Tampilkan postingan dengan label Lisa Szefel. Tampilkan semua postingan
Tampilkan postingan dengan label Lisa Szefel. Tampilkan semua postingan

Selasa, 24 April 2012

What's next in the intellectual history of conservatives?


My OAH experience this year was short but sweet. My panel, "Advise and Dissent: Intellectuals, Values, and Postwar Conservative Trajectories," which took place on Thursday, was a huge success by my account. Chaired by J. David Hoeveler (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee), it included excellent papers by Gregory Schneider (Emporia State University), who talked about Stephen Tonsor, and Lisa Szefel (Pacific University, the next S-USIH treasurer), who presented on Peter Viereck. I gave a paper on Gertrude Himmelfarb. The highlight of the session was provided by George H. Nash, author of the groundbreaking The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America since 1945 (which we debated last year at length here).
Nash opened with a fascinating autobiographical discussion about his peculiar career trajectory--which is of historiographic significance given that his seminal book on conservative intellectuals was written way, way before the topic became trendy. He then spoke some about the incredible surge of historiography on conservatism since Alan Brinkley offered the topic his imprimatur. After that, Nash concluded with some suggestions about what still needs to be done on the history of conservatism. Here they are:
Nash contends that we need biographies of the following three conservative intellectuals:
1) Irving Kristol. (It's amazing nobody has written this yet.)
2) Richard John Neuhaus. (I think our own Ray Haberski is the perfect candidate to write this book.)
3) Peter Viereck. (As Nash noted, luckily Lisa Szefel is on the case.)
Nash also argued that we need more historical exploration of the following three spheres of conservative intellectual history:
1) Neoconservatism. (I couldn't agree more.)

2) The changing place of Europe in the conservative imagination. (This is intriguing--I wanted to ask Nash more about this but forgot to.)
3) Conservative religious ecumenicalism and interfaith alliances. (Speaking as someone writing on the culture wars, for which the breakdown of religious barriers in favor of new political alliances was a major cause and consequence, I second this notion.)
What do you all think? How about an open thread on what still needs to be done on the history of conservatism, conservative intellectuals, or even intellectual history more broadly.

Selasa, 10 April 2012

The Gay Sixties

A few weeks ago I argued here that the short era known as the “sixties” should be understood to have been radical, relative to short eras before and since, even though such an understanding need also be tempered by knowledge, bolstered by a growing historiography, that plenty of non-radical history happened in the sixties as well. Claims about the radicalness of the sixties are especially true when the history of gay liberation, largely absent from standard accounts, is included. Or, as historian John D’Emilio argues in his splendid essay, “Placing Gay in the Sixties”—chapter two of his indispensable collection, The World Turned: Essays on Gay History, Politics, and Culture—the inclusion of gay history in the larger history of the sixties changes the standard sixties narrative.

The first standard element of the sixties narrative that the inclusion of gay liberation complicates is declension. Whereas many historians and other assorted commentators (Todd Gitlin comes to mind) draw a hard-and-fast line between the “good” early sixties and the “bad” late sixties, or assume that the liberation politics of the sixties quickly gave way to the regressive politics of the seventies, D’Emilio guesses “that for many gay men and lesbians, the sixties happened in the seventies.” “While millions of gay men and lesbians around the world look to 1969 as the dawn of a bright new age,” he writes, “everyone else reads it as part of the ‘bad’ sixties and all that follows.” In other words, at the moment when the civil rights and antiwar movements were foundering on the shoals of sectarianism, police repression, and cultural backlash, the gay liberation movement had its watershed moment with the Stonewall Riots.

The best history of the Stonewall Riots, and really, one of the most interesting history books I have ever read, is Martin Duberman’s Stonewall. Duberman analyzes the Stonewall Riot, what he calls “the emblematic event” of the gay right’s movement, and its larger historical context by way of a close biographical study of six individuals. These six people were key figures in gay liberation, if not necessarily lead actors in the actual events of the riot that followed a police raid of a gay bar on Christopher Street in Manhattan on June 27, 1969. The biography of Karla Jay, currently Distinguished Professor of English and Director of Women’s and Gender Studies at Pace University, and one of the six lives Duberman chronicles, provides evidence of how the history of gay liberation shakes up standard sixties narratives.

Jay came of age in in a pre-Stonewall world. Although the gay rights movement predated Stonewall, represented by the two homophile organizations founded in the 1950s—the Mattachine Society and the Daughters of Bilitis—awareness of gay rights was limited. Even many gay rights activists were hesitant about public displays of homosexuality. The Mattachine Society, for example, relied upon alliances with respected heterosexual liberals who spoke on behalf of gay rights, since most Mattachine members preferred not to “out” themselves. Such reticence was logical given the broader cultural stigma attached to homosexuality, a stigma reflected in and reproduced by the dominant professional psychological paradigm that understood homosexuality as pathological. The American Psychological Association (APA) finally declassified homosexuality as a mental disorder in 1973, in large part due to the gay liberation movement, which targeted APA meetings for disruption.

Political repression was mirrored by the personal. Jay grew up in a fairly traditionalist Jewish household where heterosexuality was assumed normative. Thus, she was unable to form a sense of what her sexual feelings meant, one way or another. In her freshman year at Barnard in 1964 she awoke to the reality that homosexuality was taboo when two of her classmates were expelled after a peeping tom witnessed them having sex in their dorm room. The young man who ratted on them suffered no consequences for his peeping, to the contrary, he was hailed as a protector of public norms. Given this, it is no surprise that Jay hid her sexuality until she was an adult.

Like many in the gay liberation movement, Jay got her activist start as part of the broader New Left and counterculture. Formative to her cultural awakening was drug use, which she claims opened her mind to alternative viewpoints. Formative to her political awakening was participating in the 1968 protests at Columbia University, against the university’s expansion into nearby black neighborhoods, and against the institution’s military-sponsored research. But, like so many other New Left women, she grew convinced that sexism plagued the movement.

By 1969, feminism became Jay’s political priority. But just as the feminist movement gained a rebirth, signified by the 1968 Miss America pageant protest in Atlantic City,
it suffered from a wave of sectarianism every bit as divisive as the sectarianism the larger New Left experienced after the 1968 debacle in Chicago. The many thousands of women who sought to join up with the feminist movement, like Jay, had to choose sides in this sectarian struggle. Many selected the more reformist route and joined the National Organization for Women (NOW). But those feminists tied to the New Left, and thus interested in more revolutionary stances than those advocated by NOW, joined up with various radical feminist groups. But, as Alice Echols shows in Daring To Be Bad: Radical Feminism in America 1967-1975, radical feminism experienced its own schisms even apart from its differences with establishment groups like NOW. The divide, at first, was between those who sought to relate the issue of women’s liberation to larger issues already on the New left’s front burner, and those who sought to prioritize the patriarchal repression of women. Jay chose the latter since, according to Duberman, she “disliked the then common notion that feminism should take a backseat to the ‘main’ struggles against capitalism, racism, and imperialism. She saw that argument as a convenient one for men, as a long-standing rationale for deferring women’s liberation by insisting that its time had not yet come, while arguing that it would automatically come once the ‘larger’ struggle had been won.”

