Senin, 31 Oktober 2011

Edge of the American West Returns!

Should I have gone with a picture of Martin Guerre?
I just found out from former EotAW blogger SEK over at Lawyers, Guns, and Money that Edge of the American West's long hiatus is over. 

Those of you who know the blog will probably be as excited as I am to see it return. Those who don't, go check it out.  You'll find a blog as notable for its commentary on current events and its off-beat sense of humor as its excellent history blogging. 

Historians, Academic Publishers, and the Ongoing Digital Publishing (R)evolution

But does it have a Reading Room?
During the last two weeks, two major national events exploring the frontiers of e-publishing took place on opposite coasts of the U.S.  On October 21, the Digital Public Library of America (DPLA) held its first Plenary Meeting at the National Archives in Washington, D.C. And on October 26-28, the Books in Browsers conference took place at the headquarters of the Internet Archive in San Francisco.

The DPLA event was built around the six winners of the DPLA's beta sprint competition to identify "ideas, models, prototypes, technical tools, user interfaces, etc. . . that demonstrate how the DPLA might index and provide access to a wide range of broadly distributed content."* The DPLA also announced a $5 million grant from the Sloan Foundation and the Arcadia Fund to promote "an intense two-year grassroots process to build a realistic and detailed workplan for a national digital library, the development of a functional technical prototype, and targeted content digitization efforts." Jill Cousins, of Europeana, the European Union's digital library project, announced a partnership with DPLA focused on coordination between European and US libraries, museums and archives. The agenda of the plenary meeting can be found here. A video of the entire event, as well as a variety of reports about it and documents from it, are available here.  The speakers at the event were, not surprisingly given the origins and scope of the DPLA process, largely from the worlds of libraries, archives (analog and digital), and academia.

The Books in Browsers conference, in contrast, was much less academic and much more geared toward the digital publishing industry.  A complete agenda can be found here. The common participant in both events was the Internet Archive itself, represented at both events by its founder, Brewster Kahle. Notably absent, at least from the agenda, were academic publishers.

What is--and what should be--the relationship of historians to these events...and to the greater digital publishing revolution in the midst of which we find ourselves?



A number of those presenting at the DPLA plenary meeting are historians--or at least history-affiliated scholars: Peter Baldwin, Professor of History at UCLA; Bob Darnton, Carl H. Pforzheimer University Professor and Director of the Harvard University Library; and Amanda French, THATCamp (The Humanities and Technology Camp) Coordinator at the Center for History and New Media.

But most historians and other academic humanists have not been much involved in these conversations about the future of digital publishing.  And academic presses--the institutions on which we largely depend for the dissemination of our work--seem to be even further removed from these developments.**

In my experience, historians and other academics in humanities disciplines tend to be rather conservative when it comes to considering structural changes in the conditions of our research or our employment. There are good reasons for this. For at least the last quarter century, most of the pressure for change has come from economic and political forces which are at best indifferent to our interests and often quite hostile to them.  But the changes that might be brought about by digital publishing might potentially be to our enormous benefit.  

Historians are, of course, very dependent on publishing.  It is a central means for circulating our work.  It is also among the most important ways that we credential ourselves professionally. And for many of us, especially in intellectual history, it also provides us with much of our data. More than scholars in any other field, historians focus on the production of books. And it is books--especially academic books--that have been put most at risk by the changing economics of the publishing industry.

Finding a publisher for an academic book has become more and more difficult...though we in U.S. history haven't seen the worst effects of the cutbacks in university press lists (talk to someone in, e.g., German or Russian Studies!).  And as the conditions of employment in the academy worsen, the imperative to publish or perish if anything grows.

The digital publishing revolution does present some dangers. To the extent that the traditional book is threatened with extinction, we ought to be defending it.  There are still things that it offers that other reading technologies don't.

But the upsides of the digital publishing revolution are potentially greater.  We are living in a moment in which the forms of academic communication--which have in the past usually changed fairly slowly and organically--seem open to experimentation and rapid innovation.  Digital technologies offer new means of disseminating work (traditionally conceived) that solve some of the economic problems associated with traditional publishing.  And they also offer the possibilities of entirely new kinds of academic work (including, of course, blogs).

The perceived crisis in traditional academic publishing--as well as the creativity that has begun to emerge in these new forms--has also led more and more departmental and university review committees to treat non-traditional forms--and non-traditionally disseminated forms--of academic work seriously.  Our central technology of quality control--peer review--cuts across the digital divide; it can be used to bolster any of these new forms.

But it is essential that historians and other humanities scholars involve ourselves more actively in the process of creating this new world of digital publishing.  There are, of course, far bigger players in this game, most of whom are at best unaware of our professional needs.  If, when the dust settles, we are stuck with digital forms that do not suit us--or face a market dominated by a few huge corporate players who have no interest in our distributional needs--we may find that these changes don't serve our purposes at all.

As the first Publications Chair of the Society for U.S. Intellectual History, I find myself having to think about these issues very concretely. In the past, a new professional organization like ours would have been faced with one big question: do we publish a journal?  Now, instead, we are faced with a more exciting, open-ended, and complicated one: what does our publication program look like? 

I would love to answer that question in ways that will put S-USIH on the cutting edge of academic publishing (taking into account our very small scale, of course).  As an organization that started as blog, we perhaps have the right pedigree to do this. But I need to further educate myself about what others are doing and what we might conceivably take on. Blogs, after all, are so 1999.

Along with a number of other S-USIH bloggers, I look forward to participating, this coming January, in THATCamp AHA.*** And Tim Lacy and I are still on the lookout for anyone interested in becoming the third member of S-USIH's Publications Committee (prospective members need to join S-USIH, of course).  Those with a knowledge of, or interest in, the changing world of digital publishing are very much encouraged to offer their services to the PubComm (though I should add that we have not by any means ruled out trying to start a journal). 

But I hope that even those who are not tempted to sign up for the S-USIH PubComm will educate themselves about the changes--good and bad for historians--taking place in the world of digital publishing. I'm convinced that we can make those changes better for us than they'd otherwise be...and quite possibly create a publishing landscape that is a marked improvement over the one we have faced in recent years, both in the quality and availability of scholarship and in the opportunities it offers us for professional advancement. 
______________________________

* This blog has discussed DPLA a number of times in the past.  The most recent video update (dated September 14) from DPLA chair John Palfrey can be viewed here.  The forty final submissions to the beta spring can be seen here.

** Among the several dozen Co-Chairs and Conveners of the six "workstreams" that will define the shape of the DPLA project going forward, only one comes from a university press:  Margeurite Avery, Senior Acquisitions Editor in Science, Technology, & Society (STS), Communications, Library and Information Science, Internet Studies, and Information Policy at MIT Press.

*** Those unfamiliar with the THATCamp concept are encouraged to listen to this episode of the Making History podcast, featuring THATCamp coordinator Amanda French.

Reviewer Wanted

[Update: This book was claimed at 11:39 a.m. - TL]

Colleagues,

I am seeking a reviewer for Sara Schwebel's Child-Sized History: Fictions of the Past in U.S. Classrooms (Vanderbilt University Press). The press blurb is immediately below. If interested write me at timothy.n.lacy-at-gmail.com.

- TL
-------------------------------------------------------

For more than three decades, the same children's historical novels have been taught across the United States. Honored for their literary quality and appreciated for their alignment with social studies curricula, the books have flourished as schools moved from whole-language to phonics and from student-centered learning to standardized testing.

