlap between the new political history and the intellectual space being carved out here at S-USIH.
But because of Julian Zelizer’s short introduction, I see this common interest much differently than I have in the past. Because so many people at S-USIH share this focus on political history, I had assumed for years that there was something inherently political about the current moment in intellectual history. I could see no reason why that might be true, but all of my experience seemed to confirm it. Now I believe it to be far more likely that S-USIH was being carried by a tide that was sweeping the profession more broadly. And, more importantly, I believe that interested intellectual historians will find a receptive audience within the new political history.