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Kamis, 27 Desember 2012

Rebirth of a Nation: Reflections, Ruminations, and Reactions

What follows are points of praise and criticism of Jackson Lears' Rebirth of a Nation: The Making of Modern America, 1877-1920. I refuse to call this a review because that implies a smooth narrative of reflection. Creating that narrative requires more time than I have today. Plus, that kind of piece isn't needed. This book has been positively reviewed, in narrative form, in a multitude of prominent, top-notch newspapers and magazines. In addition the end pages of Lears' book are littered with quotes of praise from superstars in the history profession: Richard White, Andrew Bacevich, Michael Kazin, Todd Gitlin, and Edward L. Ayers. Finally, as noted on the cover of my paperback copy, Rebirth of a Nation was declared "Best Book of the Year" (2009) by The Washington Post, Chicago Tribune, and the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette.

Although we have discussed Lears and his works at USIH on several occasions, none of us have prominently posted anything on Rebirth of a Nation (it did come up in the comments of one discussion).

So what's left to say? I don't know in an absolute sense. I haven't read all the reviews noted above, but only skimmed them (I loved the last line of Summers' write-up). All I know is what I feel compelled to pass along--to reflect upon. Here's what I have, in bullet point form:

- I love the synthetic nature of the book. Lears blends primary texts with the best analysis from secondary sources accumulated over the past forty to fifty years. Through the latter you see how the progressive building of medium-sized ideas about the era (e.g. force, heroism, manliness, rebirth) come together to, in Richard White's words, change the metaphor. If White is right, neither Wiebe's Search for Order nor Hofstadter's Age of Reform contain the dominant heuristic thought tools for the Gilded Age and Progressive Era. It's now the capacious idea of rebirth (or regeneration), which has subsumed order and reform in it. Because of this I predict that Rebirth of a Nation will now be required reading in any upper-level undergraduate or graduate course dealing with the post-Reconstruction to World War I era. And if those students attend to to Lears' notes, the book is worth at least half of a graduate education in the fields of social, cultural, and intellectual history. You could add political history to that list if that subfield weren't so neglected. In any case, this book should be on the shelf of every single historian who proclaims to study or teach post-Civil War history. It will reward reference thumbing or close reading.

- If you're in a bad mood, the alliteration and belletristic nature of Lears' writing can become tiresome fairly quickly. I grew tired of it halfway through chapter one. In the second half of the book, however, the alliteration is either toned down or less noticeable. I confess that this is a bit of carping on my part. Perhaps I'm jealous. Then again, I received a lot of criticism for too much alliteration in my early writing, so maybe I'm over-sensitive to the issue. Anyway, when it's not tiring Lears' style makes the work easy to read. This is no small thing in relation to the fact that gender analysis---one of Lears' strengths---is not my primary analytical mode. [Aside: My title is, of course, a tongue-in-cheek tribute to Lears' alliteration.]

- In my pre-reading of Rebirth (wherein I thoroughly study the TOC, Notes, and Index), I had identified chapter five as the pivotal part of the book. I do not mean, in any way, that chapters one through four are less valuable. All four are absolutely necessary to the story. But chapter five met my expectation of importance. It stirs militarism, violence, market culture, white male supremacy, and urban-rural tensions into a hot cauldron of 1890s crises. In this cauldron, crises were dissolved into a new language of reform, order, and regeneration, manifest in market consumption, the idea of a cooperative commonwealth, and empire. Every major character of the age appears in the chapter: Addams, Adams, Beveridge, Bryan, Burnham, Coxey, Darwin, Debs, Gompers, Herron, James, Morgan, Pullman, Roosevelt, Strong, Twain, and Willard. Lears shows how misunderstandings about Darwin were put to both good and evil uses (p. 204). The introductory discussion of  empire in this chapter (pp. 200-221) is first rate, supplanted only by the contents of chapter seven, titled "Empire as a Way of Life." Lears' discussion of civil religion in the chapter compared favorably, in terms of themes, to the contents of Ray Haberski's God and War---though the later focuses on the post-World War II period and, to my knowledge, doesn't reference Lears.

- In the first 100 pages of the book I became annoyed with Lears' slight tendency to look for the erotic when its presence was questionable (pp. 61, 63, 64). At some point the search says more about the author than the material. Intemperance comes in forms other than sex--e.g. anger, verbal abuse, alcohol, etc.

- Although Lears does not seem highly sympathetic to pragmatism, based on his framing of Randolph Bourne's criticisms of John Dewey later in the book (pp. 237, 344-345), William James is a clear hero in the text. Even if Lears disapproved of James' experimentalist pragmatism (he didn't, p. 225), that disapproval would have been drowned in relation to praise for James' anti-imperialism (pp. 22, 217, 219-220), his capacious spiritualism (pp. 238-239), and his desire to subvert militarism to "more humane" ends (pp. 22, 49, 329-330). Lears' perspective on James corresponds with mine, but I think the reader should know that James is a hero in the text. Despite our agreement and Lears' praise of James, I still think that Lears offers a somewhat shallow reading of James' famous essay, "The Moral Equivalent of War" (1906). I'm not sure that James "idealized war's revitalizing force" as much as he sought to deeply subvert the language of his period (i.e. the discipline, order, and physical fitness inherent in militarism are not exclusive to it). But maybe I need to reread the essay.

This is probably enough for today. I'll gather up more reflections to pass along next week. In the meantime, have you read the book? Do any of your thoughts correspond with mine? - TL

Jumat, 31 Agustus 2012

The Moment of the Foxes


There's an epistemological and historiographical problem that I am trying to make sense of in relation to the Pragmatists -- and perhaps in relation to our relation to the Pragmatists -- and I am having trouble formulating my thoughts on the matter.  So I have decided to take my question, such as it is, to the blogosophere, and see if  our good readers here can offer some clarity -- or, maybe, some complexity.  Or both.

This weekend I am reading Twentieth-Century Multiplicity by Daniel Borus  and No Place of Grace by T.J. Jackson Lears.  Both are on my reading list, but only Borus is assigned for a class -- the last organized class, by the way, that I will take in my entire academic career.  Ever.  To plunder the Kuhnian castle: I am headed for a major paradigm shift.  First, though, I have to get through this semester.

What I'm wondering about is how to historically situate or understand a particular kind of interpretive move that historians make, though it is certainly not unique to historians.  What I have in mind is our fondness for typological or characterological binarisms -- the binarisms we can employ as shorthand to distinguish between two seemingly different ways that people extract or construct meaning from events. 


I'm thinking, for example, of how one can look at American thinkers at the end of the 19th century and divide them heuristically into "optimists" (John Dewey, William James on most days) and "pessimists" (Henry Adams).  This particular binary seems especially suited -- or, I guess, favored -- when discussing this period. Fragmentation, fracture, multiplicity, contingency, instability -- however we might characterize the cosmology of that era, we seem to find it useful to situate the thinkers of the time in terms of whether or not that they saw in their own time reason for hope or cause for despair. 

In fact, I would suggest that historians of this period themselves might be seen as tending to be either "pessimistic" or "optimistic."  In a footnote to his introduction, Borus writes, "Two diametrically different but superlative efforts to link culture to political economy are T.J. Jackson Lears, No Place of Grace...and James Livingston, Pragmatism and the Political Economy of Cultural Revolution" (15). Borus does not say what makes these inquiries "diametrically different," but I would surmise that much of their difference has to do with each historian's sympathy for a particular strain of thought emerging from the period.  I mean "sympathy" in a kind of Collingwoodian sense:  their effort to understand the thoughts of their subjects by re-thinking them and re-constituting them through their historical inquiry. Lears is recovering and legitimizing an elegiac lament for a lost past; Livingston is recovering and legitimizing an exuberant celebration of an open future.  And so in a way these monographs may come to re-instantiate the very sensibilities they explore.

Perhaps one might expect the historiography of this period to embrace binarism as a mode of inquiry or even divide along binaristic lines because the period itself was so marked.  Think, for example, of James's distinction between the "tough-minded" and the "tender-minded," where epistemology becomes a matter of two basic kinds of temperament.  What's interesting about James's bifurcation of "minds," and other similar distinctions, is the way that a binary can be used to point toward plurality.

