Tampilkan postingan dengan label journal of the history of ideas. Tampilkan semua postingan
Tampilkan postingan dengan label journal of the history of ideas. Tampilkan semua postingan

Jumat, 02 November 2012

An Interview with David Hollinger


David Hollinger, the S-USIH 2012 Conference keynote speaker, is the Preston Hotchkis Professor at the University of California, Berkeley.  He will be retiring from teaching following the 2012-2013 academic year.  Professor Hollinger kindly consented to be interviewed by me via email for our conference newsletter.  I have reprinted his interview below.

Alas, as our readers know, this year's conference was canceled due to the catastrophic effects of Hurricane Sandy. However, a .pdf of the conference newsletter will be available for download at the S-USIH website.  In the meantime, you can view and download the entire newsletter through my public Dropbox folder using this link. The 8-page newsletter features a piece by David Sehat highlighting and exploring the themes of the conference he planned so thoughtfully and well, an article by S-USIH President Paul Murphy discussing the possibilities of starting a print journal, a note from Allison Perlman about our plans for next year's conference, news and notes from our members, and other key information. It would have been my great pleasure and a real privilege to help distribute this newsletter in person at our conference. Next time.

___________

An Interview with David Hollinger
by L.D. Burnett

Q: The theme of this year's S-USIH conference, "Communities of Discourse," acknowledges and celebrates the enormous influence and usefulness of your conception of the field of intellectual history, a conception that is arguably "paradigmatic" in the Kuhnian sense of the word.  As you argued in the paper you delivered at the Wingspread conference, the notion of a "community of discourse" is a capacious one, able to accommodate a far broader range of subjects and subject matter than might be suggested by narrow definitions of what the term "intellectual" in "intellectual history" stands for.  In thinking about how this paradigm has functioned to frame the field of inquiry over the past four decades, do you find it still capacious enough as a way of conceptualizing intellectual history?  Are there ways of understanding intellectual history that this paradigm is strained to accommodate? 


A: I would not want to claim too much for the notion of “communities of discourse,” and prefer to see it mostly as a heuristic, not as a charter for the field. It is a heuristic in that it can help some good projects find themselves, but good projects are certainly not limited to those that operate within its scope. I am very glad that the notion continues to help colleagues design and defend their projects, but I pushed the notion more for reasons of the politics of the profession than for strictly methodological reasons. Of course the two are connected, but my big concern was to get the profession to acknowledge that the features of human life studied by intellectual historians left material tracings every bit as real as the material tracings left by elections, wars, social movements, demographic transformations, economic booms and busts, and other features of human life that historians took for granted.

This simple point was worth making because of the incessant chatter, even by people who should have known better, about the “relation of ideas to reality,” or “the relation of the interior of the mind to external life,” as if intellectual history was a series of speculations rather than an interpretation of documentary evidence comparable to that scrutinized by historians of other subfields. The vivid positivity, the concrete substantiality of our major subject matter—discourse as carried out by socially embedded human beings who left evidence of their doings in the form of letters, essays, diaries, books, etc.-- needed to be affirmed. Second, I wanted to remind colleagues of the value of the kind of history that focused on the questions thinkers are trying to answer and on how various individual thinkers answered one another’s questions and thereby participated in a community of sorts. This, too, seemed obvious to anyone like me who was raised professionally on Collingwood, but some social historians at the time seemed not to know that this was what most intellectual historians did. Indeed, I wrote the essay in a kind of fury in the fall of 1977 when I read the Wingspread draft of Larry Veysey’s paper, which I thought misrepresented the methodological issues in the study of intellectual history, repeated the worst of contemporary social history’s libels against intellectual history, and threatened to undermine the credibility of a professional practice that I believed to be sound. I had told John Higham, who organized the Wingspread conference, that I would write about Kuhn’s influence on intellectual history, but when I saw what Larry had written in his pre-conference draft (I had yet to send mine in) I scraped my own draft, and while still drawing some inspiration from Kuhn, wrote in a hurry a very different paper.