Jay joined Redstockings, a radical feminist group founded in 1969 by Shulamith Firestone and Ellen Willis. The Redstockings rejected many doctrinaire New Left positions, but maintained a Marxist analysis about gender inequality. They argued, for example, that women mostly married out of material needs. In terms of tactics, Redstockings focused on consciousness-raising rather than direct action. Consciousness-raising, where activists gathered together to voice their individual struggles, enabled feminists to relate their personal problems to the larger political problems of living in a patriarchal society. When Jay finally came out of the closet at a Redstockings consciousness-raising group, she realized she was among many lesbians. Thus she began the process of expanding her feminist activism to her gay rights activism. In fact, “coming out” as a political tactic was similar to consciousness-raising. Jay explained the theory that guided “coming out”: “the process of self-realization that would emerge from speaking freely and honestly to other gays in the protected atmosphere of a consciousness-raising session would ramify outward, that speaking truth would end by cleansing and reconstituting society at large.”

Jay was not a Stonewall participant. Few women were. Duberman writes about her because he seeks to demonstrate the overall effect Stonewall had on the push for gay rights. Stonewall shifted the tone of the gay right’s movement. Rather than quiet and demurring, the after effects of Stonewall enabled many young activists to be confrontational and demanding of their rights. Out of this the Gay Liberation Front (GLF) formed. Duberman writes: “Karla had been initially disdainful of the ‘little penny-ante thing’ going on at Stonewall; to her it was just another all-male squabble with the prize nothing more than the right to lead an unhampered bar life—a life she scorned. But then she got wind of the effort afoot to form a Gay Liberation Front—men and women working together to produce broad social change. Now that did interest her.”

Most of the founding GLF activists were veterans of other New Left groups. “When these young gay and lesbian radicals now flocked to join the Gay Liberation Front, they brought with them a rich set of insights from their prior involvements: from the black civil rights movement came an awareness of the inequities of American life; from the women’s movement, consciousness of sexism and the profoundly important idea that the personal is political, that one’s experience mattered; from the antiwar struggle, the revelation that the government operated as a bulwark of conformity and privilege; from the countercultural revolution, the injunction to reject all received authority, to ‘do it now, to be what you want to be.’” In this, Duberman not only relates gay liberation to the larger New Left—to the radical sixties more broadly construed—he also implies that the GLF was the culmination, the full flowering, of New Left sensibilities. The GLF carried the radical sixties into the seventies.

Stonewall—1969—was a watershed for gays, a hopeful moment in their efforts to end the sadistic homophobia that dominated American culture. 1969, then, was not the end of liberation politics. D’Emilio argues that this history of gay liberation, when included in the broader narratives at all, often serves to support the declension narrative. He draws a pithy analogy: “without exactly saying as much, gay becomes associated with reaction, backlash, and social decay. We might as well be reading Edward Gibbon’s The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, the classic eighteenth-century work that tied Rome’s collapse to sexual immorality.” In this vein, the fall of the New Deal order, the decline of labor, is implicitly connected to the rise of gay liberation: too much is made of the changing demographics in the Democratic Party that followed the 1972 reform commission headed up by George McGovern, after which the number of minority, women, and gay delegates came to more closely represent the number of such constituents in the party, diminishing the number of (white, male) labor delegates. Jefferson Cowie’s excellent book, Stayin’ Alive: The 1970s and the Last Days of the Working Class seeks to correct this labor declension narrative by replacing it with an alternative one: the white working class helped usher in its own demise by allowing its racism, sexism, and homophobia to override class solidarity.

Of course, none of this is to suggest that the declension narrative that either ignores gay history or relates gay liberation to reaction should be replaced by Whiggish interpretations of unbroken progress. Although life in America is undoubtedly better for gays and lesbians, there has been much heartache along the way. As Lisa Szefel makes clear in her review of Age of Fracture, any history of the 1980s that ignores how the AIDS epidemic was allowed to go largely unchecked due to rampant homophobia of is not getting a very full picture. I’m working hard to avoid that mistake in my book on the culture wars. I spent a week in the Reagan archives last summer, where I discovered mountains of evidence that Reagan administration officials, especially liaisons to the Christian Right—Morton Blackwell during the first Reagan term, Gary Bauer during the second—helped spread anti-homosexual propaganda in order to slow the government response to the AIDS crisis.

But back to the sixties. If you’re interested in an alternative analytical model for understanding them, I highly recommend the D’Emilio’s chapter. It has much more in it that I have yet to mention, including a short but fascinating intellectual history of four sixties thinkers who also happened to be homosexuals: James Baldwin, Bayard Rustin, Allen Ginsberg, and Paul Goodman. D’Emilio argues their homosexuality is significant because, prior to gay liberation, to be public about one’s homosexuality, as these four men were to various, limited degrees, was a mark of protest, a willingness to thumb one’s nose at tradition. D’Emilio regards these thinkers as emblematic of a “gay sensibility” that worked to erode American traditions. Being publicly gay “branded one’s consciousness with a marker of difference… It necessarily made one perpetually aware of separation, of division in the body of humanity, of marginalization and ostracism.”

Ginsberg’s relation to gay liberation is fascinating. Although he wasn’t necessarily an activist in the typical sense of that role, the eponymous beat poet seemed to appear at all the sixties moments of radical lore. He makes an appearance at the Stonewall Inn, for example, two nights following the 1969 riot. When he saw “Gay Power!” scrawled on the front of the bar, he told a Village Voice reporter: “We’re one of the largest minorities in the country—10 percent, you know. It’s about time we did something to assert ourselves.” Ginsberg went inside the bar, which had been cleaned up and reopened, and described the customers as “beautiful—they’ve lost that wounded look that fags all had 10 years ago.” As Duberman relays: “Deputy Inspector Pine later echoed Ginsberg: ‘For those of us in public morals, things were completely changed… suddenly they were not submissive anymore.” That's a radical shift.

Senin, 28 November 2011

Rodgers Responds (Part V of AGE OF FRACTURE roundtable)

Dear readers: This response by Dan Rodgers is the fifth installment in our roundtable. For the first, see my review here. For the second, see Jim Livingston's review here. For the third, see Lisa Szefel's review here. For the fourth, See Mary Dudziak's review here.
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It is a great pleasure to participate in this forum, and I am grateful to Andrew Hartman and Ben Alpers for organizing it and to Andrew, Lisa Szefel, Mary Dudziak, and Jim Livingston for their thoughtful and wide-ranging comments. Those comments have focused in part on Age of Fracture, but they have also focused on the period as a whole, on the books that others are completing (Jim’s new rereading of the late twentieth-century economy and Mary’s forthcoming book on the concept of “wartime”), and on books that they would like to see written, as Lisa urged in her HNN review and repeatedly so eloquently today. And that is as it should be. The subjects of our times are big and urgent, and there is no way that a single book can, or should presume to, encompass all of what needs to be done.

