Zombie Ideas In U.S. Intellectual History: An Etymological And Epistemological Study

I first ran across the phrase "zombie ideas" in Paul Krugman's writings, either here or here---probably the latter. In the first post from November 2007, Krugman refers to this document from the Health Policy Institute, titled "Lies, Damned Lies, and Health Care Zombies: Discredited Ideas That Will Not Die." That study introduces the following phrase in its text: "These false ideas (or “zombies”) carry with them implicit policy recommendations bearing on some aspect of health care financing" (p. 6). The HPI piece was written in 1998.

Although I have found several other instances, beyond HPI and Krugman, where the phrase appears, the year 1998 seems to mark the first public appearance of the phrase "zombie ideas" in thoughtful public discourse. So much for etymology. Perhaps one of our readers---a historian with a penchant for lexicography and a fetish for the undead (hah!)---can add to this story?

But what does the phrase mean? And what is its epistemology? Addressing the former question, Krugman called them "false stories that refuse to die, and just keep coming back." The 1998 HPI study correspondingly says they are ideas with a "tendency to re-emerge." It then indirectly expands the definition of the phrase in several ways:

Yet in the United States the idea that consumer co-payments make good economic (and perhaps moral) sense steadfastly resists permanent burial. Why? The interest in user charges bears the familiar hallmarks of a zombie. First, in spite of its popularity, it is intellectually dead, and second, its overwhelming appeal is a product both of its public resonance, and of the efforts of powerful interest groups to keep it on the agenda (p. 24).

Teasing my concerns from the context of the HPI excerpt, it appears that zombie ideas are (in order of importance):

(1) intellectually dead, or are between death and life currently (hence they arise from the grave);
(2) bad (or evil);
(3) scary (people tremble at the emotional encounter);
(4) kept alive by interest groups (political or otherwise); and
(5) primarily political (or at least zombie ideas recur in this context the most).

I do not mean this list to be exhaustive; consider it a beginning. BTW: In a more humorous vein, it seems the HPI study is THE starting point for understanding zombiology in the realm of ideas.

As for epistemology, what of the science or study of this phenomenon (zombiosis, if you prefer) in the world of ideas? How does this process happen? Perhaps only the specialized historical study of interest groups will reveal changes over time: the peculiar phases, duration, and, most importantly, how zombie ideas are killed once and for all (or are they!)? It seems clear that politicians would benefit from an exhaustive study of these ideas.

I am most curious, speaking somewhat more seriously, of what ideas the historians of U.S. intellectual life feel are zombies? What ideas have recurred the most, or are the most relevant, in the history of the United States? Of course an answer to this question might indict the historians themselves. For the question could be phrased: What ideas have historians resurrected over and over to explain change in U.S. history, particular with regard to its intellectual life? So this could digress into an ad hominem thread that beats up on particular historians. That's not my goal. Besides, a comparable taxonomy has already been constructed once before by David Hackett Fisher.

What say you? What are the most important, most cited, or most over-used ideas in U.S. intellectual history? Or what have I missed in defining the meaning of zombie ideas? - TL

Zombie Ideas In U.S. Intellectual History: An Etymological And Epistemological Study

I first ran across the phrase "zombie ideas" in Paul Krugman's writings, either here or here---probably the latter. In the first post from November 2007, Krugman refers to this document from the Health Policy Institute, titled "Lies, Damned Lies, and Health Care Zombies: Discredited Ideas That Will Not Die." That study introduces the following phrase in its text: "These false ideas (or “zombies”) carry with them implicit policy recommendations bearing on some aspect of health care financing" (p. 6). The HPI piece was written in 1998.

Although I have found several other instances, beyond HPI and Krugman, where the phrase appears, the year 1998 seems to mark the first public appearance of the phrase "zombie ideas" in thoughtful public discourse. So much for etymology. Perhaps one of our readers---a historian with a penchant for lexicography and a fetish for the undead (hah!)---can add to this story?