But the notion of communities of discourse proved of value to many scholars long after Veysey’s formulations were forgotten, and I suppose it was just as well that I dealt with Larry indirectly, never mentioning his name, because that better enabled the essay I wrote to have a life even after the proximate cause  for its composition had largely disappeared. I spent most of the essay citing examples of existing scholarship, to guard against the idea that I was inventing anything new: I was trying to provide a set of terms that I thought might have efficacy in the politics of the profession to describe and defend a well-established practice. Delighted as I am to see this set of terms still functional, I am pleased with this chance to underscore that I was not trying to “define” intellectual history, but only to vindicate a primary form of its practice.

Q: Your recent "state of the field" essay in the MIH forum touched on the connection between pedagogy and scholarly inquiry.  In what ways has pedagogy at both the graduate and undergraduate level shaped your own scholarly inquiry?  Do you see the possibility for "new directions in intellectual history" arising out of the discourse community of the classroom?

A: In my own case, there has often been a connection between my undergraduate lecture course and my scholarly writings. Several of my articles, most fully “Ethnic Diversity, Cosmopolitanism, and the Emergence of the American Liberal Intelligentsia” (1975) and “How Wide the Circle of the We” (1993) began as undergraduate lectures. I’d have a sense that this or that topic was important to the field that the course was supposed to cover, but the monographic literature seemed not right on point. Lacking a literature to harvest for my lectures, I would work up what seemed to me a sensible and sound take on the topic based on my own reading of what I took to be the most relevant sources. Then if it seemed that what I’d worked up for the students might even contribute to the scholarly conversation, I’d sharpen the lecture to the point that I could deliver it as a paper at the OAH (as I did for “Ethnic Diversity”) or the AHA (as I did for “Circle of the We”), and then, depending on the reception it got from colleagues, publish it. Undergraduate teaching has the splendid effect of forcing one to address large questions, and if the scholarly literature does not go after those large questions you have to do it yourself, and doing so can, in turn, blow back into the professional literature. Graduate teaching is something that I have enjoyed equally, but in my own case it has not had remotely as direct an effect on what I write as a scholar. Graduate students I see as fully part of the community of professional scholars, but undergraduates function more as a surrogate for the educated public at large and therefore they provide a different type of stimuli. 

Q: The Society for U.S. Intellectual History and the annual conference have their beginnings in the discourse community -- or one of the discourse communities -- of the blogosphere.  Because this medium of communication/interaction is technologically new, it is tempting to see the community constituted through it as also somehow new or fundamentally different from previous communities of intellectual inquirers.  But in what ways might the S-USIH exemplify continuity with a broader and older tradition of intellectual/academic communities?  What aspects of that longer tradition do you hope the S-USIH will carry forward?

A: I am not sure that blogs create “new or fundamentally different” kinds of learned communities (perhaps they do, in ways that I do not discern?), but they surely help bring into the conversation of a specialized field a number of individuals who might otherwise not be as fully part of it as they should be. I am probably not a good person to explore this question, however, because I am lucky enough to be based on a campus where I cannot walk down the hallway from my office without running into someone with whom I can have an informed and animated conversation about the latest book or article. If I were not at one of these big campuses, with large faculties and a steady stream of bright, energetic graduate students passing through, I suppose blogs would mean more to me. Blogs enable a lot of folks who would otherwise not be in regular and direct communication to be in touch with each other whenever they feel like it, and surely that is a good thing. I’m also in the habit of treating print journals and books as somehow prior to blogs, as if blogs were something to go to once you’d finished (which I seem never to manage) reading all the other stuff. I don’t defend this attitude, but I do confess to it. I’m for blogs, just not very active in them.

Q: You published your first scholarly paper in 1968 and have announced your retirement from teaching in 2013; what changes in the field over that span of four-and-a-half decades are most striking to you?