A similar binaristic taxonomy of "mind" that paves the way for pluralism is Isaiah Berlin's famous distinction between hedgehogs and foxes.  Of course Berlin is writing after James, and in some senses perhaps in response to him -- I'll let the historians of philosophy weigh in here.  In any case, Berlin uses a binary to accentuate the value of plurality.  Indeed, Borus invokes Berlin's binaristic metaphor in the introduction to Twentieth-Century Multiplicity as a helpful way of distinguishing between two kinds of thinkers or two kinds of thought:  "The early twentieth century," Borus writes, "was the moment of the foxes, even if there were quite a few hedgehogs.  It is salutary to recall that Berlin saw the value of and need for both" (11). 

Borus situates the Berlinian fauna within the period he is studying -- but also, by implication, within his study of the period.  What he says about the thinkers of the time is easily applicable to historians' thinking about it:  "Where foxes remind us of the dangers of overgeneralization, hedgehogs remind us how helpful and at times necessary significant and meaningful generalizations are" (11).  That's not just intellectual history; that's historical method.

So here's the best I can do in framing my question:  to what extent is the epistemology of historical inquiry, especially inquiry about this particular period of epistemic turmoil, indebted to and taking place within the framework of the period itself?  

If we look at American intellectual and cultural history in this time frame and see optimists and pessimists, tough-minded and tender-minded, modernists and anti-modernists, foxes and hedgehogs, are we seeing the object of our inquiry -- the thinking of the time -- or are we seeing everything through it? 

Senin, 06 Juni 2011

READING OBAMA: Kloppenberg Responds to Summers


James Kloppenberg, Harvard University, responds to the John Summers review of his book, Reading Obama. At the end of Kloppenberg's response, below, is a short reply from Summers.

I am grateful to the editors of USIH for the chance to respond to the review of Reading Obama by my friend John Summers, and I am grateful to John for his spirited critique of my argument as he understood it. I have admired John’s fierce independence since I first got to know him a decade ago when we taught a course together at Harvard on democracy in Europe and America. I do not always agree with his judgment, however, whether the subject is scholarship, politics, or pragmatism. Here I will try to clarify our differences as I see them. The point of my book was not to provide a standard by which Obama’s presidency should be judged. My point instead was to show, using the evidence presented in Obama’s own writings, how he thinks about politics, where he locates himself in the history of American thought, and to explain, as well as possible given the limited evidence available now, why he sees the world as he does.

It seems fitting to address these issues in this forum. After all, it was Patricia Cohen’s October 28, 2010 article in The New York Times about the USIH conference in New York City that kicked off the lively discussion of Reading Obama that has continued for the past seven months. For readers who were not at the CUNY Graduate Center last fall, I presented a paper identifying central themes from Obama’s own books Dreams from My Father and The Audacity of Hope and suggested how one might locate his ideas in the rich traditions of American political thought. Although Cohen’s article was accurate and overall not unsympathetic, one sentence has trailed the book ever since: “Kloppenberg explained that he sees Mr. Obama as a kind of philosopher president, a rare breed that can be found only a handful of times in American history.” That phrase, “philosopher president,” has surfaced repeatedly, in reviews from the right and the left.

Let me begin with an emphatic denial: I have never called Obama a “philosopher president.” Unless he writes something after his presidency quite different from the fine books he wrote before his election, I doubt that I ever will. It is one thing to study the work of serious thinkers and take them seriously, as I believe Obama has done with writers ranging from James Madison to William James, from Nietzsche to Niebuhr, and from Gordon Wood to Cass Sunstein. It would be quite another to earn the title “philosopher president,” a phrase that not only suggests someone with noteworthy ideas about important question in philosophy but also conjures up, for me at least, all the unsavory connotations of Plato’s philosopher king.

It is true, as Cohen also wrote, that I consider Obama “an intellectual–a word that is frequently considered an epithet among populists with a robust suspicion of Ivy League elites.” And I remain unrepentant: I believe that editing the Harvard Law Review, writing two excellent books on American culture and politics, and teaching civil rights law for a decade at the University of Chicago Law School qualified Obama for that designation just as surely as Woodrow Wilson’s career as a political scientist placed him in that category before he entered electoral politics. Indeed, establishing that Obama’s books merit the close scrutiny of historians and political scientists was among the principal objectives of my book. That claim too has been disputed by critics who deny that intellectuals can be politicians and that politicians can have expressed ideas worthy of careful analysis. Used as a noun to indicate an individual with critical distance from partisan politics, the word “intellectual” has proved protean ever since it entered the French language during the Dreyfus affair and was imported to the US by William James. I will address this complex issue in a new Forward to the paperback edition of Reading Obama, which Princeton University Press will publish in January, 2012. In my view, individuals from John Adams and Marie-Olympe de Gouges to Jean Jaurès and Vaclav Havel--whether characterized as intellectuals or as independent thinkers–-indicate that the border between political thought and political practice had been porous, and that traffic across it had been productive, long before the author of Dreams and Audacity ran for president.

But let me return to John Summers, who has done me a favor by identifying the unintentionally fuzzy sentence, on p. 5 of Reading Obama, that might be responsible for much of the criticism leveled at the book: “Dreams and Hope, taken together, provide not only a window into Obama’s nuanced understanding of American history and culture but also a blueprint for American politics.” John takes that sentence to mean that Obama’s books provide my blueprint for American politics or the blueprint I think the US ought to follow. In his words, “it’s here, in the move from contextualizing Obama’s intellectual biography to proposing on its behalf ‘a blue-print for American politics,’ that the trouble begins.” That interpretation of the sentence never occurred to me, but I am happy to concede the ambiguity. In the paperback, I will be sure to change the words “a blueprint” to “his blueprint.” Let me emphasize here that Reading Obama presents my analysis of Barack Obama’s diagnosis and his blueprint, as presented in his books and speeches, not my own or the one I think all Americans should embrace. As I thought the book’s title would indicate, Reading Obama is an effort to examine Barack Obama’s ideas about American history and American politics and explain how they emerged.

John correctly traces the lineage of Obama’s moderate democratic politics to the early twentieth century, the era I examined in my book Uncertain Victory: Social Democracy and Progressivism in European and American Thought, 1870-1920. In Audacity, Obama himself emphasized certain features of progressive reform, including the role of the social gospel, government regulation of the economy, and the graduated income tax. Obama also stressed the revival and extension of those ideas in the social democratic program articulated by Franklin D. Roosevelt late in his third term as president, the “Second Bill of Rights” that he announced in his 1944 state of the union address and on which he ran successfully for reelection later that year. That speech outlined a program, originally developed by FDR’s National Resources Planning Board, for national health insurance, a robust minimum wage, and ambitious schemes for housing, full employment, and insurance against unemployment, accidents, and old age. In Audacity, Obama characterized FDR’s far-reaching program, which I discussed in chapter seven of my book The Virtues of Liberalism and Obama’s friend Cass Sunstein made the focus of his 2004 book The Second Bill of Rights, as the unfulfilled promise of democratic reform. So John is right that I have been interested in the issues addressed by Obama for a long time. But I tried hard in Uncertain Victory and in The Virtues of Liberalism not only to establish linkages between the pragmatism of William James and John Dewey and some strands of progressivism and social democracy on both sides of the Atlantic. I tried also to show the unresolved tensions within and between James’s and Dewey’s ideas about philosophy and politics, to show how and why their followers took their ideas in different directions and disagreed about their implications for particular political issues, and to show the very real obstacles that progressive and social democratic reformers have faced.

The meaning of American democracy has always been contested, often as vigorously as it is now. Even at the peak of enthusiasm for progressive reform or at the height of FDR’s popularity, the foes of social democratic ideas commanded economic and cultural resources that they were able to translate into substantial electoral support. I chided some of Obama’s leftist critics in my book not because I intended to position myself or Obama “above the fray,” to use John’s phrase, but because I think most leftist critics have projected onto Obama a degree of radicalism he never expressed and because I think that those of us on the left sometimes forget that the current President of the United States, no matter how powerful he appears to be, is as powerfully constrained by the United States Congress as were Wilson and FDR. I agree with Eric Alterman that we need public financing for elections, tighter restraints on lobbyists, and a new set of rules for the United States Senate. (Making it proportional to population, as partisans of representative democracy from James Madison to Robert Dahl have observed, would be a good place to begin.) But I do not think we can afford to wash our hands of politics, sordid as it is, until those reforms are in place.

