Tampilkan postingan dengan label Andrew Bacevich. Tampilkan semua postingan
Tampilkan postingan dengan label Andrew Bacevich. Tampilkan semua postingan

Senin, 28 Mei 2012

An American Orthodoxy


Last week on Facebook, Andrew Hartman posted the following fbleg from a friend:

Dear academic friends: Please help! A friend of mine is seeking texts for a student (see his query below):  
Can you think of a good text in the modern American context that would help my student (and me) learn about the tension between orthodoxy and dissidence that is not so removed from her own experience and reading? I think TV and other tools of cultural, political, and intellectual homogenization create the impression that "we are one", that the counter-culture on the left and right are simply insane, whacko. What would represent orthodoxy or the mainstream? Barack Obama's autobiography? Something by Thomas Friedman? The counter narrative? Cornell West? Glen Beck? Maybe you can think of relevant films?
 I thought that this was an interesting, but poorly framed, query. As I wrote in response:

I don't think most people in this country feel they belong to a consensual center, beset by whackos, left and right. I think that view--which is, roughly, the Tom Friedman view--belongs to a neoliberal, self-understood "center" that represents a tiny minority of the public (though a big chunk of the policy elite). More people, I think, see themselves as representing some version of "real America" with whackos besetting them from only one side (left or right, depending on which real America we're talking about). I find it difficult to discover any kind of actual consensual "center" in American culture today...except for things that are to us as water is to fish (necessary but invisible), e.g. the English language and capitalism itself, i.e. stuff we take for granted, not things that appear in particular books or movies.

But, in fact, there is at least one thing that does form something like a consensual center to American culture today: an abiding faith in the military.  Americans disagree about what our military role should be in Afghanistan.  We are deeply divided about the proper level of military spending and even about our state of military readiness.   But the military remains far and away the most trusted institution in American life.

Since 1973, Gallup has conducted an annual survey of public confidence in fifteen key institutions. Since the mid-1980s, the most trusted institution has been the military.  In the most recent survey, taken about eleven months ago, 78% of those surveyed had "a great deal of" or "quite a lot of" confidence in the military. Sixteeen per cent had "some" confidence in the military. Only 3% had little or none. While confidence in most institutions is well below historical averages, confidence in the military is 11% higher than average.*

As we celebrate Memorial Day, I think this particular cultural orthodoxy bears some further consideration.




Trust in the military as an institution is not at all support for any particular U.S. military action. Indeed, most Americans want to see us out of Afghanistan.  Nor is it the same thing, necessarily, as "supporting the troops," though in fact, Americans today overwhelmingly do this (or at least pay lip service to doing this).

Historically Americans have often expressed solidarity with those in the military while questioning the institution of the military itself.  During World War II, Bill Mauldin's iconic cartoons of frontline soldiers  lampooned and criticized army brass as consistently as they celebrated the men-in-arms.   And although often falsely remembered as expressing simple hatred toward soldiers, Vietnam-era anti-war activists frequently reached out to men in uniform and encouraged them to revolt against the military.

The most famous example of this kind of activism may be Jane Fonda and Donald Sutherland's F.T.A. Show, a kind of counter-USO show that toured (just outside) U.S. military bases in the Pacific in 1971. F.T.A.  (the title stood for a variety of things, including "Free Theater Associates," "Free the Army" and "Fuck the Army") was made into a documentary film that was released in '72 and apparently swiftly suppressed; tellingly, it was recently rereleased and largely ignored:


But of course today's military is rather unlike the Vietnam-era military.  As the former Dartmouth President and Marine Corps veteran James Wright notes in his new book "Those Who Have Borne the Battle" (reviewed by Andrew Bacevich in this week's New York Times Book Review), having for most of our history fought major wars with militaries composed of male citizens conscripted during wartime, the U.S. departed from this pattern during the last century, first by adopting peacetime conscription as a readiness measure in 1940, and then by going to an All-Volunteer Force in the 1970s.  The volunteer military finally put an end to the citizen-soldier tradition already badly strained by the Korean and Vietnam Wars. Though the Vietnam-era draft was far from socially equitable, the post-Vietnam, volunteer military is more socially discrete and disconnected from large parts of U.S. society than any wartime military in America's past.