Because this forum has ranged so widely, however, it may be useful to start by saying what I intended in Age of Fracture. I wanted to think about social ideas and arguments in the last quarter of the twentieth century, but still more I wanted to map out some stories about change. I wanted to probe the ways in which certain assumptions fell out of use, new terms crowded in, and debates were reframed. This was an experience everyone felt who lived through this period, and I thought there might be something to be gained by looking at it more closely.

This is not the only way to write a period’s intellectual history. Many of our best models in intellectual history are, by design, static. They identify a period’s key thinkers and key books, they work their way into the period’s central debates, and they figure out a pattern, a wall mural of sorts, that will hold them all. This is important work, and we have all done some of it, if not in print then in our undergraduate teaching.

But I wanted to experiment with a different design: to take some key arenas of debate in which change was particularly striking and explore the ways in which, within those same arenas, the very terms, arguments, and assumptions cracked and shifted. As those who have read Age of Fracture know, I was particularly interested in those arenas where academic thought and public argument met. I wanted to probe the way economics changed its skin, how its disciplinary axis and textbook formulas shifted and how economic argument and policy shifted with them. I wanted to explore not only arguments about race and racism in American society but the ways in which the very terms for thinking about race and identity shifted. I was interested in the ways in which feminism, launched so confidently at the period’s beginning, was remade. I was interested in the ways in which notions of instantly traversable time moved into unexpected places. In the mid-twentieth-century moment in which Alexander Bickel’s jurisprudence was formed, as Mary Dudziak notes, time and history had a glacial presence. It was the point of law school and college education to demonstrate how slowly history moved and how sticky and massive its motions were.

That mid-twentieth-century moment in social thought and argument is the reference point for these and other stories of change braided through Age of Fracture: the years of the high Cold War, when recognition of the power of history, society, institutions, and social structures was at its height in the academies and in public life. By looking at the same fields of argument as their common sense shifted over the next quarter century, I thought we might learn something important both about ideas and about change.

Shaping the design of the project in this way meant leaving out a lot. Popular media, the cracking of the monopoly of network television, the extraordinarily rapid dissemination of the personal computer, the rise of new media icons, the collapse of mid-twentieth-century censorship: all this and more fell outside the core focus of the book. So did many other debates that I might have followed, not the least, as Lisa has reemphasized, the crisis, which was simultaneously a crisis in ideas, identities, politics, and society, over AIDS and its devastations. I wasn’t trying to map the whole terrain of argument and debate. The idea of a Zeitgeist went out, or should have, at the end of the nineteenth century. I was interested in probing some critically important parts of the intellectual terrain in which we now live. But there is a lot left do, and a lot that should be done.

These, then, were my intentions in writing Age of Fracture, and I’d like to think that in some ways I succeeded in realizing them. But no one should endeavor a serious project without anticipating serious critique. That, too, is as it should be. In the comments at this forum and in other venues, critical reactions to Age of Fracture have tended to cluster around three issues which, in shorthand, might be called machinery, metaphors, and mood. First, where is the causal motor to be found behind the shifts in ideas and argument that Age of Fracture describes? What drove and explains the pervasive fracturing of the vocabulary of social life into small, actor-centered pieces, imagined as choosing, preference-satisfying individuals? Second, in this quest for causal explanations, of what serious use, if at all, is a phrase like “a contagion of metaphors?” Last, what is the mood of Age of Fracture? Austere and bleak, as Michael O’Brien reads it, elegiac and funereal, as Jim Livingston has it, or ambivalent, as Andrew Hartman suggests? All of these are invitations to larger discussions about which there’s time here only to say a word.

In explaining why a larger, thicker sense of society became so much more difficult to grasp in the last quarter of the twentieth century there are two powerful arguments in the existing scholarship. The first points to the work of the conservative foundations and the efforts of their managers and business funders to alter the terms of social debate. The second points, more generally, to the new shape of the post-industrial, post-Fordist economy and the needs of the new regime of flexible accumulation for the provisional, socially disembedded selves and disembedded ideas that the era produced.

Both these explanations are terrifically important, and yet, in themselves, they both seem to me insufficient. Assuming relatively passive audiences for the books the conservative think tanks fostered and for the economic forces of the age, they leave out the enormous amount of intellectual work that pervaded the era: the arguing, debating, claiming, refuting, puzzling out, and creative intellectual imagining that also shaped these years. Without wrestling seriously with its intense intellectual labor, we miss a key part of the age.

Is it naive of me to think that we must hold simultaneously to the extraordinary importance of structures—social, economic, technical, and political--and to the extraordinary vitality of ideas, aspirations, nightmares, and theories: the stuff of the mind? I think not. For to pose it as an either-or choice—choose structures or choose culture, as Andrew Hartman proposes—seems to me a false demand. And that is not because I like some forms of structural reasoning for some purposes, and like culturalist explanations for others. Or because I like or don’t like their political outcomes. It is a false choice because there is no recognizable picture of the world that doesn’t have a strong place for both structures and ideas. To refuse a false choice isn’t to slip into ambiguity. It is a position of realism.

But once you take the demands of the late-capitalist economy out of the driver’s seat and once you recognize that money can’t, in itself, buy assent, how are we to understand the ways in which so many of these debates seemed to echo each others’ terms and assumptions? This was not the case at the outset. Economists struggling to find adequate models for the economic turmoil of the 1970s, feminists struggling to forge a politics in which the personal and the solidaristic would hold together, political theorists struggling to find explanations for power more adequate to their symbol-saturated age, and others moved initially within separate and sharply defined contours of argument and experience. Only in time did it become apparent that these efforts had taken many of them down uncannily parallel tracks.

Through a “contagion of metaphors,” I wrote, and in retrospect it is clear that I should have made it an argument not just a phrase. I won’t spell out that argument now, but it’s a realm of intellectual and cultural life that intellectual historians ought to take more seriously than we do. For nothing is more powerful in shaping ways of seeing than a claim of likeness. “War is a surgical operation.” “War is hell.” “War is a strategic game.” “War is a gigantic fog.” These are not simply phrases. They act as trump cards in academic as well as popular debate: analogies with powerful real-life consequences.

The play of opposing metaphors can lead toward standoffs; it may strew the field of argument with the radical incommensurabilities that make discussion impossible. But claims of likeness can also be generative, as ways of seeing and claiming move from one terrain to another. 1960s liberation movements were all about seeing one’s own situation and claims for justice as like that of others. To see the Berkeley campus as another version of racist Mississippi, to see the subjugation of women as just as deep as the oppressions committed in the name of whiteness, to see gays as standing in the same social space as a phalanx of other oppressed persons: the “movement” was built on likeness claims of this sort, and it fell into smaller pieces when the analogies could no longer sustain their weight.

