Tampilkan postingan dengan label political rhetoric. Tampilkan semua postingan
Tampilkan postingan dengan label political rhetoric. Tampilkan semua postingan

Senin, 13 Februari 2012

What Use Are the Politics of Authenticity?

(Photo: Gage Skidmore)
Not much argues Rich Yeselson over at Crooked Timber in a long post about Mitt Romney that's getting a fair bit of attention on the interwebs today.

It's worth reading the whole thing, but here are the highlights.  Yeselson suggests that "authenticity" is a mirage, both because people don't have single, "real" selves and because, even if they did, there is simply no way for others to judge who a person is in his or her heart of hearts.

Citing the work of Erving Goffman (be still my 20th-century USIH heart!), Yeselson argues that far from presenting (or failing to present) one's authentic self, a person's life necessarily involves the presentation of an array of selves:

Romney, like all of us, performs the roles he must within the public institutions he inhabits and the different dramas which he plays a part in enacting.  There are reasons why he performs on the stages he does—he’ll never be any kind of liberal—but he doesn’t just play the same character every time. Each of those institutions will have a different set of observers with which the individual engages. The audience, venue and dramatic script shape and constrain our public performances.  To perform the wrong script at the wrong time is entirely possible—and a contradiction between verbal and non-verbal cues often occurs—but significant social costs will then accrue to the performer. Even famously “conviction” driven politicians like Ronald Reagan, George W. Bush or Paul Wellstone behaved in a manner that could only be socially interpreted—once an individual’s “inner direction” engages in a variety of externalized, relationally-defined episodes, the protocols and rules systems of those episodes channel the behavior of even the most willful actors.

Yeselson further suggests that the key to understanding Romney is the fact that he referred to the opposing political party as "the Demoratic Party" on one occasion several weeks ago and as "the Democrat Party" on a more recent occasion.*  Neither Democrat Party-referring nor Democratic Party-referring Romney is the authentic candidate. What we learn from his performance, instead, is that, like that of all the rest of us, his behavior is determined by its context. Which leads Yeselson to conclude:

We will probably never find out who the real Romney is, just like we haven’t found out who the real Obama or the real Lincoln is. And it won’t matter what he is not telling us about his Mormonism or how many nightmares he’s had about that terrible day in Beaulanc, France in 1968.  But who controls Congress will matter a lot as to whether we see the Romney who basically agrees with Obama about health care, but just wants to figure out a way not to tax his own class to pay for it, or the Romney who will abolish Obama’s health care reform bill, defund the EPA and the NLRB, and redistribute money from the elderly and the poor to the rich. That is a play we should never want to see performed. I can’t make it any more real for you than that.**
But can the importance of the idea of authenticity be so easily dismissed?

Let me begin by agreeing with Yeselson about the ontological and epistemological problems with attempts to gauge a politician's authentic self.  Like Yeselson, I tend to think that we do not possess such selves, and that it is not possible for us to gain full access to the inner lives of others.

But despite these problems, the discourse of authenticity is a vital one in our culture and politics. The fact that its objects may be largely imaginary no more allows us to wave it away as politically irrelevant than an atheist's non-belief in God allows her to deny the importance of religion in American life.  Instead, the empirical problems and paradoxes of the discourse of authenticity simply make it more difficult to pin down and analyze.  Since the idea of authenticity does not in any simple sense pick out a fact about the world, making sense of authenticity talk requires more, not less, attention.

Even Yeselson, who argues that Romney is like "'conviction'-driven politicians" and, in fact, "all of us" in performing himself, admits that Mitt seems particularly bad at this activity: 

People are what they do, and part of what presidential candidates must do is project a fully integrated depth of being before multiple audiences. Romney’s political problem—his poor job performance as a professional politician—is that he has an almost poignant difficulty in managing to do that. His inability to merely fake the “realness” that people hunger for reminds me of what was once said about former Texas Governor, and Democrat turned Republican John Connally:  he is the only man in the world whose real hair makes people think he’s wearing a toupee.
This admission on Yeselson's part is fairly significant.  Though his account of Romney's failure here is different from one that might be given by someone who buys the myth of authenticity--who might have said that Romney "doesn't know who he really is" or "can't communicate who he really is"--Yeselson seems perfectly capable of distinguishing Romney from other, more successful, politicians in a way that makes some sense of that authenticity talk. 