As Bacevich notes (quoting Wright):
In ­places like Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States still fights ambiguous no‑win wars in pursuit of elusive objectives. Yet in contrast to the reaction to Vietnam, the public finds these conflicts tolerable. Not required to serve or to sacrifice (or even to cover the costs incurred), Americans have effectively off-loaded responsibility for national security onto a small warrior elite, whose members, according to Wright, “are embraced as heroes, even as we do not really know them.”
Although he readily admits that he does not know how to change this situation, Bacevich has long argued that endless war fought by a small, warrior class is a very dangerous thing, both for the world at large and for the United States.

On this Memorial Day, rather than joining in the celebration of this warrior elite -- as Charlie Pierce recently noted in an excellent post criticizing this emergent military aristocracy, "every day these days, apparently, is Memorial Day"-- let me suggest a heterodox approach to this holiday: use the various pious invocations of our military that you encounter as occasions to question how we got here and to think about ways in which we might think differently about both the military as an institution and the people who it employs.  Like Bacevich and Wright I don't think there are any easy answers to how we get out of the situation we're in. But the first step is to realize that we have a problem.

And to return to Andrew Hartman's friend's fbleg, let me close by suggesting a film that embodies a countercultural view of these matters: Paul Verhoeven's brilliant satire of militarism, Starship Troopers (1997), currently available on Netflix instant view.  Having missed it when it came out, I finally saw it a couple weeks ago and it far exceeded my expectations.  Verhoeven is, to say the least, an uneven filmmaker.  At the time of its release, audiences and critics apparently did not entirely understand that the film was satirical, a failure that's especially surprising given the great success of Verhoeven's equally satirical Robocop a decade earlier. But while Robocop clearly laughs at its characters, Starship Troopers is much more deadpan. The film's own (apparent) attitude to its material, which is in many ways pretty typical of militarized space operas, is itself an object of satire.**  In a way, audiences' failure to get Starship Troopers' satire was a measure of its timeliness.



Have a happy Memorial Day, everyone!

__________________________________________________
*   Small business finished second with 64% in the "great deal" / "quite a lot" category; the police were third at 56%. All other institutions scored under 50%, with organized labor (21%), big business (19%), HMOs (19%), and Congress (12%) at the bottom of the list.

** Sometimes the film is described as a satire of fascism, but I think this, too, misunderstands Starship Troopers.  Certainly Verhoeven is playing with the rhetoric of fascism, but the world government and its military depicted in Starship Troopers, and the film itself, mix-and-match the look and feel of classical fascism with very American tropes.





Jumat, 20 Januari 2012

Evangelicals and Santorum Together: the Lure of War

A few days ago, former Pennsylvania senator Rick Santorum told Frank Luntz, who moderated a forum hosted by the conservative Faith and Freedom Coalition, that evangelicals need a candidate who "can take the bullets." Santorum's reference to violence was not meant literally--he didn't volunteer to fight in Afghanistan...or Iran (for that matter). However, Santorum wants to remind folks that he understands war--if only rhetorically. In fact, it might be the former senator's bluster on military matters that has increased his appeal among conservative evangelicals. After all, his stance on social issues--the family, homosexuals, and abortion--echoes all other GOP candidates. He has been, though, more forthright--perhaps even reckless--when it comes to thinking out loud about war.

Following questions on homosexuals and abortion, the Santorum and his wife answered a question posed by Luntz about military service. The Santorums agreed that they would be proud to have their children enter the military and fight for the United States, though Santorum was quick to correct what he viewed as a prevailing misperception that he hoped for war with Iran. Rather, he clarified, "If Iran is not stopped from developing a nuclear weapon...there will be 'war that we have never seen the likes of in this country, and it is not a matter taking out this regime, it's not a matter of preemptive war, it's a matter of taking out this nuclear ability that would change the face of our country.'" Syntax aside (and perhaps logic as well), why is Santorum speaking about war with Iran changing the face of our country? The face of Iran, the Persian Gulf, perhaps, but our country?

A war, or at least talk of one, can change our country, of course. And speaking to a gathering of conservative evangelicals about such change was probably a sensible idea. As Andrew Bacevich observed in a book on the post-Vietnam romance many evangelicals developed with the military: "In the aftermath of Vietnam, evangelicals came to see the military as an enclave of virtue, a place of refuge where the sacred remnant of patriotic Americans gathered and preserved American principles from extinction." As their neocon allies also cheered in the late 1990s, a martial attitude would correct America's long delusional obsession with the culture wars.