But what does the phrase mean? And what is its epistemology? Addressing the former question, Krugman called them "false stories that refuse to die, and just keep coming back." The 1998 HPI study correspondingly says they are ideas with a "tendency to re-emerge." It then indirectly expands the definition of the phrase in several ways:

Yet in the United States the idea that consumer co-payments make good economic (and perhaps moral) sense steadfastly resists permanent burial. Why? The interest in user charges bears the familiar hallmarks of a zombie. First, in spite of its popularity, it is intellectually dead, and second, its overwhelming appeal is a product both of its public resonance, and of the efforts of powerful interest groups to keep it on the agenda (p. 24).

Teasing my concerns from the context of the HPI excerpt, it appears that zombie ideas are (in order of importance):

(1) intellectually dead, or are between death and life currently (hence they arise from the grave);
(2) bad (or evil);
(3) scary (people tremble at the emotional encounter);
(4) kept alive by interest groups (political or otherwise); and
(5) primarily political (or at least zombie ideas recur in this context the most).

I do not mean this list to be exhaustive; consider it a beginning. BTW: In a more humorous vein, it seems the HPI study is THE starting point for understanding zombiology in the realm of ideas.

As for epistemology, what of the science or study of this phenomenon (zombiosis, if you prefer) in the world of ideas? How does this process happen? Perhaps only the specialized historical study of interest groups will reveal changes over time: the peculiar phases, duration, and, most importantly, how zombie ideas are killed once and for all (or are they!)? It seems clear that politicians would benefit from an exhaustive study of these ideas.

I am most curious, speaking somewhat more seriously, of what ideas the historians of U.S. intellectual life feel are zombies? What ideas have recurred the most, or are the most relevant, in the history of the United States? Of course an answer to this question might indict the historians themselves. For the question could be phrased: What ideas have historians resurrected over and over to explain change in U.S. history, particular with regard to its intellectual life? So this could digress into an ad hominem thread that beats up on particular historians. That's not my goal. Besides, a comparable taxonomy has already been constructed once before by David Hackett Fisher.

What say you? What are the most important, most cited, or most over-used ideas in U.S. intellectual history? Or what have I missed in defining the meaning of zombie ideas? - TL

Tim's Light Reading (5/15/09)

1. Writing Tips from Scott Eric Kaufman---How many times do professed intellectual historians direct your attention to graphics that involve a hamburger? For the record, I generally agree with Ahistoricality when he/she comments that, with regard to history, the evidence needs to outweigh the analysis. Furthermore, as a adopted Chicagoan, my evidential burger condiments generally exclude ketchup (and I do like dijon).

2. Issues in Borderline Slavery Denial at Civil War Memory---I concede that my comments on this post are akin to killing a fly with a hammer: I propose a theoretical solution that overreaches the current problem. But I do genuinely wonder if memories of the American Civil War are, at times, being pushed by extreme revisionists into a denial of slavery. Is there a need for some kind of mild law against denying our own holocaust?

3. Is David Brooks Avoiding Politics by Rethinking the Intellectual Life? (here and here)---Mr. Brooks is known, among some, for his intelligent and reasonably moderate conservatism. His commentary on PBS last fall, during the presidential campaign party conventions, compelled a grudging admiration for his sense of perspective. But I wonder, in light of the current political scene, if he is sort of retreating into the intellectual life? Don't get me wrong, I don't mind. I'm finding the intellectual Brooks more interesting than the political one. And perhaps I don't know his biography well enough; he may have been this way all along?

But on the links provided, the first, on the notion of genius, contains important elements of consideration for all aspiring and working intellectual historians. In particular I appreciated Brooks' citation of Daniel Coyle's The Talent Code and Geoff Colvin's Talent Is Overrated. Both works correspond with an ongoing theory I've held about how one becomes an intellectual with regard to whatever topic is at hand (assuming that multiple intelligences theories hold): superior ability doesn't always manifest itself clearly for evaluators of youth talent, but drive and discipline that correspond with an strong internal vision can sometimes be detected, and would be equally valuable to evaluators. With that, taking a more working, or developmental, view of "genius" would have no small consequences for how history departments, for instance, ought to select applicants. And since the brightest of our faculties in history are encouraged, for the most part, to develop their own genius to its fullest (i.e. research and publish) rather than train those under them, it seems likely that next generation of history "geniuses" is likely to come from hands-on, teaching-type doctoral departments. In other words, those that don't overly emphasize research.