But for Yeselson this doesn't--or at least shoudn't--matter. Politics should be about policy outcomes, which are, in turn, more determined by presidential circumstances than by Presidents.  Sure some act the part better than others, but this is--or should be--of little consequence once we see that they are all, in a sense, acting.

The problem is that's not how politics work.  Authenticity as it's invoked in our political talk may be an empirically lousy concept, a buzzword borrowed from existentialism, shorn of any intellectual depth it might once have had.  But authenticity talk actually makes a political difference, as all those who rightly complain about the way the media treated Gore and Bush in 2000 would acknowledge.

In fact, I think authenticity talk has political significance beyond the crude levels of character assassination and political hagiography. Among its other functions:

• It's a way of discussing how much one can trust what a particular politician says.

• It's a way of describing the cultural fit (or, more skeptically, the imaginary cultural fit) between a politician and his or her potential (primary or general) electorate.

• It's a shorthand for a host of questions about character (another important concept whose concrete existence is hard to pin down).

The empirical dodginess of authenticity talk makes it an imperfect tool for all of these things. And one might more generally deplore the importance of some of them in our political culture.   Why should it matter, for example, that a candidate is an appropriate cultural "fit"?

But what one can't do is pretend that these things don't matter simply on the basis of the fact that they shouldn't.
_____________________________________

* Yeselson correctly notes that the latter usage is a standard right-wing slur. A surprising amount of space in comments is taken up by folks naively suggesting that "Democrat Party" may just be an unfortunate malapropism.   Eat your history, kids!

** I'm going to focus on Yeselson's treatment of the idea of authenticity in my post. But I wanted to point out in passing how much his argument is framed by the idea that a President's behavior is largely determined by political circumstance. It's really quite remarkable how common this trope has become in public discourse since Obama became President.  If people--especially on the left, but to a certain extent on the right, too--tended to overrate how great a departure from past practice and how unilateral and even authoritarian the George W. Bush presidency was at the time, the presidency is now often described in terms that renders it almost entirely the hostage of circumstance.  I tend to think that both these portraits are exaggerations.  But the latter view--that presidential behavior says more about the political constraints within which a president operates than anything about the president him or herself--fits very nicely with the view of self that Yeselson outlines.  The idea of the circumstantially restrained presidency is useful to rally those somewhat disappointed with Barack Obama's performance to the cause of the President's reelection. Not surprisingly that turns out ultimately to be the point of Yeselson's post.

Kamis, 30 Juni 2011

"Almost Always Polemical": Common Sense, Mortimer Adler, and Late Twentieth-Century Liberalism (Part I)

In April of this year I wrote a post titled "Great Books Liberalism." In that piece I cited Mortimer J. Adler's 1970 book, The Time of Our Lives: The Ethics of Common Sense, as part of my larger effort to reveal the mid-century vital center-type liberalism that formed the politics of at least one prominent great books supporter. At the time I asked readers to momentarily set aside their doubts about the currency and viability of the phrase 'common sense'---doubts I revealed that I shared. What I want to do now is fully engage those doubts, meaning in relation to philosophy, history, politics, and the great books idea. My hypothesis is that 'common sense' is one of those paradoxical, maddening, inadequate, and, sadly, indispensable tropes of any democratic culture. In other words, if you want to stir thinking and reflection into any pluralistic pot with democratic aspirations, ultimately you will likely have to reckon with either 'common sense' or a similar shorthand.

Why? Or, why do intellectual historians who write about the United States---aside from me---need to concern themselves with the fate, or movements, of 'common sense'? I'm not sure I can answer this question to everyone's satisfaction. But I can, for starters, relay something significant about the phrase from at least one other historian. Daniel Rodgers, in Age of Fracture, offers the following as a form of his book's thesis (bolds mine):

"Most striking of all [from the 1970s to the present] was the range across which the intellectual assumptions that had defined the common sense of public intellectual life since the Second World War were challenged, dismantled, and formulated anew" (p. 2).

I think Rodgers meant, in this passage, the common sensibilities of post-war intellectuals rather than 'common sense' as it is used everyday. But let's explore his usage further. Rodgers goes on to use the term in relation to public thought assumptions and movements in four other passages (bolds mine):

(a) Knowing "the pressures of society on the self was…to speak within the bounds of the prevailing common sense of the matter" (p. 5);
(b) "Certain game-theory set pieces—the free-rider problem, the prisoner's dilemma, the tragedy of the commons—became fixtures of common sense" (p. 10);
(c) "As people tried to think their way through events and experiences using the shifting stock of categories at their disposal, the terrain of common sense shifted" (p. 12); and
(d) "[Reagan] claimed no special knowledge, no expertise, no special qualities of leadership beyond the embodiment of the public's common sense" (p.33).