Santorum is Catholic and his endorsement by evangelicals is not as shocking as it once might have been. But among the reasons for this rapprochement between these groups has been the steady development among conservative religious leaders of unified view of war--for more on this see the writing of Catholics George Wiegel and Michael Novak and, yes, Richard John Neuhuas. Of course, liberal religious leaders also found common ground on the issue of war; in the middle of the Vietnam War, groups such as CALCAV spoke out against the dangers of war for the nation. However, for conservatives that war served as an awakening of a different kind, distilling a moral language that would discriminate "patriots" from critics. Conservatives of various religious denominations concluded that the soul of America was worth sacrificing for, even if they would not volunteer to perform that service personally.

What conservatives of the 1970s rediscovered was the sublime nature of war in the abstract. Corey Robin pointed out on his blog recently that conservatism does not, by principle, tend to avoid war and violence, but, by practical necessity, seeks to channel its emotional power into a philosophical rush. War in the abstract--war in the sense of giving oneself over to something greater or, better, of commanding the ultimate sacrifice for something greater--is the conservative's oversoul. The realities of prosecuting a war, of paying for it, cleaning up after it, of dealing with the grief it causes, can be dismissed to the functions of the state. The nation can command sacrifice, the state only manages the paperwork.

So while Mitt Romney prattles on about his business acumen, and Newt Gingrich bellows about his big ideas for big problems (including, apparently, intergalactic empires), Rick Santorum might be the conservative to speak about the meaning of sacrifice in terms that the faithful will understand. And what about Ron Paul...well, I think more than just the GOP could stand to hear his analysis of war and the nation.

Rabu, 13 Juli 2011

Andrew Bacevich and an American 'Agape'

Andrew Bacevich has been among the most persistent and perceptive critics of recent American history. A couple of weeks ago, he wrote a piece at tomdispatch that marked a kind of turning point in his assessment of the American troubles. In light of a series of reports, polls, and essays about the American wars of the last decade, Bacevich concluded, tentatively, that America has begun to awake from a martial stupor. What follows is one part of my argument regarding Bacevich's significance. His thought seems to place him among critics such as William Appleman Williams, Gabriel Kolko, J. William Fulbright, and, even, George Kennan. Yet, I think the fact that Bacevich is Catholic complicates mattes a bit because he takes his religion seriously in matters of politics but not as seriously as someone such as Stanley Hauerwas. I am curious what others think.
Over time the war on terror became a strange amalgam of two traditions: an American penchant for hand-wringing when things go bad and an impulse to look for redemption in failure. Among the many critics who attempted to untangle these traditions, the best was perhaps Andrew Bacevich. Bacevich had credentials and the arguments similar to many other critics of American wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. He saw them as part of larger ideological problem as well as a patchwork of policies and assumptions about the world since 1945. But to my mind, Bacevich has had a few things going for him: he had been a soldier, and so could see both sides of the deification of “our troops;” he became a scholar, and thus sought critical distance from events (for example, he has used to great effect Reinhold Niebuhr’s thought in picking apart an American theology of nationalism); he is Catholic, and has made clear that like Stanley Hauerwas he takes seriously the requirements of faith and the restrictions imposed by dogma; and finally he is a father who has suffered for American civil religion—he lost a son in Iraq.

This combination made Bacevich a particularly astute and acute critic of recent American civil religion. Bacevich is a professor of international relations at Boston University and has become well-regarded as a public intellectual whose recent books include Washington Rules (2010), The Limits of Power (2008) and The New American Militarism (2005). His moral accounting of recent American wars stand as Bacevich’s contribution to the deluge of critical appraisals of post-war and, more specifically, Bush-era delusions of grandeur. But Bacevich is also a graduate of West Point and a veteran of the U.S. Army, for which he served a year in Vietnam and, as a colonel, in the Gulf War. In a revealing comment regarding his training at West Point, Bacevich explained that a significant problem with the popular adulation of the military is that as an institution the military is not an expression of democracy but it’s opposite. The point is “to socialize you to the primacy of duty, while not encouraging you to assess critically whether the duty makes any sense,” Bacevich observed. “One is devoted to one’s country above devotion to anything else other than your family: country above the notion of humanity; country above the notion of what’s right or wrong or true or beautiful.” When a nation’s civil religion becomes increasingly defined and incarnated by war, the consequences are dire.[1]