A: In 1968 American intellectual history was very close to American Studies, and the ASA’s journal, American Quarterly, was a favorite place for intellectual historians to publish. That remained true through Bruce Kuklick’s editorship in the 1970s, but by the end of the 1980s that journal had narrowed its focus methodologically and chronologically. By the 1990s it was almost entirely a “cultural studies” journal focused on the period since World War II, and largely since the 1960s. I had published in AQ three times, had read it eagerly, and had even won one of the ASA’s prizes, but I have long since quit the ASA (as have most historians I know who used to be in it). The decline (at least from my point of view) of ASA and AQ has helped make space for the creation in 2004 of Modern Intellectual History and the simultaneous rejuvenation of  The Journal of the History of Ideas, both of which turn out to be much better for us than AQ for several reasons, one of which is that they comfortably integrate American intellectual history into the intellectual history of the North Atlantic West instead of tying it, as ASA and AQ did, to more narrowly Americo-centric concerns. So, while I long lamented the transformation of the ASA and AQ, I finally came around to realizing that the liberation of American intellectual history from American Studies was a blessing in disguise. The youngest cohort of US intellectual historians is much more likely than my generation to be fluent in German and/or French, and more and more of these younger scholars are engaged in trans-Atlantic projects. This cohort, moreover, is reclaiming the study of philosophy, theology, social theory, and social science that the American Studies movement at its best had engaged, too, but then largely dropped.

The closer ties between US intellectual history and European intellectual history encourage attention to aspects of American intellectual history to which the projects that have flown under the flag of “cultural history” have been less attentive. Cultural history has done a lot of great things for us, and deserves to be celebrated, but the anti-elitist strain within cultural history limited its scope. At the risk of appearing to ignore some other really good recent stuff, I want to mention the three 2012 imprints devoted to my main field of the 20th century to have hit my desk the most recently: Angus Burgin’s The Great Persuasion: Reinventing Free Markets Since the Depression, Joel Isaac’s Working Knowledge: Making the Human Sciences from Parsons to Kuhn, and Andrew Jewett’s Science, Democracy and the American University: From the Civil War to the Cold War. These three ambitious, rigorously argued, sophisticated monographs illustrate how, looking now only at the last couple of months of twentieth century studies, the cohort to which I refer is making the field of American intellectual history more vibrant than ever. 

Kamis, 19 Mei 2011

Tim's Light Reading (5/19/2011)

1 (of 6 total). The 1960s: Good or Bad for America?

Charles Kaiser argues for good in this brief CNN article. Among many designations, others have called it "The End of Modern America" and the "Age of Contradiction." Here's the opening of Kaiser's piece (bolds mine):

----------------------------------------------------------------
"It is possible to read the history of this country as one long struggle to extend the liberties established in our Constitution to everyone in America." -- Molly Ivins, great American newspaperwoman

Forty years after they ended, the 1960s remain the most controversial decade of the 20th century. Either you believe that they destroyed America, or they cured it.

Put me down as a fervent believer in their success as a cure. ...

----------------------------------------------------------------

And these passages will be of interest to intellectual and cultural historians:

----------------------------------------------------------------
A significant factor in all of this progress was the fact that organized religion -- and all of the prejudices and superstitions it embodied -- was at one of its lowest ebbs in our history.

That's the social and political side. Then there's the cultural side.

The liberation that was occurring at the polling places and universities was mirrored elsewhere...

The Vietnam War was the decade's greatest tragedy. ...But those Americans did not die in vain -- because of their sacrifice, the Vietnam syndrome was born.

Wrongly maligned by neoconservatives [read: conservative intellectuals], this was the syndrome that prevented us from repeating anything like that on a similar scale for more than 30 years -- until George W. Bush and his henchmen embarked upon the equally disastrous and unnecessary invasion of Iraq.

The idealism embodied by John and Robert Kennedy and the Martin Luther King Jr. inspired a whole generation to change the way America was governed, and how millions of Americans would get to live their lives.

----------------------------------------------------------------

Sure, it's just an opinion piece. But it references intellectual history topics, and takes strong stand (e.g. "cured") in terms of pre-1960s wrongs. When I composed this post Kaiser's article had 265 comments and 2661 Facebook 'likes'.

And if you think that interpretations of the Sixties are not still relevant, see this. Apparently the leadership of a institution with roots in antiquity was deeply corrupted by the "tumult and change" of the decade.


2. New in Paperback

Andrew Hartman's Education and the Cold War: The Battle for the American School (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) will be out in paperback this coming December. For the unfamiliar, Andrew's book is an intellectual and political history of American schools during the era of John Dewey's influence (both directly and indirectly) and the early Cold War.