So Rodgers's usage is mixed (i.e. who controls the meaning and usage of 'common sense'---politicians? intellectuals? the public?). Even so, it's clear that some understanding of 'common sense' is necessary to properly read his history of social, cultural, and intellectual fracture in the late twentieth century.

I listed the passages above according to page appearance, but the last, as a segue, touches on the political problem of 'common sense' most disliked by both the left, currently, and those who mistrust populism. Most late twentieth-century appeals to 'common sense' (May I drop the quotes now? Thanks!) have been by populist leaders, like Reagan, appealing to conservatives. In true Rodgers style, I looked for a way to search presidential speeches collectively for references to common sense and couldn't find one (tried here). But I'd hazard a guess that the phrase appears more often in the public utterances of relatively "popular" two-term presidents like Bill Clinton and George W. Bush.

Despite the singular (potential) link to Clinton and Democrats, I think that the party mostly likely to appeal to common sense is the one with demonstrated anti-intellectual rhetorical tendencies---namely, Republicans since the Progressive Era. In other words, those currently on the political left will probably have visceral reactions to common sense appeals. I say this, of course, with no sense of ironic cavil; my hunch is that only left-leaning academic political philosophers would be excessively annoyed with left-leaning populist candidates who utilized appeals to common sense.

Speaking of politics and intellectuals, Ben Alpers indirectly reflected on late twentieth-century political uses of common sense when, in January 2009, he wrote here about "White House Intellectuals" (with a follow-up here). In that first post Ben cited the appearance of Leo Strauss disciple Robert Goldwin as the Ford administration's intellectual-in-residence. Here's the provocative money quote from Goldwin on common sense (bolds mine):

"There is something fishy about the word 'intellectual. …I think of 'intellectuals' as people who have a real distaste, sometimes even contempt, for the common sense approach, which is fundamentally the political approach."

The quote literally drips with what Leon Kass (another Straussian) called the "wisdom of repugnance." That aside, we see in Goldman a Republican administration purposely contrasting the "fishy" intellectual approach with the common sense way solving problems. Goldwin pretty clearly implies that intellectuals prefer top-down, pseudo-fascist bureaucratic means of problem solving, versus populist politicians who appeal to "the people" and seek to understand bottom-up majority opinion, if not the popular consensus. In sum, no Democrat would resort to common sense populism when an effete, eggheaded bureaucrat could get you to the desired end.

Rodgers history, my gloss, and Ben's example, however, obscure the longer political and intellectual history of appeals to common sense. That lacuna is covered, somewhat, by a brand new book I indirectly referenced in my April post: Sophia Rosenfeld's Common Sense: A Political History (Harvard Press, May 2011). Professor Rosenfeld is an historian of early modern Europe and the Atlantic world employed by the University of Virginia. Although I have put out an inter-library loan call for her book, my only access to it at this point is by way of (a) the publisher's blurb and (b) a short write-up by Josh Rothman at the Boston Globe's "Brainiac" blog.

Assuming it is reasonably reflective of the product at hand, the press blurb tells us the following:

Common sense has always been a cornerstone of American politics. In 1776, Tom Paine’s vital pamphlet with that title sparked the American Revolution. And today, common sense—the wisdom of ordinary people, knowledge so self-evident that it is beyond debate—remains a powerful political ideal, utilized alike by George W. Bush’s aw-shucks articulations and Barack Obama’s down-to-earth reasonableness. But far from self-evident is where our faith in common sense comes from and how its populist logic has shaped modern democracy.

I'm struck by these key phrases and words: "always…a cornerstone," "wisdom of ordinary people," "self-evident," "beyond debate," and "faith." Here's the second paragraph from the blurb:

The story begins in the aftermath of England’s Glorious Revolution, when common sense first became a political ideal worth struggling over. Sophia Rosenfeld’s accessible and insightful account then wends its way across two continents and multiple centuries, revealing the remarkable individuals who appropriated the old, seemingly universal idea of common sense and the new strategic uses they made of it. Paine may have boasted that common sense is always on the side of the people and opposed to the rule of kings, but Rosenfeld demonstrates that common sense has been used to foster demagoguery and exclusivity as well as popular sovereignty. She provides a new account of the transatlantic Enlightenment and the Age of Revolutions, and offers a fresh reading on what the eighteenth century bequeathed to the political ferment of our own time. Far from commonsensical, the history of common sense turns out to be rife with paradox and surprise.