In a parallel fashion, in what I have called an age of fracture, the metaphor which constructed the self as a choosing entity, as engaged in a kind of perpetual shopping and choice-making activity—raced through the academic disciplines and through politics alike, spilling across boundaries of academic discipline and social debate. It did so not as theory but as a claim of one context being “like” something else. This is the work of metaphor, and we should think about it more consciously and take it more seriously than we do.

Finally, a word about the mood of Age of Fracture. Some readers have found it mournful and nostalgic, though neither was my intent. I’m not as hopeful as Jim Livingston is in his new Against Thrift. I am not as convinced as he is that those aspects of social and economic change that he identifies as primitive disaccumulation are the only game in town. I am more worried by the forms of highly sophisticated accumulation going on at a terrific speed underneath us. But going back to the high Cold War era in social thought is not my aim.

Andrew Hartman worries that I take “a moral position neither for nor against our age,” but that, too, seems to me a false choice. What would it mean to be for an age, or against it? You live in the middle of the age you are in: arguing with it, shaped by it but hoping to shape it as well, inextricably part of it, struck by the beauty and courage you find in it, angry and distressed by its meanness and injustice. There is really no other place to stand than that.

I didn’t write Age of Fracture to pronounce a simple judgment on the last thirty years of American intellectual life. What I hoped to do, rather, was to take seriously the ways in which some Americans, placed where their ideas turned out to have very large consequences, talked and argued and thought their way from one set of assumptions about society and selves to another. I wanted to show that in the midst of that creative and productive ferment they let the language for some important dimensions of life fracture. I hoped that retracing those steps might help us find our way to something more adequate for our times, when our practical, collective interdependence strains against the choice-saturated language with which we try to grasp it.

Dan Rodgers

Jumat, 25 November 2011

Szefel on Rodgers (Part III of AGE OF FRACTURE roundtable)

Dear readers: Lisa Szefel's review of Age of Fracture is the third installment in our roundtable. For the first, see my review here. For the second, see Jim Livingston's review here. Expect Mary Dudziak's comments to be posted soon, followed by a response by Dan Rodgers. [Parts of this paper were previously published on the History News Network website, February 24, 2011]

Daniel Rodgers is the Fred Astaire of intellectual history. Words and arguments flow across the page effortlessly. One idea glides to center stage then moves off as another waltzes forward. What I would like to do today is, to paraphrase Hillary Clinton: dance backwards and in high heels. I'd like to get up close and talk about Rodgers' steps.

In Age of Fracture, Daniel Rodgers offers an elegant, often eloquent, history of intellectual life in the last quarter of the twentieth century. Primarily interested in the construction of ideas that shaped conceptions of history, society, and responsibility, he analyzes texts from an eclectic array of academic thinkers across the political spectrum. Rodgers argues that in the 1940s and 1950s, social scientists and political philosophers established the terms of the debate on a range of issues concerning the self and society, obligations and justice, morality and destiny. To these postwar intellectuals, ideas had severe consequences, contexts and nature constricted human action, and history loomed very large indeed.

While the turmoil and chaos of the 1960s caused tremors, it was not until the quakes of oil embargoes, unemployment, and inflation in the 1970s, that fault lines in this ideological consensus emerged. Into this breach, a lexicon of microeconomic principles, which had been forming for decades in libertarian circles that stressed agency, contingency, and reason emerged, promising solutions to seemingly intractable problems of disco-era stagflation. Instead of focusing on property and production, workers and owners, these economists celebrated instead the slight of (an invisible) hand that produced wealth and fostered the virtues of competition.

The vocabulary, metaphors, and grammar of the free market boosters seeped into academic discussions. Instead of the public solidity of politics and pressure groups, American historians, political scientists, anthropologists, sociologists, and literary scholars seeking to understand the formulations of class and exercise of power, now uncovered the ineluctable influence of culture and diffuse workings of hegemony. Gramsci, Geertz, and Foucault replaced Marxist dialectics while close readings of popular songs, prisons, and cockfights superseded analyses of elections, parties, and unions. This cultural turn reshaped the color line as well, as race came to be viewed less as a fixed state and more as a social construction. Notions of gender likewise became subject to preoccupations with language and consciousness-raising rather than investigations into the architecture of patriarchy.

Some other reviewers of the book, most notably Robert Westbrook, have mentioned some important omitted thinkers, most importantly, Martha Nussbaum and, I would add, Elaine Scarry. Other critiques highlight the lack, at times, of sufficient causal analyses. We see how but why did the language and values of free markets triumph so decisively? How did the fall of Communism across Europe and in Russia affect attitudes toward liberal Democrats in America who, for decades, had insisted that the Soviet economy was out-performing domestic capitalism? Cold War triumphalism, after all, was grounded in the reality that the prime alternative to free markets had been defeated. In that scenario, why heed those who were wrong?

Along those lines, why didn’t liberals offer a stouter defense of communitarian principles? Focusing on the progressives’ multicultural and linguistic turn leaves unexamined some dramatic mistakes made by liberal politicians and their supporters, which diminished their credibility. It also ignores the many images of fat cat Democratic power players showing up for budget talks, after the federal government had been shut down, in limousines.

None of this went unnoticed among the working class in those parts of the country hardest hit by deindustrialization—the manufacturing cities of the Midwest and Northeast—who switched party affiliation to become Sunbelt and Rustbelt Republicans. The usual story about backlash and resentment, perpetrated famously in Thomas Frank’s What’s the Matter with Kansas, misses the point. Rodgers, however, is on the right track. A more vertical study that presents a cross-section of values would help to illuminate the common bonds that tied blue collar and Catholics to blue blood conservatives. This is something that is missing in the history of conservatism more generally.

An intellectual historian who clearly delineates his methodology, Rodgers rarely ventures outside the realm of books and articles to explain how conceptions are formed, leading to some connections that ring hollow. In discussing the post-Fordist focus on the present, for example, no mention is made of CNN, personal computers, or the ubiquity of media images. Ideas about race are dissected without analysis of the impact wielded by rap music, MTV, or films like “Boyz n the Hood,” giving the appearance that Charles Murray was primarily responsible for stereotypes that linked skin color to violence. However, Murray said little that Archie Bunker hadn’t already articulated more than a decade earlier and, while liberals were busy decrying the possessive investment in whiteness, ethnic Americans were denouncing the possessive investment in racism among the well-heeled. While lending sheen and coherence to a neat narrative about fracture, the methodology of this particular type of intellectual history can skew analysis of issues and omit important developments." So, while I appreciate the coherence and precision with which Rodgers traces ideas--from left to right, from economics textbooks to presidential podiums. Sometimes this approach--tracing the ebb and flow of ideas--is highly appropriate. Sometimes, however, it belies the way ideas actually circulate or the way history happens. I wonder: What is lost or distorted when intellectual history is not tied to social and cultural history?

Along these lines, I don't believe in trickle down economics and I don't know that trickle down intellectual history is the best representation of the way ideas emerge and circulate. What about trickle up intellectual history (or, for that matter, trickle up economics)? Who should we include as members of the "communities of discourse" that we examine? (There was a nice debate about this on the USIH blog earlier this year).