Books like Johnny Tremain, The Witch of Blackbird Pond, Island of the Blue Dolphins, and Roll of Thunder, Hear My Cry stimulate children's imagination, transporting them into the American past and projecting them into an American future. As works of historical interpretation, however, many are startlingly out of step with current historiography and social sensibilities, especially with regard to race. Unlike textbooks, which are replaced on regular cycles and subjected to public tugs-of-war between the left and right, historical novels have simply--and quietly--endured. Taken individually, many present troubling interpretations of the American past. But embraced collectively, this classroom canon provides a rare pedagogical opportunity: it captures a range of interpretive voices across time and place, a kind of "people's history" far removed from today's state-sanctioned textbooks.

Teachers who employ historical novels in the classroom can help students recognize and interpret historical narrative as the product of research, analytical perspective, and the politics of the time. In doing so, they sensitize students to the ways in which the past is put to moral and ideological uses in the present.

Featuring separate chapters on American Indians, war, and slavery, Child-Sized History tracks the changes in how young readers are taught to conceptualize history and the American nation.

Jumat, 28 Oktober 2011

Where are all the women?

On the S-USIH facebook page (Varad affectionately termed it Susie; the executive board has taken to calling it Sushi--any opinions?) David Watt kindly inquired whether the lack of women posting/commenting on our blog and our fb page was indicative of a trend at large.

Before I reproduce the fb conversation, I feel like I should comment as the single public female face of the group (though not the only female member, by any means. For example, Jennifer Ratner-Rosenhagen has come to every conference, presenting brilliant papers every time).

I consider myself an intellectual historian for three reasons. One, when I was having difficulty as a young student picking a part of the world to focus on, I realized that every time I formulated a topic, it was about educated, articulate people. Two, I was trained by David Bailey, an intellectual historian who was trained by Henry May, David Hollinger, and Kenneth Stamp. Three, the people I study qualify as intellectuals--although not all the women would have agreed with that label of themselves.

Yet, I often feel like I don't belong in this group. Why? Well, partly my own insecurity (perhaps a large part). That insecurity makes me question everything I post here, especially since I'm on the job market this year. I need to project confidence, but it is easier for me to laugh at my own flaws. I grew up in a small town where I had to mask my intelligence in order to make friends. It's hard to sluff off that smiling self-mockery. I also tend to think of blogging as a more personal extension of academics. Here is where I can put all the self-conversation that goes on behind what I put on the academic page. However, few of the others write as personally as I do--and sometimes I feel like my personal tales are a bit superfluous compared to their very measured, intelligent comments on the past and the present.

The other reason I don't always feel like I belong is that my people are not your people. Though I am usually familiar with the names the others write about, there are four years of dissertation writing between me and the last time I read a book about the people who frequent this blog. That is part of the reason I am so curious to see what happens next semester, the first time I am teaching intellectual history as a survey. I would be more comfortable if I was teaching black history, but that wasn't an option.

But what about gender? Does that make me feel like I don't belong? Let's just say it's still under debate. I have an unproven sense that intellectual history can be the bastion for men who reject gender and race based analysis. I worry that instead of incorporating new modes of analysis, S-USIH can become a self-selecting ghetto. It is, I suppose, easy for me to write this when I have many more open positions to apply for because I study race as well as intellectual history. Still, I would encourage S-USIH members to look forward and be open, rather than insular and angry.

Every time I try to run away, though, several things draw me back. I genuinely enjoy working with the others on the S-USIH executive committee, and they have often talked me through my anxieties. I think that it is important to infuse race and gender, to the extent that I do, into this blog and society. And I have to admit that as much as the platform daunts me, I also enjoy inhabiting it.

For those of you not on facebook, I will copy the fb conversation, after the jump:

I'm struck by what a small percentage of the posts on the site come from women. Would it be fair to say that about ninety percent of those of us who belong to this group are men? (I am not trying to make a evaluative judgment here. I am simply trying to figure out the situation in which we find ourselves).
  • Lauren Kientz Anderson This is something we've talked about. I do feel a mite bit lonely at times.
    21 hours ago ·

  • Varad Mehta When Lauren started blogging, the percentage went way up. Don't ask me to calculate how much. A lot of the people who comment here know each other personally, so in that sense it functions as a personal page where "friends" are talking to each other. That said, I counted 20 women in the 155 members (which is sometimes 151 members and sometimes 153 for some reason). That's 13 or 14 per cent by my rough math. I have no idea how that compares to the field of intellectual history as a whole, but my impression is that it's one in which men have preponderated.
    19 hours ago · · 1 person

  • Andrew Hartman I would love for some fresh analysis as to why intellectual history continues to attract more men than women, even though it commonly incorporates the methods of the cultural turn that also served as an implicit critique of the gender conventions of older intellectual historical methods. As a Society, male-female imbalance is something we're conscious of and would like to change. This year's conference program features 50 women by my count, well over 1/3 of participants, a more even ratio. One of our plenary sessions is dedicated to U.S. Women's Intellectual Traditions. So we're a work in progress. http://us-intellectual-history.blogspot.com/2011/08/program-fourth-annual-us-intellectual.html

    us-intellectual-history.blogspot.com
    A general note on this schedule: this post is the official schedule of our confe...See More

    15 hours ago ·

  • Varad Mehta So perhaps the preponderance of guys here isn't really indicative of anything more than the fact that the most active members are guys. There are five main writers on the blog, and one's a woman. As the Sabermetricians would say, SSS (small sample size). As for women in the field as a whole, it seems there are plenty if you turn the magnification down a bit. And history as a whole seems pretty much 50-50 these days. Unlike, say, philosophy, which still has lots of problems. I think I posted a link about that here ages ago.
    15 hours ago ·

  • Andrew Hartman Varad: No, I think those interested in intellectual history-qua-intellectual history tend to be men, based if nothing else on notions about how it was narrowly practiced 50 years ago prior to the social and cultural turns. But hopefully this year's program is a sign that this is changing.
    6 hours ago ·

  • Constance Clark I identify as an intellectual historian and am on this list but i seldom have time to talk to anyone on Facebook because I am on too many university committees. Perhaps women have a harder time saying no to university committees? Or maybe it's just me.
    5 hours ago ·

Kamis, 27 Oktober 2011

The Stanford Debates And The Culture Wars

One week from tomorrow I'll be presenting a paper titled "The Rhetoric of Reactionaries: The Stanford Debates, the Great Books Idea, and the Culture Wars." This presentation will take place at the 51st annual meeting of the History of Education Society in Chicago. I'll be on a panel with Andrew Hartman and Christopher Hickman, chaired by Martha Biondi, titled "RETHINKING LEFT AND RIGHT IN THE EDUCATIONAL CULTURE WARS."

I've written the paper. Hopefully it'll go over well. I'm drawing your attention to it today because there two issues that came up in writing on which I'd like some feedback:

(1) Thanks to Andrew, we've discussed a definition of the "Culture Wars" here before (yes, I elect to capitalize the phrase). And there was at least one follow-up post. But, in the interest of being an independent thinker, I've decided to use a new one for my paper. Mine was inspired by a recent reading of Daniel Bell's 1992 Wilson Quarterly essay titled "The Cultural Wars: American Intellectual Life, 1965-1992." Here's my definition:

Beginning in the 1960s and continuing until the present, the Culture Wars are the sometimes public fights over the symbolism and meanings attached to cultural, social, political, and economic events by varieties of 'institutional' intellectuals—purposely and accidentally separated from each other—and non-intellectuals—the latter often using religion as their bridge back into cultural, social, political, philosophical, and economic terrain.