Although John Summers and I might disagree about political strategy, I do not think the differences derive from my alleged aspiration to the status of “Serious Thinker” or “Public Intellectual.” I aspire only to the lofty status of intellectual historian. I am puzzled by John’s characterization of my attitude toward Obama as “adulation.” As he notes but does not emphasize, I do express misgivings about many positions Obama has taken and decisions he has made, including but not limited to drones and civil liberties. I understand the limits of the health care plan and the financial reform package. But again, evaluating Obama’s presidency was not the aim of Reading Obama; I aimed instead to explain, using his own writings, why he has shown a greater willingness to compromise, seek consensus, and settle for incremental gains than some of his enthusiasts who did not read his books might have expected. I also sought, briefly, to contextualize the circumstances in which he was forced to operate in 2009. As William Galston and many other writers have noted, the most substantial progressive reforms of the twentieth century were achieved when FDR and Lyndon Johnson enjoyed overwhelming Democratic majorities in the House and the Senate, not the perilously slim Democratic majorities, weakened further by the large number of blue-dog Democrats elected in 2008, that passed the watered-down legislation on health care and financial regulation in 2009 and 2010. (Incidentally, it is not clear to me why Galston’s politics, whether left, right, or “centrist,” to use John’s word, matter in assessing the accuracy of this observation, which has been made by Bill Clinton and by many political scientists, historians, and journalists.) Enacting progressive social legislation in American history has always been a struggle. Even opening the door to economic regulation, a graduated income tax, social security, or equal protection for women and racial minorities has been met with howls of protest. Presidents aiming for substantial reform face obstacles, both from within their own parties and from the opposition.

I have no quarrel with any critics inclined to exert pressure on a president to push as hard as he can for what he wants to achieve. Again, my goal in Reading Obama was not to assess Obama’s presidency. He had occupied the White House a little over a year when the manuscript went to press, so any overall evaluation would have been premature. I sought instead to establish an unnoticed link between Obama’s approach to governance, which takes seriously the need to listen to opponents and forge coalitions and resists the lure of partisan purity as a matter of principle rather than expediency, and the intellectual transformation of America during the years he came of age. Obama’s writings indicate that he distrusts absolutes and embraces skepticism and experimentation.

In the studies of Obama that have appeared in the last few years, much has been made of the role played by the Civil Right Movement, by Obama’s experience growing up as a mixed-race individual in Hawaii and Indonesia, and by his mother’s lessons in empathy and her devotion to her career in cultural anthropology. We will learn even more about these issues in forthcoming books. All of those factors clearly played a part in shaping Obama’s sensibility. Reading Obama focuses on a different set of influences, including the ideas of anti-foundationalism, historicism, perspectivalism, civic republicanism, deliberative democracy, and the resurgence of pragmatism, all of which changed the terms of debate in American universities when Obama was coming of age. Reading Obama examines the evidence of ideas in Obama’s books and speeches. It is an intellectual biography.

John Summers reminds readers that many earlier and many more recent thinkers found pragmatism wanting: they were, he writes, “riddled by doubts over its capacity to generalize itself in democratic action.” Yet many of the thinkers he admires, including Randolph Bourne, Merle Curti, Richard Hofstadter, Robert Westbrook, and Hans Joas, have criticized some pragmatists’ misuse or misunderstanding of the tradition, as they understand it, by invoking the ideas and arguments of other pragmatists. To cite only the most familiar example, when Randolph Bourne challenged Dewey on World War I, he summoned the spirit of William James. Others have followed his lead, selecting particular strands of the multi-stranded tradition of philosophical pragmatism to wield against those they found straying from its authentic spirit. Fair enough. I have made versions of that point myself in Uncertain Victory, in The Virtues of Liberalism, and in the essay “Pragmatism: An Old Name for Some New Ways of Thinking?” published in the JAH in 1996. In Reading Obama, I wrote, “there never has been–nor, I think, can there be–a clear, explicit, singular lesson to be drawn from the philosophy of pragmatism for a particular political dispute. Indeed, the idea of such a formula is inimical to pragmatism, which is a method for testing beliefs in experience rather than measuring them against a yardstick of unchanging absolutes. Precisely because consequences matter to pragmatists, one can never say dogmatically, in advance, that one policy or another follows necessarily from the commitment to experimentation. Pragmatism is a philosophy for skeptics, a philosophy for those committed to democratic debate and the critical assessment of the results of political decisions, not for true believers convinced they know the right course of action in advance of inquiry and experimentation” (p. xiii).

John Summers is not a skeptic. As readers of his many essays and his book Every Fury on Earth know, he is a professed anarchist and a critic of the academy who thinks most tenured professors have abandoned their principles to become accomplices of injustice. He believes that one must not flinch from speaking truth to power, no matter how unpleasant that may be for privileged and comfortable insiders in universities or in government. That too is a distinguished tradition in American thought, one that runs at least from Henry David Thoreau to Christopher Lasch, and it will no doubt continue into the future through the efforts of writers like John. And he is not alone. Many people at both ends of the contemporary political spectrum see themselves as lonely truth tellers calling Americans back to the noble path as they see it. In making that observation, I hope I am not guilty yet again of “reinforcing the status quo,” as John accuses me of doing. I believe passionately that a radically more progressive tax code, a radically more aggressive approach to regulating the economy, and a radically diminished American military presence in the world are desirable goals. But I have chosen, to use Max Weber’s formulation, Wissenschaft rather than politics as a vocation. As a scholar I do not have to endure the endless give-and-take, the deal-making with people I detest, that is the steady diet of politicians.

Barack Obama has a different understanding of his role in our democracy. As he has made clear throughout his life, explained in his writings, and even announced in some of his notable speeches, he thinks that no one has sole possession of the truth. He believes in deliberating with people who see things differently. He believes in empathy, and in his speech about the killings in Tucson he explained why he thinks it matters so much. As I observed at several points in Reading Obama, those beliefs constitute a gamble in today’s hyper-partisan political atmosphere. It might be a miscalculation. It might even rest on a mistaken understanding of how American democracy works.

As Obama noted in The Audacity of Hope, on the decisive question of slavery it was indeed the extremists, those zealots who refused to compromise with evil, who ultimately forced the issue. But Obama then admitted that whenever he encounters zealots in his own day he feels compelled to ask himself whether, a century from now, they will be thought right and moderates like himself thought wrong. That degree of self-consciousness, that willingness to concede that one’s own views might prove to be wrong and that one’s opponents might prove to be right, is arresting and unusual. I do not think it worthy of “adulation,” but I do think it is uncommon among contemporary Americans, left or right, and particularly uncommon among elected officials and political commentators. Making clear where that acute self-consciousness came from, and explaining why Obama grew to view twenty-first-century cultures and politics through the lenses of skepticism, historicism, and perspectivalism, is the aim of Reading Obama.

John offers a thoughtful meditation on the role of the unconscious in American politics, and he raises the question of whether Obama is sufficiently alert to this problem. This form of political analysis has always made me uneasy. British and French social psychologists began probing the irrationality of the crowd in the late nineteenth century; Walter Lippmann later affirmed their judgment in Public Opinion. But first James and then Dewey replied by continuing to endorse rational argument and empirical evidence as the best democratic response to unreason. We on the left are quick to accuse those on the right of irrationality. Their inability to see our side of things signals their susceptibility to emotional appeals, their failure to think critically, their ignorance of the issues, their susceptibility to conspiracy theories. But as Michael Paul Rogin showed in The Intellectuals and McCarthy and Jill Lepore shows (through very different means) in The Whites of Their Eyes, the radical right has tapped into very traditional sources of American conservatism rather than appealing simply to the “collective unconscious” or manipulating paranoid fantasies. Obama’s more cerebral political style may derive from his years in academia and his commitment to deliberative democracy, but denying the efficacy of reasoned debate and embracing the politics of emotion and symbol seems to me unlikely to cure what ails our politics. I applaud John’s well informed account of this tradition of political diagnosis, but I resist the remedy that seems to be implicit in his analysis.