Andrew Bacevich and his wife personally experienced those consequences in the most tragic way when they lost their son Andrew Bacevich, Jr., who was killed in the Sunni triangle north of Bagdad on Mother's Day 2007. A few weeks later, on May 21, his family buried him in a cemetery in Walpole, Massachusetts. Thousands of people lined the streets of the town to witness the funeral procession—a gesture that “profoundly moved” the Bacevichs. Andrew Jr.’s death was the first casualty of the Iraq War for Walpole. Andrew Sr. supported his son's decision to enlist in the military, but continued to write critically about the war and President Bush’s prosecution of it.

Was this a disjunction? Bacevich ruminated on it, especially after receiving two messages contending “that my son’s death came as direct result of my antiwar writings.” Bacevich reasoned that such a charge, while seemingly vile, forced him to consider “what exactly is a father’s duty when his son is sent into harm’s way?” He answered that like his son’s service to the nation as a soldier, he, as a critic of the war in which his son fought, was doing his duty as well. But both father and son saw the tragedy of war: for Bacevich he lost his son to the war he opposed and lost hope that speaking out against war would make a difference. Bacevich remarked ruefully, “Memorial Day orators will say that a G.I.’s life is priceless. Don’t believe it.” The cost of the war was in fact the point, he argued. It was about money—money to buy influence, money spent on the war that sank the economy, and money that was given to the family of a fallen soldier to pay them for the sacrifice they made for the nation. “I know my so did his best to serve our country,” Bacevich concluded. “Through my own opposition to a profoundly misguided war, I thought I was doing the same. In fact, while he was giving his all, I was doing nothing. In this way, I failed him.”[2]

Bacevich’s profound sense of loss came in the two areas that matter most: the personal and the mythical. He lost his son to a war that had done a great deal to undermine the mythical nature of the nation he loves. Through his work, Bacevich has expressed his agape for America—his love for the nation that has been hard-earned through suffering and extensive reflection. He is not merely a cold-water critic, dousing the hopes of Americans—he chose not to dash the wishes of his son when he wanted to serve his nation. He wrote in Limits of Power, “ironically Iraq may yet prove to be the source of our salvation. For the United States, the ongoing war makes plain the imperative of putting America’s house in order. Iraq has revealed the futility of counting on military power to sustain our habits of profligacy. The day of reckoning approaches. Expending the lives of more American soldiers in hopes of deferring that day is profoundly wrong.”[3]

Can Bacevich find something in the fact that he was right?

[1] Wendy Murray, “U.S. delusions: An army man changes his mind,” The Christian Century Magazine, August 11, 2009, accessed at:

[2] Andrew Bacevich, “I Lost My Son to a War I oppose. We Were Both Doing Our Duty,” Washington Post, May 27, 2007).

[3] Bacevich, The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2007), 12-13.



Andrew Bacevich and an American 'Agape'

Andrew Bacevich has been among the most persistent and perceptive critics of recent American history. A couple of weeks ago, he wrote a piece at tomdispatch that marked a kind of turning point in his assessment of the American troubles. In light of a series of reports, polls, and essays about the American wars of the last decade, Bacevich concluded, tentatively, that America has begun to awake from a martial stupor. What follows is one part of my argument regarding Bacevich's significance. His thought seems to place him among critics such as William Appleman Williams, Gabriel Kolko, J. William Fulbright, and, even, George Kennan. Yet, I think the fact that Bacevich is Catholic complicates mattes a bit because he takes his religion seriously in matters of politics but not as seriously as someone such as Stanley Hauerwas. I am curious what others think.
Over time the war on terror became a strange amalgam of two traditions: an American penchant for hand-wringing when things go bad and an impulse to look for redemption in failure. Among the many critics who attempted to untangle these traditions, the best was perhaps Andrew Bacevich. Bacevich had credentials and the arguments similar to many other critics of American wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. He saw them as part of larger ideological problem as well as a patchwork of policies and assumptions about the world since 1945. But to my mind, Bacevich has had a few things going for him: he had been a soldier, and so could see both sides of the deification of “our troops;” he became a scholar, and thus sought critical distance from events (for example, he has used to great effect Reinhold Niebuhr’s thought in picking apart an American theology of nationalism); he is Catholic, and has made clear that like Stanley Hauerwas he takes seriously the requirements of faith and the restrictions imposed by dogma; and finally he is a father who has suffered for American civil religion—he lost a son in Iraq.