Thoughts? What have I left out? What's missing?

(2) In the course of reviewing the literature on the Stanford Debates I learned that there was neither a normalized term for the event---or series of events---nor a short-hand definition of those debates. So here's what I wrote on both topics:

What were the “Stanford Debates”? The phrase is short-hand for a series of discussions, both at Stanford University and beyond, about the nature, necessity, and required readings of a standardized, first-year course sequence called “Western Culture.” These discussions began in 1986 and culminated in a spring 1988 decision to replace “Western Culture” with something called “Culture, Institutions, and Values,” or CIV, in the fall of 1989. During the spring of 1988 those discussions reached a fever pitch. Secretary of Education William Bennett came to Stanford to debate the changes with President Donald Kennedy. There is no agreed upon name for this series of historical events; I have seen them called the “Stanford Debate” (singular), “Stanford Affair,” and “Stanford Canon Debate.” As I see it, however, those debates were about three things: (1) multiculturalism in education (diversity and/or rigor, or excellence); (2) the failings of curricula anchored in Western civilization or culture; and (3) the types of books used in those curricula (i.e. great, good, representative, etc.).

What do you think? What have I missed or neglected? - TL

Selasa, 25 Oktober 2011

Gore Vidal, Master Polemicist

I have always loved a good polemic. Perhaps this is one of the reasons I selected the culture wars as the topic of my current research. The polemic is the genre of choice for culture warriors. Unfortunately, most of the culture wars polemics I read are bad; they are mostly, to phrase it generously, “inartful.” So much so that I have almost grown immune to the polemic. But every now and then I come across a master polemicist, someone like Gore Vidal. For anyone interested in learning the art of the polemic, his 1981 essay “Pink Triangle and Yellow Star” should be compulsory reading. (The essay was originally published by The Nation [Nov. 14, 1981] but is perhaps easier located in The Selected Essays of Gore Vidal, 339-356.)

“Pink Triangle and Yellow Star” is a 17-page review of an article of about the same length, which might seem strange minus some context. Vidal’s essay was a scathing critique of Midge Decter’s infamous “Boys on the Beach” article—a vicious, anecdotal attack on the gay right’s movement—published in Commentary (Sept. 1980). “Boys on the Beach” was widely read and discussed in literary circles. In other words, Decter’s article merited the Vidal treatment.

Decter opposed the gay right’s movement in general, just as she opposed women’s liberation, and all the other movements associated with the Sixties. In this she was the typical, even prototypical neoconservative. But specific to her 1980 Commentary article, she framed her opposition to gay rights, and to homosexuality more generally, by way of her observations of the gays who populated Fire Island, a Long Island beach resort where Decter and her family spent their summers in the early 1960s. Among other slanders, Decter interpreted the homosexuality she observed on Fire Island as a flight from the responsibilities of women and children. She accused the Fire Island gays of flaunting their narcissistic behavior in the face of the straight men who duly went about their unexciting but meaningful lives but who nonetheless felt that the gays were flaunting their irresponsibility. The straight men Decter defended—men like her husband, Commentary editor Norman Podhoretz—“feel mocked most of all for having become, in style as well as in substance, family men, caught up in getting and begetting, thinking of mortgages, schools, and the affordable, marking the passage of years in obedience to all the grubby imperatives that heterosexual manhood seems to impose. In assuming such burdens they believe themselves entitled to respect, but homosexuality paints them with the color of sheer entrapment.” The upshot is that Decter believed the gays of Fire Island already had everything they wanted, so what need was there for a gay right’s movement?


Vidal cut Decter down to size on the merits of her argument, to be sure. As Vidal makes clear, Decter described the Fire Island gays as if they represented all gays, ignoring that plenty hid in plain sight due to social prejudices. And on the notion that gay men lived to torment the straight men around them, Vidal had this retort: “Although Decter’s blood was always at the boil when contemplating these unnatural and immature half-men, they were, I would suspect, serenely unaware of her and her new-class cronies, solemnly worshiping at the shrine of The Family.”

Vidal also went after Decter’s style, since, for the master polemicist, there is no strict division between style and substance. A small sample: “[Decter] writes with the authority and easy confidence of someone who knows that she is very well known to those few who know her.”

Even more damning, Vidal questions Decter’s basic understanding of homosexuality, in response to her remark, a mix of wonder and disgust, that the bodies of the gays on the beach were seemingly always hairless. “It is startling that Decter has not yet learned that there is no hormonal difference between men who like sex with other men and those who like sex with women.”

But the icing on the polemical cake is the way Vidal framed his overarching argument. By titling his article “Pink Triangle and Yellow Star,” Vidal called attention to Decter as a Jew, and to Commentary as a Jewish publication. “In the German concentration camps, Jews wore yellow stars while homosexualists wore pink triangles.” In the context of Reagan’s election and with the newfound political visibility of evangelicals, Vidal reasoned that Jews and homosexuals, once again, had common enemies and should unite. And yet, to the contrary, “Mrs. Norman Podhoretz… has managed not only to come up with every known prejudice and superstition about same-sexers but also to make up some brand-new ones. For sheer vim and vigor, ‘The Boys on the Beach’ outdoes its implicit model, The Protocol of the Elders of Zion.”

This latter element of Vidal’s argument is the most suspect, at least, in terms of accurately judging the Jewish position in the United States. That many Jews have found common cause with evangelicals, and not just regarding Israel, has not constrained their freedom as Jews in the United States. Quite to the contrary, as George Nash convincingly demonstrates in “Joining Ranks: Commentary and American Conservatism,” a chapter from his latest book, Reappraising the Right, the conservative turn taken by the Jews at Commentary demonstrated that Jews were more mainstream than ever, and thus less threatened as a minority than ever. Nash writes: “In 1945, Commentary had been born into a marginal, impoverished, immigrant-based subculture and an intellectual milieu that touted ‘alienation’ and ‘critical nonconformity’ as the true marks of the intellectual vis-à-vis his own culture. Two generations later, Commentary stood in the mainstream of American culture, and even of American conservatism, as a celebrant of the fundamental goodness of the American regime, and Norman Podhoretz, an immigrant’s milkman, was its advocate.” Of course, perspicuity is not always a prerequisite for a powerful polemic, nor for a proper ethical stance.

Allow me to conclude by asking two questions of you, dear reader: What makes a good polemic? And who are some of your favorite polemicists?

Registration for 2011 S-USIH Conference

The 2011 S-USIH annual conference is only a month away and we have updated the registration page and link that allows you to pay online for the conference. We are very encouraged by the response to this year's conference and ask that participants register for the conference and join S-USIH soon.

Please feel free to contact the conference committee or the secretary of S-USIH if you have any questions regarding the conference and membership in the society.

We look forward to an interesting conference.