I mentioned earlier that I would like to dance backwards and in high heels. Let me now add "in drag": Rodgers devotes three pages to the topic of AIDS. In his examination of race and racism, conversely, Rodgers delves deep and wide, devoting an entire chapter to the topic and strewing comments throughout the text. He even makes a rare foray into pop culture, nodding toward the contributions of Sanford & Son, the television mini-series Roots, Bill Cosby, Michael Jackson, Oprah Winfrey, Alice Walker, and Toni Morrison. He discusses “the new black presence in public life” and the legacy of the Harlem Renaissance and black arts movement, and he goes into loving detail about the conscious quest of African American authors to inculcate race pride. He cites polls from Black Enterprise magazine about black solidarity and decries the “day-to-day injuries imposed by the social marks of race in American society.” Willie Horton, Jesse Jackson, the Los Angeles riots, Anita Hill, and the debate among black intellectuals about the persistence of poverty are all there. The chapter on gender is less comprehensive but still works toward explaining relevant questions.

However, where are the gay intellectuals, writers, and activists? Where are Frank Kameny, Barbara Gittings, Larry Kramer, Sarah Schulman, Cleve Jones, John D’Emilio’s landmark, Sexual Politics, Sexual Communities (1983), The Celluloid Closet (1996), Lauren Berlant, Gayle Rubin, Matthew Shepard, and Ellen Degeneres? Where are the concerns about injuries inflicted on gay Americans, about their struggle for pride and dignity in the midst of denial and death?

Citing this omission is not just a plea for inclusion of yet another oppressed group. As Eva Sedgwick argues in Epistemology of the Closet (1990), leaving out queer voices distorts the historical lens. And, if these voices are needed to understand any era, it is most certainly the Reagan-Bush-Clinton years when anti-gay bigotry was embedded in social and intellectual life, when homophobia blanketed, like a fine layer of soot, the nation. What other community suffered as many casualties as a result of the government’s inaction? Estimates place the number of lynchings during Jim Crow as high as 5,000. Over 58,000 Americans died in the Vietnam War. The number of reported AIDS deaths from 1980 through 1997 in the United States is 641,087. Globally 30.6 million people were infected.

Let me say that, citing these statistics is not an exercise in comparative victimology. First, comparative history is a legitimate enterprise. Second, juxtaposition can be useful to bring a stunning reality into bold relief.

Today, approximately 5,000 people die every day because of AIDS, a global calamity that, some scientists argue, could have been controlled had the federal government responded swiftly in 1981 to news of deaths, as it was, most famously, in Australia. But in America the victims were members of a hated, marginalized minority and received no compassion, a key emotion that Rodgers seeks to trace as it relates to the poor. As Randy Shilts in And the Band Played On documented, the CDC and NIH were chronically underfunded. As Reagan biographer Lou Cannon concluded, Reagan's response was "halting and ineffective."

If Rodgers was reaching for a capacious survey of shaping intellectual ideas, how could he ignore this disease or the ideologies and language that allowed it to become a pandemic? The word AIDS itself would benefit from a Rodgers-style definition. Paula Treichler takes on this challenge to analyze the construction of AIDS as an “epidemic of signification” with culture, medicine, linguistics, socioeconomic status, gender, class, and race all influencing scientific naming practices. Considering the emotional and physical toll, it is no wonder that LGBT activist and intellectual Urvashi Vaid writes that “For lesbians, gay men, bisexuals, and transgendered people, the Reagan-Bush years were the worst years of our lives.”

At the heart of the Reagan-Bush era, the moral center of the period, is the AIDS crisis, the callous reaction to victims, and the lurid homophobia that sanctioned isolation and death. Historians, as a profession, have not come to terms with these events. Look at the index to almost any book on the 1980s and AIDS along with the hatred of gay people that fueled the epidemic are barely mentioned, those who do mostly talk about the response to AIDS among homosexual Americans only and the formulations of difficult to read queer theorists.

I do believe that writing a history about this period without addressing the AIDS pandemic is like writing a history of the George Bush years without talking about 9/11. AIDS and the diminishing calculus of compassion during the Reagan era are linked. Conservatism drew its force from antipathy toward a group of people who loved differently. This animus animated evangelicals and justified indifference to AIDS sufferers among Catholic leaders. It can be found everywhere in sermons, political speeches, journals, and newspapers. It inflected thinking on what constituted “normal,” on sex and gender more generally as well as reproductive rights. William Bennett, included in Age of Fracture for work that expounds on virtues, was Secretary of Education, who, along with his Undersecretary Gary Bauer (who later became head of the Family Research Council), served as the principle spokesmen for Reagan’s AIDS policies. Instead of disseminating information to educate people about how transmission occurred and how to prevent infection, these two guys were too worried about saying anything even remotely positive about gay people. Precious time was lost. Lives were lost.

I also wonder about historical context and if we need to consider authorial intention, that elusive quest that Roland Barthes deemed futile. Rick Warren receives mention by Rodgers for forging “more generous even radical frames for evangelical Protestant social thought” but not for barring gays from membership in his Saddleback Church. Pat Buchanan’s 1992 “culture war” speech gets airing for its patriotic invocations, but not his snide remarks about “homosexual rights” and denunciation of gay marriage as “amoral.” Irving Kristol’s work in the knowledge industry is acknowledged but not his charge that homosexuality was a “disease” (Reagan himself referred to it as “a tragic illness”). The issue of gays in the military and same sex marriage played a decisive role in elections, including ballot initiatives in the 1970s, and get-out-the-vote anti-homosexual campaigns, gay-bashing, and gay-baiting in campaigns since then, even affecting the outcome of presidential contests between the “straight panic” years of 1996 and 2004. If Rodgers is interested in the power of ideas, why doesn’t he analyze the origins and allure of anti-gay ideas? In our question and answer period, I hope we will discuss whether the motive of the people we analyze should form part of our analysis. How should intellectual historians consider statements motivated by bigotry and the desire to promote intolerance?

What would Age of Fracture look like if it had included this subject? On some matters, it would have reinforced his assertions. John D’Emilio’s classic essay “Capitalism and Gay Identity” would have fortified the convictions held by many that free markets induced freedom. With pastors and ministers expending tremendous energy, expounding wrathfully on homosexuality as an abomination and blaming victims for their “choice” little room was left to speak of Jesus as the man who overturned the money tables, preached poverty, humbleness, compassion, and charity, the very kind of emotional economy that Rodgers is interested in mapping.

On other important points, Rodgers would have found his organizing principle, around fracture, did not hold or at least that it was more contested. For example, by citing Butler’s notion of sexuality as a performance, he gives only one side of the debate between nature and nurture. A very large constituency of gay people themselves argued publicly for essentialism. The debate played out on the pages of Time and Newsweek, National Review, The Advocate and Slate.com, with scientific studies examining the role of genes and hormones in determining sexual orientation. At stake in this ontological question was whether gayness was akin to race and thus deserved legal protections or a choice that could be changed (and criticized).