I will conclude by addressing John’s claim that pragmatism is inadequate as a blueprint for politics. I do understand the problem. The difficulty of establishing a firm basis for political judgment in the absence of foundational philosophy was the central theme of Uncertain Victory and of much I have written since then. I have not changed my mind. Perhaps John is right: perhaps I should have paid more attention to the perils of perspectivalism than I did in Reading Obama. The title of Uncertain Victory is, after all, a pun: the victory of uncertainty itself proved uncertain. When the absolutists hawking communism or fascism after World War I demanded a response, Americans wanted–-perhaps they even needed--something other than a skeptic’s question mark. Likewise today, puzzled by a president who offered them dreams that he hoped to achieve through experimentation rather than steadfast adherence to unchanging principles, many Americans across the political spectrum want answers grounded in absolutes. They want certainty. Explaining that the man they had elected was instead, by his own admission, a disillusioned skeptic as well as a confirmed egalitarian democrat, was the purpose of Reading Obama.

But is it unfair to turn around John’s question about efficacy? Have those who refused to participate in the corrupt and corrupting activity of politics, those who stood to the side and preserved the purity of their positions while denouncing those engaged in the struggle, transformed public life as a result of what they said or wrote more effectively than did, say, John Adams or Jane Addams, Wilson or FDR, Charles Sumner or Bernie Sanders? Every reader of USIH will think of examples on both sides-–on all sides, really–-of these endlessly challenging questions. One of the many reasons to study US intellectual history, surely, is the conviction that our understanding of the history of American thought matters for how we understand the present. I decided to write Reading Obama because I believe Americans ought to grasp how the current President of the United States thinks--and why he thinks as he does. When the White House is occupied by someone who has wrestled seriously with the shaping traditions of American thought and has written about American history as incisively as Obama has done, we intellectual historians should pay attention to his ideas whether we agree with his political strategy or not. John Summers considers it evasive to say it’s too early for historians to assess the significance of the Obama presidency. I disagree. Obama’s presidency has one and a half or perhaps five and a half years to run. Historians are not soothsayers. But one part of the historical record is already in place. By 2010 this president had written two books and a number of speeches, rich and rewarding texts that we intellectual historians can use to help our students probe the traditions of American thought, traditions that all of us have inherited and that we must now shape. If Reading Obama sparks debate about Obama’s understanding of American history--and about the implications of that understanding for American democracy--it will have served its purpose.

--------------

Summers replies:

Thanks to my friend Jim Kloppenberg for his gracious and illuminating response. As anyone who knows Jim would expect, his reply raises deep and interesting issues of intellectual history. About one of these, in particular, I'd like to engage him further. He is right to identify me as an anarchist (at least on a few days of the week – like William James, Dwight Macdonald, James Agee, C. Wright Mills, Henry Adams, and others who have professed anarchism, I also have conservative impulses). He is also right that “pragmatism is a philosophy for skeptics.” But does he mean that pragmatists can't be anarchists, or that anarchists can't be skeptics? There's a natural affinity between pragmatism and anarchism that Jim elides when he counterposes them as he does in his reply, an affinity, moreover, that’s been the subject of some very good scholarship. See, for example, David Kadlec’s Mosaic Modernism: Anarchism, Pragmatism, Culture (Johns Hopkins, 2000), and Deborah Coon’s article, “One Moment in the World’s Salvation’: Anarchism and the Radicalization of William James,” from the June 1996 issue of the Journal of American History.

Anarchists are skeptical about the legitimacy of existing institutional power and authority just as pragmatists are skeptical about the legitimacy of existing discourses and conceptual systems. Indeed, contemporary higher education is precisely where institutional authority and established discourses meet. The universities that shaped Barack Obama present an obvious target for anarchist and pragmatist-inflected criticism. Yet it’s the absence of self-criticism that is most remarkable about these institutions. (One is left to wonder, for example, how William James would view Harvard’s transformation into a manufactory of wealth, power, and institutional prestige.)

READING OBAMA: Kloppenberg Responds to Summers


James Kloppenberg, Harvard University, responds to the John Summers review of his book, Reading Obama. At the end of Kloppenberg's response, below, is a short reply from Summers.

I am grateful to the editors of USIH for the chance to respond to the review of Reading Obama by my friend John Summers, and I am grateful to John for his spirited critique of my argument as he understood it. I have admired John’s fierce independence since I first got to know him a decade ago when we taught a course together at Harvard on democracy in Europe and America. I do not always agree with his judgment, however, whether the subject is scholarship, politics, or pragmatism. Here I will try to clarify our differences as I see them. The point of my book was not to provide a standard by which Obama’s presidency should be judged. My point instead was to show, using the evidence presented in Obama’s own writings, how he thinks about politics, where he locates himself in the history of American thought, and to explain, as well as possible given the limited evidence available now, why he sees the world as he does.

It seems fitting to address these issues in this forum. After all, it was Patricia Cohen’s October 28, 2010 article in The New York Times about the USIH conference in New York City that kicked off the lively discussion of Reading Obama that has continued for the past seven months. For readers who were not at the CUNY Graduate Center last fall, I presented a paper identifying central themes from Obama’s own books Dreams from My Father and The Audacity of Hope and suggested how one might locate his ideas in the rich traditions of American political thought. Although Cohen’s article was accurate and overall not unsympathetic, one sentence has trailed the book ever since: “Kloppenberg explained that he sees Mr. Obama as a kind of philosopher president, a rare breed that can be found only a handful of times in American history.” That phrase, “philosopher president,” has surfaced repeatedly, in reviews from the right and the left.

Let me begin with an emphatic denial: I have never called Obama a “philosopher president.” Unless he writes something after his presidency quite different from the fine books he wrote before his election, I doubt that I ever will. It is one thing to study the work of serious thinkers and take them seriously, as I believe Obama has done with writers ranging from James Madison to William James, from Nietzsche to Niebuhr, and from Gordon Wood to Cass Sunstein. It would be quite another to earn the title “philosopher president,” a phrase that not only suggests someone with noteworthy ideas about important question in philosophy but also conjures up, for me at least, all the unsavory connotations of Plato’s philosopher king.

It is true, as Cohen also wrote, that I consider Obama “an intellectual–a word that is frequently considered an epithet among populists with a robust suspicion of Ivy League elites.” And I remain unrepentant: I believe that editing the Harvard Law Review, writing two excellent books on American culture and politics, and teaching civil rights law for a decade at the University of Chicago Law School qualified Obama for that designation just as surely as Woodrow Wilson’s career as a political scientist placed him in that category before he entered electoral politics. Indeed, establishing that Obama’s books merit the close scrutiny of historians and political scientists was among the principal objectives of my book. That claim too has been disputed by critics who deny that intellectuals can be politicians and that politicians can have expressed ideas worthy of careful analysis. Used as a noun to indicate an individual with critical distance from partisan politics, the word “intellectual” has proved protean ever since it entered the French language during the Dreyfus affair and was imported to the US by William James. I will address this complex issue in a new Forward to the paperback edition of Reading Obama, which Princeton University Press will publish in January, 2012. In my view, individuals from John Adams and Marie-Olympe de Gouges to Jean Jaurès and Vaclav Havel--whether characterized as intellectuals or as independent thinkers–-indicate that the border between political thought and political practice had been porous, and that traffic across it had been productive, long before the author of Dreams and Audacity ran for president.

But let me return to John Summers, who has done me a favor by identifying the unintentionally fuzzy sentence, on p. 5 of Reading Obama, that might be responsible for much of the criticism leveled at the book: “Dreams and Hope, taken together, provide not only a window into Obama’s nuanced understanding of American history and culture but also a blueprint for American politics.” John takes that sentence to mean that Obama’s books provide my blueprint for American politics or the blueprint I think the US ought to follow. In his words, “it’s here, in the move from contextualizing Obama’s intellectual biography to proposing on its behalf ‘a blue-print for American politics,’ that the trouble begins.” That interpretation of the sentence never occurred to me, but I am happy to concede the ambiguity. In the paperback, I will be sure to change the words “a blueprint” to “his blueprint.” Let me emphasize here that Reading Obama presents my analysis of Barack Obama’s diagnosis and his blueprint, as presented in his books and speeches, not my own or the one I think all Americans should embrace. As I thought the book’s title would indicate, Reading Obama is an effort to examine Barack Obama’s ideas about American history and American politics and explain how they emerged.

