URI Issues a New Statement on Loomis

This is just a quick follow-up to my post on Erik Loomis from last week. The President of URI issued another statement today, responding in part to criticisms of his earlier statement:

Over the past several days we have heard from many individuals concerning statements made or repeated by Professor Erik Loomis. Many writers forcefully expressed serious concern about his statements and many others expressed very strong support for Professor Loomis, especially in regard to his First Amendment right to share his personal opinions. In the statements at issue, Professor Loomis did not make it clear that he was speaking solely as an individual, and that the views he expressed were his alone and did not reflect the views of the University of Rhode Island. This was the rationale for our original statement.

The University of Rhode Island strongly believes that Constitutionally protected rights to free expression are the foundation of American democracy, and central to our mission of imparting knowledge and promoting the exchange of ideas. It is our conviction that Professor Loomis’s personal remarks, however intemperate and inflammatory they may be, are protected by the First Amendment, as are the views of those who have contacted us in recent days.

David M. Dooley, Ph.D.
President
University of Rhode Island

You can head over to Crooked Timber for a thorough discussion of whether or not this constitutes a victory for those of us who were concerned about the tone and content of President Dooley's first statement on this matter (I'm inclined to see this glass as half-full rather than half-empty, for whatever it's worth).

Erik Loomis and Free Speech

As 99% or so of folks who read this blog probably already know, Erik Loomis, a labor and environmental historian, Assistant Professor at the University of Rhode Island, and blogger at Lawyers, Guns, and Money, has been under public attack following his posting the following angry tweet a week ago today:

I was heartbroken in the first 20 mass murders. Now I want Wayne LaPierre’s head on a stick.

Loomis was initially denounced by conservatives who falsely accused him of calling for the murder of Wayne LaPierre (who is head of the National Rifle Association). Within days he had received visits from the Rhode Island State Police and his Dean.  Earlier this week, the President of the University of Rhode Island issued the following statement:

The University of Rhode Island does not condone acts or threats of violence. These remarks do not reflect the views of the institution and Erik Loomis does not speak on behalf of the University. The University is committed to fostering a safe, inclusive and equitable culture that aspires to promote positive change.

In response, bloggers at Crooked Timber, one of the leading academic blogs, issued a statement of their own on Wednesday, the nut 'graph of which reads as follows:

Even to suggest that Loomis’s tweet constitutes a “threat of violence” is an offense against the English language. We are dismayed that the university president completely fails to acknowledge the importance of academic freedom and of scholars’ freedom independently to express views (even intemperate ones) on topics of public importance.  This statement—unless it is swiftly corrected— should give alarm to scholars at the University of Rhode Island, to scholars who might one day consider associating themselves with this institution, and to academic and professional associations that value academic freedom.

If you haven't done so yet, please go and read the whole thing.  Among the most important other points they make is that, while this case raises issues of academic freedom, in fact, what's happened to Loomis is part of a much broader issue: the ability that employers in general have to punish their employees for expressing unpopular political views that have no bearing whatsoever on the performance of their jobs. 

Given that Loomis does not have tenure, that some opponents were calling for his firing, and that his institution has fundamentally misrepresented his actions in a public statement, I believe it is particularly important that his fellow academics, especially those of us who also blog, to defend Loomis from these attacks. The bloggers who put together the Crooked Timber statement have asked other bloggers to support it and have set up a comment thread on which you can do so. I already have expressed my support on it (along with about a thousand others at this writing); I urge you to do so as well.*  That's the primary purpose of this post.

Its secondary purpose is to create an open thread to discuss this case...perhaps even in an historical context (as would befit this blog).  So have at it!

A few more thoughts below the fold...

First, I wanted to link to some other materials on this case.  It was covered today by Inside Higher Ed.  The foreign policy blog Duck of Minerva also issued a statement supporting Loomis's free speech rights.  One of the most thoughtful letters to the URI administration was written by UNM history professor Virginia Scharff.

Though the URI administration has yet to respond (at least publicly) to the criticism of its statement, some of the leading academic conservative bloggers who had attacked Loomis for his tweet have, at least, explicitly stated that he probably shouldn't be fired (perhaps because they themselves have used violent rhetoric in the past). 

Finally, I wanted to say that my wholehearted endorsement of the Crooked Timber statement should not be read as enthusiasm for Loomis's now-infamous tweet.  While it was in no way an incitement to violence, I'm not a great fan of violent rhetoric like this.  Loomis himself has expressed regret about employing it, if only because it (pretty predictably) became a distraction from the real issues raised by the Newtown shootings. My disagreements with using such language run a little deeper.  However, I almost didn't add this thought to this post, because I think it is quite beside the point when one is talking about the free speech issues raised by the campaign against Loomis and addressed by the Crooked Timber statement (which are the principal topics of this post).  One does not always defend free speech that one likes...indeed, if one is committed to free speech, one often defends speech that one doesn't.  And pointing out one's dislikes while issuing such defenses of speech can, in a sense, detract from those defenses. 