This combination made Bacevich a particularly astute and acute critic of recent American civil religion. Bacevich is a professor of international relations at Boston University and has become well-regarded as a public intellectual whose recent books include Washington Rules (2010), The Limits of Power (2008) and The New American Militarism (2005). His moral accounting of recent American wars stand as Bacevich’s contribution to the deluge of critical appraisals of post-war and, more specifically, Bush-era delusions of grandeur. But Bacevich is also a graduate of West Point and a veteran of the U.S. Army, for which he served a year in Vietnam and, as a colonel, in the Gulf War. In a revealing comment regarding his training at West Point, Bacevich explained that a significant problem with the popular adulation of the military is that as an institution the military is not an expression of democracy but it’s opposite. The point is “to socialize you to the primacy of duty, while not encouraging you to assess critically whether the duty makes any sense,” Bacevich observed. “One is devoted to one’s country above devotion to anything else other than your family: country above the notion of humanity; country above the notion of what’s right or wrong or true or beautiful.” When a nation’s civil religion becomes increasingly defined and incarnated by war, the consequences are dire.[1]

Andrew Bacevich and his wife personally experienced those consequences in the most tragic way when they lost their son Andrew Bacevich, Jr., who was killed in the Sunni triangle north of Bagdad on Mother's Day 2007. A few weeks later, on May 21, his family buried him in a cemetery in Walpole, Massachusetts. Thousands of people lined the streets of the town to witness the funeral procession—a gesture that “profoundly moved” the Bacevichs. Andrew Jr.’s death was the first casualty of the Iraq War for Walpole. Andrew Sr. supported his son's decision to enlist in the military, but continued to write critically about the war and President Bush’s prosecution of it.

Was this a disjunction? Bacevich ruminated on it, especially after receiving two messages contending “that my son’s death came as direct result of my antiwar writings.” Bacevich reasoned that such a charge, while seemingly vile, forced him to consider “what exactly is a father’s duty when his son is sent into harm’s way?” He answered that like his son’s service to the nation as a soldier, he, as a critic of the war in which his son fought, was doing his duty as well. But both father and son saw the tragedy of war: for Bacevich he lost his son to the war he opposed and lost hope that speaking out against war would make a difference. Bacevich remarked ruefully, “Memorial Day orators will say that a G.I.’s life is priceless. Don’t believe it.” The cost of the war was in fact the point, he argued. It was about money—money to buy influence, money spent on the war that sank the economy, and money that was given to the family of a fallen soldier to pay them for the sacrifice they made for the nation. “I know my so did his best to serve our country,” Bacevich concluded. “Through my own opposition to a profoundly misguided war, I thought I was doing the same. In fact, while he was giving his all, I was doing nothing. In this way, I failed him.”[2]

Bacevich’s profound sense of loss came in the two areas that matter most: the personal and the mythical. He lost his son to a war that had done a great deal to undermine the mythical nature of the nation he loves. Through his work, Bacevich has expressed his agape for America—his love for the nation that has been hard-earned through suffering and extensive reflection. He is not merely a cold-water critic, dousing the hopes of Americans—he chose not to dash the wishes of his son when he wanted to serve his nation. He wrote in Limits of Power, “ironically Iraq may yet prove to be the source of our salvation. For the United States, the ongoing war makes plain the imperative of putting America’s house in order. Iraq has revealed the futility of counting on military power to sustain our habits of profligacy. The day of reckoning approaches. Expending the lives of more American soldiers in hopes of deferring that day is profoundly wrong.”[3]

Can Bacevich find something in the fact that he was right?

[1] Wendy Murray, “U.S. delusions: An army man changes his mind,” The Christian Century Magazine, August 11, 2009, accessed at:

[2] Andrew Bacevich, “I Lost My Son to a War I oppose. We Were Both Doing Our Duty,” Washington Post, May 27, 2007).

[3] Bacevich, The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2007), 12-13.