3. JHI Articles of Interest

The April 2011 issue of the Journal of the History of Ideas (Volume 72, no. 2) has two articles that may be of special interest to USIH readers:

(a) "William James’s Ethical Republic," by TRYGVE THRONTVEIT

Few have systematically analyzed William James's ethics. But examining James's moral philosophy in light of his epistemology and metaphysics demonstrates its coherence and robustness. James provided a metaphor succinctly expressing his ethics in terms of its purpose: an "ethical republic." No fixed set of principles, the ethical republic was an ideal of private and public interests converging through widespread commitment to three virtues: intellectual experimentalism, historical wisdom, and empathy. These sustained democracy as James understood it: a culture of deliberative discourse facilitating negotiation and organization of values. Recognizing deliberation's power and limits, James's ethics have implications for modern-day interdependent societies.

(b) "How Old Are Modern Rights? On the Lockean Roots of Contemporary Human Rights Discourse," by S. ADAM SEAGRAVE

This article critically assesses three recent attempts by Brian Tierney to extend the historical analysis he provides in The Idea of Natural Rights to contemporary human rights discourse. These attempts tend to exaggerate the conceptual continuity between early medieval "rights" and those claimed in contemporary contexts. In particular, Tierney's interpretation of Locke as a central example of historical continuity in rights thinking largelyf misses Locke's distinctive contribution to contemporary ideas of human rights. It is, rather, in Locke's writings that human rights first become recognizable to the modern eye.


4. Debating Obama's Political Legacy

Cornell West thinks Obama will be remembered as the "black mascot of Wall Street oligarchs... black puppet of corporate plutocrats...and [proud]...head of the American killing machine.” Ta-Nehisi Coates disagrees.


5. Rock 'n' Roll and USIH

No one I know attended this NYC conference on Ellen Willis. But Michael Bérubé was there, and he reproduced his paper at Crooked Timber for your enjoyment and pleaasure.


6. A Personal Note

A dear friend of mine is leaving academia. I've only gotten to see him sporadically over the past 3-4 years, and I didn't know him as well as I would've liked when we had more time together in Chicago during the late 1990s. He is leaving higher education for a private school in a major metropolitan area. Read his reflections on the process that has led him to this point. It's heartbreaking, though this particular post looks mostly at the lay of the land in higher education. I particularly hope that senior professors will read it, perhaps in conjunction with this article from The Nation that has received some positive play. Best of luck to "Werner Herzog's Bear" as he embarks on a new adventure!

Tim's Light Reading (5/19/2011)

1 (of 6 total). The 1960s: Good or Bad for America?

Charles Kaiser argues for good in this brief CNN article. Among many designations, others have called it "The End of Modern America" and the "Age of Contradiction." Here's the opening of Kaiser's piece (bolds mine):

----------------------------------------------------------------
"It is possible to read the history of this country as one long struggle to extend the liberties established in our Constitution to everyone in America." -- Molly Ivins, great American newspaperwoman

Forty years after they ended, the 1960s remain the most controversial decade of the 20th century. Either you believe that they destroyed America, or they cured it.

Put me down as a fervent believer in their success as a cure. ...

----------------------------------------------------------------

And these passages will be of interest to intellectual and cultural historians:

----------------------------------------------------------------
A significant factor in all of this progress was the fact that organized religion -- and all of the prejudices and superstitions it embodied -- was at one of its lowest ebbs in our history.

That's the social and political side. Then there's the cultural side.

The liberation that was occurring at the polling places and universities was mirrored elsewhere...

The Vietnam War was the decade's greatest tragedy. ...But those Americans did not die in vain -- because of their sacrifice, the Vietnam syndrome was born.

Wrongly maligned by neoconservatives [read: conservative intellectuals], this was the syndrome that prevented us from repeating anything like that on a similar scale for more than 30 years -- until George W. Bush and his henchmen embarked upon the equally disastrous and unnecessary invasion of Iraq.

The idealism embodied by John and Robert Kennedy and the Martin Luther King Jr. inspired a whole generation to change the way America was governed, and how millions of Americans would get to live their lives.

----------------------------------------------------------------

Sure, it's just an opinion piece. But it references intellectual history topics, and takes strong stand (e.g. "cured") in terms of pre-1960s wrongs. When I composed this post Kaiser's article had 265 comments and 2661 Facebook 'likes'.