John correctly traces the lineage of Obama’s moderate democratic politics to the early twentieth century, the era I examined in my book Uncertain Victory: Social Democracy and Progressivism in European and American Thought, 1870-1920. In Audacity, Obama himself emphasized certain features of progressive reform, including the role of the social gospel, government regulation of the economy, and the graduated income tax. Obama also stressed the revival and extension of those ideas in the social democratic program articulated by Franklin D. Roosevelt late in his third term as president, the “Second Bill of Rights” that he announced in his 1944 state of the union address and on which he ran successfully for reelection later that year. That speech outlined a program, originally developed by FDR’s National Resources Planning Board, for national health insurance, a robust minimum wage, and ambitious schemes for housing, full employment, and insurance against unemployment, accidents, and old age. In Audacity, Obama characterized FDR’s far-reaching program, which I discussed in chapter seven of my book The Virtues of Liberalism and Obama’s friend Cass Sunstein made the focus of his 2004 book The Second Bill of Rights, as the unfulfilled promise of democratic reform. So John is right that I have been interested in the issues addressed by Obama for a long time. But I tried hard in Uncertain Victory and in The Virtues of Liberalism not only to establish linkages between the pragmatism of William James and John Dewey and some strands of progressivism and social democracy on both sides of the Atlantic. I tried also to show the unresolved tensions within and between James’s and Dewey’s ideas about philosophy and politics, to show how and why their followers took their ideas in different directions and disagreed about their implications for particular political issues, and to show the very real obstacles that progressive and social democratic reformers have faced.

The meaning of American democracy has always been contested, often as vigorously as it is now. Even at the peak of enthusiasm for progressive reform or at the height of FDR’s popularity, the foes of social democratic ideas commanded economic and cultural resources that they were able to translate into substantial electoral support. I chided some of Obama’s leftist critics in my book not because I intended to position myself or Obama “above the fray,” to use John’s phrase, but because I think most leftist critics have projected onto Obama a degree of radicalism he never expressed and because I think that those of us on the left sometimes forget that the current President of the United States, no matter how powerful he appears to be, is as powerfully constrained by the United States Congress as were Wilson and FDR. I agree with Eric Alterman that we need public financing for elections, tighter restraints on lobbyists, and a new set of rules for the United States Senate. (Making it proportional to population, as partisans of representative democracy from James Madison to Robert Dahl have observed, would be a good place to begin.) But I do not think we can afford to wash our hands of politics, sordid as it is, until those reforms are in place.

Although John Summers and I might disagree about political strategy, I do not think the differences derive from my alleged aspiration to the status of “Serious Thinker” or “Public Intellectual.” I aspire only to the lofty status of intellectual historian. I am puzzled by John’s characterization of my attitude toward Obama as “adulation.” As he notes but does not emphasize, I do express misgivings about many positions Obama has taken and decisions he has made, including but not limited to drones and civil liberties. I understand the limits of the health care plan and the financial reform package. But again, evaluating Obama’s presidency was not the aim of Reading Obama; I aimed instead to explain, using his own writings, why he has shown a greater willingness to compromise, seek consensus, and settle for incremental gains than some of his enthusiasts who did not read his books might have expected. I also sought, briefly, to contextualize the circumstances in which he was forced to operate in 2009. As William Galston and many other writers have noted, the most substantial progressive reforms of the twentieth century were achieved when FDR and Lyndon Johnson enjoyed overwhelming Democratic majorities in the House and the Senate, not the perilously slim Democratic majorities, weakened further by the large number of blue-dog Democrats elected in 2008, that passed the watered-down legislation on health care and financial regulation in 2009 and 2010. (Incidentally, it is not clear to me why Galston’s politics, whether left, right, or “centrist,” to use John’s word, matter in assessing the accuracy of this observation, which has been made by Bill Clinton and by many political scientists, historians, and journalists.) Enacting progressive social legislation in American history has always been a struggle. Even opening the door to economic regulation, a graduated income tax, social security, or equal protection for women and racial minorities has been met with howls of protest. Presidents aiming for substantial reform face obstacles, both from within their own parties and from the opposition.

I have no quarrel with any critics inclined to exert pressure on a president to push as hard as he can for what he wants to achieve. Again, my goal in Reading Obama was not to assess Obama’s presidency. He had occupied the White House a little over a year when the manuscript went to press, so any overall evaluation would have been premature. I sought instead to establish an unnoticed link between Obama’s approach to governance, which takes seriously the need to listen to opponents and forge coalitions and resists the lure of partisan purity as a matter of principle rather than expediency, and the intellectual transformation of America during the years he came of age. Obama’s writings indicate that he distrusts absolutes and embraces skepticism and experimentation.

In the studies of Obama that have appeared in the last few years, much has been made of the role played by the Civil Right Movement, by Obama’s experience growing up as a mixed-race individual in Hawaii and Indonesia, and by his mother’s lessons in empathy and her devotion to her career in cultural anthropology. We will learn even more about these issues in forthcoming books. All of those factors clearly played a part in shaping Obama’s sensibility. Reading Obama focuses on a different set of influences, including the ideas of anti-foundationalism, historicism, perspectivalism, civic republicanism, deliberative democracy, and the resurgence of pragmatism, all of which changed the terms of debate in American universities when Obama was coming of age. Reading Obama examines the evidence of ideas in Obama’s books and speeches. It is an intellectual biography.

John Summers reminds readers that many earlier and many more recent thinkers found pragmatism wanting: they were, he writes, “riddled by doubts over its capacity to generalize itself in democratic action.” Yet many of the thinkers he admires, including Randolph Bourne, Merle Curti, Richard Hofstadter, Robert Westbrook, and Hans Joas, have criticized some pragmatists’ misuse or misunderstanding of the tradition, as they understand it, by invoking the ideas and arguments of other pragmatists. To cite only the most familiar example, when Randolph Bourne challenged Dewey on World War I, he summoned the spirit of William James. Others have followed his lead, selecting particular strands of the multi-stranded tradition of philosophical pragmatism to wield against those they found straying from its authentic spirit. Fair enough. I have made versions of that point myself in Uncertain Victory, in The Virtues of Liberalism, and in the essay “Pragmatism: An Old Name for Some New Ways of Thinking?” published in the JAH in 1996. In Reading Obama, I wrote, “there never has been–nor, I think, can there be–a clear, explicit, singular lesson to be drawn from the philosophy of pragmatism for a particular political dispute. Indeed, the idea of such a formula is inimical to pragmatism, which is a method for testing beliefs in experience rather than measuring them against a yardstick of unchanging absolutes. Precisely because consequences matter to pragmatists, one can never say dogmatically, in advance, that one policy or another follows necessarily from the commitment to experimentation. Pragmatism is a philosophy for skeptics, a philosophy for those committed to democratic debate and the critical assessment of the results of political decisions, not for true believers convinced they know the right course of action in advance of inquiry and experimentation” (p. xiii).

John Summers is not a skeptic. As readers of his many essays and his book Every Fury on Earth know, he is a professed anarchist and a critic of the academy who thinks most tenured professors have abandoned their principles to become accomplices of injustice. He believes that one must not flinch from speaking truth to power, no matter how unpleasant that may be for privileged and comfortable insiders in universities or in government. That too is a distinguished tradition in American thought, one that runs at least from Henry David Thoreau to Christopher Lasch, and it will no doubt continue into the future through the efforts of writers like John. And he is not alone. Many people at both ends of the contemporary political spectrum see themselves as lonely truth tellers calling Americans back to the noble path as they see it. In making that observation, I hope I am not guilty yet again of “reinforcing the status quo,” as John accuses me of doing. I believe passionately that a radically more progressive tax code, a radically more aggressive approach to regulating the economy, and a radically diminished American military presence in the world are desirable goals. But I have chosen, to use Max Weber’s formulation, Wissenschaft rather than politics as a vocation. As a scholar I do not have to endure the endless give-and-take, the deal-making with people I detest, that is the steady diet of politicians.