More key ideas and points: "a political ideal," used to "foster demagoguery…exclusivity…[and] popular sovereignty."

Here's what Rothman had to say about Rosenfeld's book (bolds mine---aside: notice the similarities and differences with the blurb):

-------------------------------------------------------------
Common sense has a special place in modern politics. Politicians constantly appeal to it in their arguments, and they do so because democracy itself is founded on a faith in common sense. In 1776, for instance, Thomas Paine wrote, in his pamphlet Common Sense, that "simple facts, plain arguments, and common sense" would suffice to place the rights of the people above the rights of the king. The king, and many others, disagreed; and yet today common sense seems, so to speak, self-evident.

The truth is, as usual, more complicated. …Common sense was invented by scientists, philosophers, and politicians. It only seems self-evident now because the idea of common sense presents itself as common-sensical, as though everyone, were he not disabused of the notion by experts, would know that he possessed it. Common sense is…a "slippery" idea -- the kind of idea that covers its own tracks.

Rosenfeld's account of common sense centers on the eighteenth century, when common sense and the scientific method both got their starts. Both ways of thinking about thinking [i.e. epistemology], she writes, began with "a Protestant emphasis on direct, experiential knowledge, simplicity, and the value of 'ordinary life.'" Enlightenment thinkers, who championed reason over tradition and superstition, often cited something not unlike common sense as the quality that authorized them to set aside received ideas and come to their own conclusions. But that alliance was not to last. Science became increasingly specialized, and thinking, especially in print, more rigorous, complicated, and systematized.

Rosenfeld ties her story to a number of large historical developments throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Living in thriving, cosmopolitan cities gave ordinary people the sense that their (actually very local) intuitions might be universally true. Well-educated media types -- think Thomas Paine -- began presenting themselves as representatives of "the people," in an effort to find a middle position in an economically stratified society. And people in authority, overwhelmed by an explosion of books and pamphlets, began using the idea of "common sense" to disqualify ideas they didn't like as absurd or inappropriate. What emerges from this history is that, as Rosenfeld puts it, "common sense is almost never fully consensual;" instead, ideas about what's common-sensical are "almost always polemical."

-------------------------------------------------------------

What are we to take away from Rosenfeld's history---assuming these passages above accurately reflect the contents of her book?

The political usage of common sense over time is clearly "rife with paradox" and inconsistencies. This is probably not surprising to most of us. Past and present politicians have a penchant for using words, terms, and phrases for personal gain---irrespective of truth, philosophy, and consistency. Nevertheless, Rothman reports Rosenfeld to argue that "democracy itself is founded on a faith in common sense." This is probably disheartening to a significant number of intellectuals, but I think she's right. I can't decide, however, if this says more about the fragility of democracy or the tentative nature of knowledge. In either case, today's usage of common sense is indeed "almost always political"---if mostly anchored in right-wing politics.

But, if we can set aside the uses and abuses of common sense by politicians, Rosenfeld also tells us that we should take seriously the intellectual foundations of common sense. ...

Let me stop here, however, since this post is getting overly long. Next week I'll try to connect those serious intellectual foundations with Mortimer Adler, the great books, and late twentieth-century liberalism. Stay tuned! - TL

"Almost Always Polemical": Common Sense, Mortimer Adler, and Late Twentieth-Century Liberalism (Part I)

In April of this year I wrote a post titled "Great Books Liberalism." In that piece I cited Mortimer J. Adler's 1970 book, The Time of Our Lives: The Ethics of Common Sense, as part of my larger effort to reveal the mid-century vital center-type liberalism that formed the politics of at least one prominent great books supporter. At the time I asked readers to momentarily set aside their doubts about the currency and viability of the phrase 'common sense'---doubts I revealed that I shared. What I want to do now is fully engage those doubts, meaning in relation to philosophy, history, politics, and the great books idea. My hypothesis is that 'common sense' is one of those paradoxical, maddening, inadequate, and, sadly, indispensable tropes of any democratic culture. In other words, if you want to stir thinking and reflection into any pluralistic pot with democratic aspirations, ultimately you will likely have to reckon with either 'common sense' or a similar shorthand.