And if you think that interpretations of the Sixties are not still relevant, see this. Apparently the leadership of a institution with roots in antiquity was deeply corrupted by the "tumult and change" of the decade.


2. New in Paperback

Andrew Hartman's Education and the Cold War: The Battle for the American School (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) will be out in paperback this coming December. For the unfamiliar, Andrew's book is an intellectual and political history of American schools during the era of John Dewey's influence (both directly and indirectly) and the early Cold War.


3. JHI Articles of Interest

The April 2011 issue of the Journal of the History of Ideas (Volume 72, no. 2) has two articles that may be of special interest to USIH readers:

(a) "William James’s Ethical Republic," by TRYGVE THRONTVEIT

Few have systematically analyzed William James's ethics. But examining James's moral philosophy in light of his epistemology and metaphysics demonstrates its coherence and robustness. James provided a metaphor succinctly expressing his ethics in terms of its purpose: an "ethical republic." No fixed set of principles, the ethical republic was an ideal of private and public interests converging through widespread commitment to three virtues: intellectual experimentalism, historical wisdom, and empathy. These sustained democracy as James understood it: a culture of deliberative discourse facilitating negotiation and organization of values. Recognizing deliberation's power and limits, James's ethics have implications for modern-day interdependent societies.

(b) "How Old Are Modern Rights? On the Lockean Roots of Contemporary Human Rights Discourse," by S. ADAM SEAGRAVE

This article critically assesses three recent attempts by Brian Tierney to extend the historical analysis he provides in The Idea of Natural Rights to contemporary human rights discourse. These attempts tend to exaggerate the conceptual continuity between early medieval "rights" and those claimed in contemporary contexts. In particular, Tierney's interpretation of Locke as a central example of historical continuity in rights thinking largelyf misses Locke's distinctive contribution to contemporary ideas of human rights. It is, rather, in Locke's writings that human rights first become recognizable to the modern eye.


4. Debating Obama's Political Legacy

Cornell West thinks Obama will be remembered as the "black mascot of Wall Street oligarchs... black puppet of corporate plutocrats...and [proud]...head of the American killing machine.” Ta-Nehisi Coates disagrees.


5. Rock 'n' Roll and USIH

No one I know attended this NYC conference on Ellen Willis. But Michael Bérubé was there, and he reproduced his paper at Crooked Timber for your enjoyment and pleaasure.


6. A Personal Note

A dear friend of mine is leaving academia. I've only gotten to see him sporadically over the past 3-4 years, and I didn't know him as well as I would've liked when we had more time together in Chicago during the late 1990s. He is leaving higher education for a private school in a major metropolitan area. Read his reflections on the process that has led him to this point. It's heartbreaking, though this particular post looks mostly at the lay of the land in higher education. I particularly hope that senior professors will read it, perhaps in conjunction with this article from The Nation that has received some positive play. Best of luck to "Werner Herzog's Bear" as he embarks on a new adventure!

Jumat, 05 November 2010

Tim's Light Reading (11/05/2010)

I offer the following as a break from our (excellent!) long posts reflecting on conference matters:

1 (of 5). The Problem of Political Philosophy: Only Links to Offer

Bookforum's excellent Omnivore blog held forth on "The Problem of Political Philosophy" in a post a few days ago. If you're not familiar with Omnivore, its posts are constructed as carnivalesque clouds of links on specific themes. Each link is usually a full story, opinion piece, or book review. My favorite link in this post is to a paper by Francesca Pasquali that brings together political theory, political philosophy, and public philosophy. The last has been a concern to me for some time because it links the work of Walter Lippmann and Mortimer J. Adler. Here's a provocative excerpt from Pasquali's abstract (bolds mine):

Public philosophy detects the shared values grounding political practices and employs them to develop criteria for guiding policy decisions. It is attentive to empirical data and constraints and it provides solutions that are effective in political terms. Political philosophy takes its distance from congiuntural facts and practically subscribed principles. While sensitive to practical problems, it does not aim at elaborating practically viable solutions: it is rather concerned with the theoretical adequacy of its principles. Public philosophy seems better equipped for developing proposals serviceable during hard times, when effective political responses are in need.