Barack Obama has a different understanding of his role in our democracy. As he has made clear throughout his life, explained in his writings, and even announced in some of his notable speeches, he thinks that no one has sole possession of the truth. He believes in deliberating with people who see things differently. He believes in empathy, and in his speech about the killings in Tucson he explained why he thinks it matters so much. As I observed at several points in Reading Obama, those beliefs constitute a gamble in today’s hyper-partisan political atmosphere. It might be a miscalculation. It might even rest on a mistaken understanding of how American democracy works.

As Obama noted in The Audacity of Hope, on the decisive question of slavery it was indeed the extremists, those zealots who refused to compromise with evil, who ultimately forced the issue. But Obama then admitted that whenever he encounters zealots in his own day he feels compelled to ask himself whether, a century from now, they will be thought right and moderates like himself thought wrong. That degree of self-consciousness, that willingness to concede that one’s own views might prove to be wrong and that one’s opponents might prove to be right, is arresting and unusual. I do not think it worthy of “adulation,” but I do think it is uncommon among contemporary Americans, left or right, and particularly uncommon among elected officials and political commentators. Making clear where that acute self-consciousness came from, and explaining why Obama grew to view twenty-first-century cultures and politics through the lenses of skepticism, historicism, and perspectivalism, is the aim of Reading Obama.

John offers a thoughtful meditation on the role of the unconscious in American politics, and he raises the question of whether Obama is sufficiently alert to this problem. This form of political analysis has always made me uneasy. British and French social psychologists began probing the irrationality of the crowd in the late nineteenth century; Walter Lippmann later affirmed their judgment in Public Opinion. But first James and then Dewey replied by continuing to endorse rational argument and empirical evidence as the best democratic response to unreason. We on the left are quick to accuse those on the right of irrationality. Their inability to see our side of things signals their susceptibility to emotional appeals, their failure to think critically, their ignorance of the issues, their susceptibility to conspiracy theories. But as Michael Paul Rogin showed in The Intellectuals and McCarthy and Jill Lepore shows (through very different means) in The Whites of Their Eyes, the radical right has tapped into very traditional sources of American conservatism rather than appealing simply to the “collective unconscious” or manipulating paranoid fantasies. Obama’s more cerebral political style may derive from his years in academia and his commitment to deliberative democracy, but denying the efficacy of reasoned debate and embracing the politics of emotion and symbol seems to me unlikely to cure what ails our politics. I applaud John’s well informed account of this tradition of political diagnosis, but I resist the remedy that seems to be implicit in his analysis.

I will conclude by addressing John’s claim that pragmatism is inadequate as a blueprint for politics. I do understand the problem. The difficulty of establishing a firm basis for political judgment in the absence of foundational philosophy was the central theme of Uncertain Victory and of much I have written since then. I have not changed my mind. Perhaps John is right: perhaps I should have paid more attention to the perils of perspectivalism than I did in Reading Obama. The title of Uncertain Victory is, after all, a pun: the victory of uncertainty itself proved uncertain. When the absolutists hawking communism or fascism after World War I demanded a response, Americans wanted–-perhaps they even needed--something other than a skeptic’s question mark. Likewise today, puzzled by a president who offered them dreams that he hoped to achieve through experimentation rather than steadfast adherence to unchanging principles, many Americans across the political spectrum want answers grounded in absolutes. They want certainty. Explaining that the man they had elected was instead, by his own admission, a disillusioned skeptic as well as a confirmed egalitarian democrat, was the purpose of Reading Obama.

But is it unfair to turn around John’s question about efficacy? Have those who refused to participate in the corrupt and corrupting activity of politics, those who stood to the side and preserved the purity of their positions while denouncing those engaged in the struggle, transformed public life as a result of what they said or wrote more effectively than did, say, John Adams or Jane Addams, Wilson or FDR, Charles Sumner or Bernie Sanders? Every reader of USIH will think of examples on both sides-–on all sides, really–-of these endlessly challenging questions. One of the many reasons to study US intellectual history, surely, is the conviction that our understanding of the history of American thought matters for how we understand the present. I decided to write Reading Obama because I believe Americans ought to grasp how the current President of the United States thinks--and why he thinks as he does. When the White House is occupied by someone who has wrestled seriously with the shaping traditions of American thought and has written about American history as incisively as Obama has done, we intellectual historians should pay attention to his ideas whether we agree with his political strategy or not. John Summers considers it evasive to say it’s too early for historians to assess the significance of the Obama presidency. I disagree. Obama’s presidency has one and a half or perhaps five and a half years to run. Historians are not soothsayers. But one part of the historical record is already in place. By 2010 this president had written two books and a number of speeches, rich and rewarding texts that we intellectual historians can use to help our students probe the traditions of American thought, traditions that all of us have inherited and that we must now shape. If Reading Obama sparks debate about Obama’s understanding of American history--and about the implications of that understanding for American democracy--it will have served its purpose.

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Summers replies:

Thanks to my friend Jim Kloppenberg for his gracious and illuminating response. As anyone who knows Jim would expect, his reply raises deep and interesting issues of intellectual history. About one of these, in particular, I'd like to engage him further. He is right to identify me as an anarchist (at least on a few days of the week – like William James, Dwight Macdonald, James Agee, C. Wright Mills, Henry Adams, and others who have professed anarchism, I also have conservative impulses). He is also right that “pragmatism is a philosophy for skeptics.” But does he mean that pragmatists can't be anarchists, or that anarchists can't be skeptics? There's a natural affinity between pragmatism and anarchism that Jim elides when he counterposes them as he does in his reply, an affinity, moreover, that’s been the subject of some very good scholarship. See, for example, David Kadlec’s Mosaic Modernism: Anarchism, Pragmatism, Culture (Johns Hopkins, 2000), and Deborah Coon’s article, “One Moment in the World’s Salvation’: Anarchism and the Radicalization of William James,” from the June 1996 issue of the Journal of American History.

Anarchists are skeptical about the legitimacy of existing institutional power and authority just as pragmatists are skeptical about the legitimacy of existing discourses and conceptual systems. Indeed, contemporary higher education is precisely where institutional authority and established discourses meet. The universities that shaped Barack Obama present an obvious target for anarchist and pragmatist-inflected criticism. Yet it’s the absence of self-criticism that is most remarkable about these institutions. (One is left to wonder, for example, how William James would view Harvard’s transformation into a manufactory of wealth, power, and institutional prestige.)

Jumat, 27 Mei 2011

Book Review: Summers on Kloppenberg's READING OBAMA


Politics and Pragmatism
by John Summers

James T. Kloppenberg, Reading Obama: Dreams, Hope, and the American Political Tradition, Princeton University Press.

Barack Obama studied history at Occidental College, majored in political science at Columbia University, earned a law degree at Harvard University, and taught constitutional law at the University of Chicago. Reading Obama, by James Kloppenberg, is a biography of the ideas he encountered at these institutions, then amalgamated and expressed in his books and speeches. Kloppenberg, the chair of the Harvard history department, explains the pragmatic approach to politics that marked Obama’s rise, and finds in the President firm commitments to “historicism, perspectivalism, anti-foundationalism, and philosophical pragmatism,” commitments that reflect the influence of academic intellectuals such as Cass Sunstein, John Rawls, Lawrence Tribe, Clifford Geertz, Michael Sandel, and Gordon Wood.

Reading Obama offers a steady flow of commentary on race, law, and religion, and picks out biographical facts of special interest to intellectual historians. One learns, for example, that Malia and Sasha, his daughters, attended the Lab School in Chicago, an institution founded by Alice and John Dewey; and that when Obama’s mother studied anthropology at the University of Hawaii her advisor was Alice Dewey, the philosopher’s granddaughter.

Kloppenberg’s big point is that habits of compromise and conciliation have a moral history at odds with Clintonian “triangulation.” He describes philosophical pragmatism, the locus of the book and center of Obama’s sensibility, as a method whose value lies in its refusal to promise any particular results. It does not logically entail any particular conception of politics, but it does supply a philosophical affinity for one particular form of political practice. Just because pragmatism’s anti-metaphysical stance does not provide by itself an ethical foundation means that it can, through its rational, inter-subjective protocols of belief and communication, establish a framework for negotiating rival ethical systems into a revisable consensus—the very task of democracy in a pluralist culture.