Why? Or, why do intellectual historians who write about the United States---aside from me---need to concern themselves with the fate, or movements, of 'common sense'? I'm not sure I can answer this question to everyone's satisfaction. But I can, for starters, relay something significant about the phrase from at least one other historian. Daniel Rodgers, in Age of Fracture, offers the following as a form of his book's thesis (bolds mine):

"Most striking of all [from the 1970s to the present] was the range across which the intellectual assumptions that had defined the common sense of public intellectual life since the Second World War were challenged, dismantled, and formulated anew" (p. 2).

I think Rodgers meant, in this passage, the common sensibilities of post-war intellectuals rather than 'common sense' as it is used everyday. But let's explore his usage further. Rodgers goes on to use the term in relation to public thought assumptions and movements in four other passages (bolds mine):

(a) Knowing "the pressures of society on the self was…to speak within the bounds of the prevailing common sense of the matter" (p. 5);
(b) "Certain game-theory set pieces—the free-rider problem, the prisoner's dilemma, the tragedy of the commons—became fixtures of common sense" (p. 10);
(c) "As people tried to think their way through events and experiences using the shifting stock of categories at their disposal, the terrain of common sense shifted" (p. 12); and
(d) "[Reagan] claimed no special knowledge, no expertise, no special qualities of leadership beyond the embodiment of the public's common sense" (p.33).

So Rodgers's usage is mixed (i.e. who controls the meaning and usage of 'common sense'---politicians? intellectuals? the public?). Even so, it's clear that some understanding of 'common sense' is necessary to properly read his history of social, cultural, and intellectual fracture in the late twentieth century.

I listed the passages above according to page appearance, but the last, as a segue, touches on the political problem of 'common sense' most disliked by both the left, currently, and those who mistrust populism. Most late twentieth-century appeals to 'common sense' (May I drop the quotes now? Thanks!) have been by populist leaders, like Reagan, appealing to conservatives. In true Rodgers style, I looked for a way to search presidential speeches collectively for references to common sense and couldn't find one (tried here). But I'd hazard a guess that the phrase appears more often in the public utterances of relatively "popular" two-term presidents like Bill Clinton and George W. Bush.

Despite the singular (potential) link to Clinton and Democrats, I think that the party mostly likely to appeal to common sense is the one with demonstrated anti-intellectual rhetorical tendencies---namely, Republicans since the Progressive Era. In other words, those currently on the political left will probably have visceral reactions to common sense appeals. I say this, of course, with no sense of ironic cavil; my hunch is that only left-leaning academic political philosophers would be excessively annoyed with left-leaning populist candidates who utilized appeals to common sense.

Speaking of politics and intellectuals, Ben Alpers indirectly reflected on late twentieth-century political uses of common sense when, in January 2009, he wrote here about "White House Intellectuals" (with a follow-up here). In that first post Ben cited the appearance of Leo Strauss disciple Robert Goldwin as the Ford administration's intellectual-in-residence. Here's the provocative money quote from Goldwin on common sense (bolds mine):

"There is something fishy about the word 'intellectual. …I think of 'intellectuals' as people who have a real distaste, sometimes even contempt, for the common sense approach, which is fundamentally the political approach."

The quote literally drips with what Leon Kass (another Straussian) called the "wisdom of repugnance." That aside, we see in Goldman a Republican administration purposely contrasting the "fishy" intellectual approach with the common sense way solving problems. Goldwin pretty clearly implies that intellectuals prefer top-down, pseudo-fascist bureaucratic means of problem solving, versus populist politicians who appeal to "the people" and seek to understand bottom-up majority opinion, if not the popular consensus. In sum, no Democrat would resort to common sense populism when an effete, eggheaded bureaucrat could get you to the desired end.

Rodgers history, my gloss, and Ben's example, however, obscure the longer political and intellectual history of appeals to common sense. That lacuna is covered, somewhat, by a brand new book I indirectly referenced in my April post: Sophia Rosenfeld's Common Sense: A Political History (Harvard Press, May 2011). Professor Rosenfeld is an historian of early modern Europe and the Atlantic world employed by the University of Virginia. Although I have put out an inter-library loan call for her book, my only access to it at this point is by way of (a) the publisher's blurb and (b) a short write-up by Josh Rothman at the Boston Globe's "Brainiac" blog.