2. A Poll: "The Best Quality Journals in the History of Philosophy"

University of Chicago Law School professor (and philosopher) Brian Leiter, who runs Leiter Reports: A Philosophy Blog, recently conducted a poll that should be interest to all intellectual historians. Using CIVS (Condercet Internet Voting Service), he asked readers to rank the best journals, of a list of seventeen, for publication on the history of philosophy. Here are his Top 11:

1. Journal of the History of Philosophy
2. Philosophical Review
3. Philosophy & Phenomenological Research
4. British Journal for the History of Philosophy
5. Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie
6. History of Philosophy Quarterly
7. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
8. European Journal of Philosophy
9. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
10. Canadian Journal of Philosophy
11. Journal of the History of Ideas

See the rest of his results here.

3. Teaching The Big, Hard Ideas---Online

Writing for the National Association of Scholars (a rather conservative group that advocates "working to foster intellectual freedom and to sustain the tradition of reasoned scholarship and civil debate in America’s colleges"), David Clemens offers a rather pessimistic assessment of the ability of online courses to relay the essence of the humanities online. Here is a sampling of his reflections (bolds mine):

I recall a college administrator who while cutting literature classes spoke passionately about more “student access to higher education.” I said, “Access doesn’t do them any good if there’s no higher education when they get here. What you are cutting is higher education.”

Between dumbing down and advocacy teaching, peer editing and “student-centered” classrooms, Theory and CorporateU., PowerPoint presentations and courses on Buffy— higher education in the traditional sense has been smothered. ...Instead of seriously examining such eternal questions of the meaning of life, the liberal arts and humanities wither away in favor of pragmatic but less formative pursuits. What do these words have in common: American, leisure, postcolonial, liberal, gender, disability, queer, environmental, animal? Answer: followed by the word, “studies,” all are degree-granting college majors. ...

The Big Question is whether the imperatives of current educational models make widespread embrace of online classes inevitable. It may be a situation of hug or die. ...Conversely, online is ideal for what I call “boutique” courses, classes people take because they are interested in the subject, not because they “need” them. ...That’s online’s proper role—to supplement face-to-face classes for students in special circumstances (pregnant, remote, homebound) and as a lab for exploration of niche topics. Will that prevail? I doubt it.


To bring this home, Clemens piece makes me skeptical that intellectual history courses can be effectively taught---or at least effectively absorbed by students---in an online teaching environment.

4. Defining American's Knowledge of Religion

About a month ago, before the elections heated up, the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life’s "U.S. Religious Knowledge Survey" was all over the news. Like other "shocking" surveys that make an impression, this one was about how ignorant Americans are. These are usually about history (or those are the ones I remember), but this one covered comparative religion. Because it asked respondents their religious affiliation, it was also able to break down responses by sect. Here's an excerpt from the survey's Executive Summary (to catalyze your memory):

On average, Americans correctly answer 16 of the 32 religious knowledge questions on the survey. ...Atheists and agnostics average 20.9 correct answers. Jews and Mormons do about as well, averaging 20.5 and 20.3 correct answers, respectively. Protestants as a whole average 16 correct answers; Catholics as a whole, 14.7. Atheists and agnostics, Jews and Mormons perform better than other groups on the survey even after controlling for differing levels of education.

I'm bringing this to your attention not to replay the results, but to draw your attention to this excellent set of scholarly replies posted at The Immanent Frame, a blog hosted by the Social Science Research Council. Here is a sampling of the first reply by Richard Amesbury, Associate Professor of Ethics, Claremont School of Theology; Associate Professor of Religion, Claremont Graduate University (bolds mine):

Insofar as it aims to grade Americans on their “religious knowledge,” the new Pew survey contains a strongly normative subtext: that there are certain things that every American ought to know about religion. ...In an earlier piece, I suggested an alternative interpretation: that the things social scientists take to be important about “religion”—--in this case, a range of externally available facts about “the tenets, practices, history and leading figures of major faith traditions”—--aren’t all that important to many Americans. This need not imply that Americans are insincere or incapable of successfully orienting themselves in a culturally diverse environment; rather, it suggests that the conceptual maps they use to do this don’t always conform to the expectations of demographers.

Instead of concluding that Americans lack “religious knowledge” because they don’t know what social scientists think they should, we might want to ask what, if anything, the study reveals about lived religion.