Reading Obama, thus understood, regards the President not only as the rightful heir to a democratic sensibility, but of one particular kind of democracy—a deliberative democracy, infused with civic republicanism. As Kloppenberg writes, “Dreams from My Father and The Audacity of Hope should be acknowledged as the most substantial books written by anyone elected president of the United States since Woodrow Wilson, who enjoyed a successful career as a political scientist before ascending to the presidency of Princeton University, then governorship of New Jersey, and finally the White House. Dreams and Hope, taken together, provide not only a window in Obama’s nuanced understanding of American history and culture but also a blue-print for American politics.” And it’s here, in the move from contextualizing Obama’s intellectual biography to proposing on its behalf “a blue-print for American politics,” that the trouble begins.

The political motive informing James Kloppenberg’s scholarship has been clear since his debut. Uncertain Victory: Social Democracy and Progressivism in European and American Thought, 1870-1920, explored with skill and sympathy social thinkers in Germany, France, England, and the United States, thinkers like Wilhelm Dilthey, Jean Jaures, Eduard Bernstein, Thomas Hill Green, Henry Sidwick, Alfred Fouillee, Max Weber, William James, and John Dewey. Then, too, Kloppenberg’s rehabilitation of pragmatism as a philosophy of “the via media” did not logically entail social democracy, but he presented an affinity with its values and procedures.

In Reading Obama, the political motive is again clear, as Kloppenberg adopts a tone of adulation toward the President and annoyance toward his critics. This time, though, he has selected a contemporary man of power who operates between the remove of large abstractions and the milieu of action, and although he has much to say about the former, he has little to say about the latter. He does not analyze Obama’s political and policy decisions since his election, even though more than a year’s worth of results were available before he finished writing. At no point, moreover, does he analyze any particular political or policy decision Obama made before he became president in terms of the general sensibility he ascribes to him.

Kloppenberg, instead, positions his argument as the president has positioned himself: above the fray, beyond the two parties and their partisans. “Because shrill, partisan simplifications dominate public debate, Obama’s cautious, measured approach to economic reconstruction has infuriated the Right without satisfying the Left,” he writes, as if caution itself, and not Obama’s failure to enact reconstruction sufficient to the problem, is what dissatisfies “the Left” (which, being simple and shrill, must prefer incaution). “At a time when partisans left and right vie to proclaim rival versions of certainty with greater self-righteousness, the pragmatists’ critique of absolutism and embrace of open-ended experimentation seems off-key, unsatisfying, perhaps even cowardly,” he continues, omitting the possibility, ably argued in Eric Alterman’s Kabuki Democracy: The System versus Barack Obama, that experimentalism will be ineffective until the United States adopts publicly financed elections, a ban on lobbying, changes in the rules of the Senate, and other institutional reforms that currently stand no chance.

In Uncertain Victory, Kloppenberg positioned the philosophers of “the via media” in contradistinction to the revolutionary Marxism that threatened Europe and loomed over American political society between 1870 and 1920. But there is no comparable Left movement today. The value of the beyond-left-and-right trope lies in its evasion of the political fights that remain. There are social benefits as well. To present oneself as the adult supervising quarrelsome children, as the engaged observer equidistant from the dogmas of left and right, is to bid for Serious Thinker status from Washington DC journalists such as Ross Douthat, Matthew Yglesias, Erza Klein, David Rieff, James Fallows, Andrew Sullivan, Clive Crook, and other figures on the left or right, but not in either camp. On Ivy League campuses, where a conspicuous distrust of partisan passion reflects the social fact that no professor feels any personal urgency in the outcome of policy debates, to deploy the trope is to bid for Public Intellectual status. The obligatory nod to the opposition is honored here, accordingly. “Scholars are now showing that serious ideas lay beneath the apparent anti-intellectualism of recent American conservative politicians,” Kloppenberg writes, without bothering to identify any of those “serious ideas.” Enough said.

But Kloppenberg’s diffidence costs Reading Obama plenty. The book does not offer any independent ethical arguments for civic republicanism—it has much to say about the idea of the common good, but little about its actual social content—nor does it defend deliberative democracy from critics who see in its fetish for communicative rationality a high-minded form of civic therapy. “I am sure,” wrote hedge-fund manager Daniel Loeb, in an email circulated widely on Wall Street this Spring and published last month in the Wall Street Journal, “if we are really nice and stay quiet, everything will be alright and the president will become more centrist and that all his tough talk is just words. I mean, he really loves us and when he beats us, he doesn’t mean it.” What is one to make of Mr. Loeb, a bundler of big money for the president? What does Mr. Loeb hear in Obama’s rhetoric that Kloppenberg does not?

To discuss the influences on Obama’s conception of politics without analyzing the consequences of any one of his decisions leaves one ready to agree in the abstract but bereft of criteria by which to judge the sensibility in action. Pragmatism, civic republicanism, and deliberative democracy do not exhaust the influences on President Obama, which must also include his experiences as a community organizer, legislator, and civil rights lawyer. Yet how can one weigh the proportions in any specific issue? Was it vulgar pragmatism or philosophical pragmatism guiding him when he broke his campaign promise and disallowed tax cuts on the rich to expire? Surely it was not his commitment to deliberative democracy that has caused him to normalize his predecessor’s program for national surveillance and outdo even him in zeal for suppressing public information, prosecuting whistleblowers, and detaining dissenters. Could it have been his civic republican fealty to the idea of the common good that caused him to begin budget negotiations with himself, then to cede the terms of the debate to the minority opposition?

The closest Kloppenberg comes to testing his argument lies in brief comments over the President’s handling of health care. “His flexibility and his willingness to compromise infuriated some of his supporters on the left, and the refusal of his intransigent Republican opponents caused many observers to mock the president’s repeated appeals to negotiation, bipartisanship, and creative compromise. As savvy pundits left and right pointed out repeatedly, it takes two to compromise, and efforts to negotiate are futile when the other side shows no interest. But Obama’s steadfast insistence that he was open to suggestions, that he was willing to meet with his adversaries and consider their ideas, and his repeated invitations to Republicans to propose alternatives served a purpose that few commentators seemed to notice as the debate wore on. His was displaying, over and over, with a patience that outraged his allies and bewildered his foes, an iron fortitude that his critics mistook for weakness.”

The adulation is chilling. Obama’s heroic patience may have proved his pragmatist mettle, but did it serve the sick, the helpless, and the dying? Kloppenberg, citing no evidence or authority other than the centrist political scientist William Galston, offers that the resulting bill “might” be the best Obama could have gotten. Crucially, he does not attempt to show that the bill grew better as a result of Obama’s “iron fortitude.” Nor does he mention that, due to a deal cut with pharmaceutical and insurance corporations, the bill’s mandated expansion in coverage does not take effect until 2014. While uninsured Americans wait, the corporations invited to take immediate advantage of the bill’s provisions have been making record profits.

Pragmatism has been an academic movement from its inception in the nineteenth century, with all but one of its four founders enjoying successful careers as teachers and scholars in leading U.S. universities, to its contemporary revival in law, history, and literary and political theory. As formulated by John Dewey and George Mead at the University of Chicago and William James at Harvard, pragmatism also has offered itself as a public philosophy for modern America--a cultural source of ideas and ideals for democracies, a warrant for their power in history-making.

Kloppenberg writes as if one must be a cynic, an absolutist, or a materialist to reject the “blue-print for American politics” he infers from Obama’s pragmatist biography. Yet the political history of pragmatism has been riddled by doubts over its capacity to generalize itself in democratic action--a history inaugurated by Randolph Bourne during World War I; renewed in the 1930s and 1940s by Merle Curti, Walter Lippmann, Dwight Macdonald, C. Wright Mills, Lewis Mumford, and Reinhold Niebuhr; and sustained in the 1950s and 1960s by Richard Hofstadter, Christopher Lasch, Morton White, and others. Hannah Arendt, reviewing Dewey’s Problems of Men (1946), articulated a common complaint among the non-Marxist left to the effect that Dewey’s pragmatism, in particular, seemed “out of tune with reality.” Arendt, writing after the experience of fascism, marveled at “this fantastic disparity between the argumentation itself, which in an abstract sense is always right, and the basis of experience, which in its historical actuality is always wrong,” and sought to explain the disparity “in the light of Dewey’s central concept, which is not a concept of Man but a concept of Science.”