_____________________________
* It should go without saying, but I'll say it anyway, that I do these things as an individual and that I am not speaking for this blog nor for the Society for U.S. Intellectual History, which are not in the habit of issuing collective statements and have no plans to begin doing so at the moment.  I'd also add that I think this is basically a good thing, as issuing truly collective statements can often be a complicated and contentious matter. Indeed, even Crooked Timber attributed its statement to the individual bloggers signing it, not to the blog collectively.

Too Good Not to Repost

(h/t Crooked Timber)

Too Good Not to Repost

(h/t Crooked Timber)

Do You Still Read Hofstadter?

In continuation of what appears to be a series, I'd like to talk about Richard Hofstadter. Hofstadter, of course, was the American political historian who taught at Columbia with other academic luminaries such as Lionel Trilling and Jacques Barzun. Though an immaculate stylist and one of the most influential historians of his generation, Hofstadter's star faded upon his (premature) death, before experiencing a slight revival with the publication of of David S. Brown's Richard Hofstadter: An Intellectual Biography. Today his reputation is unclear to me, and I can't quite figure out the status of his work, even when it overlaps with my own field.

Hofstadter introduced several hugely influential terms into historical analysis and public debate, many of which you still hear: "status anxiety," "anti-intellectualism in American life," and "the paranoid style of American politics." And his books continue to be known, though many of them have various problems. I still run across references to his first book, Social Darwinism in American Thought, though I've never had the occasion to read it. His second book, The American Political Tradition, would prove the most lasting, but after Rogers Smith's work positing multiple traditions in American political life, I'm not sure that Hofstadter's book can hold up. The Development of Academic Freedom in the United States, as Brian Ingrassia has pointed out in a recent comment, remains the fullest statement of academic freedom (at least as far as I know), even though it is so old. I've heard numerous people call Anti-Intellectualism in American Life a "brilliant but flawed book," but whenever I press them on the flaws, they are never quite forthcoming. The Paranoid Style in American Politics, and Other Essays continues to be known mainly for the titular essay. And, finally, there is The Age of Reform, a book that is still widely read but, many people assure me, the most problematic of the lot. In short, many of his books are still in some kind of circulation, some more than fifty years after he wrote them, but they are all of uncertain reliability.

So how are we to regard Richard Hofstadter? I think I'm not alone when I say that I have long had an intellectual crush on him. And I suspect that one of the reasons that his work is still read is that, even if you think that he is historiographically dated, he is just so fun to read. But what is the academic status of his individual works and of his oeuvre as a whole?

Do You Still Read Hofstadter?

In continuation of what appears to be a series, I'd like to talk about Richard Hofstadter. Hofstadter, of course, was the American political historian who taught at Columbia with other academic luminaries such as Lionel Trilling and Jacques Barzun. Though an immaculate stylist and one of the most influential historians of his generation, Hofstadter's star faded upon his (premature) death, before experiencing a slight revival with the publication of of David S. Brown's Richard Hofstadter: An Intellectual Biography. Today his reputation is unclear to me, and I can't quite figure out the status of his work, even when it overlaps with my own field.

Hofstadter introduced several hugely influential terms into historical analysis and public debate, many of which you still hear: "status anxiety," "anti-intellectualism in American life," and "the paranoid style of American politics." And his books continue to be known, though many of them have various problems. I still run across references to his first book, Social Darwinism in American Thought, though I've never had the occasion to read it. His second book, The American Political Tradition, would prove the most lasting, but after Rogers Smith's work positing multiple traditions in American political life, I'm not sure that Hofstadter's book can hold up. The Development of Academic Freedom in the United States, as Brian Ingrassia has pointed out in a recent comment, remains the fullest statement of academic freedom (at least as far as I know), even though it is so old. I've heard numerous people call Anti-Intellectualism in American Life a "brilliant but flawed book," but whenever I press them on the flaws, they are never quite forthcoming. The Paranoid Style in American Politics, and Other Essays continues to be known mainly for the titular essay. And, finally, there is The Age of Reform, a book that is still widely read but, many people assure me, the most problematic of the lot. In short, many of his books are still in some kind of circulation, some more than fifty years after he wrote them, but they are all of uncertain reliability.