Amesbury suggests the very thing I pointed out to a few friends in a debate about the results: We study epistemology because there are different ways of knowing. And in this case, the creators of the Pew survey did not address practical knowledge in relation to religion---or the kinds of knowledge (i.e. ethics, or how-to navigational skills) that practitioners seek from their chosen faiths. I hope that historians of American religion make these distinctions when they assess how religion operates? And this topic also matters to those assessing how religion fits into the Culture Wars in the United States.

5. A New Journal: History of the Present

Andrew Hartman alerted me to this via his FB page, but History of the Present: A Journal of Critical History should be of interest to U.S. intellectual historians. It relays its avowed purpose as follows:

Its aim is twofold: to create a space in which scholars can reflect on the role history plays in establishing categories of contemporary debate by making them appear inevitable, natural or culturally necessary; and to publish work that calls into question certainties about the relationship between past and present that are taken for granted by the majority of practicing historians. Its editors want to encourage the critical examination of both history’s influence on politics and the politics of the discipline of history itself. The journal’s object is to showcase articles that exemplify the practice of what might be called theorized empirical history.

I can definitely see some of our regular USIH contributors and commenters taking an interest in getting into this periodical. It seems like this endeavor borders on investigative journalism---which reminds me of a quip I recently heard, relayed by Bill Moyers: "The difference between a journalist and an historian is that the historian knows the difference." Humor aside, it looks like History of the Present will be a place for historians to act in the Laschian tradition of social criticism. - TL

Tim's Light Reading (11/05/2010)

I offer the following as a break from our (excellent!) long posts reflecting on conference matters:

1 (of 5). The Problem of Political Philosophy: Only Links to Offer

Bookforum's excellent Omnivore blog held forth on "The Problem of Political Philosophy" in a post a few days ago. If you're not familiar with Omnivore, its posts are constructed as carnivalesque clouds of links on specific themes. Each link is usually a full story, opinion piece, or book review. My favorite link in this post is to a paper by Francesca Pasquali that brings together political theory, political philosophy, and public philosophy. The last has been a concern to me for some time because it links the work of Walter Lippmann and Mortimer J. Adler. Here's a provocative excerpt from Pasquali's abstract (bolds mine):

Public philosophy detects the shared values grounding political practices and employs them to develop criteria for guiding policy decisions. It is attentive to empirical data and constraints and it provides solutions that are effective in political terms. Political philosophy takes its distance from congiuntural facts and practically subscribed principles. While sensitive to practical problems, it does not aim at elaborating practically viable solutions: it is rather concerned with the theoretical adequacy of its principles. Public philosophy seems better equipped for developing proposals serviceable during hard times, when effective political responses are in need.

2. A Poll: "The Best Quality Journals in the History of Philosophy"

University of Chicago Law School professor (and philosopher) Brian Leiter, who runs Leiter Reports: A Philosophy Blog, recently conducted a poll that should be interest to all intellectual historians. Using CIVS (Condercet Internet Voting Service), he asked readers to rank the best journals, of a list of seventeen, for publication on the history of philosophy. Here are his Top 11:

1. Journal of the History of Philosophy
2. Philosophical Review
3. Philosophy & Phenomenological Research
4. British Journal for the History of Philosophy
5. Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie
6. History of Philosophy Quarterly
7. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
8. European Journal of Philosophy
9. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
10. Canadian Journal of Philosophy
11. Journal of the History of Ideas

See the rest of his results here.

3. Teaching The Big, Hard Ideas---Online

Writing for the National Association of Scholars (a rather conservative group that advocates "working to foster intellectual freedom and to sustain the tradition of reasoned scholarship and civil debate in America’s colleges"), David Clemens offers a rather pessimistic assessment of the ability of online courses to relay the essence of the humanities online. Here is a sampling of his reflections (bolds mine):

I recall a college administrator who while cutting literature classes spoke passionately about more “student access to higher education.” I said, “Access doesn’t do them any good if there’s no higher education when they get here. What you are cutting is higher education.”

Between dumbing down and advocacy teaching, peer editing and “student-centered” classrooms, Theory and CorporateU., PowerPoint presentations and courses on Buffy— higher education in the traditional sense has been smothered. ...Instead of seriously examining such eternal questions of the meaning of life, the liberal arts and humanities wither away in favor of pragmatic but less formative pursuits. What do these words have in common: American, leisure, postcolonial, liberal, gender, disability, queer, environmental, animal? Answer: followed by the word, “studies,” all are degree-granting college majors. ...