David Sehat in the AHR

The latest issue of the American Historical Review (116: 4; October 2011) contains a featured review (page 1066) of David Sehat's The Myth of American Religious Freedom. Sehat is one of the founders of the Society for U.S. Intellectual History, and currently serves on the organization's executive committee as the officer in charge of the 2012 S-USIH conference. The review, by Mark Douglas McGarvie, is very positive, calling the book a "wonderful intellectual history of the United States addressing a topic of perpetual concern to Americans since the founding." In the high praise department, Richard Hofstadter is referred to as "one of [Sehat's] leading predecessors." Congratulations, David!

Senin, 24 Oktober 2011

"Positivism": A Bleg

A Word of Many Meanings
One of the bêtes noires of Leo Strauss and his students is "positivism."  The term appears frequently in Strauss's own (English-language) writings of the 1950s and beyond.  For example, Strauss's essay "The Liberalism of Classical Political Philosophy," which originally appeared in 1959 in The Review of Metaphysics and was later published as Chapter 3 of Liberalism Ancient and Modern (1968), begins with a polemic against "positivism":

Classical political philosophy--the political philosophy originated by Socrates and elaborated by Plato and by Aristotle--is today generally rejected as obsolete. The difference between, not to say the mutual incompatibility of, the two grounds on which it is rejected corresponds to the difference between the two schools of thought which predominate in our age, namely, positivism and existentialism. Positivism rejects classical political philosophy with a view to its mode as unscientific and with a view to its substance as undemocratic. There is a tension between these grounds, for, according to positivism, science is incapable of validating any value judgment and therefore science can never reject a doctrine because it is undemocratic. But "the heart has its reasons which reason does not know," and not indeed positivism but many positivists possess a heart. Moreover there is an affinity between present day positivism and sympathy for a certain kind of democracy; that affinity is due to the broad, not merely methodological, context out of which positivism emerged or to the hidden premises of positivism which positivism is unable to articulate because it is constitutionally unable to conceive of itself as a problem. Positivism may be said to be more dogmatic than any other position of which we have records.
Strauss's identification of positivism and existentialism as "the two schools of thought which predominate in our age" may have been something of an exaggeration, but was, at the time in which he wrote these words in the late 1950s, at least grounded in intellectual reality.  "Positivism" was a powerful, positive word in the American academy at the time, though it often meant different things in different intellectual places, from social scientists' adherence to certain empirical approaches to its use by early analytic philosophers, for whom the Vienna Circle's logical positivism was very important. In the context of legal scholarship, "positivism" has yet another set of connotations.

Today, Strauss's critique of positivism remains vitally important for younger thinkers in the Straussian vein.  For example, Nasser Behnegar's Leo Strauss, Max Weber, and the Scientific Study of Politics (2005) is largely a recapitulation of Strauss's critique of positivism.

But what exactly do Strauss and his followers mean by positivism?

Political scientist Stanley Rothman, an early critic of Strauss and his school of thought, noted in 1962 that Strauss "never really defines with any precision" what he means by the label "positivist."*

And, as even some Straussians note, today the term "positivism," if it appears at all in American academic writing, tends to be a pejorative.** For example, "positivism" is the charge leveled against Sam Harris by Jackson Lears in a recent, scathing Nation review.***  And logical positivism, once a dominant view in philosophy of science, is in the words of John Passmore, "dead, or as dead as a philosophical movement ever becomes."****

But while it's clear that positivism's fortunes were up in the 1950s and down half a century later,  the diversity of meanings attached to the term makes its history more difficult to grasp.

The term "positivism" was coined by the 19th-century French philosopher and sociologist Auguste Comte.  The social scientific usages of "positivism" in the 20th century seem to be in many ways direct descendents of Comte's thought. But the stream of ideas that led to the Vienna Circle's logical positivism is usually seen as flowing from the philosophical work of Ernst Mach.*****

So here's the bleg: does anyone know of any fairly comprehensive treatment of the history of the term "positivism" in its various national and disciplinary contexts?

My hunch is that the role of positivism in Strauss's mature works of the 1950s and '60s has something to do with his international intellectual biography. His education took place in the early interwar period in German intellectual circles that had just finished beating back Machian positivism and were then battling the emergent logical positivism of the Vienna Circle. Strauss arrived in the quite different intellectual context of the U.S. in the late 1930s and took some years establishing himself as  a major intellectual figure in his adoptive country.  Strauss may well have recognized the ascendent positivism of the post-World War II American academy as an old, familiar foe.  But was it, in fact, the same opponent?
___________________________________
* Stanley Rothman, "The Revival of Classical Political Philosophy: A Critique," The American Political Science Review, Vol. 56, No. 2 (Jun., 1962), 350.

** Strauss student Thomas Pangle in Leo Strauss: An Introduction to His Thought and Intellectual Legacy (Johns Hopkins, 2006) notes that "positivism" is currently out of fashion...though the thought is relegated to a footnote (pp. 135-6).


*** I thank Andrew Hartman for pointing me in the direction of this review in a post on this blog

**** Quoted in the Wikipedia entry on logical positivism

***** Mach's positivism and its relationship to the later logical positivism of the Vienna Circle is nicely covered in Edward Sidelsky's fascinating intellectual biography of Strauss's Doktorvater, Ernst Cassirer, who was himself a significant critic of logical positivism.






Jumat, 21 Oktober 2011

Opinions of Eric Hobsbawm?

Eric Hobsbawm
In Britain, nonagenarian Eric Hobsbawm has enjoyed something of a resurgence in the last few years as a commentator on the current economic climate. He seems to be saying that capitalism had it coming all along and finally everyone is recognizing what he already knew. But is he reliable in this analysis, given his support for Stalin long past most intellectuals dropped their support because of Stalin's ethnic cleansings?

I have had a soft spot for Eric Hobsbawm because his Nations and Nationalism was the first difficult history text in undergrad that I understood. I remember this as a kind of light bulb moment--there was a time when his text was completely inaccessible and then, after a little help from a great professor, I understood it.

I also liked the narrative scope of The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991 and have thought about assigning it to undergrads. I sat in on a class in graduate school that read several histories of the twentieth century, and this one stuck in my mind as accessible and thought provoking. 

As I was contemplating putting the text on a syllabus for the job market, I ran across this heated 2009 article by Geoffrey Levy about Hobsbawm, dismissing his many books because of his opinion on Marxism and more particularly on Stalinism. It exposes how insipid my own "ahhhh, Hobsbawm has another book out, how cute" impulse is (I also read his autobiography for a class, which made him seem so much more like a personable character to me). Why does England venerate him as a great historian if he has long held these views on Stalin? Let me quote the beginning:

The Marxist historian who's crowing about the crash of capitalism and says Stalin was right to murder millions is demanding to see his MI5 files. Imagine how the KGB would have treated him!

The voice, though old and crackly, trembled with self-justification. 'Globalisation, which is implicit in capitalism,' it declared, 'not only destroys the heritage and tradition but is incredibly unstable...'

Imagine the pomposity and satisfaction with which Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm, who lives in a large house in the fashionable North London suburb of Hampstead Heath, regurgitated his old argument to listeners of Radio 4's flagship Today programme.