So how are we to regard Richard Hofstadter? I think I'm not alone when I say that I have long had an intellectual crush on him. And I suspect that one of the reasons that his work is still read is that, even if you think that he is historiographically dated, he is just so fun to read. But what is the academic status of his individual works and of his oeuvre as a whole?

Grafton on Cronon and Academic Freedom

There's a blog post by Anthony Grafton over at the New York Review of Books website on academic freedom in light of the Cronon affair. He makes a lot of the usual points, but in the midst of his post he suddenly veers into a territory that I find welcome. While defending academic freedom, he also lays out a vision of academic responsibility that goes hand in hand with academic freedom and is necessary for the maintenance of academic freedom's legitimacy. He says:

"Scholars and scientists, of course, have all the same rights as other citizens: they can enter debates, join political organizations and work for campaigns. But when they enter the public sphere in their special capacity as acknowledged professional experts, they bear special responsibilities: they’re not acting as ordinary citizens, nor as pundits who are ready to pronounce on anything. They should be real experts on the problems they attack. They should acknowledge their own fallibility and the provisional character of the knowledge they rely on. They should expect contradiction, both from other experts and from those whose interests they cross, and maintain civility amid the eldritch yips and guttural growls of American public debate. And the conclusions they put forward must be the ones that their expertise dictates, whether or not they find these pleasing. It’s a little bit like being a Raymond Chandler detective. You go out into the mean streets, armed only with knowledge and determination, knowing that you can easily be wrong, and grimly aware that your only reward for being right may be a blow on the head. It’s a great, quixotic part of the vocation of science and scholarship. That’s why universities have come to agree that honest public interventions are a legitimate part of academic work, and why they do their best to protect those who engage in them from personal and political attack."

I was struck by this passage because Grafton hits a different note than I normally hear. Consider this passage from Felix Frankfurter in his concurring opinion in Sweezy v. New Hampshire (1957):

"Progress in the natural sciences is not remotely confined to findings made in the laboratory. Insights into the mysteries of nature are born of hypothesis and speculation. The more so is this true in the pursuit of understanding in the groping endeavors of what are called the social sciences, the concern of which is man and society. The problems that are the respective preoccupations of anthropology, economics, law, psychology, sociology and related areas of scholarship are merely departmentalized dealing, by way of manageable division of analysis, with interpenetrating aspects of holistic perplexities. For society's good - if understanding be an essential need of society - inquiries into these problems, speculations about them, stimulation in others of reflection upon them, must be left as unfettered as possible. Political power must abstain from intrusion into this activity of freedom, pursued in the interest of wise government and the people's well-being, except for reasons that are exigent and obviously compelling. These pages need not be burdened with proof, based on the testimony of a cloud of impressive witnesses, of the dependence of a free society on free universities. This means the exclusion of governmental intervention in the intellectual life of a university. It matters little whether such intervention occurs avowedly or through action that inevitably tends to check the ardor and fearlessness of scholars, qualities at once so fragile and so indispensable for fruitful academic labor."

Here Frankfurter states the issue somewhat differently than Grafton does. Academic freedom is freedom from governmental intrusion, Frankfurter says, allowing unfettering inquiry into the full range of existence without fear of political consequence. But many proponents of academic freedom argue that it entails the freedom to enter the public sphere to influence the workings of government, something implied by Frankfurter but never quite elaborated or explained. Grafton's warning that academic responsibility requires that we limit our political interventions to those problems on which we are experts seems to be a necessary limitation to this vision of academic freedom. It is the only way that we can justify that freedom.

Grafton on Cronon and Academic Freedom

There's a blog post by Anthony Grafton over at the New York Review of Books website on academic freedom in light of the Cronon affair. He makes a lot of the usual points, but in the midst of his post he suddenly veers into a territory that I find welcome. While defending academic freedom, he also lays out a vision of academic responsibility that goes hand in hand with academic freedom and is necessary for the maintenance of academic freedom's legitimacy. He says:

"Scholars and scientists, of course, have all the same rights as other citizens: they can enter debates, join political organizations and work for campaigns. But when they enter the public sphere in their special capacity as acknowledged professional experts, they bear special responsibilities: they’re not acting as ordinary citizens, nor as pundits who are ready to pronounce on anything. They should be real experts on the problems they attack. They should acknowledge their own fallibility and the provisional character of the knowledge they rely on. They should expect contradiction, both from other experts and from those whose interests they cross, and maintain civility amid the eldritch yips and guttural growls of American public debate. And the conclusions they put forward must be the ones that their expertise dictates, whether or not they find these pleasing. It’s a little bit like being a Raymond Chandler detective. You go out into the mean streets, armed only with knowledge and determination, knowing that you can easily be wrong, and grimly aware that your only reward for being right may be a blow on the head. It’s a great, quixotic part of the vocation of science and scholarship. That’s why universities have come to agree that honest public interventions are a legitimate part of academic work, and why they do their best to protect those who engage in them from personal and political attack."