The second Brooks piece looks at the Harvard College "Grant Study." Here he is underscoring Joshua Wolf Shank's June 2009 Atlantic article. That piece is about the pursuit and causes of happiness, but it's also an object lesson in the caprices of intelligence. It highlights something emphasized by Barzun in House of Intellect: namely, that pursuing the intellectual life has only a moderate correlation with intelligence (circling back to the Coyle/Colvin thesis above, reflecting a consistent thread in Brooks' reading list). And of course all historians should keep these two conclusions from Brooks in mind:

a. "It is as if we all contain a multitude of characters and patterns of behavior, and these characters and patterns are bidden by cues we don’t even hear."
b. "There is a complexity to human affairs before which science and analysis simply stands mute."

- TL

Tim's Light Reading (5/15/09)

1. Writing Tips from Scott Eric Kaufman---How many times do professed intellectual historians direct your attention to graphics that involve a hamburger? For the record, I generally agree with Ahistoricality when he/she comments that, with regard to history, the evidence needs to outweigh the analysis. Furthermore, as a adopted Chicagoan, my evidential burger condiments generally exclude ketchup (and I do like dijon).

2. Issues in Borderline Slavery Denial at Civil War Memory---I concede that my comments on this post are akin to killing a fly with a hammer: I propose a theoretical solution that overreaches the current problem. But I do genuinely wonder if memories of the American Civil War are, at times, being pushed by extreme revisionists into a denial of slavery. Is there a need for some kind of mild law against denying our own holocaust?

3. Is David Brooks Avoiding Politics by Rethinking the Intellectual Life? (here and here)---Mr. Brooks is known, among some, for his intelligent and reasonably moderate conservatism. His commentary on PBS last fall, during the presidential campaign party conventions, compelled a grudging admiration for his sense of perspective. But I wonder, in light of the current political scene, if he is sort of retreating into the intellectual life? Don't get me wrong, I don't mind. I'm finding the intellectual Brooks more interesting than the political one. And perhaps I don't know his biography well enough; he may have been this way all along?

But on the links provided, the first, on the notion of genius, contains important elements of consideration for all aspiring and working intellectual historians. In particular I appreciated Brooks' citation of Daniel Coyle's The Talent Code and Geoff Colvin's Talent Is Overrated. Both works correspond with an ongoing theory I've held about how one becomes an intellectual with regard to whatever topic is at hand (assuming that multiple intelligences theories hold): superior ability doesn't always manifest itself clearly for evaluators of youth talent, but drive and discipline that correspond with an strong internal vision can sometimes be detected, and would be equally valuable to evaluators. With that, taking a more working, or developmental, view of "genius" would have no small consequences for how history departments, for instance, ought to select applicants. And since the brightest of our faculties in history are encouraged, for the most part, to develop their own genius to its fullest (i.e. research and publish) rather than train those under them, it seems likely that next generation of history "geniuses" is likely to come from hands-on, teaching-type doctoral departments. In other words, those that don't overly emphasize research.

The second Brooks piece looks at the Harvard College "Grant Study." Here he is underscoring Joshua Wolf Shank's June 2009 Atlantic article. That piece is about the pursuit and causes of happiness, but it's also an object lesson in the caprices of intelligence. It highlights something emphasized by Barzun in House of Intellect: namely, that pursuing the intellectual life has only a moderate correlation with intelligence (circling back to the Coyle/Colvin thesis above, reflecting a consistent thread in Brooks' reading list). And of course all historians should keep these two conclusions from Brooks in mind:

a. "It is as if we all contain a multitude of characters and patterns of behavior, and these characters and patterns are bidden by cues we don’t even hear."
b. "There is a complexity to human affairs before which science and analysis simply stands mute."

- TL