In the current world crisis, who better for the BBC to exhume for its listeners than the West's greatest 20th-century apologist for Soviet communism and excuser of its totalitarian evils.
Professor Hobsbawm has been all over the airwaves since the credit crunch crisis began, crowing about capitalism's demise. But then, should one expect anything else from an intellectual who has never apologised for expressing his approval of Stalin's mass murders?
On our facebook page, James Livingston explained why he doesn't read or assign Hobsbawm:

I have long thought that Hobsbawm was both doctrinaire and derivative, which pretty much go together, anyway: mostly a bore, telling you what you already knew, with lots of footnotes or hurrumphing erudition. Among those canonical Brits of the 1970s, Christopher Hill and Raymond Williams were the key figures for me, because they were never boring--Hill writing a whole goddamn book on Milton in the English Revolution, Williams writing the most heartbreaking non-fiction book I've ever read, The Country and the City.

I'm always thinking about and with these folks because they were the writers I turned to in trying to understand early modern capitalism, back when I was doing Russian history, ugh. Hobsbawm was always the least interesting of them because he was always trying to prove that Marx was right about something, whatever it was. Everybody else had something else to prove
He has long thought this,
since reading The Age of Revolution in 1971, when I didn't know what it meant to be a Marxist, and thus had no intention of becoming one. 

Do American historians read Hobsbawm? I started out my professional life with a foot in European history, so I have perhaps more exposure to him than others, but I haven't read him in many years. What is your opinion of his work and his legitimacy as a public critic of contemporary capitalism?

Intellectual History of the Atlantic World

Came across this fascinating sounding book, Domingos Alvares, African Healing, and the Intellectual History of the Atlantic World by James Sweet. Here is the publisher's overview:

Between 1730 and 1750, Domingos Alvares traversed the colonial Atlantic world like few Africans of his time--from Africa to South America to Europe. By tracing the steps of this powerful African healer and vodun priest, James Sweet finds dramatic means for unfolding a history of the eighteenth-century Atlantic world in which healing, religion, kinship, and political subversion were intimately connected.
Alvares treated many people across the Atlantic, yet healing was rarely a simple matter of remedying illness and disease. Through the language of health and healing, Alvares also addressed the profound alienation of warfare, capitalism, and the African slave trade. As a result, he and other African healers frequently ran afoul of imperial power brokers. Nevertheless, even the powerful suffered isolation in the Atlantic world and often turned to African healers for answers. In this way, healers simultaneously became fierce critics of Atlantic imperialism and expert translators of it, adapting their therapeutic strategies in order to secure social relevance and even power. By tracing Alvares' frequent uprooting and border crossing, Sweet illuminates how African healing practices evolved in the diaspora, contesting the social and political hierarchies of imperialism while also making profound impacts on the intellectual discourse of the "modern" Atlantic world.

Kamis, 20 Oktober 2011

Tim's Light Reading (10-20-2011): War Powers, Catholicism, OWS, Academostars, and More

Relaying these bits and pieces to you while celebrating my spouse's birthday. Happy birthday, Jodi!

1. Contingency in Intellectual History (i.e. Political Philosophy)

At the Legal History Blog, Mary Dudziak points us to a new piece by Tulane University Law School Stephen Griffin's titled "Reconceiving the War Powers Debate." The basis for this discussion, as Professor Dudziak sees it (in relation to her own work), is this passage from Michael Hogan's Cross of Iron:

The most important aspect of the postwar constitutional order, one with subtle, far-reaching and long-lasting effects, was the gradual erasure of the difference between wartime and peacetime. Because all foreign wars prior to 1950 had been authorized by Congress, the prewar constitutional order featured a sharp distinction between the powers of government in war and peace. As Hogan demonstrates, the early Cold War featured a massive effort to convince the President, Congress and the public that this distinction no longer made sense.


2. Nominations Are In For The Category "America's Greatest Catholic Intellectual"

Where, you ask? Benedictine College's Gregorian Institute has a blog, and at that blog they have reported on survey wherein the Institute asked "top Catholic commentators, editors and scholars" about "America's Greatest Catholic Intellectuals." The Institute is trying to create an "online Catholic Hall of Fame." Here's their tentative nomination list:

1. Orestes Brownson (1803–1876) [right]
2. John Courtney Murray (1904-1967)
3. John Senior (1923-1999)
4. Avery Dulles (1918-2008)
5. James Schall (1928-)
6. Ralph McInerny (1929-2010)
7. Richard John Neuhaus (1936-2009)
8. Mary Anne Glendon (1938-)
9. George Weigel (1951-)
10. Robert P. George (1955-)

Where's John Tracy Ellis? Fulton Sheen? Where are Peter Maurin and Dorothy Day? And why do we need an intellectual star system anyway?

3. Academostars

I'd be happy to talk about Frank Donoghue's link (from immediately above) on its own merits. Here's a flavor of its content (bolds mine):

“Academostars” is a term coined by Jeffrey Williams, who edited an edition of the minnesota review on that topic in 2001. In that issue, Williams offers both a critique and a complement to David Shumway’s PMLA article, “The Star System in Literary Studies.” It’s entitled, “Name Recognition,” avoiding Shumway’s key terms. ...Williams offers one very useful qualification of Shumway’s thesis—that the star system migrated into academia sometime during the heyday of theory in the late 1970s and early 1980s. It did, Williams seems to acknowledge, and there are stars out there of the magnitude of Spivak, Butler, Zizek, and Fish. ...He [Williams] argues that “there are various declensions or quantum levels of stardom, ranging from who is a star in one’s department; of a specialization within a subfield (the star of 18th-century c. French furniture, as I heard a colleague called, which makes me wonder how many other people are in the field),” etc. “At the other end of the spectrum, one aspires to be the star of one’s graduate program, or of the job pool in a particular field. Hiring committees, especially at research universities, look for potential stars.” I could add that the rhetoric of stardom is thrown around, often recklessly at tenure meetings—the best way to make a pitch for a promising tenure candidate is to describe that person as a “rising star.”

My hope is that hiring committees with my name in front of them will be operating on a "Moneyball" thesis and see me as a market inefficiency to be exploited.


4.a. The Intellectual Roots of OWS

The Chronicle's Dan Berrett explores those roots. Aside from discussing the appearances of "academostars" at Zuccotti Park, here's Berrett's provocative thesis:

Occupy Wall Street's most defining characteristics—its decentralized nature and its intensive process of participatory, consensus-based decision-making—are rooted in other precincts of academe and activism: in the scholarship of anarchism and, specifically, in an ethnography of central Madagascar. It was on this island nation off the coast of Africa that David Graeber, one of the movement's early organizers, who has been called one of its main intellectual sources, spent 20 months between 1989 and 1991. He studied the people of Betafo, a community of descendants of nobles and of slaves, for his 2007 book, Lost People. ...He transplanted the lessons he learned in Madagascar to the globalism protests in the late 1990s in which he participated, and which some scholars say are the clearest antecedent, in spirit, to Occupy Wall Street.

It's a great article even if you find the thesis off-putting. Let's discuss. [BTW #1: Here are some statistics that inform the direction of OWS. #2: Here's a bit about the relationship between Catholic identity and OWS]

4.b. OWS Signals the Unity of the Creative and Working Classes

John Russo, from the Center for Working-Class Studies, writes that OWS represents the falsification of Richard Florida's ten-year old thesis that the interests of the "creative class" are more important than, or different from, those of the working classes. In other words, the creative class is subject to the same dislocations and whimsical desires of financiers who prioritize profit over national solidarity.

5. The Cost of Certainty About Falsehoods

Axiom from William James: "There is truth-pursuit and error-avoidance. We don't want to have one without the other."