I was struck by this passage because Grafton hits a different note than I normally hear. Consider this passage from Felix Frankfurter in his concurring opinion in Sweezy v. New Hampshire (1957):

"Progress in the natural sciences is not remotely confined to findings made in the laboratory. Insights into the mysteries of nature are born of hypothesis and speculation. The more so is this true in the pursuit of understanding in the groping endeavors of what are called the social sciences, the concern of which is man and society. The problems that are the respective preoccupations of anthropology, economics, law, psychology, sociology and related areas of scholarship are merely departmentalized dealing, by way of manageable division of analysis, with interpenetrating aspects of holistic perplexities. For society's good - if understanding be an essential need of society - inquiries into these problems, speculations about them, stimulation in others of reflection upon them, must be left as unfettered as possible. Political power must abstain from intrusion into this activity of freedom, pursued in the interest of wise government and the people's well-being, except for reasons that are exigent and obviously compelling. These pages need not be burdened with proof, based on the testimony of a cloud of impressive witnesses, of the dependence of a free society on free universities. This means the exclusion of governmental intervention in the intellectual life of a university. It matters little whether such intervention occurs avowedly or through action that inevitably tends to check the ardor and fearlessness of scholars, qualities at once so fragile and so indispensable for fruitful academic labor."

Here Frankfurter states the issue somewhat differently than Grafton does. Academic freedom is freedom from governmental intrusion, Frankfurter says, allowing unfettering inquiry into the full range of existence without fear of political consequence. But many proponents of academic freedom argue that it entails the freedom to enter the public sphere to influence the workings of government, something implied by Frankfurter but never quite elaborated or explained. Grafton's warning that academic responsibility requires that we limit our political interventions to those problems on which we are experts seems to be a necessary limitation to this vision of academic freedom. It is the only way that we can justify that freedom.

Tim's Light Reading (11/25/2009)

1. Christopher Hitchens dissects the anti-intellectualism that surrounds Sarah Palin---I'm no general fan of Hitchens but he points to a number of inexplicable intellectual contradictions surrounding last year's flavor of a few months.

2. The Fears And Hopes of 1958's Intellectuals---Courtesy of the University of Chicago's Law School, the concerns and thoughts of some of 1958's more eminent intellectuals were preserved in a time capsule. Opened a year and one-half late, the capsule contains letters from: Jacques Maritain; Carl Friedrich; Edward Teller; Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.; and several other Supreme Court Justices. There is a slideshow highlights the opening and some of the contents---as well as conservators in action!

3. A Misleading AP Headline? This AP article sells itself as follows: "Bishops discuss authority over Catholic colleges." I have been trying to decide whether the lead is sensational. My academic and Catholic reading glasses say yes. I mean, what academic wouldn't cringe at the thought of a bishop controlling the work of her/his college? But is this what the article's author, Rachel Zoll, intended or meant? The content gives mixed messages (underscores mine):

---Exhibit A: "Chicago Cardinal Francis George, president of the bishops' conference, revealed this week that he had formed a task force charged with reviewing the issue. Its research included a look at what church law says about bishops' authority over the schools."

---Exhibit B: "George said the issue would be taken up at the meeting as part of a broader look at what groups can legitimately call themselves Catholic. 'If those relationships — which don't mean control, they mean relationship — are now weakened, then we have to think of ways to enter discussion in order to strengthen them, and to redefine perhaps what are the criteria for a university or any other organization to consider itself Catholic,' George said in an interview ahead of this week's meeting."

So, it seems to be more about identity than control. But hasn't this issue been in the news for 10-20 years or more? Because it has, I suppose we now need the twist of control and authoritarian bishops to draw us in? Or has identity morphed into different story in light of the recent actions of bishops (e.g. protests over Obama at Notre Dame)? Even so, I don't think this is a case of twenty-first century anti-Catholicism, per the recent musings of New York's Bishop Timothy Dolan. But is this headline about changing views of the bishops, or does it have something to do with competition between old and new media. Perhaps AP is feeling some pressure to sensationalize? Or maybe my knowledge of the history of Catholicism is clouding my reading of the story?

4. Messiah College's John Fea Reflects on what Messiah Students would give up for an iPhone: No, this is not a sensationalist headline. I don't want to give away Fea's story, but I'll tease you with his conclusion: "In the end, those who fear that Christian college students are mounting some sort of assault to overtake the country with their Christian ideals, political virtue or spiritually-inspired disinterestedness seem to have little to worry about."