The Big Question is whether the imperatives of current educational models make widespread embrace of online classes inevitable. It may be a situation of hug or die. ...Conversely, online is ideal for what I call “boutique” courses, classes people take because they are interested in the subject, not because they “need” them. ...That’s online’s proper role—to supplement face-to-face classes for students in special circumstances (pregnant, remote, homebound) and as a lab for exploration of niche topics. Will that prevail? I doubt it.


To bring this home, Clemens piece makes me skeptical that intellectual history courses can be effectively taught---or at least effectively absorbed by students---in an online teaching environment.

4. Defining American's Knowledge of Religion

About a month ago, before the elections heated up, the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life’s "U.S. Religious Knowledge Survey" was all over the news. Like other "shocking" surveys that make an impression, this one was about how ignorant Americans are. These are usually about history (or those are the ones I remember), but this one covered comparative religion. Because it asked respondents their religious affiliation, it was also able to break down responses by sect. Here's an excerpt from the survey's Executive Summary (to catalyze your memory):

On average, Americans correctly answer 16 of the 32 religious knowledge questions on the survey. ...Atheists and agnostics average 20.9 correct answers. Jews and Mormons do about as well, averaging 20.5 and 20.3 correct answers, respectively. Protestants as a whole average 16 correct answers; Catholics as a whole, 14.7. Atheists and agnostics, Jews and Mormons perform better than other groups on the survey even after controlling for differing levels of education.

I'm bringing this to your attention not to replay the results, but to draw your attention to this excellent set of scholarly replies posted at The Immanent Frame, a blog hosted by the Social Science Research Council. Here is a sampling of the first reply by Richard Amesbury, Associate Professor of Ethics, Claremont School of Theology; Associate Professor of Religion, Claremont Graduate University (bolds mine):

Insofar as it aims to grade Americans on their “religious knowledge,” the new Pew survey contains a strongly normative subtext: that there are certain things that every American ought to know about religion. ...In an earlier piece, I suggested an alternative interpretation: that the things social scientists take to be important about “religion”—--in this case, a range of externally available facts about “the tenets, practices, history and leading figures of major faith traditions”—--aren’t all that important to many Americans. This need not imply that Americans are insincere or incapable of successfully orienting themselves in a culturally diverse environment; rather, it suggests that the conceptual maps they use to do this don’t always conform to the expectations of demographers.

Instead of concluding that Americans lack “religious knowledge” because they don’t know what social scientists think they should, we might want to ask what, if anything, the study reveals about lived religion.


Amesbury suggests the very thing I pointed out to a few friends in a debate about the results: We study epistemology because there are different ways of knowing. And in this case, the creators of the Pew survey did not address practical knowledge in relation to religion---or the kinds of knowledge (i.e. ethics, or how-to navigational skills) that practitioners seek from their chosen faiths. I hope that historians of American religion make these distinctions when they assess how religion operates? And this topic also matters to those assessing how religion fits into the Culture Wars in the United States.

5. A New Journal: History of the Present

Andrew Hartman alerted me to this via his FB page, but History of the Present: A Journal of Critical History should be of interest to U.S. intellectual historians. It relays its avowed purpose as follows:

Its aim is twofold: to create a space in which scholars can reflect on the role history plays in establishing categories of contemporary debate by making them appear inevitable, natural or culturally necessary; and to publish work that calls into question certainties about the relationship between past and present that are taken for granted by the majority of practicing historians. Its editors want to encourage the critical examination of both history’s influence on politics and the politics of the discipline of history itself. The journal’s object is to showcase articles that exemplify the practice of what might be called theorized empirical history.

I can definitely see some of our regular USIH contributors and commenters taking an interest in getting into this periodical. It seems like this endeavor borders on investigative journalism---which reminds me of a quip I recently heard, relayed by Bill Moyers: "The difference between a journalist and an historian is that the historian knows the difference." Humor aside, it looks like History of the Present will be a place for historians to act in the Laschian tradition of social criticism. - TL