The contemporary revival of pragmatism has been marked by similar doubts. Critical studies and essays such as John Patrick Diggins’s The Promise of Pragmatism (1994) and Alan Wolfe’s “The Missing Pragmatic Revival in American Social Science” (1998) have focused attention on the absence of empirical studies of social and political institutions on the part of pragmatists. But many sympathetic studies--William Caspary’s Dewey on Democracy (1991), Andrew Feffer’s The Chicago Pragmatists and American Progressivism (1993), James Campbell’s Understanding John Dewey (1995), Louis Menand’s The Metaphysical Club (2001), Cornel West’s The American Evasion of Philosophy (1989), Alan Ryan’s John Dewey and the High Tide of American Liberalism (1995)--have acknowledged its limitations as well. Hans Joas’s Pragmatism and Social Theory (1993) notes that although Dewey had hoped, and often expected, his conception of philosophy to support a democratic social order, “the actual importance of this type of social order in modern societies poses one of the main problems of pragmatism’s political philosophy and of the sociology based on that philosophy.” In G.H. Mead: A Contemporary Re-examination of his Thought (1997) Joas observes that the founders of pragmatism left a gap between their philosophy and social reality, the same gap that appears in Reading Obama. “I am convinced that the pragmatists tended to neglect those important forms of political and sociological analysis that lie between abstractly universal statements about the origins of human communication, on the one hand, and overly concrete comments about the social conflicts of the day, on the other.”

Kloppenberg is most convincing when he shows Obama deploying his empathetic intelligence to resolve conflicts at places like Harvard Law School and the Saguaro Seminar, a dialogue on civic trust convened in 1995 by political scientist Robert Putnam. In these social contexts, a rough consensus on the underlying value of compromise was a condition of participation. Do Obama’s negotiating partners in politics share this underlying value? This question, belittled by Kloppenberg as the anxiety of the unsophisticated, lies, in fact, at the heart of pragmatism in politics. “As Dewey acknowledged,” Robert Westbrook writes in John Dewey and American Democracy (1991), “if social reform was to be as rational, relatively conflict-free, and nonrevolutionary as he suggested it could be, the criteria of the acts of judging at the heart of such reform had to be shared by all the groups in a society, especially those at odds with one another. A widespread consensus on the values of associated living was one of the ‘laboratory conditions’ for experimental reform.” Such reform rested on an “ethical postulate of which many remained unpersuaded, an axiom that masters in particular could not be presumed to accept.”

Kloppenberg himself has doubts. He finds in the President’s economic policies “reason for concern,” calls “murky” the process by which he might bring progressive values to bear on the social problem of inequality, and wonders whether he has “now been yanked by the chain of power back from the commitment to economic democracy proclaimed in The Audacity of Hope.” In such passages, however, Kloppenberg adopts the pragmatist habit of deferring questions of power to the future. He brackets his concerns with airy qualifiers such as “too soon to say” and “not yet clear” and “only the historical record will show.” Meanwhile, he thinks, the rest of us have an urgent responsibility to give the President a break. “As the case of slavery shows,” Kloppenberg writes, “democratic compromise is not always possible. But Americans, including those who malign Obama’s efforts to resolve rather than intensify conflict, should never forget the cost of its failure.” In fact, the political value of this conclusion--in a time when there is zero threat of civil war--lies in reinforcing the status quo. The President himself has urged his supporters to hold him accountable to the principles and promises he voiced during the election.

As Kloppenberg argues for a politics of reason that insists on the potential for negotiation with conservatives, conservatives turn inward toward a tradition that emerged early in the twentieth century as an alternative to pragmatist conceptions of history, law, politics, and human nature. In this tradition, unconscious emotional drives were thought to belie the image of the rational citizen handed down by democratic theorists. Studies of propaganda in the Great War taught journalists, publicists, and social and political scientists--Charles E. Merriam, Elton Mayo, Thurman Arnold, Walter Lippmann--to distrust or deny the ethical force of public opinion and the educative value of politics. Successful politicians tapped into the collective unconscious of voters, controlling their perceptions. Power was a game played out in folk rituals, images, and slogans, in misinformation campaigns, and in the subliminal stimulation sneaked into advertisements for “The American Dream,” a phrase that first circulated in this period.

Ever since, books and essays such as Harold Lasswell’s Psychopathology and Politics (1930), Richard Hofstadter’s “The Paranoid Style in American Politics” (1964), and Garry Wills’s The Kennedy Imprisonment (1982) have pointed attention to the unconscious of movements and leaders. Sigmund Freud and William Bullitt’s Thomas Woodrow Wilson (1966) explored the “tendency to nervous breakdown” by the chief executive, a subject all too germane in the nuclear age. Richard Nixon’s breakdown in the seventies generated a vogue for psycho-biography that shows up today in titles such as Jacob Weisberg’s The Bush Tragedy (2008), where the drama of power plays out in the guise of family romance, and Dan McAdams’s George W. Bush and the Redemptive Dream: A Psychological Portrait (2011).

“Was it all just a dream?” Michael Moore asked in “Fahrenheit 9/11,” his farce of George Bush’s first term. By the end of the second, a sense of absurdity, a feeling that American had fallen into the hands of a claque that refused to acknowledge the results of logic and evidence, had become a general theme voiced by many observers. The image of the bewildered public invigilated The Age of American Unreason (2008), by Susan Jacoby, and Just How Stupid Are We? Facing the Truth about the American Voter (2008), by Rick Shenkman. Just as historians and journalists documented public ignorance that was absurd for a society that makes schooling compulsory, so the incorrigible irrationality of the citizen was ostensibly proved by the empirical science of mass politics. George Lakoff's The Political Mind: Why You Can't Understand 21st-Century American Politics with an 18th-Century Brain (2008), Drew Westen's The Political Brain: The Role of Emotion in Deciding the Fate of the Nation (2008) and many other studies cast doubt on the possibility of the deliberative public that Kloppenberg’s “blue-print” takes for granted.

Even moderate conservatives are turning to this alternative tradition, as David Brooks suggests in his synthesis of neurobiology, The Social Animal (2011). “We are primarily the products of thinking that happens below the level of awareness,” Brooks writes. “The unconscious parts of the mind are most of the mind—where most of the decisions and many of the most impressive acts of thinking take place.” For direct evidence of incommensurability, look no farther than conservative views of Obama’s intellectual biography. Kloppenberg reads Obama and equips him with a birth certificate stamped all over with the impress of U.S. thought and institutions. In The Roots of Obama’s Rage (2010), Dinesh D’Souza reads the curriculum at Punahou Academy, the private school that Obama attended in Hawaii, and lashes books like Gavan Daws’s Shoal of Time and Dee Brown’s Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee willy-nilly to an irrational emotional psychology of anti-colonialism. Kloppenberg links biographical facts and anecdotes with books, schools, and movements of ideas, building an interpretation that shows how Obama reformulated his cultural inheritance. D’Souza attributes influence to a “near-magical” process of unconscious transmission. Kloppenberg leads us to analyze politics in terms of interests and ideology, with corruption and extremism lying dangerously ahead, and mass democracy as the ideal. D’Souza leads us into its fantasies, myths, and pathologies.

James Kloppenberg has written a substantial book with a serious limitation, serious because the suave unfolding of the argument depends on his refusal to test it. President Obama is the product of democracy, and his pragmatic writings and speeches do suggest a sophisticated understanding of how the American experiment was designed. Yet his opponents are also the product of democracy; and the country was not designed for plutocracy. Reading Obama begs the question of whether an intellectual educated in the self-image of our wealthiest universities can become the fighting liberal the rest of us need.

John Summers is visiting scholar in history at Boston College and author of Every Fury on Earth.

James Kloppenberg will reply to Summers next week.