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Selasa, 20 September 2011

David Harvey’s “Mental Conceptions”

Yesterday, I finished writing up my comments on Daniel Rodgers, Age of Fracture, which I will present at our conference in November. This was a difficult review for me to write because there are so many things about the book that sparked my intellectual curiosity. I settled on examining the epistemology implied by the book, in part because, though we’ve done a great deal of speculating about it here (see for example David Sehat’s posts on whether Rodgers is Rortyian here and here and here), none of the formal reviews have addressed Rodgers’s theoretical underpinnings to my satisfaction. I also rested my review on epistemology because, as regular readers of this blog have no doubt noticed, I am always thinking about it in relation to history and historiography.

This is not to say that my epistemological influences or interests are necessarily well rounded. As our frequent gadfly Varad pointed out in a recent post, the theories of culture and power I focus on tend to run the gamut between Marxism and its derivatives. Fair enough. In my defense, this gamut seems large when I’m trying to decipher the differences between Marx and Derrida. But I admit this might be the narcissism of small differences. Oh, well, at the risk of beating a dead, narcissistic horse, today I continue my thread about theories of culture by returning to the subject of last week’s post: David Harvey, specifically, his latest book, The Enigma of Capital (which I find a deeply satisfying read).

In Chapter 5, “Capital Evolves,” Harvey pauses from his historical dissection of capitalism (by way of Marx’s Capital) to offer up a general theory of history (by way of, you guessed it, Marx’s Capital). I find this theory worth discussing because it makes sense to me, but also because it puts into clear words the nuanced sense of culture that Harvey displayed in his classic work, The Condition of Postmodernity. I also find it worth discussing because I think its an implicit structuralist response to those poststructuralists who only see base-superstructure determinism when they see Marxism.

Harvey argues that “cultural norms and belief systems (that is, religious and political ideologies) are powerfully present but do not exist independently of social relations…” Pretty standard stuff, and not far removed from Althusser or from Marx for that matter. Harvey calls these cultural norms and belief systems our “mental conceptions of the world,” one of seven “distinctive activity spheres” that comprise the historical development of capitalism. All seven in Harvey’s words:

1. Technologies and organizational forms
2. Social relations
3. Institutional and administrative arrangements
4. Production and labor processes
5. Relations to nature
6. The reproduction of daily life and the species
7. Mental conceptions of the world

This last “sphere” of course speaks most to intellectual historians. Harvey sees all of these spheres as mutually constitutive: no one sphere dominates even as none of them are independent. "Each sphere evolves on its own account but always in dynamic interaction with the others.” So though this is a structuralist account of historical change, in that a contrived mental conception like a metaphor cannot take on a life of its own apart from the other spheres, and although it’s “total” or even “totalizing” in its sense of a social formation, which postmodernists of the world have united against, it is not economically determinist in the “vulgar” sense that economics underlies all else. More from Harvey to give a sense of how he sees this at work:

Our mental conceptions of the world… are usually unstable, contested, subject to scientific discoveries as well as whims, fashions and passionately held cultural and religious beliefs and desires. Changes in mental conceptions have all manner of intended and unintended consequences for [the other activity spheres]…

Harvey argues that we should think about the interrelatedness of these spheres as we think about an ecosystem. Parts of the ecosystem can act seemingly independent of the rest, but have consequences for the whole by way of the dialectic processes of accommodation and resistance. “The complex flow of influence that move between the spheres are perpetually reshaping all of them.” In stable societies, these seven spheres roughly harmonize. In societies in flux or crisis, there are imbalances that shakedown in unpredictable ways.

In Harvey’s conclusion, he provocatively asks if this co-evolutionary theory of social change can be projected into a co-revolutionary theory of a break. He argues it can and it should. In fact, he maintains that past revolutionary projects failed in part because “they fatally failed to keep the dialectic between the different activity spheres in motion and also failed to embrace the unpredictabilities and uncertainties in the dialectal movement between the spheres. Capitalism has survived precisely by keeping that dialectical movement going and by embracing the inevitable tensions, including crises, that result.”