On a final note: Who mourns for the gay men and women who either committed suicide, lived closeted lives filled with fear and anguish, alienated from family, friends, church, and denied the opportunity to build their own families or to love who they loved. I understand it is not the historian's job to hold pity parties, but I wonder if empathy is a necessary first step before historians start weaving the experiences of gay people into the story of our past. It is certainly within our realm of responsibility to try to understand, as Ranke would say, how it really was, to see not only flawless execution but missteps, and trips, and dips, to assess not just waltzes, but break dancing, the Hustle, the rumba, the samba, and cha-cha-cha.

Rabu, 27 Juli 2011

Book Review: Amy Wood on Szefel's *The Gospel of Beauty in the Progressive Era*

Review of Lisa Szefel’s The Gospel of Beauty in the Progressive Era: Reforming American Verse and Values (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011). ISBN: 978-0-230-11284-1. 280 pages.

Reviewed by Amy Wood
Illinois State University

In a 1991 essay titled “Can Poetry Matter?” poet Dana Gioia lamented the withering relevance of poetry in contemporary America. (The essay, originally published in the Atlantic Monthly, became the basis for a 1992 book by the same name). Despite the fact that poetry was the object of unprecedented support, through published anthologies and literary magazines, fellowships and prizes, and professorships and creative writing programs, poets nevertheless constituted an isolated subculture in American arts. Poetry in the late twentieth century, he bemoaned, had become inaccessible and esoteric, as poets increasingly secluded themselves within clubby academic circles and wrote their verse no longer for a larger educated readership, but, really, only for each other. Gioia looked nostalgically back to a mid-century poetic heyday when figures like Robert Lowell, Elizabeth Bishop, Langston Hughes, and John Berryman, to name a few, were prominent voices in American intellectual life. In addition to poetry, they wrote essays and criticism that broadened their intellectual reach. I don’t think the situation is much different twenty years later. Intellectuals and educated readers tend to be familiar with the leading historians, philosophers, critics, and novelists of the day, but would be hard pressed to name more than one or two contemporary poets.

This is a shame because, as Gioia contends, good poetry can offer particular aesthetic pleasures, pleasures that can, to paraphrase Wallace Stevens, contribute to our happiness. Children, of course, intuitively recognize the enjoyment to be found in verse, as anyone who has read and re-read the same nursery rhyme or Dr. Seuss story to a child knows. But Gioia also glimpses significant political consequences to the declining importance of poetry in contemporary life. Poetry, he says, “is the art of using words charged with their utmost meaning.” A healthy society depends upon a literate citizenry who can appreciate and grasp the power of language, if only to guard against its manipulations and distortions from their political leaders. As George Orwell warned, the deterioration of language walks hand in hand with political turmoil. Gioia’s call for a renewed awareness of the craft of poetic language has even more salience now, when there is so much intellectual lamentation that our Twitter and texting culture has flattened language and reduced it to cloying abbreviations and emoticons. Gioia ends his essay by calling for poets to come out of their self-inflicted seclusion, form much-needed alliances with other artists and intellectuals, and use their talent to speak to humanity’s greatest concerns. As it had in the past, a reinvigorated and socially relevant poetic culture could provide a small bulwark against the technocratic and materialist mindsets that dominate our society.

In The Gospel of Beauty in the Progressive Era, Lisa Szefel illuminates a time when American poets became committed to the notion that poetry should matter, that it should speak to the greatest concerns of the day. In this original and elegantly written account, Szefel traces the rise of a progressive-minded poetry movement that, between 1910 and 1920, developed alongside the social reform efforts of the era. These poets sought to break away from the genteel elitism of Victorian poetry and produce works that reflected the experiences of ordinary Americans and addressed the woes and sorrows that unmanaged capitalism had wrought. They believed that socially relevant poetry could strike readers’ moral imaginations and spur social action. With the help of sympathetic editors and readers, they created a flourishing literary community, which built the “cultural infrastructure” (p. 2) that later allowed the famous mid-century poets that Gioia celebrates to thrive.

Well-known poets such as Amy Lowell, Carl Sandberg, and Robert Frost enter her story, but Szefel gives us an appreciated introduction to more obscure figures like Edwin Markham, Harriet Monroe, and William Stanley Braithwaite. In doing so, she welcomes us into a circle of poets largely neglected in American cultural histories of the period. After all, when we think of literary output in the Progressive era, we think of the social realism of Upton Sinclair or the literary naturalism of Theodore Dreiser and others who wrote with vivid and shocking clarity about social injustice and human suffering in modern America. And when we think of a twentieth-century renaissance in American poetry, the great poets of the Harlem Renaissance or the high modernists like T.S. Eliot and William Carlos Williams come to mind. In drawing attention to the poets who preceded and even anticipated these movements, Szefel has filled an enormous gap in literary and intellectual histories of the Progressive era.

One reason why historians have tended to overlook these poets is that amidst the reformist ethos of the era, poetry could appear indulgent and twee. The spirit of the time seemed more suited to the gritty realism that other artistic media like fiction or photography could more readily provide. Progressive poets struggled with this very problem of form. They sought to portray the ugly realities of urban industrial life through verse, while at the same time they embraced a “gospel of beauty” rooted in Victorian sensibilities. Szefel presents them as transitional figures, awkwardly straddling the chasm between the Victorian and the modern. Disturbed by the disruption and corruption of modern life, they remained deeply wedded to the Platonic idealism of nineteenth-century romanticism and transcendentalism, believing that poetry, as the pure expression of beauty, could serve as an antidote to the rationalization and materialism of the day by allowing for subjective expression and self-revelation. Poetry thus provided spiritual nourishment, representing a space in the human soul where true freedom resides, apart from social constraints. That ennobling element could in turn cultivate moral goodness in readers by sparking their empathetic imaginations and attuning them to the sufferings of others. Their gospel of beauty, in this way, Szefel argues, shared much in common with the Social Gospel movement. (It is telling marker of these poets’ transitional status that Gioia does not mention the expression of beauty as a purpose of poetry, but instead focuses on personal happiness.)

Yet these poets chafed against the rigid conventions of the Victorian poetry that dominated the pages of both literary journals and middlebrow magazines at the turn of the century. They considered the genteel idealism of that poetry, with its focus on pastoral themes, to be both stale and effete. This new generation poets saw themselves as part of an avant-garde who would reinvigorate poetry – i.e. inject it with manly vigor – to articulate the “messiness” of modern life and animate the “mundane and mechanical” about it (p. 45). Though still committed to poetry’s aesthetic purpose, they wanted to shift the meaning of beauty to find it in common places, on city streets, in dockyards and skyscrapers, and in the haggard bodies of laborers.