With that, Baylor University's Alexander Pruss speculates, or argues rather, the following:

Given some very plausible assumptions on epistemic utilities, one can prove that one needs to set more than 2.588 times (more precisely: at least 1/(log 4 − 1) times) as great a disvalue on being certain of a falsehood as the value one sets on being certain of a truth!

...Something to ponder. - TL

Rabu, 19 Oktober 2011

Why 'Wars'?

Andrew has written a great post on locating our particular historical moment in the constellation of the culture wars. As he knows, I am interested in how the narrative of the culture wars relates to other ways to organize historical narratives, such as how real wars shape the same period defined by the culture wars.

Recently the PEW Research Center published an intriguing poll about post-9/11 veterans, their views on the nation and the nation's view of them. The authors entitled the article in which they presented this data, "War and Sacrifice in Post-9/11 Era." There are some useful insights to glean from the data, but perhaps the upshot is this: vets and most Americans are proud of the service those in uniform have devoted and continue to devote to the nation; but many vets and even more Americans are very ambivalent about the wars the nation asked them to fight.

What I found most interesting about this general view was where vets and Americans lay blame for all the hardships and tragedies caused by wars that they seem to agree were not really worthy of such sacrifices. Vets and most non-military Americans polled pointed to the individual soldiers themselves. The individual is responsible for making a choice that brought he or she into wars without purpose. But at the same time, the fact that people in the military made sacrifices for wars not worthy of such sacrifice generated a great deal of admiration. The individual carries the nation while the nation forsakes the individual.

Even though the culture wars aren't about people killing each other to protect their property or God, the rhetoric of the culture wars better exposes genuine conflicts than how we choose to speak about people actually killing each other over their property and their God.

Andrew's post made me think yet again about how a parallel narrative of war-speak offers a way for Americans to imagine being united beneath a banner of sacrifice and devotion to the nation, while just close by, on another track, Americans battle over differences that polarize them to a point that calls into serious question why any ideal of unity would be worthy of grave sacrifice. It's a curious moment.



Selasa, 18 Oktober 2011

Occupy Wall Street: The Culture Wars of the “New Class”?

In January of 2009, shortly after Obama’s inauguration, I gave my first public talk on the culture wars, research that was relatively new to me at that stage. In the talk, I discussed the politics of higher education in the 1990s through the lens of conservatives like Allan Bloom, Dinesh D’Souza, Roger Kimball, and Lynne Cheney. In the Q&A that followed, an audience member whom I will call Liberal Academic Superstar asked me some version of the following question: “In light of Obama’s historic victory, which ushers in a new era of liberalism, and in light of the financial meltdown, which ushers in new intellectual priorities, isn’t all this talk about conservatives and culture wars quaint, even outdated?” Flabbergasted, my response was something to the following effect: “Just wait.”

At the time, I believed Liberal Academic Superstar’s question was incredibly stupid. I still do, and my guess is that if Liberal Academic Superstar could actually be persuaded that he or she in fact asked that incredibly stupid question, say, if he or she was caught on video and made to watch his or her performance, then Liberal Academic Superstar would be quite embarrassed, given all that has since transpired. And yet, despite its stupidity, I have given a great deal of thought to that question. So, if nothing else, it was a productive question and I am glad to have been asked it. (Granting him or her the benefit of the doubt, perhaps this was Liberal Academic Superstar’s purpose? Na…) It has forced me to think about what has changed since the heyday of the culture wars (the early 1990s), and what remains of the culture wars. It has given me time to reflect on the “Passover Question”: Why are the culture wars important as a topic of historical research? I had assumed their importance went without saying. But nothing that serves as the subject of a book, especially a history book, should go without saying.

Conservative reactions to the Obama presidency and the economic crisis brought discussion of the culture wars back into fashion. The Birthers and the Tea Party screamed, “don’t forget about us culture warriors,” even if the coordinates of the Obama-era culture wars did not map neatly onto the Reagan- or Clinton-era culture wars. But I want to argue that another phenomenon, even more recent, and from the opposite end of the political spectrum, can also be understood through the lens of the culture wars. Or, at least, the culture wars help us understand the varied responses to the phenomenon. I’m talking, of course, about the riveting and important Occupy Wall Street Movement (OWS).

A few weeks ago, ubiquitous blogger Matthew Yglesias wrote a short post, titled, “The Economy as Culture War,” where, in tantalizingly brief fashion, he made the case that “economic policy debate in the United States is in part just another culture war issue.” On the one hand, Yglesias contends that a genuine clash of economic interests drives the divide between the private-sector business class and the public-sector knowledge class. He describes this as “a kind of bitter feud between businessmen and the kids they went to college with who didn’t go on to become businessmen. What did they do instead? They became teachers or doctors or nurses or professors or lawyers or scientists or nonprofit workers. And they fight with each other in part because of genuine economic clashes of interest. The businessmen tend to be targeted for tax hikes, while the people they went to college with tend to actually capture some of the public sector expenditure streams.”

But on the other hand, Yglesias qualifies his analysis of the economics behind the clash that is driving OWS with the type of insight that is often used to explain the culture wars. He argues that if either side were objective in their pursuit of rational economic interests, they would realize that a healthy economy needs both profit and non-profit enterprises. But people tend to be irrational: “Layered on top [of rational economic interest politics], I think, is a raw gut-level dislike — both kinds of people think the other kind of people are clueless about what really matters in life.” “The business coalition sees the service coalition as composed of useless moochers, and the service coalition sees the business coalition as greedy bastards.” So Yglesias is extrapolating from the Thomas Frank “what’s the matter with Kansas” model of understanding the culture wars. Frank’s well known thesis, oft critiqued, goes as follows: cultural or religious conservatives often voted against their own economic interests due to their irrational obsession with the culture wars, to which Republican politicians cynically lent rhetorical support as they attended to more important matters, such as rewriting the tax codes in favor of the economic royalists. To his credit, Yglesias does not merely think conservatives are irrational. He seems to be painting everyone involved in the great economic debates as somewhat irrational. But more to my point, the reason Yglesias seems to think economic debates play out in culture war terms is because they emit elements of the irrational. Culture wars equals irrational.

Beyond trading on recent punditry tropes, Yglesias’s understanding of the culture wars, whether he knows it or not, also echoes the “new class” analysis innovated for a post-1960s American context by early neoconservatives such as Irving Kristol, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Norman Podhoretz, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Gertrude Himmelfarb, and Midge Decter, among many others. Moynihan first used the term “new class” in writing about the “education lobby” in a 1972 Public Interest article (prefiguring Yglesias): “The social legislation of the middle third of the century created ‘social space’ for a new class whose privilege (or obligation) it is to disperse services to populations that are in various ways wards of the state.” Similarly, take notice of the following long quotes from an Irving Kristol article, titled, “Business and ‘the New Class’,” published in the Wall Street Journal in 1975:

What is commonly called a “bias” or an “animus” against business is really a byproduct of larger purposiveness. There are people “out there” who find it convenient to believe the worst about business because they have certain adverse intentions toward the business community to begin with… These people constitute what one may simply call, for lack of a better name “the new class.”

This “new class” is not easily defined but may be vaguely described. It consists of a goodly portion of those college educated people whose skills and vocations proliferate in a “post-industrial society (to use Daniel Bell’s convenient term)… It is, by now, a quite numerous class; it is an indispensable class for our kind of society; it is a disproportionately powerful class; it is also an ambitious and frustrated class.