5. The Varieties of Public Intellectualism: This post by my friend Michael Kramer, particularly subpoint (3), touches on a number of conceptual issues that will be of interest to those working on the history of public intellectuals.

6. Grover Krantz, His Dog Clyde, Bigfoot, and Remembering Public Intellectuals: One of our faithful readers, Samuel Redman, a history graduate student at Berkeley, meditates in this post on Grover Krantz's place in America's pantheon of public intellectuals. According Krantz's autobiography, Only a Dog, Clyde saved Krantz's career and personal life. This is why they are exhibited together at the Smithsonian. Krantz made some recognizable contributions to late twentieth-century anthropology. But Redman fears we historians will only remember Krantz's relationship with Clyde and Krantz's belief in the existence of Bigfoot (Krantz being one of the few professionals who did not disavow that mountain legend). Perhaps. I can't reassure him too much on that account, but who kid resist a Bigfoot hook, at least, to draw a few readers in?! - TL

Tim's Light Reading (11/25/2009)

1. Christopher Hitchens dissects the anti-intellectualism that surrounds Sarah Palin---I'm no general fan of Hitchens but he points to a number of inexplicable intellectual contradictions surrounding last year's flavor of a few months.

2. The Fears And Hopes of 1958's Intellectuals---Courtesy of the University of Chicago's Law School, the concerns and thoughts of some of 1958's more eminent intellectuals were preserved in a time capsule. Opened a year and one-half late, the capsule contains letters from: Jacques Maritain; Carl Friedrich; Edward Teller; Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.; and several other Supreme Court Justices. There is a slideshow highlights the opening and some of the contents---as well as conservators in action!

3. A Misleading AP Headline? This AP article sells itself as follows: "Bishops discuss authority over Catholic colleges." I have been trying to decide whether the lead is sensational. My academic and Catholic reading glasses say yes. I mean, what academic wouldn't cringe at the thought of a bishop controlling the work of her/his college? But is this what the article's author, Rachel Zoll, intended or meant? The content gives mixed messages (underscores mine):

---Exhibit A: "Chicago Cardinal Francis George, president of the bishops' conference, revealed this week that he had formed a task force charged with reviewing the issue. Its research included a look at what church law says about bishops' authority over the schools."

---Exhibit B: "George said the issue would be taken up at the meeting as part of a broader look at what groups can legitimately call themselves Catholic. 'If those relationships — which don't mean control, they mean relationship — are now weakened, then we have to think of ways to enter discussion in order to strengthen them, and to redefine perhaps what are the criteria for a university or any other organization to consider itself Catholic,' George said in an interview ahead of this week's meeting."

So, it seems to be more about identity than control. But hasn't this issue been in the news for 10-20 years or more? Because it has, I suppose we now need the twist of control and authoritarian bishops to draw us in? Or has identity morphed into different story in light of the recent actions of bishops (e.g. protests over Obama at Notre Dame)? Even so, I don't think this is a case of twenty-first century anti-Catholicism, per the recent musings of New York's Bishop Timothy Dolan. But is this headline about changing views of the bishops, or does it have something to do with competition between old and new media. Perhaps AP is feeling some pressure to sensationalize? Or maybe my knowledge of the history of Catholicism is clouding my reading of the story?

4. Messiah College's John Fea Reflects on what Messiah Students would give up for an iPhone: No, this is not a sensationalist headline. I don't want to give away Fea's story, but I'll tease you with his conclusion: "In the end, those who fear that Christian college students are mounting some sort of assault to overtake the country with their Christian ideals, political virtue or spiritually-inspired disinterestedness seem to have little to worry about."

5. The Varieties of Public Intellectualism: This post by my friend Michael Kramer, particularly subpoint (3), touches on a number of conceptual issues that will be of interest to those working on the history of public intellectuals.

6. Grover Krantz, His Dog Clyde, Bigfoot, and Remembering Public Intellectuals: One of our faithful readers, Samuel Redman, a history graduate student at Berkeley, meditates in this post on Grover Krantz's place in America's pantheon of public intellectuals. According Krantz's autobiography, Only a Dog, Clyde saved Krantz's career and personal life. This is why they are exhibited together at the Smithsonian. Krantz made some recognizable contributions to late twentieth-century anthropology. But Redman fears we historians will only remember Krantz's relationship with Clyde and Krantz's belief in the existence of Bigfoot (Krantz being one of the few professionals who did not disavow that mountain legend). Perhaps. I can't reassure him too much on that account, but who kid resist a Bigfoot hook, at least, to draw a few readers in?! - TL