By emphasizing their social purposefulness, Szefel sets the sensibilities of these poets apart from the anti-modernism of other artists and intellectuals of the period, as characterized by T. Jackson Lears in No Place of Grace. Lears argued that figures like Charles Eliot Norton, Frank Norris and Henry Adams retreated to the arts or to spirituality as a repudiation of the modern industrial order and as a counterweight to the sense of meaninglessness that they felt in it. But ultimately their bourgeois rejection of capitalism was toothless. It offered them personal rejuvenation and therapeutic release, but it did not disrupt their class hegemony or challenge the existing order in any meaningful way; in fact, their retreat constituted an accommodation to the very values that repelled them, and the onslaught of modernity continued uninterrupted. Szefel, however, wants to see her poets in a more favorable light, as sincere in their desire to change the world. Art for them could create bonds of solidarity that were crucial to the “discernment of meaning, value, and individual freedom” in modern life (p 45).

Yet, although Szefel demonstrates the commitment that progressive poets had to infuse poetry with a social conscience, it is less evident how exactly their poems operated as political or social commentary. Part of the reason for this is that Szefel is more attentive to the motivations of her figures and the complex relationships between them than she is with the poetry itself. To be fair, the book is one of literary history, not literary analysis. But to make the claim, as she does, that poetry can help to cultivate human sympathy for others and motivate social action requires attention to the form and content of the verse itself. Szefel references the work of Elaine Scarry, Martha Nussbaum, and Richard Rorty, who have emphasized the importance of “aesthetic sensibilities” and “narrative imagination” to the development of empathetic understanding (p. 11). I found myself longing for her to apply that theoretical work more directly to the poems under study.

What’s more, throughout her richly detailed account of their careers, Szefel reveals that her poets were much more ambivalent about reform than her larger argument suggests. It is never made clear how exactly their poetry linked up to progressive politics or reform efforts; the connections between them appear nebulous, a matter of vague aspiration rather than specific intent. And ultimately, the movement’s adherence to the gospel of beauty led poets and editors to recoil against works that focused on human suffering and social turmoil for fear that they would only lead to hopelessness. For example, Edwin Markham’s 1898 poem, “Man with a Hoe,” with its unsentimental depiction of an overburdened laborer, was a breakthrough piece that shocked readers and reflected the belief that the “moral power of art could temper avarice and induce charity” (p. 60). At the same time, as Szefel concedes, the poem refrains from any direct critique of capitalism and maintains a spiritual, optimistic sensibility, so that his portrait of the farmer appears more romantic than reformist. Szefel devotes a wonderful chapter to Amy Lowell, an extraordinarily fascinating figure, but Lowell’s imagiste poetry, with its focus on vivid imagery and direct language, was more concerned with breaking down Victorian ornamentation and reconfiguring conventions of poetic expression and form than with politics. In fact, she believed that poetry should remain a “serf to beauty” and not act as a “voice of protest” (p. 184). Similarly, although poet and editor Harriet Monroe promoted poets like Carl Sandberg and Edgar Lee Masters, who dealt with startling realities in their verse, she eschewed poetry that would appear propagandistic. Even the editor of the socialist magazine, The Masses, Max Eastman, comes off as tepid in his conception of poetry’s political role. (Szefel surprisingly pays only scant attention to socialist poets like Clement Wood and Mike Gold).

Compared to the work of people like Upton Sinclair or Lewis Hine, the reformist ethos of these poets appears weak and hesitant. Indeed, with their abiding faith in aesthetics as a means to self-fulfillment and moral truth, they appear closer to Lears’ bourgeois anti-modernists than the zealous social reformers that Szefel claims them to be. Their ambivalence is, of course, also part of Szefel’s point that these poets were part of a complex transition in the poetic arts from Victorian romanticism to modernism. And there is no doubt, after reading Szefel’s book, that these poets, through their experimentation with free verse and commonplace themes, played a critical role in developing modern poetry. Still, one is left wondering how much poetry did in fact matter to Progressive-era politics. If it did matter, it seemed to do so much in the way Gioia hopes it would today – as snapshots of everyday moments and expressions of real feeling in an otherwise harried and soulless age.

Book Review: Amy Wood on Szefel's *The Gospel of Beauty in the Progressive Era*

Review of Lisa Szefel’s The Gospel of Beauty in the Progressive Era: Reforming American Verse and Values (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011). ISBN: 978-0-230-11284-1. 280 pages.

Reviewed by Amy Wood
Illinois State University

In a 1991 essay titled “Can Poetry Matter?” poet Dana Gioia lamented the withering relevance of poetry in contemporary America. (The essay, originally published in the Atlantic Monthly, became the basis for a 1992 book by the same name). Despite the fact that poetry was the object of unprecedented support, through published anthologies and literary magazines, fellowships and prizes, and professorships and creative writing programs, poets nevertheless constituted an isolated subculture in American arts. Poetry in the late twentieth century, he bemoaned, had become inaccessible and esoteric, as poets increasingly secluded themselves within clubby academic circles and wrote their verse no longer for a larger educated readership, but, really, only for each other. Gioia looked nostalgically back to a mid-century poetic heyday when figures like Robert Lowell, Elizabeth Bishop, Langston Hughes, and John Berryman, to name a few, were prominent voices in American intellectual life. In addition to poetry, they wrote essays and criticism that broadened their intellectual reach. I don’t think the situation is much different twenty years later. Intellectuals and educated readers tend to be familiar with the leading historians, philosophers, critics, and novelists of the day, but would be hard pressed to name more than one or two contemporary poets.

This is a shame because, as Gioia contends, good poetry can offer particular aesthetic pleasures, pleasures that can, to paraphrase Wallace Stevens, contribute to our happiness. Children, of course, intuitively recognize the enjoyment to be found in verse, as anyone who has read and re-read the same nursery rhyme or Dr. Seuss story to a child knows. But Gioia also glimpses significant political consequences to the declining importance of poetry in contemporary life. Poetry, he says, “is the art of using words charged with their utmost meaning.” A healthy society depends upon a literate citizenry who can appreciate and grasp the power of language, if only to guard against its manipulations and distortions from their political leaders. As George Orwell warned, the deterioration of language walks hand in hand with political turmoil. Gioia’s call for a renewed awareness of the craft of poetic language has even more salience now, when there is so much intellectual lamentation that our Twitter and texting culture has flattened language and reduced it to cloying abbreviations and emoticons. Gioia ends his essay by calling for poets to come out of their self-inflicted seclusion, form much-needed alliances with other artists and intellectuals, and use their talent to speak to humanity’s greatest concerns. As it had in the past, a reinvigorated and socially relevant poetic culture could provide a small bulwark against the technocratic and materialist mindsets that dominate our society.

In The Gospel of Beauty in the Progressive Era, Lisa Szefel illuminates a time when American poets became committed to the notion that poetry should matter, that it should speak to the greatest concerns of the day. In this original and elegantly written account, Szefel traces the rise of a progressive-minded poetry movement that, between 1910 and 1920, developed alongside the social reform efforts of the era. These poets sought to break away from the genteel elitism of Victorian poetry and produce works that reflected the experiences of ordinary Americans and addressed the woes and sorrows that unmanaged capitalism had wrought. They believed that socially relevant poetry could strike readers’ moral imaginations and spur social action. With the help of sympathetic editors and readers, they created a flourishing literary community, which built the “cultural infrastructure” (p. 2) that later allowed the famous mid-century poets that Gioia celebrates to thrive.