The “new class”—intelligent, educated, energetic—has little respect for such a commonplace (business) civilization. It wishes to see its “ideals” more effectual than the market is likely to permit them to be. And so it tries always to supersede economics by politics—an activity in which it is most competent, since it has the talents and the implicit authority to shape public opinion on all larger issues.


Based on a reading of Kristol, it’s clear that some early neoconservative “new class” thought was strictly a way to express anti-anti-capitalism. It was obliquely in this context that Lewis Powell wrote his infamous 1971 memo where he argued that the business class must meet the threat posed by anti-capitalist academics on their terms, by creating a sort of counter-academy under the auspices of the Chamber of Commerce, which “should consider establishing a staff of highly qualified scholars in the social sciences who do believe in the system.” I trace Yglesias’s characterization of the contemporary clash between the businessman and his critic—both of which display a “gut-level dislike” for the other—to this mode of “new class” analysis.

But most “new class” thought extended far beyond an analysis of any particular clash of economic interests. Much of it was rooted in Lionel Trilling’s famous examination of an “adversary culture,” mostly about avant-garde modernists—the lens through which the neocons read the 1960s. A private memorandum written by Moynihan for his boss President Nixon in 1970 exemplified how “new class” thought was shaping the coming culture wars, as refracted through the 1960s: “No doubt there is a struggle going on in this country of the kind the Germans used to call a Kulturkampf. The adversary culture which dominates almost all channels of information transfer and opinion formation has never been stronger, and as best I can tell it has come near silencing the representatives of traditional America.” Nixon lapped up this type of rhetoric because he saw himself as the leader of the silent majority that stood toe-to-toe with 1960s adversarial types. The neocons saw Nixon in this light as well, which explained why a Democrat like Moynihan saw fit to work for him. As Podhoretz wrote (not long after Watergate, no less): “The 1960s ended… not with a revolution but with the election of Richard Nixon: Richard Nixon, who better than any single figure in American public life seemed to epitomize everything in opposition to which the adversary culture had always defined itself.”

Midge Decter nicely captured the 1960s “adversary culture” of the neoconservative imagination in her harsh 1972 rebuke of feminism, The New Chastity and Other Arguments Against Women’s Liberation. Decter argued that women had it better than ever, for example, in their newfound abilities to secure gainful employment and control pregnancy through birth control. And yet, even with such advances, or perhaps because of them, the “women’s liberation” movement objected that women were subjected to patriarchal strictures. Decter contended that women feared their newfound freedoms, because with such new freedoms came new responsibilities. For instance, if women were going to enter the workplace like men, then they had to be prepared to compete alongside men in a dog-eat-dog world that men had long grown accustomed to. In short, Decter believed that feminists wanted to shirk the responsibilities of living in capitalist America. They were adversarial to the discipline enshrined in American traditions, such as the Protestant work ethic that the mostly Jewish neoconservatives came to adore.

The importance of work ethic, Protestant or otherwise, informed neoconservative new class thinking. In this, neoconservatives led the conservative movement more generally to the type of colorblind rhetoric of individual merit that now shapes its discourse. For example, Podhoretz claimed that the new class was anti-liberal because it supported quotas to its favored groups as opposed to equality of opportunity. This “could be understood, then, as an extension into concrete social policy of the adversary culture’s assault on the ‘Protestant ethic.’” Similarly, Gertrude Himmelfarb, historian and big fan of Victorian-era values, wrote: “In its denigration of ‘bourgeois values’ and the ‘Puritan ethic,’ the new class has legitimized, as it were, the values of the underclass and illegitimized those of the working class, who are still committed to bourgeois values, the Puritan ethic, and other such benighted ideas.” Alarm over the death of the Protestant work ethic is not merely leveled against the baby boomers who violently rejected society in the 1960s. Now, the so-called millennial generation seems not to have the proper attitude towards work. Hillary Clinton’s words on the matter, as Bhaskar Sunkara writes in his generational analysis of OWS, “could have been ripped out of National Review”: “A lot of kids don’t know what work is. They think work is a four-letter word. … We’ve got to send a different message to our young people. America didn’t happen by accident. A lot of people worked really hard. They’ve got to do their part too.”

The most common conservative argument made against OWS is that the protestors are lazy, elitist ingrates who want to blame their own deficiencies on Wall Street and are looking for a government handout because they fear the responsibilities that accompany freedom. This is the argument that informs the message-based images against the movement that have gone viral (in an appropriation of a popular movement tactic). Take for instance the 53% guy (pictured just below) who advises OWS protestors to “suck it up you whiners.” His incredible sacrifices show that with grit and determination anyone in America can, well, stay afloat, without so much as health insurance, and without whining. In this he continues the fight taken up by the neocons, who vehemently defended American intellectual and political traditions, such as the colorblind rhetoric of equal opportunity, which they believed had served them well. Most neoconservatives were from Jewish immigrant families and felt the sting of discrimination growing up. Yet, such biographical barriers did not inhibit them from “making it,” as Podhoretz titled his 1967 memoir. In this context, the wide-ranging demands made by rowdy campus protestors on campuses across the country in the 1960s, such as for affirmative action, struck the neoconservatives as brazenly anti-American. Many view the OWS protestors through the same lens. This is a culture wars lens, even if not precisely in the way Yglesias maintains.

Although Yglesias probably thinks conflating economic debate with the culture wars is a way of not being an economic determinist, he is repeating the vulgar determinism of Thomas Frank by maintaining that people who don’t act in their obvious economic interests, people who act on “gut” instincts, or worse, in identity-based ways, are irrational. To argue, as I do, that the culture wars were not epiphenomenal, is not to deny the importance of economics, but rather, to point to what Marx called a “social formation” (analyzed with much skill recently by David Harvey), where culture, ideas, and economics interact in complex and unpredictable ways. As large historical forces, such as the deindustrialization of the economy that disempowered labor unions while empowering those who worked in the information economy, shaped the culture wars, the culture wars in turn reshaped the social formation in dialectical fashion. The tribal clashes that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s, as brilliantly told by Village Voice journalist Paul Cowan—whose excellent 1979 collection of essays, The Tribes of America, was recently re-released with an introduction by Rick Perlstein—polarized into two great camps by the 1980s and 1990s: James Davison Hunter’s “secular-progressives” and “orthodox-traditionalists.” Even those who sought to transcend the culture wars, for example Christopher Lasch, whose work often defended traditionalism as a means to ward of the evils of capitalism, were sucked into the culture wars vortex, as feminists like Susan Faludi lumped Lasch with anti-feminists like George Gilder. As part of this polarization process, cultural conservatives or traditionalists often came around to conservative economic or anti-statist positions that would have shocked their forebears. As Leo Ribuffo shows, pro-family activists in the early twentieth century most often blamed the market for disrupting traditional life. But by the 1970s, the state was to blame, situating the Christian Right smack dab in a Republican coalition that sought to dismantle the New Deal Order.

As Robert Putnam and David Campbell argue by way of sociological analysis of poll data, in their new book American Grace, religious and political positioning are more inextricable than ever. Whereas the degree to which a person was religious in the 1950s had little bearing on whether they identified as Democrat or Republican, today it matters greatly, as the more religious someone is the more likely they are to vote Republican. Conversely, people who are conservative but not religious gravitate towards religion because they find likeminded people in churches. And the same goes for liberals who are quitting church, or atheists who are quitting the Republican Party. This polarization is a microcosm of the culture wars.