Some might think this all too abstract or utopian. But I like the way, as a general theory of history, it allows for the importance of structure without being deterministic; and the way it allows for (mild) optimism while also calculating heavy constraints.

Kamis, 01 September 2011

Fundamental Tensions In U.S. History, Intellectual and Otherwise

I don't normally spend a lot time thinking about essential, or fundamental, tensions in American history. I think positing these tensions is a bit cheap---a reductionist way of sweeping a lot important details, or contingencies, under the rug. I suppose I should think more about these tensions, however, since they are useful. Many well-known historians resort to them. And many solid historians respect others who resort to these shorthands.



For a long time Hegel, for instance, was important---a force to be reckoned with---in terms of theorizing about history. In case you're forgotten (or are unfamiliar), Hegel discussed a dialectic, or a tension, around the idea of freedom in history. He saw a dialectic of transition, progress actually, in relation to our increased consciousness of freedom. Hegel forwarded the theory that the idea of freedom was coming into being by grades---that there was a teleology of the realization of human freedom in history. See his Philosophy of History for more, or read more about his thought here. I think this is a fair, shorthand way, of characterizing his thought. He saw a tension, and believed it should characterize accounts of Western history. It's whiggish, but past historians of the United States have applied it in their accounts.



But I'm not here to dwell on Hegel. My present thinking about fundamental tensions has arisen because of some side reading in Reinhold Niebuhr.* This past week I started reading Niebuhr's 1944 book, The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness. This is a work of political philosophy, infused with Christian theology, that covers democracy, fascism, cynicism, and optimism in relation to liberal Christian and secular thought. Ray Haberski referenced this work in an earlier UISH post. Ray used Niebuhr's Children in a discussion of the 1949 film noir classic, The Third Man, to analyze fascism's success in the context of the growth of democratic liberalism.



I'm intrigued by a fundamental tension Niebuhr attributes to Western societies in Children. He argues that you can view the history of Western political philosophy, and American politics by extension, through the lenses of excessive optimism and extreme cynicism. The former is linked to political liberals (particularly the twentieth-century American variety) through their sharp focus on general welfare. These are the naive "Children of Light." The latter, the "Children of Darkness," use our inherent self-interest to manipulate politics through cynicism---playing factions off each other.



This resonated with me. But I probably would've held Niebuhr's theory in tension had I not seen an immediate application this week in the classroom. I'm teaching "The History of American Education" this term, and our first applied reading---after a two-period discussion of the nature and philosophy of history---was in William J. Reese's America's Public Schools: From the Common School to "No Child Left Behind" (Johns Hopkins Press, 2001). The book is part of a series edited by Stanley I. Kutler called "The American Moment."



Normally I don't dwell on forewords from series editors in my readings with students; even in an academic press series, these are usually puffery---an academic's attempt at salesmanship. But I decided to have them look at this one. Kutler's foreword offered at least one intriguing point relating to "fundamental tensions" in American history:



"Schooling also reflects the eternal quest for the proper balance between individualism and community---both "values," deeply ingrained in the American character, with substantial merit and appeal. Americans, Reese notes [on p. 8], vacillate between the two, yet constantly search for a useful, meaningful reconciliation of any tension between them, favoring an education system that will promote and serve both values" (p. ix).



Just to be painfully explicit, I'm connecting individualism to self interest, and general welfare to community (or the common good).



Just before the crush of the term began, as I was attempting to finish my recent manuscript chapter on Mortimer J. Adler, the great books idea, and reactions to the Sixties, I was dwelling a lot on feelings of alienation in relation to the common good. I was thinking a great deal about how our institutions (public, private, and in-between) navigate the individual-community divide, and how they get off-track and require reform---or even revolution.