Well-known poets such as Amy Lowell, Carl Sandberg, and Robert Frost enter her story, but Szefel gives us an appreciated introduction to more obscure figures like Edwin Markham, Harriet Monroe, and William Stanley Braithwaite. In doing so, she welcomes us into a circle of poets largely neglected in American cultural histories of the period. After all, when we think of literary output in the Progressive era, we think of the social realism of Upton Sinclair or the literary naturalism of Theodore Dreiser and others who wrote with vivid and shocking clarity about social injustice and human suffering in modern America. And when we think of a twentieth-century renaissance in American poetry, the great poets of the Harlem Renaissance or the high modernists like T.S. Eliot and William Carlos Williams come to mind. In drawing attention to the poets who preceded and even anticipated these movements, Szefel has filled an enormous gap in literary and intellectual histories of the Progressive era.

One reason why historians have tended to overlook these poets is that amidst the reformist ethos of the era, poetry could appear indulgent and twee. The spirit of the time seemed more suited to the gritty realism that other artistic media like fiction or photography could more readily provide. Progressive poets struggled with this very problem of form. They sought to portray the ugly realities of urban industrial life through verse, while at the same time they embraced a “gospel of beauty” rooted in Victorian sensibilities. Szefel presents them as transitional figures, awkwardly straddling the chasm between the Victorian and the modern. Disturbed by the disruption and corruption of modern life, they remained deeply wedded to the Platonic idealism of nineteenth-century romanticism and transcendentalism, believing that poetry, as the pure expression of beauty, could serve as an antidote to the rationalization and materialism of the day by allowing for subjective expression and self-revelation. Poetry thus provided spiritual nourishment, representing a space in the human soul where true freedom resides, apart from social constraints. That ennobling element could in turn cultivate moral goodness in readers by sparking their empathetic imaginations and attuning them to the sufferings of others. Their gospel of beauty, in this way, Szefel argues, shared much in common with the Social Gospel movement. (It is telling marker of these poets’ transitional status that Gioia does not mention the expression of beauty as a purpose of poetry, but instead focuses on personal happiness.)

Yet these poets chafed against the rigid conventions of the Victorian poetry that dominated the pages of both literary journals and middlebrow magazines at the turn of the century. They considered the genteel idealism of that poetry, with its focus on pastoral themes, to be both stale and effete. This new generation poets saw themselves as part of an avant-garde who would reinvigorate poetry – i.e. inject it with manly vigor – to articulate the “messiness” of modern life and animate the “mundane and mechanical” about it (p. 45). Though still committed to poetry’s aesthetic purpose, they wanted to shift the meaning of beauty to find it in common places, on city streets, in dockyards and skyscrapers, and in the haggard bodies of laborers.

By emphasizing their social purposefulness, Szefel sets the sensibilities of these poets apart from the anti-modernism of other artists and intellectuals of the period, as characterized by T. Jackson Lears in No Place of Grace. Lears argued that figures like Charles Eliot Norton, Frank Norris and Henry Adams retreated to the arts or to spirituality as a repudiation of the modern industrial order and as a counterweight to the sense of meaninglessness that they felt in it. But ultimately their bourgeois rejection of capitalism was toothless. It offered them personal rejuvenation and therapeutic release, but it did not disrupt their class hegemony or challenge the existing order in any meaningful way; in fact, their retreat constituted an accommodation to the very values that repelled them, and the onslaught of modernity continued uninterrupted. Szefel, however, wants to see her poets in a more favorable light, as sincere in their desire to change the world. Art for them could create bonds of solidarity that were crucial to the “discernment of meaning, value, and individual freedom” in modern life (p 45).

Yet, although Szefel demonstrates the commitment that progressive poets had to infuse poetry with a social conscience, it is less evident how exactly their poems operated as political or social commentary. Part of the reason for this is that Szefel is more attentive to the motivations of her figures and the complex relationships between them than she is with the poetry itself. To be fair, the book is one of literary history, not literary analysis. But to make the claim, as she does, that poetry can help to cultivate human sympathy for others and motivate social action requires attention to the form and content of the verse itself. Szefel references the work of Elaine Scarry, Martha Nussbaum, and Richard Rorty, who have emphasized the importance of “aesthetic sensibilities” and “narrative imagination” to the development of empathetic understanding (p. 11). I found myself longing for her to apply that theoretical work more directly to the poems under study.

What’s more, throughout her richly detailed account of their careers, Szefel reveals that her poets were much more ambivalent about reform than her larger argument suggests. It is never made clear how exactly their poetry linked up to progressive politics or reform efforts; the connections between them appear nebulous, a matter of vague aspiration rather than specific intent. And ultimately, the movement’s adherence to the gospel of beauty led poets and editors to recoil against works that focused on human suffering and social turmoil for fear that they would only lead to hopelessness. For example, Edwin Markham’s 1898 poem, “Man with a Hoe,” with its unsentimental depiction of an overburdened laborer, was a breakthrough piece that shocked readers and reflected the belief that the “moral power of art could temper avarice and induce charity” (p. 60). At the same time, as Szefel concedes, the poem refrains from any direct critique of capitalism and maintains a spiritual, optimistic sensibility, so that his portrait of the farmer appears more romantic than reformist. Szefel devotes a wonderful chapter to Amy Lowell, an extraordinarily fascinating figure, but Lowell’s imagiste poetry, with its focus on vivid imagery and direct language, was more concerned with breaking down Victorian ornamentation and reconfiguring conventions of poetic expression and form than with politics. In fact, she believed that poetry should remain a “serf to beauty” and not act as a “voice of protest” (p. 184). Similarly, although poet and editor Harriet Monroe promoted poets like Carl Sandberg and Edgar Lee Masters, who dealt with startling realities in their verse, she eschewed poetry that would appear propagandistic. Even the editor of the socialist magazine, The Masses, Max Eastman, comes off as tepid in his conception of poetry’s political role. (Szefel surprisingly pays only scant attention to socialist poets like Clement Wood and Mike Gold).

Compared to the work of people like Upton Sinclair or Lewis Hine, the reformist ethos of these poets appears weak and hesitant. Indeed, with their abiding faith in aesthetics as a means to self-fulfillment and moral truth, they appear closer to Lears’ bourgeois anti-modernists than the zealous social reformers that Szefel claims them to be. Their ambivalence is, of course, also part of Szefel’s point that these poets were part of a complex transition in the poetic arts from Victorian romanticism to modernism. And there is no doubt, after reading Szefel’s book, that these poets, through their experimentation with free verse and commonplace themes, played a critical role in developing modern poetry. Still, one is left wondering how much poetry did in fact matter to Progressive-era politics. If it did matter, it seemed to do so much in the way Gioia hopes it would today – as snapshots of everyday moments and expressions of real feeling in an otherwise harried and soulless age.