The polarization of the culture wars, I suggest, helps us to understand the response to OWS, or perhaps more compellingly, the differences between the Tea Party and OWS, both of which were nominally anti-Wall Street. The popularity of the Tea Party could initially be partly explained by the antipathy to the Wall Street bailouts. But the Tea Party became a political force more as a conglomerate of conservative positions that tended towards austerity—towards the notion that the state could not help us out of this mess, that if anything it would make matters worse. Furthermore, the Tea Party’s anti-tax messages evinced opposition to laziness and government handouts, the sort of anti-“loser” rhetoric that fired up the traders who surrounded Rick Santelli when he lashed out at a plan to relieve foreclosed upon homeowners. Polarization also shapes the style or aesthetics of the two movements, as James Livingston has been arguing about OWS in several compelling blog posts. Tea Party activists dressed up as 18th century patriots and often talked as much about God and Country as about Taxes. OWS activists look like hippies, smoke weed, and often talk as much about the spiritual evils of consumerism as they do about anti-austerity. Style, identity, and culture: these things seem to matter to both sides as much as politics (which is not to argue that these things can replace politics, if reform or revolution be the goals). Style, identity, and culture: these things are as polarized as politics. This is the legacy of the culture wars that helps shape our understanding of the great debate taking place right now.

Quote for Tuesday

"To 'provincialize' Europe was precisely to find out how and in what sense European ideas that were universal were also, at one and the same time, drawn from very particular intellectual and historical traditions that could not claim any universal validity. It was to ask a question about how thought was related to place. Can thought transcend places of their origin? Or do places leave their imprint on thought in such a way as to call into question the idea of purely abstract categories?"

Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (2007 edition; xiii)

Senin, 17 Oktober 2011

Will "Straussianism" Become Like "Deconstruction" in Popular Discourse?

 Begging for a Straussian Reading of Some Kind?
Yesterday, Tim Lacy called my attention to this piece by Matt Yglesias in which he analyzes a recent piece by New York Times columnist David Brooks.

"David Brooks’ column 'The Thing Itself' is just begging for a Straussian reading of some kind," Yglesias begins.  Even as a student of popular anti-Straussianism, I was initially at something of a loss to see what Yglesias was talking about.

Brooks's column is--or perhaps one should say in deference to Yglesias "appears to be"--a celebration of outgoing Port Authority head Chris Ward and his, at least according to Brooks, extremely practical approach to rebuilding at Ground Zero.  Brooks then uses Ward's practicality-over-symbolism as a positive contrast to a variety of issues that Brooks argues have been dominated by "culture war" purism, e.g. the politics of gun ownership and Obama's Green Tech initiative.*

But according to Yglesias, this isn't really what the column is about.


Pointing out that the column's title phrase (repeated in its body) is a translation of Kant's Ding an sich, which is "unknowable and inexpressible," Yglesias suggests that the column is thus really arguing something quite different:
The basic topic of the column is perfectly plausible here. A call for people to be more practical. But why link that idea specifically to Kant’s phrase, and then use it to call for us to do something that Kant says is impossible? I get a distinct air of Leo Strauss and the University of Chicago around this. Brooks is winking at those of us in the know to signal to us that there’s a deeper meaning afoot. The esoteric argument, I think, is that people necessarily engage with mass politics on a symbolic and expressive level rather than a practical way (voting isn’t very practical) so our endeavors are doomed to failure.
Why would an argument of the sort that Yglesias suggests Brooks is making have to be presented esoterically? How does it in any way contradict the explicit message of the piece?  Far from challenging the conventional wisdom of our day, the idea that mass politics is inherently irrational and militates against practical solutions is practically a dogma of our nation's punditocracy.  And it certainly doesn't contradict Brooks's explicit praise for the practicality of an appointed official.

But there's a more basic problem here.  David Brooks isn't a Straussian.  Indeed, before I saw this piece, I would have told you that, in an era in which practically everyone on the right has gotten called a Straussian by somebody at one time or another, Brooks had the relatively rare distinction of never being so labelled. After all, Brooks seems more interested in the nonexistent salad bar at Applebee's than in the "timeless questions" that Straussians concern themselves with.  Even when Brooks considered questions of human nature in his latest book, The Social Animal, he turned to (poorly understood and popularized) neuroscience, rather than to Socratic philosophy, to explain it.

But then I discovered that Yglesias, at least, has been calling Brooks a Straussian for years.  The 2005 Brooks column Yglesias focuses on in this earlier piece is even less "Straussian" than  the one about Chris Ward. Written on the eve of President George W. Bush's first Supreme Court appointment, Brooks starts by calling on Dubya to look for a "philosophical powerhouse," then suggests Michael McConnell, whom Brooks praises for having a less strict understanding of the separation of church and state.  Yglesias correctly points out that the column's first argument--that Presidents should appoint smart people to the court--is not its most important, which is that the separation of church and state should be eased.  But burying the lede as Brooks does here is hardly an example of esotericism, let alone Straussianism.

As far as I can tell, the case that Brooks is a Straussian is based on guilt by extremely vague association. He is Jewish. He's arguably a neoconservative.  He went to the University of Chicago.

However, Brooks majored in history. And, as readers of this blog are well aware, there's nothing remotely Straussian about the History Department at Chicago...or for that matter about most departments at Chicago beyond Political Science and the Committee on Social Thought (even they include plenty of non-Straussians alongside their Straussians).

And what makes this column "Straussian"? It has a reference to a German philosophical concept that would likely go over the heads of many readers.  It disparages democratic politics. And it does so in a way that doesn't emphasize that argument.

But, like the earlier Brooks column that Yglesias called Straussian, this column's argument is not an instance of esotericism in the Straussian (or for that matter any other) sense. Brooks disparages politics entirely openly in the piece. Chris Ward, whom he praises, notably didn't get his job via election; he was appointed, first by Mayor Michael Bloomberg to another post, and then by Governor David Paterson, to his current one.  Brooks does like to sugarcoat his often quite conservative arguments in moderate-sounding rhetoric. But, again, that's not esotericism.

There are a number of pretty simple lessons here: Not all neoconservatives are Straussians.  Not all graduates of the University of Chicago are Straussians.  Not all elitists are Straussians. People besides Straussians sometimes make references to highfalutin' German philosophical concepts.  People besides Straussians try to tailor their arguments for their audience...and there are many ways to do so that do not involve esotericism. And people besides Straussians sometimes harbor anti-democratic political views.

But I also wonder whether we are beginning to see the term "Straussian" take a rhetorical journey similar to that which "deconstruction" took in the last quarter of the twentieth century. "Deconstruction" began life as a technical term coined by Jacques Derrida to describe his method of reading a text. It then entered popular language as a pejorative to describe any abstruse form of textual analysis. And then the pejorative connotation began to fall away.  Today people often say "deconstruct" when they really mean nothing more than "analyze carefully."
______________________________

* This argument really is classic Brooks.  Immediately after making a pseudo-moderate, pox-on-both-houses argument about the essentially dead issue of gun control, Brooks hauls out a standard, right-wing Republican talkingpoint about a very live issue:  "President Obama’s Green Tech initiative has become a policy disaster — not only at Solyndra but at one program after another — because its champions ignored basic practical considerations. They were befogged by their own visions of purity and virtue."