Assuming it is reasonably reflective of the product at hand, the press blurb tells us the following:

Common sense has always been a cornerstone of American politics. In 1776, Tom Paine’s vital pamphlet with that title sparked the American Revolution. And today, common sense—the wisdom of ordinary people, knowledge so self-evident that it is beyond debate—remains a powerful political ideal, utilized alike by George W. Bush’s aw-shucks articulations and Barack Obama’s down-to-earth reasonableness. But far from self-evident is where our faith in common sense comes from and how its populist logic has shaped modern democracy.

I'm struck by these key phrases and words: "always…a cornerstone," "wisdom of ordinary people," "self-evident," "beyond debate," and "faith." Here's the second paragraph from the blurb:

The story begins in the aftermath of England’s Glorious Revolution, when common sense first became a political ideal worth struggling over. Sophia Rosenfeld’s accessible and insightful account then wends its way across two continents and multiple centuries, revealing the remarkable individuals who appropriated the old, seemingly universal idea of common sense and the new strategic uses they made of it. Paine may have boasted that common sense is always on the side of the people and opposed to the rule of kings, but Rosenfeld demonstrates that common sense has been used to foster demagoguery and exclusivity as well as popular sovereignty. She provides a new account of the transatlantic Enlightenment and the Age of Revolutions, and offers a fresh reading on what the eighteenth century bequeathed to the political ferment of our own time. Far from commonsensical, the history of common sense turns out to be rife with paradox and surprise.

More key ideas and points: "a political ideal," used to "foster demagoguery…exclusivity…[and] popular sovereignty."

Here's what Rothman had to say about Rosenfeld's book (bolds mine---aside: notice the similarities and differences with the blurb):

-------------------------------------------------------------
Common sense has a special place in modern politics. Politicians constantly appeal to it in their arguments, and they do so because democracy itself is founded on a faith in common sense. In 1776, for instance, Thomas Paine wrote, in his pamphlet Common Sense, that "simple facts, plain arguments, and common sense" would suffice to place the rights of the people above the rights of the king. The king, and many others, disagreed; and yet today common sense seems, so to speak, self-evident.

The truth is, as usual, more complicated. …Common sense was invented by scientists, philosophers, and politicians. It only seems self-evident now because the idea of common sense presents itself as common-sensical, as though everyone, were he not disabused of the notion by experts, would know that he possessed it. Common sense is…a "slippery" idea -- the kind of idea that covers its own tracks.

Rosenfeld's account of common sense centers on the eighteenth century, when common sense and the scientific method both got their starts. Both ways of thinking about thinking [i.e. epistemology], she writes, began with "a Protestant emphasis on direct, experiential knowledge, simplicity, and the value of 'ordinary life.'" Enlightenment thinkers, who championed reason over tradition and superstition, often cited something not unlike common sense as the quality that authorized them to set aside received ideas and come to their own conclusions. But that alliance was not to last. Science became increasingly specialized, and thinking, especially in print, more rigorous, complicated, and systematized.

Rosenfeld ties her story to a number of large historical developments throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Living in thriving, cosmopolitan cities gave ordinary people the sense that their (actually very local) intuitions might be universally true. Well-educated media types -- think Thomas Paine -- began presenting themselves as representatives of "the people," in an effort to find a middle position in an economically stratified society. And people in authority, overwhelmed by an explosion of books and pamphlets, began using the idea of "common sense" to disqualify ideas they didn't like as absurd or inappropriate. What emerges from this history is that, as Rosenfeld puts it, "common sense is almost never fully consensual;" instead, ideas about what's common-sensical are "almost always polemical."

-------------------------------------------------------------

What are we to take away from Rosenfeld's history---assuming these passages above accurately reflect the contents of her book?

The political usage of common sense over time is clearly "rife with paradox" and inconsistencies. This is probably not surprising to most of us. Past and present politicians have a penchant for using words, terms, and phrases for personal gain---irrespective of truth, philosophy, and consistency. Nevertheless, Rothman reports Rosenfeld to argue that "democracy itself is founded on a faith in common sense." This is probably disheartening to a significant number of intellectuals, but I think she's right. I can't decide, however, if this says more about the fragility of democracy or the tentative nature of knowledge. In either case, today's usage of common sense is indeed "almost always political"---if mostly anchored in right-wing politics.

But, if we can set aside the uses and abuses of common sense by politicians, Rosenfeld also tells us that we should take seriously the intellectual foundations of common sense. ...

Let me stop here, however, since this post is getting overly long. Next week I'll try to connect those serious intellectual foundations with Mortimer Adler, the great books, and late twentieth-century liberalism. Stay tuned! - TL