In other words, my reading, research, and teaching are coming together to underscore the notion that fundamental tensions, especially this one between self-interest and the general welfare, are not just cheap, reductionist shorthands that ignore contingencies. Indeed, some dialectics and dichotomies are representative of historical realities---the historical contingencies at hand are about these tensions. These tensions feel simple, but have an explanatory power that can't be denied. Maybe Niebuhr, Kutler, and Reese are right? And maybe I need to take Hegel more seriously than I have in the past?



What "fundamental tensions"---or dichotomies or dialectics---guide your thinking about intellectual history, or American culture generally? How do you work around the problems they present? How do you reckon with their explanatory power in relation to other valid tropes? - TL



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* Have you heard about the recent posthumous release of John Patrick Diggins' Why Niebuhr Now? (University of Chicago Press, 2011)? I'd be interested to hear any early scuttlebutt on the book's quality, contents, or potential for controversy. - TL

Kamis, 16 Juni 2011

Theory and The History of Education

The May 2011 issue of History of Education Quarterly (HEQ), a journal published by the History of Education Society, focuses on theory, or philosophy, in educational history. The TOC below provides a taste of the issues discussed. Tamura's full article, "Narrative History and Theory," may be of interest to upcoming USIH conference participants.

------------------------------------------------------------

History of Education Quarterly
Volume 51, Issue 2 Pages 145 - 271, May 2011

Guest Editor's Note: Theory in Educational History (pages 145–147)
Eileen H. Tamura

Introduction: Theory in Educational History (pages 148–149)
Eileen H. Tamura, Caroline Eick and Roland Sintos Coloma

Articles

Narrative History and Theory (pages 150–157)
Eileen H. Tamura

Oral Histories of Education and the Relevance of Theory: Claiming New Spaces in a Post-Revisionist Era (pages 158–183)
Caroline Eick

Who's Afraid of Foucault? History, Theory, and Becoming Subjects (pages 184–210)
Roland Sintos Coloma

Responses

Probing the Deep: Theory and History (pages 211–217)
Nancy Beadie

History, Theory, and Education (pages 218–228)
John L. Rury

The Proper Place of Theory in Educational History? (pages 229–238)
Wayne J. Urban

What's Foucault Got to Do with It? History, Theory, and Becoming Subjected (pages 239–246)
Ronald E. Butchart

“What Happens in the Historian's Head?” (pages 247–253)
Kathleen Weiler

A Matter of Class (pages 254–263)
Kathleen A. Murphey

Reflections on History, Education, and Social Theories (pages 264–271)
V. P. Franklin

Theory and The History of Education

The May 2011 issue of History of Education Quarterly (HEQ), a journal published by the History of Education Society, focuses on theory, or philosophy, in educational history. The TOC below provides a taste of the issues discussed. Tamura's full article, "Narrative History and Theory," may be of interest to upcoming USIH conference participants.

------------------------------------------------------------

History of Education Quarterly
Volume 51, Issue 2 Pages 145 - 271, May 2011

Guest Editor's Note: Theory in Educational History (pages 145–147)
Eileen H. Tamura

Introduction: Theory in Educational History (pages 148–149)
Eileen H. Tamura, Caroline Eick and Roland Sintos Coloma

Articles

Narrative History and Theory (pages 150–157)
Eileen H. Tamura

Oral Histories of Education and the Relevance of Theory: Claiming New Spaces in a Post-Revisionist Era (pages 158–183)
Caroline Eick

Who's Afraid of Foucault? History, Theory, and Becoming Subjects (pages 184–210)
Roland Sintos Coloma

Responses

Probing the Deep: Theory and History (pages 211–217)
Nancy Beadie

History, Theory, and Education (pages 218–228)
John L. Rury

The Proper Place of Theory in Educational History? (pages 229–238)
Wayne J. Urban

What's Foucault Got to Do with It? History, Theory, and Becoming Subjected (pages 239–246)
Ronald E. Butchart

“What Happens in the Historian's Head?” (pages 247–253)
Kathleen Weiler

A Matter of Class (pages 254–263)
Kathleen A. Murphey

Reflections on History, Education, and Social Theories (pages 264–271)
V. P. Franklin